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Abstract
The assumption of many theologians that Barth has a christology only 'from above' is highly
questionable, in spite of his having such a strong and uncompromising emphasis 'from above'
throughout his christology.
The primary reason for our doubt is that Barth himself emphasises his christology consists in both
movement 'from above' and 'from below'. This being the case, regarding his christology as one
only 'from above' is indeed very much open to debate, because no interpretation or comprehension
can ever postulate its authenticity over against what the author said. Readers can give their opinions
or observations, but they cannot force the author to accept their understandings to be the author.
Further, this christology 'from above' turns out to be a different matter when we comprehend
Barth's christology by means of a Sachkritik ('content criticism'), a critique from an holistic point
of view, instead of an analytic point of view. Differently put, when we ask the meaning and
intention of this uncompromising emphasis 'from above' it is nothing but envisioning a 'from
below'. The 'from above' does indeed stand and exist nowhere but in the 'from below'. Phrasing
his christology as The Doctrine of Reconciliation in lieu of The Doctrine ofJesus Christ etc, and
portraying the theologia crucifixionis (which is for him the centre of christology) in such a chiastic
way that the divine content is operated in the human form are the exact reflections of this
christological insight.
Certainly Barth in many respects maintains a christology 'from above', especially seen from his
method of approach and from the divine domination. However, our Sachkritik also suggests to us
the fact that to dispute that he is advocating a christology 'from above' in view of the method of
approach alone (the divine incarnation 'from above'), or in terms of the divine domination alone
are only one-sided observations which surely lack an holistic or a comprehensive understanding of
his christology. Insofar as the train of his christological thought is concerned, it does not stop or
finish within a framework of 'from-to' alone, which implies much more of a lineal hermeneutic, but
rather is a circular (trinitarian) hermeneutic. What needs to be noted is that, for him, the doctrine
of the Trinity, the Godhead, is nothing but an exposition of revelation, Jesus Christ. Hence, if one
insists on Barth holding a 'high' christology in view of his method of approach, this insistence
would have to suffer from ignoring his trinitarian hermeneutic which is the christological and as
such theological framework in his dogmatic enterprise.
Our Sachkritik naturally leads us to rediscover Barth's re-opening a new vista for natural theology
which he once rejected so stringently-even its possibility. Surprisingly, although many theologians
talk about the early and late Barth, many of them do not seem to follow the content of his
development.
In short, as far as an impartial appreciation of Barth's christology is concerned, it is not only that
we must take the 'from below' approach and content into account, but we must also ask the
question of the meaning and intention of the christology 'from above' by means ofSachkritik. When
his christology is seen from this point of view, to describe him as preserving one only 'from above'
is indeed an oversimplification of his christology.
A theological significance of our contention is that it is the hermeneutical filter for our responsible
understanding of christology, and as such God.
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Foreword
The aim of our thesis is to rediscover the significance of a christology 'from
below' in Barth's theology. It is not difficult at all to imagine that this title may
easily upset many scholars of Barth, or that they may even simply disengage with
our thesis, asserting that there is no such aspect at all in Barth's thought. Either
attitude, whether sympathetically sceptical or harshly negative, towards the 'from
below' aspect is understandable since the movement 'from above' was not only so
predominant especially in his early thought, but it also still underlies his later
thought in such a consistent manner as well. Therefore if we undermine the 'from
above' movement in Barth's christology, it might be said, it will result in a
complete misinterpretation. This is the primal implication of the word 'rediscovery'
in the title of our thesis: A Rediscovery of the Significance of 'from below' in
Barth's Christology.
However, we are equally convinced that it would be a serious misunder¬
standing if we obscure the 'from below' movement in Barth's christology. Why?
To defend our view is not difficult (at least from our perspective!) as Barth himself
reminds us so clearly and strongly of his christology definitively consisting of both
the 'from above' and 'from below' movements (CD IV/2, 21; CD IV/1, 123, 135).
But, for the purpose of our thesis, we will go beyond this apparent reminder by
investigating further what Barth means by this dual scheme of both 'from above'
and 'from below'. For the same purpose, we will seek a responsible answer to the
question whether we should call Barth's christology truly a christology 'from
above' judging upon the basis of such a consistent emphasis upon the 'from above.'
In other words, we will scrutinise what the 'from above' movement truly signifies,
if this 'from above' movement is indisputably prevalent, and if it is in fact what he
'finally' says in his christology. Our question about the insistence upon the 'from
above' will be even more seriously pursued than that of the dual scheme both 'from
above' and 'from below', as this line of understanding is by far the major concern
and thus the point of controversy of our thesis. And surprisingly - particularly for
those who resolutely argue that 'from above' is alone in Barth's christology - in a
qualified sense, we even sense that what Barth means by the both 'from above and
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from below' and 'from above' in his christology is nothing but the christology
'from below'. We believe that this perception is the content of our Sachkritik
(content criticism) of the two understandings based on a consistent reference to
Barth's dogmatics. This formidable inclination is a further implication of the word
'rediscovery' in the title of our thesis.
The character of our thesis is a reinterpretive analysis of the text (Barth's
dogmatics), as we intend to rediscover the significance of the 'from below' in
addition to the biased view of the 'from above' among Barth interpreters. Method¬
ologically, then, our thesis will proceed by way of an exposition. We lay stress on
this expository methodology since we believe that, ultimately, no interpretations can
verify or vindicate what Barth said but Barth himself. Hence we regard all the
views and interpretations of Barth's christology only as secondary references
however sound that they may be. But this is by no means to play down other
interpretations and views but rather this is by all means to clarify their positions by
contrasting them with our view. Then our thesis is a cordial but serious invitation
of any serious theologians or students into a sincere and serious dialogue with
Barth, and as such with our perspective.
Why this issue in particular? We believe this issue is not merely a play on
words or concepts, but is crucial as the hermeneutical filter for our responsible
speaking of christology and therefore of God. Our Christian faith and theology will
be determined ultimately by the kind of God whom we know or confess, since we
wish to believe in Him (at least in principle if our faith is genuine) and therefore
to live our lives according to our understanding of God. Further, if we succeed in
rediscovering the significance of the 'from below' aspect, our thesis will have
tremendous implications in many respects: a more relevant and therefore more
acceptable doctrine of God for more scientifically and rationally oriented modern
human beings; a continuous challenge to human beings and their society which
therefore forces Christians to engage in the issue of justice which will be addressed
later.
Why Barth then? Our primary concern lies with a proper evaluation of
Barth's thought. The more seriously we study Barth, the more surprisingly we find
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many errors either in a clear misrepresentations or a partial contortions of Barth's
ideas. Responsible scholarship, however, does not tolerate either unbearable
exaggeration or unverified assumption. Conversely, we are concerned with an
appropriate or full appreciation rather than criticism, not only because of scholars'
general consensus that modern theology cannot be properly discussed apart from
Barth, but also because it is often the case that appreciation is a much more
difficult task than criticism.
Certainly appreciation presupposes interpretation. But interpretation too
presupposes a certain presupposition. This indicates that the strength of our thesis
lies in its own perspective. This strength of perspective is in turn, then, an implicit
challenge to Western scholarship which seems to rest its mechanism of understand¬
ing too heavily upon the process of analysis (analytical mind-set) instead of seeing
things in a holistic or comprehensive or synthetical way.
The thesis will consist of five chapters. The opening chapter sketches the
recent development to the issue 'from above-from below' in order to give readers
a basic orientation of the issue involved. Having given a glimpse of the issue, the
second chapter will then analyse the various views of Barth interpreters which will
enable us to set up the issues to be discussed. On this basis of analysis, the
succeeding three chapters will investigate the tenability of the claim that Barth truly
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CHAPTER ONE
Recent Development of the Issue
I. Introduction
1. The Protagonists of the Issue 'from above/from below' in Contemporary
Christology
The phrases 'from above' and 'from below' are too complex to be simply
defined. The concepts could be defined in many ways not only comparatively
between the 'from above' and the 'from below', but also independently within the
'from above' or the 'from below' itself.1 We see an example of the complexity of
1
Clarifying 'from above' and 'from below' is conceptually (categorically) and methodological¬
ly problematic since the phrases could be understood in such manifold ways according to how we
conceptually and categorically define them. For instance, we may delineate 'from above' and 'from
below' in terms of divinity vs. humanity, or fact vs. meaning (interpretation), or precedent question
between methodology vs. epistemology etc. Methodologically too, as Tracy points out, describing
the two forms of christology is also problematic, because 'high' christology which seeks the
christological meaning and therefore builds christology in terms of a 'philosophical reconstruction'
of Jesus still seems to rest on the assumption that only the fact of Jesus termed as 'low' christology
secures the christological meaning, 'high' christology (David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order [New
York: Seabury, 1975], pp. 216-218, 231-232). (=Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order) For the illusiveness
of the subject see also (Colin E. Gunton, Yesterday and Today; A Study of Continuities in
Christology [London: Darton and Longman & Todd Ltd., 1983], esp. pp. 45-46, 49-51, 53; John
Macquarrie, "The Humanity of Christ" in: Theology 74, [1971], p. 246; Nicholas Lash, "Up and
Down in Christology" in: New Studies in Theology 1, (ed.) S. Sykes & Holmes Derek [London:
Gerald Duckworth, 1980], pp. 31-46, esp. 32-33, 43-44). Hereafter, (=Gunton, Yesterday and
Today), (=Macquarrie, The Humanity of Christ), and (=Lash, Up and Down in Christology).
Cone adopts the idioms 'from above/'from below' in terms of the past ('from above') vs.
the present ('from below') of Jesus Christ in order to emphasise that a proper understanding of
christology does not exclude one aspect on another but mutually includes (James H. Cone, The God
of the Oppressed [New York: The Seabury Press, 1975], p. 108-137, esp. 130). While, as for
Rosato, the 'Logos christology' represents a christology 'from above', the 'Spirit christology'
represents a christology 'from below'. See pages 1-2 in chapter two. The illusiveness of Rosato's
definition is found in the fact that, at a glance, the 'Spirit christology' seems to refer rather a 'high'
christology as the word 'Spirit' is by all means an ambiguous, unseeable, unphysical reality and thus
it could be understood more easily in metaphysical terms such as 'life giving power' as Moltmann
recently describes it (Jtirgen Moltmann, The Spirit ofLife [SCM Press, 1994]). In case of Pittenger,
the word 'from above-from below' is used rather in order to say that the actulisation of our abiding
relationship in God (fulfilled by the election of Jesus Christ) is by the 'Self Expressive' Word of
God and not by chance (W. Norman Pittenger, The Word Incarnate. A Study of the Doctrine of the
Person of Christ [James Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1959], p. 182).
Generally speaking, it seems that while the phrase 'from above-from below' is invented to
characterise Barth's (and others too!) christology in terms of the method ofapproach, the 'high' and
'low' is employed to argue the relevance of christology, especially of Barth's christology. Yet we
use the two wordings interchangeably as theologically we regard the method of approach eventually
as a matter of relevance and vice versa.
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the issue 'from above' and 'from below' in the theology of Jiirgen Moltmann.
According to Moltmann, we cannot call this or that christology a christology 'from
above' or 'from below' on the basis of the pattern of christology, incarnation and
crucifixion or humiliation and exaltation. Emphasising the divinity of Jesus Christ
rather than His humanity, or asking first of all what was 'above' in terms of the
question of God and salvation before asking about the Jesus of Nazareth cannot be
called a 'christology from above'.2
Moltmann admits that christological answers begin with 'from above' and
then present the mystery of Jesus Christ on the pattern of the incarnation and the
resurrection. The modern 'speculative christology' of German idealism worked out
its christologies on this pattern.3 Nevertheless, the christology 'from above' con¬
siders itself the history of Jesus ofNazareth. In the ancient theological doctrine, the
'ratio cognoscendT works rather in the 'ratio essendi.' It is being which lasts for
human knowledge and not vice versa. This means that Jesus is already the Son of
God even prior to the events of crucifixion and resurrection although Jesus is not
recognisable as the Son of God until these events take place. Whereas being is
classified as 'from above', for Moltmann, knowledge is classified as 'from below'.
However, at the same time he points out how essentially the 'from above' and the
'from below' are inter-locked by stating that 'All knowledge begins inductively
'from below' and is a posteriori, and all historical knowledge is post factum.' That
is to say, both epistemology and 'from below' presuppose both ontology and 'from
above'. Further, the question about God assumes that it is a finite human being who
asks the question concerning infinite divine being. Hence it is not necessary 'to
stand in the position of God', as Pannenberg phrased it to critique Barth, in order
to follow the Son's way into the world. Rather 'one must accept the openness of
^
Jiirgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (London: SCM Press, 1980), p. 89.
Moltmann, The Crucified God 89-91.
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one's own finite existence in order to recognize its fulfilment of one's own
openness.'4 Thus Moltmann declares that the difference between a christology
'from above' and a christology 'from below' is 'only apparent.'5
Generally speaking, however, we may say that christology 'from above'
represents the christology which attempts to understand Christ by beginning with
the divinity of Christ, or with the divine incarnation. In other words, the christology
'from above' which is often called 'high' christology is concerned mainly with its
a priori divine origin, and then comes to investigate the meaning of the actual
historical manifestation, the humanity of Christ. In contrast, christology 'from
below' which is also called Tow' christology represents the christology which
essays to understand Christ by focusing on the human reality of Christ, and, then
asks whether He was the Christ or a mere human being. To put it simply, while the
christology 'from above' proceeds from divinity to humanity, the christology 'from
below' proceeds from humanity to divinity. But these two insights of christological
paradigms originate from the Scripture6 in which the two paradigms are expressed
in an intermingled way. Broadly speaking, however, while the Synoptic Gospels in
their basic characters tend to present a christology beginning with 'historical'
development of the humanity of Christ 'from below', the Johannine Gospel and the
Pauline epistles tend to present their christologies with a view of the incarnation of
the Logos 'from above'.
That the Scripture is the origin of our issue signifies the fact that the theme
which we are going to deal with is not new but discussed throughout Christian
4
(Moltmann, The Crucified God 89). For Moltmann on W. Pannenberg and O. Weber, see pp.
108-109, fn. 18 (ibid). For Pannenberg on Barth, see (W. Pannenberg, Jesus-God andMan [London:
SCM Press, 1973], p. 35). (=Pannenberg, Jesus-God Man). In addition, we see a human beings'
'openness' towards the infinite Being in chapter one developed by Rahner in terms of the
'transcendental christology.'
5
Moltmann, The Crucified God 91.
6
Macquarrie, for example, believes the christology 'from below' is not an apologetic device
in a secular age but the 'recapitualtion' of the early chriatian christology. They knew first the human
Jesus; but somewhere along the way they discerned in him a depth that led them to confess his
divinity. The story of the transfiguration is the striking symbol of this experience (Macquarrie, The
Humanity of Christ 249-250).
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theology.7 This familiarity of the issue, with respect to our thesis, suggests that we
cannot bypass our past tradition. Our difficulty in trying to bypass the tradition
becomes even more conspicuous when we see the extent of Barth's wide range of
indebtedness to the heritages of past theologies and rationalities. Indeed, Barth's
theology covers the period from the early Church fathers to his contemporaries.
However, we will limit the scope of our introductory discussion within the
christological thoughts of the nineteenth century. We will do this because we are
first of all concerned with the manageability of our thesis. And secondly because
although Barth's integration of the past ecclesiastical tradition is seen throughout
his christology, the source of this integration is found particularly in the nineteenth
century's thinking in terms of a christological framework apart from the Scripture.
As TeSelle states, 'We are all of us children of the nineteenth century in theology,
even those who occasionally engage in parricide. ... The nineteenth century is still
with us as part of our living past ... and in understanding it we can understand
ourselves better.'8 Bearing these two reasons in mind, we will select F.D.E.
Schleiermacher (1768-1834), G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), and A. Ritschl (1822-
1889), and then we will briefly mention their christologies regarding them major
figures in laying (directly or indirectly) a groundbreaking notional framework of
'from above' or 'from below' in their ways of doing christology among modern
theologians.9
Schleiermacher's christology is shaped by his reaction against the dominant
idea of natural religion. His contemporaries despised popular religion. They were
7
For a brief survey of the history of the concepts 'from above' and 'from below' see (Peter
C. Hodgson, Jesus-Word and Presence [New York: Oxford University Press, 1971], pp. 60-64); for
a wider discussion sec (Gunton, Yesterday and Today 1-183, esp. 1-55).
(Eugene TeSelle, Christ in Context: Divine Purpose and Human Possibility [Philadelphia:
Fortress, 1975], p. 47). For Barth's interaction with nineteenth century thought consult From
Rousseau to Ritschl even though his view is mostly critical rather than receptive of it (trans. Brian
Cozens [London: SCM Press, 1959], esp. pp. 268-397).
9
Baur is an another nineteenth century theologian who employed the concept 'from above' and
'from below' in christology (Ferdinand Christian Baur, Kritische Untersuchungen iiber die
kanonischen Evangelien [Tubingen, L.F. Fues, 1847], pp. 312-314, cited by Hodgson's Jesus-Word
and Presence. An Essay in Christology [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971], p. 60).
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not tolerant of its exclusive claim, and they assumed that religion could only be
taken seriously and properly by the respected or by the educated people insofar as
it is capable of making a certain statement in terms of a universal and eternal truths
of natural religion. In other words, the contemporaries of Schleiermacher
understood religion as primarily a matter of intellect. But Schleiermacher, against
his contemporaries' attitude, perceives that religion must learn to give discursive
reason its due rights. Religion must allow for the freedom and autonomy of the
moral consciousness, because religion has its root in the depths of human
personality which is deeper than reason or will. Religion lies in the relation of each
human person to the Infinite. It is not a function of thought or action, but of the
'feeling of absolute dependence.' As religion is all about each individual's feeling,
the essence of religion must be understood individually rather than collectively as
a whole. Thus the great historical religions are not to be regarded as declensions
from or additions to the simple general truths of a supposed religion of Nature, but
the necessary and varied individual demonstrations of a fundamental relationship
between the finite and the Infinite. Schleiermacher applies this understanding of
religion to the two historical religions, Judaism and Christianity. However we are
concerned with Christianity. In Christianity, according to Schleiermacher, we
discover the struggle of the Infinite God to reconcile the disobedient world to
Himself. In redeeming the fallen world, Jesus Christ announced Himself to be the
Divine. And although this announcement that He is the Divine, viz. Jesus' 'God-c¬
onsciousness', is mystery, one significant thing is that the union of the divine
'nature' and the human 'nature'10 is accomplished. Accordingly the knowledge of
10
For Schleiermacher, the orthodox doctrine of Christ as one Person in two natures is
unintelligible. The word 'nature' applied to the Divine does not exist in a monotheistic faith but in
a polytheistic religion. Also, divine and human cannot be brought together under a single
conception. The word 'nature' is wrongly adopted for the doctrine of the divinity of Christ since
nature is the sum of all finite or corporeal existence, while Divine is infinite and more than
corporeal existence. Consequently the word 'nature' cannot be attributed to God. And, if 'person'
indicates a constant unity of life whilst 'nature' is a sum of the ways of action or laws, then the
unity of life cannot coexist with the duality of natures unless the one gives way to the other, or
unless they fuse into each other. Hence all the results of the effort to achieve a living presentation
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the Christian religion is chiefly about Jesus Christ."
Having seen Schleiermacher's view thus far, what strikes us is that he does
not simply assume an irrefutable revelation in describing his christology. Rather,
articulating the historicity as being the ground of christology above all other
elements, 'he had opened up a method of approach to historical positive religion
without presupposing the conception of infallible revelation.'12 Another indication
of the unity of the divinity and humanity in christology have always oscillated, either by separating
the two natures or disturbing the necessary balance, or by forming the third formulation which is
neither human or divine, nor both divine and human. Also, the question of two natures in one
person raises the question of whether two natures also have two wills according to the number of
natures. Incidentally, the question may also be raised as to whether Christ had two reasons, as we
are accustomed to take will and reason together. Further, the Western Church's talking about the
'three Persons' in one Essence in the doctrine of the Trinity is also unintelligible as it resulted in
the three Persons as an independent anterior existence in themselves. If each person is also a nature,
we will have three divine natures for the three divine Persons in the one Divine Essence. So
Schleiermacher was sceptical about the values of this dogmatics of 'nature' for ecclesiastical use
(Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart [Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clark, [1830-12] 1928], pp. 391-398).
Pittenger also observes this 'nature christology', two natures in one person, as 'frankly and
utterly incredible' (Norman Pittenger, Christology Reconsidered, [London: SCM Press, 1970], pp.
1 1-12). This incredibility becomes even stronger to those who were influenced by Whitehead,
Hartshorne, and Thailhard de Chardin etc., since these figures understood being (or person) rather
in terms of'process', 'relation' or 'in the light of cosmic dimension'. Such an unintelligible 'nature
christology' was a result of an attempt to perceive Jesus Christ in terms of substance. Recognising
this problem of'nature (substance) christology' Pittenger suggests a metaphor of relationship, 'love-
in-act' (ibid., 21), regarding it as the 'key' (ibid., 20) metaphor in understanding christology on the
whole. And this suggestion of the theme of 'love' is what he means by the title Christology
Reconsidered (ibid., 1-153).
Yet Schleiermacher's attempt to replace the word 'two natures' by a more proper word
reveals that his own assumptions are also being dualistic since he defines God as the unconditioned,
and the world and humanity as the conditioned (Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith 392).
Recognising this case, Gunton points out that Schleiermacher fails in his attempt to demonstrate the
fact that the chief problems of christology are inherent in the tradition. The problem of
Schleiermacher's view, according to Gunton, is that he rather adopts the critique of the tradition
from the transcendent perspective, the unconditionality of'God being'. This problem was the result
of the lack of the appreciation of the complexity of the christological debate before and after
Chalcedon, Antiochene and Alexandrian alike (Gunton, Yesterday and Today 88-92).
1' Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion. Speeches to its cultured despisers, trans. Richard
Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 [= 19882]), pp. 96-223; The Christian Faith
31-76, 131-141.
1 ^
(J.M. Creed, The divinity ofJesus Christ. A study in the history ofChristian doctrine since
Kant [London: Cambridge University Press, 1938], p. 24). Emphasis added, and hereafter (ea).
(=Creed, The Divinity of Jesus Christ). Alike, 'he [Schleiermacher] does not attempt to deduce
formal conclusions of a doctrinal character from the texts of Scripture. His system is not to be a
collection of credenda but an interpretation of an actual faith controlled by a dominant Person, Jesus
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of Schleiermacher opening up a method of describing christology 'from below' is
found when he says that 'Christianity is a monotheistic faith, belonging to the
theological type of religion, and is essentially distinguished from other such faiths
by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus
of Nazareth.'13 Similarly, but perhaps even more clearly, Schleiermacher extends
another clue to this opening up by stating that 'The disciples recognised in Him
[Christ's humanity] the Son of God without having the faintest premonition of His
resurrection and ascension, and we too may say the same ourselves.'14 That is to
say, Schleiermacher exposes a sign of the 'from below' element in his christology
by suggesting that the disciples already had a 'full' christology - that this man was
the Son of God - prior to and apart from the resurrection, which supposedly
epitomises the divine power and reality worked out 'from above down to below'.15
of Nazareth' {ibid., 27).
13
(Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith 52). For Brunner, Schleiermacher's scene of general
religion as feeling or intuition, and at the same time, seeing the Christian religion (Jesus Christ)
essentially as knowledge, is a fundamental contradiction (Emil Brunner, The Mediator, trans. Olive
Wyon [London: The Lutterworth Press, 1934], pp. 90-94).
Yet Creed disagrees with Brunner's criticism. Christianity apart from knowledge of Jesus
Christ is not possible. It is also true however that there are other religions alongside of Christianity
which share certain general characteristics, because we use the one generic term, 'religion,' of them
all. Then it is legitimate to maintain both standpoints: religion is a universal element in humankind
and there is no Christianity without Jesus Christ. The general characteristic of religion should
receive a peculiar quality through the knowledge of that particular Jesus Christ. Brunner is afraid
of the doctrine of the single sufficiency of the Mediator (Creed, The Divinity ofJesus Christ 36-38).
14
(Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith 418). The reason, according to Schleiermacher, is that
Paul does not seem to suppose that the resurrection has an exclusive connection with the peculiar
being of God in Christ, even though Paul seems to attribute to the resurrection just as much as to
the death, as a share of its own in redemption (Rom 4:25) and sees the resurrection as a guarantee
of our own resurrection (1 Cor 15:13, 16). Also, the resurrection was never adduced as evidence
of divine indwelling in Christ; it is not ascribed to Christ, but to God (Acts 2:24, 3:5, 4:10; Rom
4:24; 1 Cor 6:14, 15:15; 2 Cor 4:14) {ibid). Contrary to Schleiermacher's opinion, Creed argues that
Paul's statement of 'the first-fruits of them that sleep' (1 Cor 15:13) rather represents the doctrinal
and religious significance of the resurrection (Creed, The Divinity of Jesus Christ 33). Anyhow,
modern Christian scholarships would not agree with Schleiermacher's standpoint as they believe that
the disciples recognised Jesus as Christ only after the resurrection.
15 'The [Schleiermacher's] thought of a divine being who comes down from above is replaced
by the teaching that in Christ there takes place the 'completion of the creation of man', so that his
deity is found in his perfected humanity' (John Macquarrie, "Recent Thinking on Christian Belief'
in: The Expository Times Vol. 88 [Oct. 1976-Sept. 1977], p. 37; similarly, 'He [Schleiermacher] ...
seeks to replace the "divine being who comes down from heaven" with a "perfected humanity in
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According to Hegel, for Christianity, the 'infinite Idea of the Incarnation'
is the 'speculative middlepoint' or 'centre' of the understanding of true God and
His relation to the world.16 The idea of the Incarnation 'permeates all religions'
(.LPR 1:77). Yet, Christian christology fulfils all religious consciousness since only
Christianity demonstrates true God in this idea of Incarnation. Religious conscious¬
ness was all about seeking the true God or true Spirit. This religious consciousness
which all religions longed for is manifested in Jesus of Nazareth. So Christian
religion is the 'perfect [or consummate: vollendete], absolute religion' (LPR 1:84;
VPR 11:83) of all religions. For Hegel, this christological knowledge: that 'Jesus
is Christ', is possible on two grounds.
On the one hand, in the ordo cognoscendi 'everything [our christological
knowledge] must come to us in an external way' (LPR 2:336), as the 'objective'
for human consciousness mediated by sensuous intuition in perception; that is to
say, our christological knowledge is constituted in the external or 'objective'
character of religious knowledge. On the other hand, although our christological
knowledge first appears in an 'objective' and in an external character of religious
knowledge based within human capacity, it is by no means to remain in this
condition (LPR 2:337). What is true for [mankind's] spirit is something for which
'sensuous manifestation becomes of secondary value' (LPR 3:117-118). Our
christological knowledge, which 'starts' with the sensuously positive aspects of
historical knowledge in a religious tradition, is transformed into a content of
'entirely different nature,' for it has changed itself 'from being a sensuous,
empirically existing object into a divine object. ... [As such] this content is no
longer anything sensuous' (LPR 3:116).
Now, this movement from the sensuous object to the spiritual, i.e. the dual
which deity was experienced"' (David G.A. Calvert, From Christ to God [London: Epworth Press
1983], p. 1).
16
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion 3 vols, trans. & ed.,
E.B. Speirs & J. Burdon Sanderson (London: Regan Paul, Trench, Triibner, & Co. Ltd., 1895),
1:151 (=LPR 1:151); from 'Vorlesungen liber die Philosophie der Religion' vols. 11-12, ed. D.
Philipp Marheinicke in: Werke, 11:146. (=VPR 11:146)
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aspect 'from below' and 'from above', appears in Hegel's understanding of
Christian faith as well. Faith 'starts' from the history of the life of Christ.
Nevertheless, faith anchored in this history alters its meaning. That is to say, faith
'has to do not only with faith as faith in this external history, but with the fact that
this man was the Son of God' (LPR 3:115). Christology 'has the Divine for its
content, divine action, divine timeless events, a mode of working that is absolutely
divine' which becomes the object of our reason {LPR 1:146). However, christology
is more than the Divine act because it develops itself in the 'phenomenal sphere.'
This 'phenomenal sphere' as the 'inner element' of christology has the decisive
speculative significance in doing christology. This means, for Hegel, that the history
of Jesus of Nazareth is 'the Idea of Spirit itself,' that is, 'the infinite history of
God."7
We may ask, how does Hegel know this? What kind of christology does he
suggest to us? According to him, we know this since it is a truth 'implicitly present
in the self-consciousness of men' {LPR 3:112). Differently put, we know Jesus as
being the Christ because this knowledge is exposed 'in the process of history, by
the gradual advance of the World-Spirit' {LPR 3:112). Yet how and why should
this particular Jesus be believed as Christ in spite of many divine messengers?
Hegel replies:
... the Idea ... when it was ripe and the time was fulfilled, was able to attach itself
only to Christ, and to see itself realized only in him. ... This [fact] is what must
be understood as basic; this is the verification, the absolute proof; this is what is
to be understood as the witness of the Spirit. It is the Spirit, the indwelling Idea,
which has attested Christ's mission and this is the verification for those who
believed and for us who possess the developed Begriff [the developed concept or
form of christology] {LPR 3:113; VPR 12:320-321).
The point Hegel is making in this statement is that we can do or have our
christology because Jesus of Nazareth is known to be the Christ by virtue of the
inner testimony of the Spirit. This inner certainty given by the Spirit is the final
17
Hegel, Hegel's Lectures on the History ofPhilosophy 3 vols, trans. E.S. Haldane and F.H.
Simpson (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), 3:16 {=LHP, 3:16); from 'Vorlesungen fiber die
Philosophie der Geschichte' vols 11, 3rd ed, in: Samtliche Werke, 15:100. {=VPG, 15:100).
/. The Protagonists of the Issue from above/from below'
in Contemporary Christology
10
verification both for the christology of the primitive Christian community and for
the christology of modern time.
What does our discussion tell us with regard to our thesis? Certainly, it
should be noted that Hegel does not explicitly spell out a christology 'from above'
or 'from below' so to speak. And Kiing argues that Hegel's christology proceeds
too much 'from above' and too speculatively 'high.'18 This critique is quite right
for two reasons. First, it seems that Hegel did not sufficiently reflect upon the
human aspect or reality of Christ even though he weaves this aspect sporadically
into his lectures on religion. Secondly, Hegel deals with christology basically in the
framework of religion, religion which is highly ambiguous to define. Nevertheless,
according to our analysis, what is important in Hegel's christology in connection
with our thesis are these two points. First, analytically speaking, Hegel's perception
of'from above' or 'from below' mainly revolves around an epistemic ground (How
could we know the 'indwelling Idea'?) rather than a methodic ground (How we
could approach, or whether this or that approach is possible or impossible).
Secondly, Christian christology is constituted by the two christological elements
'from above' and 'from below' in such a way that one christology cannot be done
without the other at least in principle if not in practice.19 It could be 'from above'
18
(Hans Kiing, A7enschweretitng Gottes: Eine Einfiihrung in Hegels theologisches Denken als
Prolegomena zu einer kunftigen Christologie [Frieburgh: Herder, 1970], pp. 592-599). A similar
view is shared by TeSelle. Hegel's christology, in its character, did not show any interest in
questioning the personal dynamics of Jesus' 'inner life' in His function as Christ. Instead, Hegel
was looking at the meaning of Jesus for other persons and his starting-point in doing this was the
human consciousness, not Jesus in Himself. Thus the Christ event was of 'speculative' significance
for christology and faith. Hegel tried to show in what sense Jesus has personal and present religious
significance for human self-understanding in the current economy of God's redemptive work in the
world (TeSelle, Christ in Context 51, 48). However, Yerkes argues that Hegel was interested also
in Jesus' inner life, especially in his early time in contrast to the late emphasis on the meaning of
Jesus as Christ (James Yerkes, The Christology ofHegel [Scholars Press, Missoula, Montana No.
23], p. 318, 329 fn. 23). (=Yerkes, The Christology ofHegel)
19
'Barth, in his era, felt the need to emphasize the truth of God's transcendence as "wholly
other" in relation to man and the world; Hegel clearly felt the need to emphasize the truth of God's
immanence as "wholly present".' 'And both if read carefully, do not fail to maintain the respective
converse truths' (Yerkes, The Christology of Hegel 311). Hegel's christology functions with both
"mythic' and 'existential power in human consciousness' {ibid., 176).
In probability, Hegel's dual aspect of christology emerged in reaction to the existing
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because he takes the Incarnation of God in Jesus as the sole Divine act witnessing
to the ontological redemptive truth from God to humankind. It could also be 'from
below' since our confirmation of this from above is explicitly known 'everywhere
and by all' in the life of a man Jesus, and this man's life continually renders to be
present to us as human possibility for the perception of christology.
Albrecht Ritschl also has influenced modern christological thought. One of
Ritschl's most basic claims is that the originally historical and dynamic Gospel of
the early Church was transformed into a speculative Christianity.20 But the
correspondence between the cultural forms ofphilosophical 'scepticism' and religious'subjectivism'
his day. Hegel may have wanted to reject both extremes by emphasising both 'from above' and
'from below'. On the one hand, philosophical 'scepticism' is to be rejected since we know Jesus'
as being the Divine by watching this man ('from below'). Namely, we cannot be sceptical of the
answer to the ultimate philosophical question as to 'what God is.' Now, Hegel's persistent position
is that philosophy is all about the knowledge of 'what is' (e.g., LPR 3:112 [VPR 12:319];
Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox [London: Oxford University Press, 1967], p. 11 [=/7?]; The
Logic of Hegel, trans. William Wallace [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 18922], p. 78). Its fundamental
subject matter or object is God, as philosophy and religion share the conviction that God is 'the
unrestricted principle and cause on which everything hangs' (PR 165-166). In such a way 'the
content of religion and philosophy is the same' although their forms of expression differ from each
other. On the other hand, religious subjectivism is to be rejected as we ultimately confess Jesus as
Christ by virtue of the inner testimony of the Spirit (which is 'from above'), and not by human
feeling or experience.
20
In line with the rejection of the hellenised Christianity in favour of the dynamic Gospel,
Ritschl also refuses the traditional perception of the possibility of the reconciliation as a 'penal
satisfaction' to God. But this 'penal satisfaction', which understands the reconciliation in terms of
a moral order, is derived from the Greek concept of justice. This penal satisfaction suggests God
being the dispenser of both reward and punishment of human actions. But the problem with this
view lies in its mingling law with religion, and applying the principle of law to the principle of
religion. Religion and law are the two species, and species is an exclusive concept. Then the legal
concept of justice cannot be applied to the religion of reconciliation since the latter has been laid
upon His grace. If we (as Anselm did) derive the necessity for penal satisfaction from a concept
of the justice of God, then this view would imply an equality (Billigkeit) in private rights between
God and human beings. Moreover, it is a contradiction to derive the possibility of the reconciliation
(as Luther did) from the love of God, and at the same time to derive it from the wrath of God for
which Christ had to satisfy through His vicarious (substitution theory) endurance of punishment.
For it is impossible to think of sinners as objects both of God's love and God's wrath at the same
time and in the same respect. What the Scripture testifies foremost is the goodness of God: God
causes the sun to rise on both the good and the evil, and lets the rain fall on the just and the unjust;
Christ declares to love even our enemies (Matt 5: 44-48). If this is the perfection of God, God
cannot be understood in terms of the co-ordinator of punishment and reward. Therefore the view
of 'penal satisfaction' (substitution) derived from the twofold attribute of God as being the
'Punisher' and the 'Rewarder', is an 'idol' (ibid., 261).
The problem is that from the outset some theologians (represented by Justin Martyr and
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problem is that for Christians 'doing' christology is primarily not a matter of
rational inquiry but a matter of belief in Him, the belief which is based on the
historical fact and not on a conceptualisation or on a metaphysical understanding.
We are able to understand God only when we 'consciously' and 'intentionally'
accept the faith of the early community of Christ.21 In principle, except for the
doctrine of God, Christian dogmatics offer no opportunity to set forth directly a
metaphysical concept.22 Accordingly the task of modern theology is to return to
dynamic, history, and Hebraic thought. For Ritschl, this implies that Christ's
divinity could not be spoken of responsibly unless we have first experienced
Christ's saving power. Human beings know Christ's divinity only through what He
actually has done for us. So Ritschl declares that the statement that Christ is 'my
Lord' depends on the 'whole scope of His human existence, activity, and
then expanded by the Lutherans and Reformed theologians) ascribed to justice greater importance
than to grace. By definition, justice is a conditional concept but grace is an unconditional concept.
As such, justice is a part of grace and grace encircles justice. In such a way, the possibility and
necessity of the reconciliation lies in God's grace, that is, 'His whole righteousness'' {ibid., 265).
In sum, with regard to the possibility and the necessity of the reconciliation, Ritschl rejects the
concept of'penal vicarious satisfaction', that is both 'satisfaction theory' and 'substitution theory,'
while adopting the concept of righteousness, because the former ideas are not biblical points of view
but are from the Hellenic religion which has carried over into Christianity (Ritschl, The Christian
Doctrine ofJustification and Reconciliation [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1900], pp. 259-265, 472-
484, esp. 259-265, 478). (=Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation)
Yet Crawford in an earlier time shared a different view from Ritschl. Crawford holds that
using the concept of'substitution' is perfectly legitimate since that concept had already been widely
spread at that time. For his view of 'substitution theory' Crawford refers his readers to the terms
'dvuf' in Mark 10:45 (cf. Matt 20:28) and in 1 Timothy 2:6 (Thomas J. Crawford, The
Doctrine ofHoly Scripture Respecting the Atonement [Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood
and Sons, 18834], pp. 20-26, 177, 495-496; also The Mysteries of Christianity [Edinburgh &
London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1874], pp. 221-251).
21
(Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation 4). '... ifwe can rightly know God only ifwe know
Him through Christ, then we can know Him only if we belong to the community of believers' {ibid.,
7). For Ritschl's overall critique of the predominant rationalism in Christian theology see pp. 1-25,
193-279 {ibid).
22
Nevertheless, Ritschl does not entirely rule out the use of metaphysics in Christian theology,
for methodically metaphysics is necessary as the formal pattern for the cognition of religious entities
or relationships. So the remaining question is: 'which [=what form of] metaphysics is justified in
theology?' (Ritschl, Three Essays, trans. Philip Hefner [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972], p. 187).
For Ritschl's view of the role ofmetaphysics in Christian theology see pp. 151-212 {ibid). (=Ritschl,
Three Essays)
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suffering.'23 Now, to emphasise the centrality of the 'from below' element in
christology, Ritschl goes on to say that it really is in Christ's human achieve¬
ments that His Godhead becomes for His people manifest, conspicuous, intelligible,
winning our faith, not in the form of assent to an unintelligible dogma, but of
personal trust for our own salvation.'24 Further, our honouring Christ as God, and
our confession of Christ's divinity, is a 'value-judgment' of His 'saving influence'
upon ourselves.25 This saving influence is the achievement in Christ's humanity.
Thus determining the being of God a priori, 'from above' downwards, prior to the
saving effect and actual revelation, 'from below' upwards, is problematic.26
However, it was Karl Rahner (1905-1984) who has explicitly elaborated on
the concept 'from above' and 'from below' after Ritschl. Rahner employs the
concept 'from below' in Schriften zur Theologie I in 1954 which is published in
English in 1961 under the title Theological Investigation I. The phrase 'from
below' appears to describe the christology which begins with human experience of
Jesus in reference to some biblical passages.27 Rahner refers to Acts 2:36 as
representing the oldest of all the christologies 'from below'. Of course it is often
thought that Peter's christology was 'primitive' and that it was soon superseded by
the more sophisticated Pauline christology. The christology of Acts is even
considered to be adoptionist. Yet Rahner insists that a human being is not only a
corporeal and historical entity which is absolutely terminated quantity on earth, but
it 'absolutely open upwards' and 'reaches its highest perfection' when the Logos
Himself becomes existent in it in the world. If this view of human transcendence
Albrecht Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation 393, of. 2-22, 203-211.
~4
Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation 394 ea.
25 '... we know the nature of God and Christ only in their worth for us' (Ritschl, Justification
and Reconciliation 212).
Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation 398-399.
27
Acts 2:21-36; 3:12-26; 4:8-12:27; 5:29-32; 7:56; 9:22; 10:34-43; 13:28-41; 17:31; 18:28
(Karl Rahner, 'Current Problem in Christology' in: Theological Investigation / [London: Darton and
Longman Todd, 1961], p. 155).
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is accepted, then it is also possible to build a christology 'from below' up starting
from a 'dynamic anthropology.'28
Rahner further develops this notion 'from below' more specifically in
contrast to the concept 'from above' in 1972.29 Here he writes that, there are
the30 two types of christology, that is, the 'from above' and the 'from below'.
While Rahner calls the christology 'from above' as 'descending' or 'metaphysical'
christology, he calls the christology 'from below' as 'ascending' christology, that
is, the christology of'saving history.'31
28~
(Rahner, 'The Current Problem in Christology' in: Theological Investigation / [ 1961 ], pp.
147-200, esp. pp. 183-188; cf. also 'The Eternal Significance of the Humanity of Christ,'
Theological Investigations 3 [1967], pp. 35-46; 'Remarks on the Importance of the History of Jesus
for Catholic Dogmatics' in: Theological Investigation 13 [1975], pp. 201-212). Incidentally, this
'self-transcendence' or 'openness' of humankind towards God is one of the key concepts for
Rahner's Theology and christology.
However, Gunton contends that Rahner's christology is problematic and obscure because
it is not a full account of orthodox christology, even though Gunton does not clearly spell out what
he means by this term. Moreover, Rahner's christology is an Antiochene christology in which the
human Jesus is seen as a special case as far as the possibilities for grace inherent in all human
existence is concerned. Rahner's weakness, according to Gunton, lies in his concept of 'human
transcendence' since it creates 'a gulf between the New Testament picture of Jesus and forms of
human self-assessment drawing heavily on existentialist and other modern traditions' (Gunton,
Yesterday and Today 12-13, 15). For Gunton's overall critical reflection on Rahner's christology
consult pp. 10-18 (ibid).
29
Karl Rahner, 'The Two Basic Types of Christology' in: Theological Investigation XIII
(London: Darton and Longman, [1972] 1975), pp. 213-224. (=Rahner, The Two Basic Types of
Christology)
J
But as for Tracy, christologies operating in these two typical paradigms are not exhaustive
options for contemporary christology for at least two reasons: 1) these two types of christology
overlap each other; 2) christology, as a human language, cannot capture or exactly reproduce the
words and deeds of Jesus, but it is a 're-presentative limit language' (Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order
217-223, 233-236).
31
(Rahner, The Two Basic Types of Christology 213-214). Here we see an example of our
initial statement about how broad and subtle the phrase 'from above/from below' is to define.
Rahner, about four years later in this discussion, uses another concept of 'transcendence' in
clnistology. By this 'transcendental' christology he means 'from below'. However, this 'from below'
christology differs from the one which is being discussed in these two types of christology. While
the christology 'from below', in these two types, means one which begins with the humanity of
Christ itself, the 'from below' christology, in terms of the 'transcendental' christology, means one
built on the human experience of Jesus, which asks about the a priori possibilities in human beings
instead of in Jesus. Within the 'transcendental' christology, the 'from below' christology is an
attempt to understand Christ with what human beings have already found in Jesus of Nazareth,
which is a 'finality' and 'dynamism' imparted by God Himself towards God's self-communication
(Karl Rahner, Foundations ofChristian Faith, trans. Dych, William V. [London: Darton Longman
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On the one hand, the 'from below' christology focuses on the life-act of
Jesus. The life-act of Jesus of Nazareth is the content of the specifically Christian
experience of saving history. This implies that for the 'from below' christology
Jesus of Nazareth is not 'a/T utterance of God to human beings which always
remains at the level of the provisional and conditional turning of God to human
beings, but rather the definitive, eschatological utterance of God to human beings.
The point of departure for this 'from below' christology is, therefore, the simple
experience of the man Jesus of Nazareth, and of the Resurrection. It is from this
man Jesus of Nazareth that human beings encounter their existential quest for
salvation.32 Where Jesus is present in this sense there exists an orthodoxy too - a
Chalcedonian christology. In other words, this 'from below' christology is from the
outset seen within the context of the individuals' quest for salvation in the concrete
human conditions of his life, and thus the world as such does not enter into the
question. In this 'from below' christology, the world is to be understood as the
stage for this saving event.33
On the other hand, Rahner understands that the 'from above' christology,
the 'metaphysical' christology, is inevitable if the christology clearly goes beyond
the original experience of Jesus by the believer whether or not it is justifiable. The
'from above' christology finds its point of departure and the possibility of verifying
it, in the 'from below' christology. Yet this 'from above' christology constitutes
something more than a mere inversion of the 'from below' christology. The pre-
existence of the Logos, His divinity, is regarded as manifestly belonging to him
from the first. This pre-existent Logos, the Son of God, descends from heaven and
& Todd, 1978'], pp. 206-212). (=Rahner, Foundations ofChristian Faith)
32
Rahner, The Two Basic Types of Christology 215.
Also, in this 'from below' christology, the promise of the Spirit, given through Jesus,
signifies not merely the salvation of human beings, but rather the self-communication of the
absolute God, present in Jesus, with human beings (Rahner, The Two Basic Types of Christology
216). Thusing further intensifies Rahner's transcendental christology on the basis of Scripture (Karl
Rahner and Wilhelm Thusing, A New Christology, trans. D. Smith and V. Green [London: Burns
& Oates, 1980], pp. 59-68).
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assumes a human reality as his own.34
The decisive factors in this 'from above' christology are twofold. Firstly, it
proceeds from something that is self-evident and does not need any further recourse
to the experience of Jesus in saving history, that is, a doctrine of the Trinity, and
of the Logos, as the pre-existing Son of God. These proceeding bases are not
grounded on the experience in saving history of the crucified and risen Jesus, but
made known through verbal teaching by this same Jesus, a teaching which is
regarded as His ipsissima verba. This 'from above' christology is not a justifiable
interpretation of a more original experience of saving history, but the supreme and
primary 'axiom' of its christology, though we are aware that there is history behind
the revelation of this axiom itself.
Secondly, unlike the 'from below' christology, this 'from above' christology
implies a doctrine concerning the cosmic and transcendental significance of the
Incarnation. Further, this process of becoming a human being constitutes more than
a mere isolated event marking a particular time and space and belonging to a
particular category, but rather this 'from above' christology is the supreme point
in the relationship of the divine Logos to his world in general. The creation is then
regarded as the enabling condition for the self-communication of God which opens
itself to receive its own glory. The Incarnation is not so much an event in space
and time, simply requiring to be accepted in its actuality, but is rather the supreme
point of a transcendental, albeit free, relationship of God to the creation, His
personal history of love within it. Saving history, the 'from below' christology, is
embraced and integrated within a relationship of God to the world.35
Certainly, as Colin E. Gunton has pointed out, Rahner's christological
method is problematic. Rahner's attempt arose in order to safeguard the full
humanity of Christ with the rest of humankind, and as such to avoid the orthodox
j4
Rahner sees these basic forms of christology in the christological hymns of the Pauline
Epistles and in the Prologue to the Johannine Gospel (Rahner, The Two Basic Types ofChristology
217).
35
Rahner, The Two Basic Types ofChristology 218-219.
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tradition's frequent tendency towards docetic christology. But if Jesus is fully a
human being, it is difficult to speak of the absolute uniqueness of Jesus. We will
have to speak of the uniqueness of Jesus' humanity in degree, and not in kind.36
Rahner's christology 'from below' then operates with the presupposition that the
significance of Jesus consists in His having a large degree of human qualities. That
is to say, Jesus' divine significance is grounded in His supreme human qualities.
The problem is that this view presupposes the fact that to be divine is to be
successfully human. Conversely speaking, this presupposition also implies the fact
that in some sense to be human is already to share divinity. All humankind is
already incipiently divine by virtue of some feature of their being. The divinity of
Christ is bringing this innate quality to its perfection demonstrating the supreme
degree of what humankind is already. Therefore, the humanity of Christ is different
from that of all humankind not in principle or in kind, but in degree. Gunton
further argues that if Jesus' significance is based on His superior human qualities
to us, then we repeat the weakness of traditional christology, that is, that He is no
longer truly one of us because this Jesus is so different from us.37
Whether or not we agree with Karl Rahner's analysis it must be noted that
it was he who explicitly formulated the distinction between 'from above' and 'from
below' in contemporary theology. At this point, we have to ask what made Rahner
employ this approach of 'from below' in christology. If we agree that theology is
a human activity, then we must also conclude that theology does not emerge out
of thin air but out of a certain context. Theology is not a static text or object given
from outside any human context; rather, all theology is a dynamic process arising
out of specific world contexts, and this is the reason why we do not claim our
j6
Robinson and Rahner prefer 'degree christology' to 'kind christology' in order to safeguard
Christ's true humanity within the rest of all humankind (J.A.T. Robinson, The Human Face ofGod
209-210). 'A degree Christology operating from below reproduces the methodological features of
some ancient Christology from above' (Gunton, Yesterday and Today 53). The problem of 'degree
christology' is that it, as an 'inverted Arianism or Docetism from below,' represents a divinised
human being rather a humanised Logos (ibid., 53).
37
Gunton, Yesterday and Today 11-18.
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theologies to be any kind of 'canonic theology' but we affirm them to be a
theologia viatorum. This implies that all theology is a human reflection upon its
own contextual ethos or concern. Such an awareness necessitates a brief sketch of
some of the theological background to, and reasons38 for, the emergence of the
'from above/from below' issue before we advance our thesis. Further, our dealing
with some theological reasons for and background to the interest in christology
'from below' is inevitable, since this will demonstrate how important our thesis is.
2. Some Theological Background and Reasons for the Rise of the Issue 'from
below'
The rise of the christology 'from below' is, firstly, associated with Barth's
theological paradigm shift. Nineteenth century theology was dominated by a
positive humanism. This humanism suggested (with the emergence of Schleiermac-
her's theology which is understood as the representative of the nineteenth century's
theological liberalism in particular) that humankind could manage its life, culture,
and history in such a successful manner that God has little to do for them.
Overshadowed by such a positive humanism, Christian christology too became
much more interested in the humanity of Christ than in the unintelligible and
inexpressible 'divine being' in order either to justify or to test current positive
humanism. ITumankind now stands in the centre of its life and history, whereas
God stands on the periphery.39 But such a positive humanism was completely
shattered by the two World Wars, since humanity has experienced the brutality and
38
Of course there could be more factors than our discussions here which underlie the issue.
For a brief sketch of theological roots for the re-emphasis on the humanity of Christ see
(Macquarrie, The Humanity ofChrist 243-245; David G.A. Calvert, From Christ to God [London:
Epworth Press, 1983], pp. 3-5). (=Calvert, From Christ to God). Calvert sees that, whereas 19th-
century liberalism thought it could recover the historical Jesus, 20th-century liberalism thought it
could not be done satisfactorily (ibid., 4).
39
See Barth's criticism on the optimistic humanism in (From Rousseau to Ritschl 11-57).
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destructiveness of humanity rather than its goodness. Moreover, as the first and the
second Wars were supported by many Church leaders and theologians particularly
in Germany, Western Christianity did not know how to understand their God, and
therefore what to say to the world about their faith, Church, culture, and history.
The reason was that the support of many in the Western Church for such terrible
Wars was in contrast to their preaching of the 'Gospel', hence, Western Christianity
was in great need of a reshaping of its understandings of God, faith, and history in
the face of theological and ethical challenges.
To this theological and ethical impasse Barth announced the 'infinite
qualitative distance' between God and humankind, God and Church, and God and
human history and culture. Humankind can know God only when He reveals
Himself. God is 'wholly other' who breaks in upon it 'perpendicularly from above.'
Barth introduced these concepts of 'infinite distance' and of the 'wholly other' in
order to say that Christian activities cannot be identified with the act of God,
however sincere or faithful such activities may be. Thus the primary concern of
theology became God and His act instead of human beings and their culture,
history, and faith. This change of primary concern in theology led christology to
re-build itself with the presupposition that Christ is God incarnated 'from above'
instead of building christology with a view to the human life-act 'from below'.
However, as Barth had later acknowledged that his early view of the 'wholly
otherness' of God was partly wrong, the emphasis on the humanity of Christ
resurfaced in an effort to present Jesus as our contemporary.
Secondly, the emphasis on the christology 'from below' received support
from New Testament scholarship.40 Jesus was not a mythically fabricated figure
40
See (Matthew Black, A Survey ofChristological Thought 1872-1972 [Edinburgh: St Andrew
Press, 1972]). (=Black, A Survey ofChristological Thought)', John Macquarrie, The Humanity of
Christ', for a good summary of sources and theological sketches of the issue see also (G.E. Ladd,
A Theology of the New Testament [Michigan: Eerdmans, 1993 [=1974]], pp. 1-20, 170-180).
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but one who shared the specific culture and tradition of His time as a human
being.41 This view of Jesus led some scholars to challenge the sceptical view of
the historical Jesus, the historicity of Jesus, with a new question.
Studies about the historical Jesus concluded that it is not possible to
reconstruct the historical man.42 This quest was mainly the quest of the 'what
(who) of Jesus' in terms of the modern understanding of history and biography.
This quest was called the 'old' quest. Yet, as an attempt to overcome the impasse
of the historical quest, scholars raised two fundamental questions: 1) We cannot
assume that the early Church community's cognizance of 'history' is the same as
the modern one. We cannot impose our modern understanding of 'history' upon
them. Hence form-criticism's negative conclusion about the historical Jesus cannot
be the final answer to the question of its reliability; 2) The interest in the historical
Jesus arose primarily out of the uniqueness of His life-act. In other words, Jesus
has been remembered throughout the ages because of the way in which He lived.
Then our christological question initially must be about 'how (why)' prior to the
'what (who).' This is called the 'new' quest.43 Asking this 'new' quest for 'how
41
For example (Pittenger, Christology Reconsidered 22-44; Geza Vermes, Jesus the Jew
[London: Collins, 1973], pp. 15-102). Yet we may point out that Vermes' view, relying mainly on
the Gospel narratives and the writings of Flavius Josephus, is made without their source and content
critique, assuming that these sources are 'reliable'.
"
Originally, this 'old' quest of the historical Jesus was raised by M. Kahler (Die Wissenschaft
der christlichen Lehre, von dem evangelischen Grundartikel aus im Abriss dargestellt, Leipzig, 1883
[=19053]). But A. Schweitzer's book on The Quest of the Historical Jesus (1906) became more
widely known as the 'classic' volume of the 'old' quest. Both Kahler and Schweitzer's sceptical
view of the historical Jesus is more radicalised by R. Bultmann's demythologisation (Jesus [1926]
-Jesus and the Word [1935]; The New Testament and Mythology [1941]); for a survey of the issue
of the historical Jesus consult James P. Mackey's Jesus the Man and the Myth. A Contemporary
Christology [SCM Press, 1979], pp. 10-51; for an overall summary of Bultmann's christology and
theology see David Fergusson, Bultmann [London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1992], pp. esp. 14-19, 73-80,
107-125).
As for Black, Bultmann's understanding of Christ in the New Testament as mythological
is a 'twentieth-century docetism' (Black, A Survey of Christological Thought 14).
43
For an account of the nature of the 'new' quest of the historical Jesus, of its theological
significance, and of the problem of understanding 'history,' see (James M. Robinson, 'A New Quest
of the Historical Jesus' in: Study in Biblical Theology No. 25 [London: SCM Press, 1959], pp.9-125;
'Bultmann himself has conceded in a letter to me the possibility and legitimacy of the [new] quest'
(Robinson, 'The Historical Question' in: The Christian Century [October 21, 1959], LXXVI, 1210).
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(why)' naturally drew an attention to the humanity of Christ. This indicated that the
concrete life-act of the humanity of Christ would sufficiently vindicate the
reliability of believing in Him although it may not be fully sufficient. As the
concrete life-act sufficiently authenticates the historical Jesus, His teaching may
Interestingly enough, this 'new' quest was raised by the Bultmann's students: (Giinther Bornkamm,
Jesus of Nazareth, Hodder and Stoughton 1960; Ernst Kasemann and Ernst Fuchs, in Studies in
Biblical Theology series no. 41 & 42), although Hans Conzelmann maintains Bultmann's
sympathetic scepticism of the historical Jesus by omitting the historical aspect of Jesus in his book
on (An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament, trans. J. Bowden [London: SCM Press,
1969]; from Grundriss der Theologie des Neuen Testaments [Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag,
1968]).
Nevertheless, both Van Harvey and Ogden are sceptical of Robinson's description of the
issue as the 'new' quest. They maintain that the problem of Robinson's contention is found in the
view that while he, in reference to Bultmann, holds that the 'old' quest is impossible and
illegitimate, the 'new' quest is possible and legitimate. In point of fact, the 'old' quest is concerned
basically with 'the what' or 'the true fact' of Jesus' sayings and deeds, whereas the 'new' quest is
an attempt to authenticate the sayings and deeds of Jesus in terms of 'how' he lived. But if we
cannot really authenticate the 'old' quest, that is, 'the what' or 'the true fact', we cannot dare to ask
'how' Jesus lived. Robinson makes claims for the legitimacy of the 'new' quest by turning to
Bultmann's endorsement. But this claim is not only mistaken since there is no real 'shift' or
'concession' in Bultmann's position of the historical Jesus to admit the possibility and legitimacy
of the 'new' quest throughout his writings, but Robinson also failed in providing sufficient evidence
for Bultmann's 'shift' or 'concession' from the 'old' to the 'new,' because Bultmann has not
changed his position regarding the impossibility and illegitimacy at all, in questioning the historical
Jesus. Moreover there is virtually no difference between Bultmann and Bornkamm's position either,
even though Robinson supposes there is. Accordingly 'the new quest hardly seems to be new at all.'
(Van Harvey and Schubert Ogden, 'How New is the "New Quest of the Historical Jesus"?' in: The
Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ. Essays on the New Quest ofthe Historical Jesus, trans.
& ed. Carl E. Braaten and Roy A. Harrisville (New York & Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1964), pp.
197-242; from 'Wie neu ist die "Neue Frage nach dem historischen Jesus"?' in: Zeitschrift fur
Theologie und Kirche (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]; The Point ofChristology [London:
SCM Press, 1982], pp. 48-51). '... if there is really anything new about the "new quest," it lies
decisively in the realm of dogmatic interests motivating it and their more precise characterisation'
(E. Kasemann, 'Die neue Jesus-Frage' in: Jesus aux origines de la christologie, ed. Jean Dupont.
Gembloux: J. Duculot: 52, cf. 47-57. This text is cited by Schubert M. Ogden, The Point of
Christology 50)
Pittenger classifies 'history' in two categories: the history deduced from the available
evidence, and the history of which the precise details are not as clear as we would wish to have but
which are simply 'ploughed into' succeeding ages. And the historicity of Jesus lies in these 'double
histories' (Christology Reconsidered 24-25).
It should be noted, incidentally, that Bultmann was not entirely sceptical about the
historicity of Jesus as can be seen by the fact that he stresses that we know much about the
historical figure although this historicity lacks the knowledge of Jesus' personality and biography
(Bultmann, Jesus and the Word). Such an affirmation leads Pittenger to assert that 'the genius of
Christianity lies precisely in the claim that the Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ of faith, the Christ
of faith is the Jesus of history' (Pittenger, Christology Reconsidered 33, 22-44).
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even reflect His personality as well.
Thirdly, a new interest in the christology 'from below' emerged partly due
to a struggle to find out a new and more dynamic model for thinking about God.
This new struggle derives from the advent of Marxism, which criticised Christianity
maintaining the traditional view of God. According to Marxism, the God of
Christianity does not solve the socio-economic problem of human beings. The
traditional idea of God held by Christianity cannot help its contemporary socio¬
economic problems. Not every Marxist could 'believe' in the 'saviour', because the
historical-materialist method rather determined (shaped) the 'saviour' of Christian¬
ity. The Judaeo-Christian tradition has been concerned with the problems which
contributed certain models towards their solution.44 In this view Marxism, as a
'counter-ideal-to-God', emphasised that it is humankind, not God with all his
intellectual and spiritual gifts and values, who 'solves' human problems.45
Such a struggle to find a more relevant model for thinking about God by
means of human capacity led Marxist scholarship to turn to the humanity of Christ.
According to Marxism, the genuinely historical Jesus must have been affected by
44 Milan Machovec,/! Marxist Looks at Jesus (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1976'), pp.
24, 29. (=Machovec, A Marxist Looks at Jesus)
45 Marxists' rejection of the God of traditional Christianity corresponds exactly to Feuerbach's
critique of Christianity's God: 'The personality of God is nothing else other than the projected
personality of man' (Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity [New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1957], p. 226, cf. pp. 33-43, 120-134, 140-149, 226-231). This rejection of a traditionally-
understood God by Christianity was the context of Marx's critique of religion as 'opium.'
Incidentally, Machovec also joins the critiques of Feuerbach and Marx, accusing Christianity of
being 'quasi-revolutionary' and 'non-conformist' towards the message of Jesus Christ (Machovec,
A Marxist Looks at Jesus 193-194, 197-198, 200).
Here we must remember that Barth was sympathetic to Feuerbach's critique of the faith of
the traditional Christianity. This was because, according to Barth, the one who revealed Himself in
Jesus Christ is not, in many ways, the God of the traditional Church and Christianity overall since
Christianity manipulated God and disobeyed Him instead of listening to Him. Barth's sympathy
with Feuerbach and Marx is well indicated in his harsh critique of religion as 'unbelief,' since
religion is a human attempt at divinising itself (CD 1/2, 280-361, esp. 297-325; see also Barth's
preface on Feuerbach's The Essence ofChristianity x-xxx). Also, H. Richard Niebuhr points out that
both Feuerbach and Barth agree that, to have faith in Christianity itself is to put one's trust in
something human, personal, and social, but they disagree in that whereas Feuerbach can believe in
humanity Barth cannot (ibid., viii).
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a specific culture, place, and milieu of His time. Thus for them to execute a proper
christology meant to be carrying out a christology which is concerned chiefly with
this culturally and historically conditioned humanity and act of Jesus, rather than
any presupposed or preconceived idea of Christ.46
Fourthly, the articulation of the christology 'from below' arose out of an
apologetic reasoning. The traditional God-language: the eternal Logos or Jesus as
the second person of the Trinity, is not intelligible to many people in a secular age.
So what could offer a readily accessible starting-point for christology is not an
ambiguous God or Church dogma, but the humanity of Christ, who truly shared His
life with all mankind. In short, much interest in 'doing' christology with a view to
the earthly aspect of Christ rather than the assumed divine aspect of Christ is partly
a conscientious reaction to the inadequacy and unintelligibility of the traditional
God-language.47
The fifth reason for the emphasis on the christology 'from below' has to do
with a doctrinal problem. If the divinity of Christ outshines His humanity, this
christology would result in a kind of Doceticism and Gnosticism irrespective of its
intention. Docetic and Gnostic christology cannot stand, because Christ without full
or true humanity is irrelevant to the human condition.48
The sixth theological background of the emergence of the christology 'from
below' is rooted in the strain ofWestern thought, theology and philosophy. 'Faced
46
(M. Machovec, A Marxist Looks at Jesus 119-120, 198-199; See also Vitezslav Gardavsky,
God is Not Yet Dead [Pelican Books, 1973], pp. 34-52). The problem inherent in this view is that
if christology is going to be determined mainly by the culturally and historically conditioned
humanity of Christ, then Christianity's confession that 'Jesus is the universal Christ' could be
understood as if the universality of Christ is not real in Christ Himself but merely a Christian
ascription. Calvert sees this approach as one of the key problems that such a stress on the reality
of Jesus' humanity creates. An emphasis on the ordinariness of the humanity of Christ necessarily
raises the questions why and how the confession of his divinity could properly have arisen (Calvert,
From Christ to God 5).
47
See Macquarrie, The Humanity of Christ 244-245, 249; Calvert, From Christ to God 5.
48
'Only one who has fully shared the human condition can have any convincing significance
as a Mediator or High Priest, as the Epistle to the Hebrews shows' (Macquarrie, The Humanity of
Christ 244).
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with a loss of confidence in traditional ways of ascribing the source of Jesus's
significance to a transcendent world, theologians in this tradition sought the divine
in history, in human mind, or in human moral striving.'49 Moreover, ever since
Augustine, Western theology has tended to conceptualise its belief; for Western
theology, faith or revelation alone was not enough to convince it; faith or revelation
has to be clarified by reason. As a result, 'doing' theology has often been a
discipline of conceptualisation rather than a holistic discipline of both theory
(theologising) and praxis (realising).50
We find that the seventh reason for an interest of the christology 'from
below' is also triggered by the question of epistemology, and as such methodology.
Christology 'from above' downwards presupposes a pre-existent Being as the Being
who should come down from somewhere. The problem is that we cannot know
whether such a Being pre-existed, nor can we assume that this Being was God even
if such a Being actually pre-existed before the creation. So we cannot know or
approach any christology unless we also take part in the process of this Being's
coming down 'from above' downwards. Therefore an alternative to 'doing'
christology is first to approach christology from the human aspect of Christ, 'from
below', and subsequently to conclude that this man, Jesus of Nazareth, was Christ
who came 'from above' as the second person of the Trinity.51
Having introduced the implicit and explicit initiators of, some theological
background to, and reasons for the issue 'from above/from below', we will now
turn to Barth's interpreters' understanding of 'from above/from below' in order to
proceed further with our thesis.
49
Gunton, Yesterday and Today 16.
50
Gunton, Yesterday and Today 28.
51
This epistemological and methodic problem is raised by Wolfhart Pannenberg, and we will
resume this issue in chapter two.
CHAPTER TWO
Christology 'from above'
An Analysis of the Views of Karl Barth's Interpreters
The task of this chapter is to introduce and analyse a series of diverse
understandings of Barth's christology. The analysis raises questions, questions
which require our special attention since they put forward to us the interest and
direction of our thesis. In limiting the scope of our thesis we will be selective in
our analysis of the views of Barth's interpreters. No doubt there will be more
scholars who would advocate Barth as sustaining a 'high' christology apart from
the scholars who are going to be mentioned in our discussion. But we believe,
unless we are mistaken, that it would not do much harm to our thesis to say that
the rest of the unquoted scholars would also fall more or less into one of these
categories.
I. An Analysis of the Views of Barth Interpreters
1. Christology 'from above' in terms of holding the Primacy of the Incarna¬
tion of the Logos 'from heaven' in Christology, viz. in view of the Method
of Approach
One of the most common grounds for labeling Barth's christology as a
'high' christology is his 'Logos christology.' According to Philip J. Rosato, Barth
holds a christology 'from above' because he advocates 'Logos christology,' a
christology which focuses primarily upon the incarnation of the Logos. Logos by
no means refers to an earthly, visible, and tangible Tow' existence, but contains
purely a concept of a certain 'high' being or reality. Thus, by calling Barth's
christology a 'Logos christology,' Rosato denotes that Barth holds a christology
'from above'. He is however somewhat sympathetic to Barth's christological stance,
and does acknowledge that, to a certain extent, he has some element of 'Spirit
christology' which signals for Rosato somewhat a christology 'from below'.
Rosato's designation of'Spirit christology' as a christology 'from below', however,
is surprising, for Spirit is an entirely metaphysical concept. Spirit christology is a
metaphysical christology which can then hardly be thought of as a Tow' christology
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from any traditional point of view. Rosato believes such a designation as legitimate
by identifying physical being (Jesus) with metaphysical being (Spirit). His
insistence on such an identification stands under a doctrinal presupposition, of the
Trinity. Simply put, if God is truly the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, then
the Spirit must be one God with the Son and the Father. Yet, Rosato's intention in
stressing such an identification is not to argue or to develop the doctrine of the
Trinity so to speak, but rather to single out the importance of the Spirit and
therefore, to criticise Barth's weakness in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in his
dogmatics in light of the doctrine of the Trinity. Rosato's book The Spirit as Lord
is about this critique.1 Anyway, we need to analyse Rosato's understanding of
Barth's christology because he does claim overall that Barth has a christology 'from
above' rather than 'from below'.
Rosato proposes that, for Barth, the primary ground of Jesus' divinity is not
His anointing with the Spirit, but the 'hypostatic union' of the two natures. He feels
that Barth unnecessarily suppressed pneumatology for the sake of christology due
to his preference for an 'unmitigated Logos Christology.'2 Rosato states:
Barth's own choice of an unmistakable christology 'from above' which is
reinforced by a pervasive Word theology risks the opposite danger of coming too
close to a Gnostic concept of the eternal Word in the process of realising itself
throughout natural and human history. The choice of such a Logos christology ...
does not adequately do justice to the biblical notion that the Father broke His
silence and poured out His Spirit in full measure on Jesus Christ. ... his exagger¬
ated Logos christology seems blatantly to bypass the biblically attested truth that
1
For an appreciative and yet constructive criticisms on Rosato's interpretation of Barth see
(John Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology of Karl Barth [Pennsylvania: Pickwick
Publications, 1991], pp. 197-211).
2
(Philip J. Rosato. The Spirit as Lord; The Pneumatology ofKarl Barth [Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clark, 1981], p. 174). (=Rosato, The Spirit as Lord)
Even a radical criticism is made by Sykes reagarding this Logos-flesh christology as
Barth's proof of textual errors for two reasons: Firstly, the Prologue of John the Gospel, especially
1:14 which Barth proposes as 'the central New Testament statement (CD 1/2, 132),' is not a
historical statement but a theological statement. Moreover, it is written by the Gnostic, Valentinus.
Secondly, the christology of John tends to be 'docetic' banking heavily on theological judgments
thereby its historical force is correspondingly deminished (S.W. Sykes, 'Barth on the Centre of
Theology' in: Karl Barth-Studies ofhis Theological Methods [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979], pp.
48-49). While Hodgson rather, throughout his book, escalates the vitality of the Logos concept in
theology and christology arguing that the real meaning is not studied seriously and properly enough
(Peter C. Hodgson, Jesus-Word and Presence [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971]).
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Christ must be understood in the context of God the Spirit's continual
interactions with man ... ,3
This is a neat argument, and unless we attend to what Barth said in his
christology, we could simply assume Rosato's observation as accurate. Yet the
danger and opacity of this observation will be dismantled as we raise the question
as to whether Barth's 'Logos christology' necessarily undergirds Rosato's claim
that Barth has a christology 'from above', and whether Rosato perceives what Barth
means by the 'Logos christology'. Did Barth really 'exaggerate' Logos christology
so as to 'blatantly bypass' the biblical truth? Furthermore, Rosato presumes that
Barth would have objected to beginning his christology with the humanity of Jesus
of Nazareth due to a fear that such a christological model would conclude with
nothing other than the affirmation of Jesus' humanity.4 This view invites the
further question of whether this presumptive view does not considerably reduce the
theological significance of the life-act of the Royal Man. What if Barth highlights
the life-act of the Jesus of Nazareth, the Royal Man, as the only verifiable basis for
an understanding of the revealed God? And what of Barth's clear cut articulation
of Jesus Christ being the vere Deus et vere homo? These issues will be addressed
later.
David G.A. Calvert too presents Barth as having a christology 'from above'
3
Rosato, The Spirit as Lord 174.
4
(Rosato, The Spitiy as Lord 176). Similarly, Puffenberger implicitly accuses Barth of having
a christology 'from above' by insisting that 'Barth cannot begin with the historical Jesus Christ and
then argue that God was in Christ. ... [Since] Barth significantly devotes a full forty pages to the
theological exegesis of the text of John 1:14 (CD 1/2, 132-171).' However, we see the quoted text
rather differently. What Barth wants to say is not like a christology 'from above' in terms of the
incarnation of the Logos, but rather to show how the Word could become flesh so as to emphasise
His union with the human being in Jesus Christ. For this reason, Barth explicates 'The Word
became flesh (Jn 1:14)' in a separate way: 'The Word,' 'became,' and 'flesh' with equal articul¬
ation. Further, Puffenberger apparently misses Barth's ensuing statement in the same text that 'Every
question concerning the Word which is directed away from Jesus of Nazareth, the human being of
Jesus Christ, is necessarily and wholly directed away from Himself, the Word, and therefore from
God Himself, because the Word, and therefore God Himself, does not exist for us apart from the
human being Jesus Christ' (CD 1/1, 166). (William V. Puffenberger, The Word of God and
Hermeneutics in the Theologies of Karl Barth and Gerhard Ebeling [Boston: Boston University
Press, 1968], pp. 95-103, esp. 97). Having said this we sympathise with Puffenberger's contention
since his book does not cover late Barth at all, and in particular his christology.
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by insisting that, for Barth, the concept of incarnation stands at the very centre of
his christology. Perhaps for a similar reason, Peter C. Hodgson also puts Barth
within this line 'from above', without expanding this argument further however.5
According to Calvert, Barth combines the event of incarnation with the language
of the descent and ascent of the Son of God. Behind such an incarnational
christology Barth develops his doctrine of the Trinity in order to answer the
question of how the second person of the Trinity became a human being. The
difficulty of such an approach, according to Calvert, is that it presupposes the
divinity of Christ instead of presenting reasons for it. The approach 'from above'
recognises the real, historical human being only with difficulty.6
Both Rosato and Calvert's contentions are concerned with a matter of
methodology in approaching christology. This question of methodology is raised
by Wolfhart Pannenberg. He categorises the concepts 'from above' ('high') and
'from below' ('low' christology) mainly in terms of the methods of approach. He
asserts that christology 'from above' is intended to be one which primarily sets out
the divinity of Christ in which the concept of incarnation stands in the centre of
christology. 'Low' christology, on the other hand, begins with the historical Jesus,
moving to the recognition of his divinity. Christology 'from below' is concerned
chiefly with Jesus' 'message' and 'fate' and eventually leads to the concept of
incarnation, the pre-existent divinity.7
5
Peter C. Hodgson, Jesus-Word and Presence [New York: Oxford University Press, 1971], p.
61; similarly even though implicit by James H. Cone, The God of the Oppressed [New York: The
Seabury Press, 1975], p. 130.
6
Calvert, From Christ to God 13.
(Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man 33). So Pannenberg attempts to build his christology 'from
below', building a christology from Jesus' words and deeds.
Nonetheless, an incongruity of his argument appears when he states that '... while Christology
must begin with the man Jesus, its first question has to be that about his unity with God. ... The
specific element in the Christological question about Jesus ... does not begin with some preliminary
aspect of his words and deeds or his effects on men, but with his relation to God ... . Individual
aspects of his work and message as well as of his fate are then to be evaluated in this context'
(ibid., 36 ea). Then Pannenberg finds Jesus' unity with God not in an analysis of His words and
deeds, but in His resurrection.
Hodgson describes, in recognition of such a discrepancy, that 'The historical materials with
which Pannenberg starts in his effort to "prove" the divinity of Jesus are drawn from the Easter
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Given such an understanding of the 'from above' and the 'from below',
Pannenberg bluntly asserts that Barth's christology is a christology 'from above'.8
His reason is that Barth speaks about a 'history of incarnation': the humiliation of
the Son of God (CD IV/1) and the exaltation of the Son of Man (CD IV/2). Then
Barth combines both the two natures of, Jesus as God and man, and the doctrine
of humiliation and exaltation of the incarnate Son of God. Pannenberg points out
that this combination comes close to 'the basic outline of the Gnostic redeemer
myth.'9
Our question is whether, for Barth, the ground of epistemology precedes his
methodology of approach. Would Pannenberg's judgement be tenable if, for Barth,
the christological Sache, a well defined or refined content, determines his
christological approach? We question the labelling of Barth's christology as a
'high' christology purely on account of the method of christological approach,
particularly when we recognise the fact that Barth never absolutised his christolog¬
ical scheme, e.g. his method of christological approach. These questions will be
addressed later. So far, it may be noted that it is our intention to demonstrate that
Barth has been accused of having a christology 'from above' mainly on account of
his method of christological approach.
According to Pannenberg, the characteristic of a christology 'from above'
is that the doctrine of the Trinity is assumed. On this presupposition, the
christology 'from above' asks: 'how has the second person of the Trinity, the
Logos, assumed a human nature?'10 What Pannenberg means by this contention
is that Barth's christology is a christology 'from above', as his christology begins
with this presupposed Godhead (Trinity) 'from above'. Seen from the perspective
of the approaching method, it is true that Barth lays the doctrine of the Trinity as
traditions, not from the earthly ministry of Jesus. To get to the "above," Pannenberg in effect, starts
from above: the divine demonstration of the divinity (or divine sonship) of Jesus by means of his
resurrection from the dead' (Hodgson, Jesus-Word and Presence 21).
8
Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man 33-37.
9
Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man 33-34.
10
Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man 34.
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the christological ground and then sets it forth as the ontology of christology before
the discussion about christology per se. However, Barth's christology is not to be
understood entirely in terms of the method of approach. We therefore have to ask
whether Barth's christology does not go beyond this category of the method of
approach. That is to say, how would Pannenberg adequately reply to Barth's
consistent emphasis that the doctrine of the Trinity is nothing other than the
'exposition of revelation'?11 What implications would Pannenberg draw from
Barth's emphasis?
John Macquarrie is another figure who marks Barth's christology as a
christology 'from above', in view of his christological method of approach. He
argues that Barth begins his christology with the history of divine descent in the
Church Dogmatics IV/1, and continues with human ascent in the Church
Dogmatics IV/2. 'It was God who went into the far country, and it is man who
returns home.'12 However, the primary emphasis lies on the divine descent 'from
heaven' ('from above') and not the human ascent from earth ('from below'). For
Macquarrie, such a conventional model is an obvious reason for sealing Barth's
christology as a 'high' one. He consequently explicitly describes Barth's
christology thus, '... Barth's christology is ... a 'christology from above', that is to
say, it follows the classical pattern of speaking first of Christ's descent from the
Father, and then of his return.'13 Macquarrie is correct in so far as this is the
11
Yet Mclntyre points out that Barth's exposition of revelation is 'quite unhistorical' in its
character (John Mclntyre, The Shape of Christology [SCM Press, 1966], p. 159).
Kiing perceives such an unhistorical approach of Barth's as inevitable as his theological
epistemology depended radically on Anselm's dictum: Fides quaerens intellectum in which credo
ut intelligam was found. Faith was defined as the knowledge and affirmation of the Word of Christ.
But the problem was that this faith was quickly identified with the creed of Church. And Barth took
this for granted as his dogmatic approach. Church Dogmatics now became the reflection upon the
Creed, as already recited and affirmed. Consequently Barth elaborated the doctrine of the Trinity
not from the Bibliical witnesses but from the teaching of the 4th century (Hans Kiing, 'Karl Barth
after the Postmodern Paradigm' in: The Princeton Seminary Bulletin Vol. 9, No. 1, [1988], p. 23).
12
(CD IV/2, 21). Macquarrie's general critique of Barth's theology as a whole are quite
agreeable (ibid., pp. 278-288).
13*John Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought (London: Trinity & SCM Press, 1990),
p. 285. (-Jesus Christ in Modern Thought)
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pattern of Barth's description. Nevertheless, we ask whether the pattern itself is a
justifiable enough basis for such an assertion. Should our utmost concern not be
rather to understand christological, and as such, theological, meaning, reasons, and
implications of the pattern employed particularly in Barth, rather than judging his
christology in terms of the appearance of the employed pattern itself?
2. Christology 'from above' in view of the Rejection of 'Natural Theology'
A different reason for branding Barth's christology as a 'high' christology
comes from a view of his rejection of 'natural theology'. This reason is again given
by John Macquarrie. According to Macquarrie, the evidence of Barth having a
christology 'from above' is found in his cognizance of The Humanity of God in
Barth. Macquarrie acknowledges the modification of Barth's theology, and as such
of his christology, from The Epistle to the Romans to The Humanity ofGod. Barth
revises his early vigourous emphasis on the 'wholly otherness' of God in terms of
the 'humanity of God,' and yet Macquarrie supposes that this modification does not
make much difference to his early christological posture as 'from above'. So
Macquarrie, in stamping Barth's christology as a 'high' christology in spite of his
theological, and as such christological, emphasis on the humanity of God, depicts
it in the following fashion: 'The latter book [The Humanity of God\ allows for
some affinity between God and man, and therefore for the possibility of something
like incarnation.'14 However, 'Though talk of the 'absolute qualitative difference'
between God and man was muted, there was still, in Barth's view, no way from
man to God, no natural theology.'15 Likewise, Robert Jenson also presents Barth
14
Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought 352; see also John Macquarrie, S. Kierkegaard,
The Point of View (Harper & Row 1962), p. 16.
15
(Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought 284). Matczak's summary on Barth's view of
natural theology speaks well on its own, unless we count Barth's latest development on natural
theology (CD IV/3.1) (Sebastian A. Matczak, Karl Barth on God. The Knowledge of the Divine
Existence [London et al: St. Paul Publications, 1962], pp. 221-269).
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as holding a 'high' christology on the grounds that Barth rejects 'Natural Theol¬
ogy.'16
Similarly, Paul Tillich sees Barth as having a 'high' christology on the basis
of his disapproval of natural theology.17 Tillich's critique of Barth is succinct and
yet comprehensive enough to discuss. According to Tillich, Barth launches his
whole theology and as such his christology with the 'otherness of God': 'God is in
heaven and humankind is on earth'. There is no 'contact point' ('Ankniipfungspun-
kf) between God and His creatures. Human beings cannot know God unless God
reveals Himself. Consequently there is no way from human being to God, but only
from God to human beings. Tillich declares: 'Thus the Barthian theology, from first
to last, preserves the sovereign prerogative of God as expressed in the first
commandment. God's sovereignty is not blended with any form of human existence
and action.'18 In short, Tillich's declaration of Barth maintaining a christology
'from above' stems from the perspective of Barth's rejection of 'natural theology'.
Basically, Tillich agrees with Barth. God is God and human beings are
human beings. The kingly rule of God cannot be identified with human activities.
The kingly rule of God is purely a 'transcendental' and 'eschatological quan¬
tum.'19 As such, sound Christian theology can neither substitute the self-develop¬
ing personality for the place of the sinner, the self-developing religious man Jesus
for the place of Christ, or the self-developing religious consciousness of humanity
for the place of the Word of God in Scripture.
However, Tillich's constant argument is that Barth's total repudiation of
'natural theology' and as such of 'cultural theology' is wrong, because God does
not reveal Himself in a vacuum but in a tangible, visible, and experiential way.
There must be something to be touched by God if God seeks to communicate
16
Jenson, God after God (Indianapolis, 1969), p. 71.
Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, from Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to
Existentialism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967), pp. 535-539, esp. 539.
18
Paul Tillich, 'What is Wrong with the "Dialectic" Theology?' in: TJR (1935 April, Vol. XV
no. 2), p. 135. (=Tillich, Dialectic Theology 135)
19
Tillich, Dialectic Theology 134.
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Himself with earthly human beings. If so, then Christian theology should recognise
human beings and human reality such as culture, reason, history, and philosophy
of religion, as an important and necessary means of divine communication.
Tillich makes a number of further criticisms. For example, the statement
'God is in heaven and human being is on earth' can be made only if heaven and
earth have touched each other not only once, but continually in a process of history.
Human being, in this process, may understand the statement sometimes rightly or
sometimes wrongly. But this 'erring knowledge' cannot be regarded as an utter
ignorance about God; a concept which is held by Barth. Barth transformed the
whole history of religion into a "Witches' Sabbath" of ghostly fancies, idolatry, and
superstition'20 by undermining the value of erring knowledge about God.
Similarly, Tillich asks about human being in connection with Barth
measuring nature, culture, and history by a human standard. Tillich's argument is
that nature, culture, and history cannot be solely thought of apart from the divine.
They concern themselves:
neither solely with God as a remote reality nor solely with human self-glori¬
fication, but with erring and questioning knowledge about God. ... 'natural
theology' has very little to do with natural human wisdom in the general and
formal sense. Perhaps the conception 'natural theology' is itself the product of a
faulty supernatural ism.21
If revelation could not be received by means of human culture and human
phenomena it would be 'a destructive foreign substance'22 or 'a disruptive non-
human entity' which could have had no power to shape and direct human history.
Further, human perception tends to go beyond or transcend itself. But this
20
Tillich, Dialectic Theology 138-139.
21
(Tillich, Dialectic Theology 139-140). The theme of Tillich's whole article is that Barth's
theology is a 'supernaturalistic theology' rather than a 'dialectic theology'. See pp. 127-145 (ibid).
22
On the contrary, as for Barth, the power which converts people to Christianity derives from
the noetic power of the resurrection. There is a sovereignly operative power of revelation, of the
transition from Him to humankind, and therefore of His communication with humankind. But the
work of this power is not to destroy our earthliness, but to give a new determination (CD IV/2,
318). Of course Barth does not offer any clear answer to the question 'how', which is certainly a
difficult one to reply to. For theology, which speaks about the divine there always exists mystery.
Also, theology is primarily not a matter of scientific or logical proof, but of witness or confession.
Thus theological language will be eventually either sceptical language or doxological language.
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transcendentalising by no means suggests that human beings possess God or His
transcendence. Humanity raises the question of God and transcendence. Also, this
query is possible only because the transcendental draws us out beyond ourselves.23
Tillich agrees with Barth to the point that theology is not anthropology as if it
surrendered itself into the thought of Feuerbach. But theology is the answer to the
anthropological question. So Tillich writes: 'In general, Barth leaves unexplained
how revelation can communicate anything to man if there is nothing in him
permitting him to raise questions about it, impelling him toward it, and enabling
him to understand it.'24 Further, Barth' playing down of the historical-critical
method stands in danger of making his christology another type of the very
mysticism that he rejected. Revelation can neither be called into question nor
established by means of historical criticism. Yet the content of the event of revel¬
ation is passed on to us by historically bound witnesses. So the original meaning
of the text must first be interpreted. We cannot simply repeat the scriptural texts
without undertaking the critical process. Tillich thus says that 'Barth quite properly
makes his christology and his teaching about the word of God independent of the
results of historical criticism.'25 In short, Barth's christology is a christology 'from
above', because Barth builds his christology only upon the vertical power of divine
initiative from the 'heaven' ('from above') and not from the earth ('from below').
That is to say, Barth holds a christology 'from above' since he rejects natural
theology. We see Tillich's critiques in particular as legitimate as they stand in their
own period of theological setting.
However, these critiques and particularly this scepticism about Barth's
theological revision and as such these arguments that Barth still does not allow
natural theology, need to be questioned, since we clearly see Barth opening a new
23
(Tillich, Dialectic Theology 140). This thought is also held by Karl Rahner in the discussion
of the importance and necessity of the 'transcendental christology' (Karl Rahner, Foundations of
Christian Faith, an introduction to the idea of Christianity [London: Darton Longman & Todd,
1978], pp. 206-212; also Theological Investigation Vol. 13. 217-219).
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vista for 'natural theology' not only for its mere possibility but also for its reality.
We simply ask what would have been their responses had they really understood
the paradigm shift of Barth's christology and the centre of theological pivot within
the whole framework of the Church Dogmatics as well?
Now, the problem of the contentions of these scholars becomes even more
crucial when we realise its theological as well as its christological implication,
because these contentions suggest to us the fact that we cannot know God in or
through the humanity of Jesus Christ. Further, we ask whether or not the
implication of these contentions leads us to understand Barth as having a
'functional christology'. Namely, Barth 'functionalised' the humanity of Christ for
his dogmatic purpose in which the humanity is more or less dissolved into the
divinity of Jesus Christ. However, how would these contentions sustain this
implication of functionalisation when we see Barth's christology in the doctrine of
the Trinity which is the hermeneutical ground for a proper understanding of his
christology? To be more specific, these contentions will have to face Barth's
criticism of the tendency of the traditional christology: 'it [the older dogmatics] was
more interested in the former [the Godhead of Jesus Christ] than the latter [the
manhood of Jesus Christ]' (CD IV/2, 156), if these arguments are to be sustained.
For what Barth implies by this statement is that the humanity of Christ (human
being, 'from below') should by no means be pushed away at the expense of the
divinity of Christ (God, 'from above').
3. Christology 'from above' in view of the Dominance of the Divinity of
Christ over the Humanity of Christ, viz. Alexandrian Character in the
Usage of the Name 'Jesus Christ'
An impressive and relatively more comprehensive attempt for an understand¬
ing of Barth's christology emerges from Charles T. Waldrop. Unlike other
theologians, Waldrop takes a linguistic approach, focusing upon the doctrinal
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insight of Barth's christology. According to Waldrop, Barth's christological
language is theological in principle and not simply philosophical, linguistic or
semantic. His conclusion, based on this premise, is that Barth's christology is an
'Alexandrian' christology in its basic character rather than an 'Antiochian' one. The
fundamental issue between the two characters is whether Jesus Christ possesses the
inherent quality of divinity in which His divinity and humanity is understood as a
unity between two persons or two subjects,26 or whether His divinity is associated
with a role or function rather than with an intrinsic quality so that there is only one
person in Jesus Christ.27 As a result, while Antiochian christology has been
accused of professing two Sons or two Christs, Alexandrian christology has been
accused of tending towards the Monophysite doctrine. What Waldrop, by this
clarification, implies is that Barth's christology is a christology 'from above'. Being
concerned primarily with the oneness of the christological subject or hypostasis,
Alexandrian christology virtually dissolved the humanity of Jesus into the divinity
of Jesus. Since the divinity of Jesus is the real Subject of Jesus Christ, the humanity
of Jesus is nothing other than a second stage of His divine existence. For Alexan¬
drian thought, the human person or the human nature of Jesus Christ which the
Logos assumed in the incarnation is not identified with the individual named
'Jesus'. Jesus Christ is divine prior to, and apart from, his existence as a human
being. The human being is therefore not a complete individual person in its own
right. For Antiochian theology, two personal subjects - the divine person God and
the human person Jesus - are united in one reality, whilst for the Alexandrian camp,
26
Claude Welch holds this understanding (Claude Welch, In This Name: The Doctrine of the
Trinity in Contemporary Theology [New York: 1952], pp. 169-183; 222). (=Welch, In This Name
169-183; 222)
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Mclntyre holds this view by differentiating revelation from its 'form' or 'medium.' Revel¬
ation is not 'a theophany, the naked appearance of God before us. ... Revelation, any revelation,
therefore entails some kind of diminution of God's stature, some form of kenosis' (John Mclntyre,
The Shape ofChristology [SCM Press, 1966], p. 154). The reason is that '... if the medium and the
subject of revelation are identical and thus known directly, there is no occasion for revelation' {ibid.,
169). For a fuller discussion about the revelation model, see ibid., pp. 83-113, and pp. 144-176 in
particular.
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the name 'Jesus' denotes the one divine person.28 To prove his judgment on Barth
to be accurate, Waldrop refers to the textual evidence from the Church Dogmatics.
The proof proceeds from the fundamental question of whether Barth's use of the
name 'Jesus Christ' denotes the divine person or the human person, or whether
sometimes uses the name 'Jesus Christ' to denote the human person and sometimes
the divine person.29
Waldrop admits that Barth sometimes incorporates the Antiochian character
of christology in which the human nature of Jesus is understood as a single person
and a distinct human person apart from his divinity or his relation to God.30 Yet,
Waldrop proposes that the overall direction of Barth's christology and its character
suggests that the humanity of Jesus is not a fully independent human person but a
partial person. The human nature of Jesus is not a complete individual person in its
own right. Waldrop states:
The specific human nature of the Lord is not, for Barth, a complete person in
itself, although it is, in some sense, personal. It possesses its own will, soul, body,
personality, and even its self-consciousness, and it is related to the Logos in obedi¬
ence and fellowship; yet it is, in the final analysis, less than a personC
Similarly, Waldrop even goes on to say that '... Barth conceives of the unity
of God and man in Christ as a unity between the person God and a specimen of
human nature which is not a person.'32 As such Barth's use of the name 'Jesus'
and 'Jesus of Nazareth' does not denote a human subject, even though he uses the
terms to connote the divine Logos in His being and action as a human being.33 In
other words, whereas the divinity of Jesus Christ is the determinative subject of
Barth's christology His humanity has an 'assistant function', so to speak. So what
Barth promotes is not a notion of 'participatory' divinity, but one of an 'intrinsic'
28
(Charles T. Waldrop, Karl Barth's Christology its basic alexandrian character [Berlin:
Mouton Publisher, 1984], pp. vii-3). (=Waldrop, Barth's Alexandrian Character). For a doctrinal
definition of the two understandings in the history of Christian doctrine see (J.N.D. Kelly, Early
Christian Doctrines 2nd ed. [New York: Harper, 1958], pp. 317-321).
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divinity."54
Waldrop is inclined to say that Barth underscored the full humanity of Jesus
Christ at the expense of his 'Alexandrian character' of christology. He then
criticises Barth by turning to nothing less than Barth's doctrine of the Trinity. If
Jesus Christ is the second mode of God's being, then He must be none other than
God Himself. The doctrine of the Trinity provides the answer to the question of the
ontology of christology. As a corollary, Waldrop declares:
Since Barth identifies Jesus Christ with revelation, his insistence that Christian
theology must begin with revelation means that it must begin with Jesus Christ.
In addition, because Jesus Christ is also of the same divine essence as the Father
and the Holy Spirit, to begin with revelation is to begin with the divinity of Jesus
Christ.35
Waldrop is correct in so far as he says that for Barth Jesus Christ is primarily God
Himself.36 Certainly Barth has constantly stressed the oneness of the christological
subject, lest we fall into any idea of Christianity having two Gods. It is also true
that Barth consistently reminds us of the fact that it is God and not humankind who
is the Subject of christology and as such the Subject of Barth's doctrine of recon¬
ciliation.
Nonetheless, our questions are what Barth means by the emphasis upon the
divine subject? What is the epistemological ground of this revelation? What is the
origin of Barth's perception that Jesus Christ is the second mode of God's being?
Is the perception of Barth's preconceived idea about the 'Trinity' prior to the
particular revelation? Above all, Waldrop's argument again places the issue on the
problem of 'functional christology,' since marking Barth's christology as a
christology 'from above' in terms of an Alexandrian christology clearly suggests
to us the fact that whereas the divinity is the Subject of christology, the humanity
as a predicate of the Subject plays an assistant role. The humanity of Christ is not
an independent whole person. Moreover, such a subjugatory understanding of the
j4
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humanity of Christ inevitably faces the issue of anhypostasis-enhypostasis.
For Waldrop, an 'Alexandrian character' in christology means the
dominance of the divinity of Christ over the humanity of Christ. Macquarrie
describes this divine dominance as an 'asymmetrical participation' in the
participation of the two natures between the divine and the human in Jesus Christ.
Because, Macquarrie quotes: 'his divine essence is that which is originally proper
to him, and his human essence is only adopted by him and assumed to it ... the
determination of his divine essence is to his human, and the determination of his
human essence from his divine.'37 This teaching undermines the full humanity of
Jesus Christ and pushes us in a 'monophysite direction.'38 By saying this,
Macquarrie insists that Barth's christology is a 'catabatic' christology, a christology
'from above', rather than an 'anabatic' christology, a christology 'from below'.39
Argued in such a way, Macquarrie understands the phrase 'from above' in terms
of the lack of the full humanity of Jesus Christ. Differently put, Barth's christology
is understood as a 'high' christology in terms of the dominance of the divinity over
the humanity of Christ or in terms of the imbalance between the two natures. But
in portraying Barth's christology as a christology 'from above' we will have to deal
again with Barth's clear cut statement that the history of Christian dogmatics tended
to be more interested in the divinity of Christ rather than the humanity of Christ
{CD IV/2, 156).
We wonder whether Waldrop as well as Macquarrie did not rather single out
a certain character or clause of Barth's christology, and then expand it in
accordance with their theses instead of reading Barth in a holistic way, viz. treating
his christology through theological content, direction, meaning, and implication en
masse. In short, these observations need to be examined in the light of Barth's
articulation of the dolus Christus.'
37
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4. Christology 'from above' in terms of Barth's Preference for Meaning
(Interpretation) over Fact
A harsh and intelligent critique of Barth's christology appears in the work
of Robert Jenson. It is true that Jenson does not explicitly employ the metaphors
'from above' or 'from below', yet we have to deal with his observation of Barth's
christology because the implication of his argument stands directly against our
thesis. Jenson proposes that Barth 'simply reversed the order'40 of christology
from the nineteenth century's telling of the story of man and then sought the role
of Christ in that story to question first the role of Christ. In other words, Barth
reversed the christological order from-fact-into-meaning to from-meaning-into-fact.
Barth's christology is orientated in its character not from historical fact but
primarily in a meaning pursuing christology. Meaning pursuing christology
effectively operates on the basis of rational capacity. So unless our rational capacity
reaches a certain level for understanding we cannot properly follow meaning
pursuing christology.
This implies that 'meaning christology' could be ambiguous as it could be
understood in different ways. Hence for some, or perhaps for many, meaning
christology would be nothing but a christology which is beyond their comprehen¬
sion, so to speak. Consequently, meaning christology limits its boundary of reality
to a certain intellectual realm rather than fleshing itself out, at least from the point
of human understanding. In contrast, 'fact christology' concerns itself chiefly with
descriptions of a certain fact. And fact as a simple object exposes itself to all
rational humankind in virtue of its concrete visibility and palpability. Surely
responsible christology presupposes fact before interpretation and meaning. But, as
we noted, in 'meaning christology', understanding or meaning, stands in a different
realm from fact, although meaning is derives from fact. The point we are making
here is simple. Meaning refers to metaphysical ('high') reality whilst fact refers to
physical ('low') reality. For Jenson, this implies that Barth has a 'high' christology
to the extent that his christology speaks over people's heads since it explains
40
Jenson, God after God 69.
I. An Analysis of the Views ofBarth Interpreters 41
something 'from above', and thus his christology does not speak to the world
reality.
Jenson intensifies the view that Barth holds a 'from above' christology by
stating that, 'A story of man prior to Christ's story does not occur, and never has
occurred. There is no human life in itself, ... Rather the event of Jesus Christ's life
... is the eternal presupposition of all else that happens.'41 This indication proves
to be true as Jenson continues to say that
Not one word of what is said in the Commentary on Romans is withdrawn. But
where abstract eternity was, Jesus of Nazareth now stands. ... the predestining God
... is now Jesus Christ; the decree of predestination is the decision made in his life
about us. Indeed, the entire pattern of the dialectic we traced remains quite
unaltered in Barth's post-1930 theology.42
We ask, why does Jenson not take Barth's paradigm shift from abstract
eternity to Jesus of Nazareth seriously? Is Jenson's impression about Barth's early
idea of the 'otherness of God' expressed primarily in the Commentary on Romans
still not too great to see the reversal of the reversal made by Barth himself? Does
Jenson not oversimplify the constant development of Barth's thought? Jenson
actually criticises Barth even more harshly: 'If one went through the Commentary
on Romans and replaced the tangential intersection of time and eternity with the
story narrated by the second article of the Apostle's Creed, he would obtain the
theology of the Church Dogmatics!43
However, Jenson's is rather harsh description of Barth's christology with far
more negative an undertone than many other of Barth's interpreters. For our part,
we must come to terms with the question of perspective. Why should we not
conceive the insight of the 'otherness of God' from the point of view of the
'tangential intersection of time and eternity', rather than the other way around? Is
Jenson's hermeneutical standpoint balanced enough or too biased for a proper
interpretation of Barth's christology? So much for the argument. Jenson's
interpretation of Barth's use of the copula 'A' elicits our special attention. Indeed,
41
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the implication of interpretation topples not only the intention and meaning of
Barth's trinitarian hermeneutics but also its content. To come to the point, Jenson's
interpretation of Barth's use of the copula 'is' again raises a serious question
whether or not Barth functionalised 'Jesus-ology' for the sake of 'Christ-ology'.
Further, Jenson, with help from others,44 argues that Barth abolished the
duality of God and Jesus, Creator and creature, sinner and saint, Jesus and
ourselves, and Church and society, which is essential to Christian faith and thought.
Jenson insists that the vigour of Barth's christological 'is' does not mean ident¬
ity.45 The reason for this is that throughout his dogmatics, Barth by this 'is' means
nothing other than an 'analogy,' 'image,' or 'reflection.'46 Then Jenson presumes
that if Barth were to limit the 'is' in any way he would have said: God is 'very
like' Jesus. We are Christ's, 'if we behave such and such. Christ is 'intended' to
be the lord of the civil community. With this presumption Jenson again affirms that
Barth would thus fall back to his position before the Commentary on Romans.41
This insistence needs to be countered by the question: how would Jenson
respond to Barth's clear teaching that 'Jesus is like us and unlike us'? What would
Jenson think of the fact that Barth did not say that God is man or man is God, but
rather spoke of the divinity of God and the humanity of God? Can Barth's
emphasis upon both sides be easily undermined? Would Jenson expect Barth to say
'simply' that God is man or man is God? Macquarrie, at this juncture, needs to be
mentioned since he somewhat anticipates this simple equation. Macquarrie's
understanding of Barth's christology as one 'from above' derived from the fact that
Barth still talks of the humanity of God, and not the humanity of Jesus Christ, or
44
Van Buren, Roman Catholics in general, Gustav Wingren, and Wiliam Hamilton (Jenson,
God after God 74, cf. fns. 29-31; 33).
45
Jenson, God after God 74.
46
Jenson specifically refers to the terms such as 'Christ ... exists analogously to God's way
of existing' (CD IV/2, 166: KD 185); Jesus' actions and words 'mirrors and copies' God's actions
and words {CD IV/2, 180: KD 200ff); And the terms of 'repetition' {Wiederholung), 'correspon¬
dence' (Entsprechung), 'copy' {Nachbildung), or 'resemblance' (Ahnlichkeit); English edition
translates this as 'similarity' {CD III/2, 219: KD 261).
47
Jenson, God after God 74.
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the humanity of man, or any other such term.48 Should the terms not be under¬
stood separately in their own context rather than simply integrating and generalising
the specific insight of the terms? Further, if the 'is' has not an ontological but a
functional role, does Jenson not then negate the ground of Barth's theology per se,
the doctrine of the Trinity, which is for him the hermeneutical principle in the
Church Dogmatics? Then, it is critical to ask whether Jenson has not overlooked
Barth's discussion about the Royal Man {CD IV/2), because we regard it as the
christological bulwark for the christology 'from below'.
5. Earth's Christology as both 'from above' and 'from below'
John Thompson, in basic agreement with Bertold Klappert, classifies Barth's
christology as a christology both 'from above' and 'from below'. This classification
is occasioned by Barth's treatment of christology in the dipolar movements: the
Father's going into the far country, incarnation {CD IV/1, § 59), and the Son's
returning home, exaltation {CD IV/2, § 64). Barth's christology is not only
concerned with God's humiliation, but also with Man's exaltation. Hence, 'His
method can more correctly be described as 'from above to below' and vice
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versa.
Thompson's observation is much fairer to Barth than the other critiques
encountered above. Indeed, Barth portrays his christology as being from the two
movements: 'from above' and 'from below'. For the purpose of our thesis,
however, we further ask what the ground and the locus for the movement are. We
understand this ground to be for Barth the theologia crucifixionis, not only as the
essence of the christology 'from below', but also as one of the two christological
underpinnings (with the resurrection) in Barth's whole christology. In addition,
48
'It is important to note, however, that he [Barth] talks of the humanity of God, never of the
divinity of man' (Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought 284).
49
(John Thompson, Christ in Perspective in the Theology ofKarl Barth [London & Edinburgh:
1978], p. 17). For a short discussion see ibid., pp. 16-18.
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insofar as we seek a proper evaluation of Barth's christology, our pursuit leads us
to go beyond these dual scheme (both 'from above' and 'from below'), because this
reality or locus, which is beyond this dual scheme, shows where Barth's christology
really leads and what he really means by these dual scheme.
Summary
Our analysis shows that the quoted scholars, except John Thompson,
unanimously label Barth's christology as a christology 'from above'; and yet these
judgements were made from various points of view. Some, for example Pannenbe-
rg, Rosato, and Macquarrie judge Barth's christology in view of the method of a
christological approach. Others, for example Tillich, Macquarrie, and Jenson argue
that Barth has a christology 'from above' in view of Barth's rejection of 'natural
theology'. As yet another view is taken by, for example Waldrop and Macquarrie,
who argue that Barth's christology is a christology 'from above' because in it the
divinity of Christ still prevails over his humanity. Consequently, Barth subordinates
the humanity of Christ to his divinity. Barth does not allow any possibility of
building christology 'from below' as he demarcates radically between the two lines
of God and man. Jenson is even harsher by saying that, in fact, Barth has not
changed his christology 'from above' in spite of his apparent paradigm shift. Some
like Rosato insist that Barth holds a christology 'from above' in terms of his
advocating 'Logos christology,' a concept which is a highly ambiguous one in
comparison with having a 'life-act christology' of the man Jesus, so to speak.
Differently put, Barth promotes a christology 'from above' because, for him,
interpreting the meaning precedes the fact rather than allowing the fact to lead to
a certain meaning. Additionally, we saw a much more appropriate assessment of
Barth's christology, conserving a christology both 'from above' and 'from below'.
Facing such a variety of reasons for marking Barth's christology as a
christology 'from above', we will in the following chapters investigate whether the
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above judgments are appropriate. Yet, our discussion will go beyond these labelling
categories in order further to develop our understanding of the significance of the
'from below' element in Barth's christology. In addition, we see our going beyond
these categories as perfectly proper and necessary insofar as we are truly concerned
with a fair and responsible account of Barth's christology and not a biased or
distorted picture of it.
CHAPTER THREE
Christology 'from above' Examined in Barth's Christology
Having analysed the diverse aspects of Barth's interpreters, this chapter will
examine the tenability of labelling Barth's christology as a christology only 'from
above' in light of this christology.
I. The Precedence of Epistemology over Methodology
One of the major reasons indeed the most common one for charging Barth
with having a christology 'from above' is occasioned by his taking the pattern of
traditional christology, the incarnation of the Logos. Barth's christology proceeds
from divine descent to human ascent. In other words, Barth's christology begins
with the divinity of christology in which the notion of incarnation stands in its
centre. Barth's christology is all about the history of incarnation, the incarnation of
the Logos. This charge is held particularly by John Macquarrie, Wolfhart
Pannenberg, and Philip J. Rosato. The accusation would be reasonable enough if
it simply means the apparent method of approach alone, that is, that Barth begins
his christology first of all with the divine incarnation 'from above', from the
Incarnate Logos, and not from the historical Jesus. In short, one of the issues
involved here is associated with the method of Barth's christological approach.
Barth's christology is 'from above' because he approaches it first of all with Logos
christology, with a pattern of divine incarnation, with divine movement 'from
above'.
However, this charge is an oversimplification and therefore it is highly
questionable whether it can bear its implication sufficiently. Certainly modern
theology, not to mention modern science, heavily depends on a certain methodology
to get a right knowledge, or to verify the object of its studies. Thus the same object
could be understood differently according to the methodology employed, because,
methodology has as one its functions that of interpretation as it is often based upon
a certain previous knowledge and therefore it limits the result to a certain extent.
Consequently methodology often not only determines our understanding of the
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content but also predetermines our understanding or epistemology. As such,
methodology plays a very significant role in modern theology as well as in modern
science and in the academic world. But methodology, no matter how important,
cannot always be taken for granted as the determinative axiom for our knowledge
throughout the academic world. This relativity is conspicuous especially in the case
of Barth's christology. This implies that we have to question the direction, goal,
and especially presupposition of the approaching method, because no methodology
stands sui generis but for a certain purpose. This suggests, with respect to our
thesis, that as far as a proper understanding of Barth's christology is concerned, we
have to go beyond the realm of his method of approach by asking what he means
by the incarnation of Logos. In other words, what is the reason for taking this
approach and what does he point tol
Insofar as christological reason is concerned, Barth begins with the history
of divine incarnation in order to clarify the ontology of christology.1 He wishes to
clarify the subject matter of christology, namely to clarify who Jesus Christ is and
who we are who talk of christology. For the necessity of clarification Barth states:
... God's deity in Jesus Christ consists in the fact that God Himself in Him is the
subject who speaks and acts with sovereignty. ... He is the initiator, founder,
preserver, and fulfiller of the covenant. He is the sovereign Lord. ... Without the
condescension of God there would be no exaltation of man. As the Son of God
and not otherwise, Jesus Christ is the Son of Man. This sequence is irreversible.
God's independence, omnipotence, and eternity, God's holiness and justice and
thus God's deity, in its original and proper form, is the power leading to this
effective and visible sequence in the existence of Jesus Christ.2
For Barth, the fundamental issue of christology is about who and why Jesus Christ
in particular was and is to be our Reconciler or Saviour. So Barth asks that 'If God
is not truly and altogether in Christ, what sense can there be in talking about the
reconciliation of the world with God in Him?' (CD IV/1, 183). It is worth noting
that Barth clearly remarks that the reconciliation of the world took place in the
existence of 'this man [Jesus of Nazareth].' Yet our natural question is who is this
1
Theologically this ontology reflects upon the framework of the doctrine of the Trinity.
Christologically this ontology is mirrored in terms of the Initiator or Reconciler.
2
Karl Barth, The Humanity of God (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1960), p. 48.
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man then? According to Barth, this question is a matter of theological assumption
as he states that 'we must still know what we are presuming to say in this statement
[that the reconciliation took place in this man Jesus of Nazareth]' (CD IV/1, 183).
In the preliminary of section 2 on The Judge Judged in Our Place (CD IV/1) which
is an intensive discussion of the crucifixion, Barth acknowledges that The Way of
the Son of God into the Far Country is the revelation of His deity, i.e., the
christological movement 'from above to below'. However, this is very unlikely to
advocate his christology as a 'from above' or 'high' christology. For the movement
'from above' is not an end in itself but aims at the movement 'from below'. So
Barth clearly notes that 'But now we enter a whole sphere of new considerations.
For this way has an end, a scope, a meaning. It does not contradict His deity, ...
It conforms supremely to it' (CD IV/1, 211 ea). That is to say, 'We [Barth] had to
know who the servant is who is here actively at work as subject. We [Barth] had
to know that He is the Lord, the Lord of all lords, the one true God' (CD IV/1, 211
ea) although Barth is concerned with the christology 'from below' no less than that
of the christology 'from above'.3 For this reason, 'in ascribing to this man in His
unity with God a divine being and nature, it is not speaking only or even primarily
of Him but of God' (CD IV/1, 183). As such the incarnation story concerns the
origin of the event of reconciliation. In other words, the primary aim of the
approach 'from above' is to ask and to ensure how the event of reconciliation took
place.
This adduces one of our definitions of christology 'from below'. We mean that Barth's
christology is one 'from below' by the fact that, for him, the event of the crucifixion is the core of
the doctrine of reconciliation; christology. Secondly, this event of crucifixion is worked out, not in
the heavenly sphere or the realm somewhere 'from above', but in the reality of humankind, on earth.
This point of view will be more intensively dealt with in chapter four.
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1. Theo-logical Decision
Certainly, in his preliminary discussion of the doctrine of reconciliation
Barth notes that the divine promise, the atonement made in Jesus Christ, has come
down 'from above, from God into the world' (CD IV/1, 119). This standpoint
derives from his christological axiom that we cannot responsibly speak about
christology unless God reveals Himself to us 'from above'. This necessarily
resulted in Barth launching his christology not on the historical man Jesus of
Nazareth, but on the incarnation of the Logos. So ostensibly the christology 'from
above' predominates in Barth's christology, as many argue. However, it could be
said that mentioning these issues prior to all others in christology is for Barth a
theo-logical decision. For him, the reconciliation presupposes the being and act of
God.4 This presupposition proposes that humankind cannot save itself from its
predicament and thus is in need of a Saviour from outwith itself. This proposition
is clearly shown in Barth's exposition in the Very God and Very Man. The section
focuses on 'The Word became flesh' (CD 1/2, 132-171). The overall emphasis in
the interpretation is that the Word truly became flesh. But what Barth first of all
does is clarify who the Subject is in the flesh. According to him, the Word is the
'Subject' in the flesh. This implies that the incarnation cannot be regarded as one
of its 'evolutionary possibilities,' because 'man and man's history are stamped and
hallmarked by the Fall' (CD 1/2, 134). For this reason, God condescended Himself
'from outside, from above' (CD IV/1, 158) to save humankind from its predica¬
ment. Humankind is saved. But since its salvation occurred by 'God' Barth
ruminates upon the meaning of 'true God' in regard to the condescension before
dealing with other issues, and theological or christological phenomena.
According to Barth, God becoming a human being is simply an incredible
event, because it is impossible for a true and holy God to become a sinful human
4
'It is also true of the fruit of it [atonement] brought forth by the Holy Spirit, and the existence
of the Christian community and the human decision of faith. But because we are dealing with the
true Lord God, because it is a matter of the atonement which was made and is made in His action
and work' (CD IV/1, 159 ea).
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being. Yet accepting the witness of Scripture, it is the Novum mysterium {CD 1/2,
172-202), the 'impossible possibility.'5 In other words, if the divine incarnation is
truly the 'impossible possibility' then this paradoxically exhibits the theo-logical
criterion for distinguishing the true God from false gods. In sorting out the
theological criterion, theological canon, Barth notes that '... what distinguishes the
man Jesus as the Son of God is that which apparently stands in the greatest possible
contradiction to the being of God: the fact that in relation to God ... this man wills
only to be obedient.'6 The divine incarnation demonstrates the fact that only true
God can become flesh like us by making possible that which is truly impossible.
Thus Barth lays a theological corner-stone by saying that 'The true God-if the man
Jesus is the true God-is obedient. We have to keep before us the difficulty of this
question if we are to be clear what we have to understand and to accept or reject
as the content of the New Testament witness to Christ.'7 Indeed, it is not the being
of the man Jesus himself who has come down 'from above', but the Son of God
'as the suffering servant of God' {CD IV/1, 164). This being the case, exploring the
story of divine humiliation, the movement 'from above', was necessary before
exploring the story of human exaltation, the movement 'from below'. Barth says:
... God shows Himself to be the great and true God in the fact that He can and
will let His grace bear this cost, that He is capable and willing and ready for this
condescension, this act of extravagance, this far journey. What marks out God
above all false gods is that they are not capable and ready for this. In their
5
(CD Ii/1, 532). We paraphrase the term in a positive sense. The term first appears to describe
the problem of the existence of evil. The evil (like shadow), exists and exposes its identity, only
as the light of the crucifixion shines, i.e., the root of evil is annihilated at the crucifixion. So
although evil still 'exists' and 'works' in our reality it exists and works only as 'unreal real,' 'untrue
true,' and 'impossible possibility' (CD III/3, 289-368). However the limit of Barth's view of evil
is that it does not reach the problem of what we call today 'natural evil'. In other words, Barth did
not deal with the problem of natural catastrophes such as earthquakes, from the perspective of
natural evil, which obviously has nothing to do with human will or human power or relationships.
6
(CD IV/1, 164 ea). It is illuminating, with regard to our insistence that Barth 'envisioned' the
christology 'from below' even though he was still talking of the christology 'from above', that Barth
is concerned with the man Jesus 'from below' while he is talking of the divine incarnation 'from
above', The Way of the Son of God into the Far Country {CD IV/1, 164-165).
'Der wahre Gott - wenn denn der Mensch Jesus wahrer Gott ist - ein Gehorsamer! Man muss
sich schon die Harte dieser Gleichung vor Augen halten, um sich klar zu machen, was man als
Inhalt des neutestamentlichen Christuszeugnisses zu verstehen, anzunehmen oder eben abzulehnen
haf {CD IV/1, 164; KD IV/1, 179).
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otherworldliness and supernaturalness and otherness, etc., the gods are a reflection
of the human pride which will not unbend, which will not stoop to that which is
beneath it. God is not proud. In His high majesty He is humble. It is in this high
humility that He speaks and acts as the God who reconciles the world to Himself.
It is under this aspect first that we must consider the history of the atonement.
That is why the title of this chapter [Vol. IV/1, section 59, chapter XIV] is 'Jesus
Christ, the Lord as Servant.' At every point we shall be dealing with the action
and work of the Lord God. ... It is also true of the fruit of it [atonement] brought
forth by the Holy Spirit, and the existence of the Christian community and the
human decision of faith. But because we are dealing with the true Lord God,
because it is a matter of the atonement which was made and is made in His action
and work, we have to do with Him in that form of a servant which as the true
Lord He was capable and willing and ready to assume in order to exist in it, and
in which He is true Lord God and as such the true Reconciler of man with God
(<CD IV/1, 159 ea).
Certainly, The Way of the Son ofGod into the Far Country is the demonstration of
the movement of His divine Sonship 'from above to below'. Yet 'we had to begin
with this side-the doctrine of the 'person of Christ' - because it is the presupposi¬
tion of everything that follows ... in our attempt to understand the whole
reconciliation of the world with God' (CD IV/1, 211 ea). In short, this 'particular'
history of divine self-obedience is the 'indispensable basis and substance of all that
follows' in christology. 'It [the divine humiliation] is a matter of the whole Christ
and the whole atonement from this one standpoint.'8
In defining the being of Jesus Christ as the unity of the being of the living
God and living man Barth stresses that, 'It is a being, but a being in a history' (CD
IV/1, 126). This is why Barth warns us not simply to dismiss his early Theologie
der Offenbarung as if it is useless because the early theology 'constitutes the
presupposition of that which must be further considered today.' So Barth states: 'He
... who still may not be impressed with the fact that God is God, would certainly
8
(CD IV/1, 159). Ebeling rightly points out that the intention of traditional Logos-flesh
christology, christology 'from above', is not in the least an intention to describe an epistemological
direction, but rather to reflect the direction of the event itself-from God to mankind. The real
meaning of christology 'from above' is the movement from God to humankind, in which God alone
is the giver, and humanity the recipient. In this regard, all christology must be 'from above'
(Gerhard Ebeling, Lectures on Christology, University of Tubingen, Summer Semester 1967, pp.
177-182; quoted by Peter C. Hodgson, Jesus-Word and Presence [Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1971], p. 68). Similar views are found in Donald M Baillie and P.R. Baelz (Donald M Baillie, God
Was in Christ [London: 1955], p. 20; P.R. Baelz 'A deliberate mistake?' S.W. Sykes & J.P. Clayton
(eds.) in: Christ, Faith and History [Cambridge, 1972], p. 33).
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not see what is now to be said in addition as the true word concerning His
humanity.'9
The christological necessity of dealing with the incarnation story ('from
above to below') in the first place, in spite of the fact that Barth's christology
9
(Barth, Humanity ofGod 42). '... You [God] are not that through another but through Your
[God's] very self (Anselm, Proslogion ch. XII, p. 133). Bonaventure, in applying Anselm's view
of this ontological proof of the existence of God, further to Anselm's assertion that God is the being
who [alone] exists in a strict and absolute sense (Proslogion, ch. XXII, p. 145), comments that 'If
God is God, God exists. And since the antecedent is evident, the conclusion is evident likewise.'
Yet, Brecher argues that Bonaventure's paraphrase of Anselm's thought in terms of'God
is God' is highly ambiguous. Assuming that Bonaventure's 'God is God' is an accurate
interpretation of Anselm's view that God is maximally real, then 'God' is functioning in both
instances as a proper name. But since proper names are not definitions but only descriptions,
Anselm's view that 'God is God,' re-presented by Bonaventure, is not a definition of God, but a
description of God. Therefore, Bonaventure's 'God is God' would be that 'God [=proper name] is
God [descriptive predicable]; therefore he exists.' So Brecher puts forward the former word as
'God' and the latter as 'god' in his thesis (Robert Brecher, Anselm's Argument. The logic ofdivine
existence, Avebury Series in Philosophy, [Gower Publishing Company, Blackmore Press, 1985], p.
108).
The significance of Brecher's exposition lies in its implication that such an expression as
'God is God' cannot mute our recurring questions about 'who,' 'why,' and 'how' the existence and
the act of God is. For Barth, this phrase 'God is God,' undoubtedly received from Anselm's thought
and Bonaventure's re-presentation in such a formulation, is the last resort in answering the questions
about 'how,' 'why,' and 'what' in connection with the act and existence of God. This wording
implies that, strictly speaking, human beings cannot know or question His act and existence, because
God is different from human beings. Nevertheless, if the second word 'God' is an 'adjective' so that
it describes who and what God is (Being), Barth's emphasis that 'God is God' cannot keep human
beings silent regarding the existence and act of God because the 'God' (noun) could be understood
in many different ways depending on what natures or characters we attribute to the adjective 'God',
and thus to the noun 'God'. Hence, such an implication simply uncovers the insufficiency of the
phrase 'God is God' in describing the 'how,' 'why,' and 'what/who' God is in the existence and
act of God, the phrase with which Barth wished to satisfy the questions raised above.
This insufficiency is what Brecher means when he concludes his thesis by saying that, in
Anselm's view the God of the Judaeo-Christian tradition cannot have the attributes of eternity and
self-sufficiency. Anselm contended that 'a necessary being must be eternal and self-sufficient'. But,
Brecher asks whether it is conceivable that God should be such an entity, and whether it is logically
possible that an eternal and self-sufficient being should act in the world. Additionally, Anselm's
question of the existence of God contains two questions: is, to ask if God exists, the same as to ask
if it is possible to talk coherently of God's existence, and vice versa. However, it is not possible
to say that 'God exists' is necessarily true. Therefore the God of Christianity could not possibly
exist unless a satisfactory account of God-talk is available, and according to Brecher, this has not
been available. This unavailability means that Anselm's ontological argument raises the question
of availability rather than answering the set question. This 'questioning' is what Brecher implies by
insufficiency {ibid., pp. 114-116). Incidentally, Brecher proceeds his thesis with the view that
Anselm's Proslogion in the context of Platonic metaphysics {ibid., pp. 3-4), while Barth perceives
Proslogion as an entirely theological discussion, an exposition of faith (Barth, Anselm: Fides
Quaerens Intellectum [London: SCM Press, 1960], p. 165).
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anchors at and envisions the man Jesus of Nazareth ('from below to above'), is
well expressed in his understanding of the method of treating the doctrine of
reconciliation. According to Barth, whereas the humiliation of Jesus Christ is the
work of reconciliation in its 'first form,' the exaltation of Jesus Christ is its 'second
form' (CD IV/1, 134-135). This 'first' or 'second' is not simply to mean that his
christology is one 'from above' as such. For the two movements are not of the two
status of Jesus Christ which succeed one another, but of two 'sides' or 'directions'
or 'forms.' This is the 'twofold action' and as such the 'actuality' of His work (CD
IV/1, 133). Similarly, to refer to the divinity and the humanity of Jesus Christ is not
to ascribe to Him two different persons or natures, but the free act of the one God-
man. The two are to be explicated in 'mutual relationship' (CD IV/1, 134). The
reason is this.
The New Testament obviously speaks of Jesus Christ in both these ways: the one
looking and moving, as it were, from above downwards, the other from below
upwards. It would be idle to try to conclude which of the two is the more original,
authentic and important. Both are necessary. Neither can stand or be understood
without the other. A Christ who did not come in the flesh, who was not identical
with the Jesus of Nazareth who suffered and died under Pontius Pilate, would not
be the Christ Jesus-and a Jesus who was not the eternal Word of God, and who
as man was not raised again from the dead would not be the Jesus Christ-of the
New Testament.10
The two natures and the two movements of Jesus Christ should be under¬
stood in terms of the totus Christus, because it is 'His' being and 'His' work.11
This raises a practical question as to who and which one should be the first
10
(CD IV/1, 135 ea). The movement of'from above to below' and 'from below to above' are
'two elements of the one grace' (CD IV/1, 136). 'For that reason its [New Testament] statements
concerning Him always move in either the one direction or the other, from above downwards or
from below upwards' (Ibid); 'Eben darum laufen seine Aussagen iiber ihn immer wieder entweder
in die eine oder in die andere Richtung: von oben nach unten oder von unten nach oben' (KD IV/1,
149). These statements clearly mute the voices of those who charge Barth as having a christology
'from above'. Further, it is crucial, for the purpose of our thesis, to take special attention of the
second half of the quotation. What Barth means by the God 'from above' is nothing more than the
God 'from below', the fleshed, the man Jesus of Nazareth. We will elaborate this point later in our
discussion.
(CD IV/1, 134). Similarly, Pittenger urges us to see the 'location' of the incarnation in terms
of'totality' rather than singling it out discretely. For the incarnation 'from above' took place within
a certain historical context ('from below') of the ongoing God-human being relationship (Norman
Pittenger, Christology Reconsidered, [SCM Press, 1970], pp. 66-87).
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consideration of christology and why? The special-ness of the incarnation of Jesus
Christ is that in Him 'God Himself humiliated Himself ... in a supreme loyalty to
His divine being' which is the 'secret' of the Christmas and Easter stories (CD
IV/1, 134). The 'special' and 'new' thing about the exaltation of Jesus Christ is that
He is free, sinless, overcame suffering, He is alive, and is Lord despite the fact that
He was bound like us, tempted, suffered, died, and was a servant. Indeed, this
special and new thing is known through and in the life-act of the man Jesus of
Nazareth. Yet what Barth sees is that this special and new thing is not initiated by
human power but by the divine power which is revealed in the event of the
resurrection and ascension. To wit, the man Jesus of Nazareth is exalted in the
power of His deity. This divine power is what makes Him the Mediator between
God and humankind. So Barth clarifies the issue that 'If in Christ ... God is not
unchanged and wholly God, then everything that we may say about the reconcili¬
ation of the world made by God in this humiliated One is left hanging in the air'
(CD IV/1, 183) in the midst ofhis emphasis on Christ being the true flesh. For this
reason Barth had to clarify the subject matter, the ontology of christology, of the
doctrine of reconciliation by focusing upon the story of divine incarnation first,
prior to the discussion of the exaltation of the man Jesus of Nazareth. We therefore
notice that, 'The doctrine of reconciliation in its first two forms will then
necessarily begin with a discussion of the God who humbles Himself in Jesus
Christ and of the man who in Jesus Christ is exalted' (CD IV/1, 135).
Our appreciation of Barth's theological hermeneutics will support our
contention too. For Barth, the doctrine of the Trinity is the 'hermeneutical
principle'12 particularly of the doctrine of God and of the doctrine of Christ. The
12
(CD 1/1, 359). In parenthesis, Jiingel sees Barth's doctrine of the Trinity and Rudolf
Bultmann's demythologisation as having the same hermeneutical function in safeguarding the
divinity and the humanity of Christ: '... the doctrine of the Trinity in Barth's theology (1932) has
the same function as the programme of demythologizing in the theology of Rudolf Bultmann. ... If
we understand Bultmann's programme as the concern for appropriate speech about God (and
therewith about man) and if we view the fulfilment of this concern as a concern not to objectify
God or let him be objectified as an It or He, but to bring him to speech as Thou ... we shall not fail
to recognize a conspicuous parallelism to the significance which Barth attributes (and gives) to the
doctrine of the Trinity. For the significance - not the final, but certainly a primary significance - of
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triune being is the ontology of christology. This means considering the divinity,
'from above', before the humanity, 'from below', is a corollary of two perspectives.
Theologically speaking, it is God who became flesh, so that Jesus Christ is the
temporal and spatial realisation of God Himself.13 Soteriologically speaking,
Barth had to begin his christology with its divinity in order to be consistent with
his previous argument that all human beings are sinners and therefore only God can
reconcile them to Himself.
The motif of the clarification presupposes the fact that Barth's knowledge
of divine revelation came from the particular man Jesus of Nazareth: 'Beyond
doubt God's deity is the first and fundamental fact that strikes us when we look at
the existence of Jesus Christ.''14 We must remember at this point that this
christological assumption is not a later development but was already stressed in the
Church Dogmatics (IV/l) which is written before The Humanity of God:
As we look at Jesus Christ we cannot avoid the astounding conclusion of a divine
obedience. Therefore we have to draw the no less astounding deduction that in
equal Godhead the one God is, in fact, the One and also Another, that He is
indeed a First and a Second, One who rules and commands in majesty and the
One who obeys in humility {CD 1V/1, 202).
'As a man, of this human essence, He can be known even by those who do not
know Him as the Son of God' {CD IV/2, 91). Further Barth, in reaffirming Martin
Luther's view of the crucifixion that what took place in Jesus Christ is the clash
between 'summum, maximum et solum peccatum and summa, maxima et sola
iustitia,' points out that the truth of this can be verified 'when we have only to look
the doctrine of the Trinity for Barth consists in ensuring over against subordinationism on the one
hand and modalism on the other, that God becomes "neither an It or a He": "he remains Thou"'
(Jiingel, God's Being is in Becoming 22). For Gunton's own translation of Jiingel's view see (Colin
E. Gunton, Becoming and Being [19802], p. 151).
Similarly, Jeanrond observes that although both Barth and Bultmann used different
hermeneutical methods, Barth's extra nos and Bultmann's intra nos, their aim was the same as both
wanted to protect the biblical texts from eisegesis (Werner G. Jeanrond, 'Karl Barth's Hermeneutics'
in: Reckoning with Barth [1988], ed. Nigel Biggar, 80-97).
13
God 'becomes a second time in a very different way, namely, in manifestation, i.e., in the
form of something he is not' {CD 1/1, 316). So the divinity of Jesus is basic and not derivative {CD
1/1, 402-447).
14
(Barth, Humanity of God 48). Second emphasis added.
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at the Gospel passion-narrative and especially the role of Jesus in it.'15 Upon this
assumption, Barth now proceeds to theologise about the christological knowledge
obtained through the life-act of the konigliche Mensch (Royal Man)16 in terms of
the movement of divine humiliation and the human exaltation. To be more specific,
Barth christologises his knowledge of divine revelation with the help of the biblical
concept of Logos. In a wider spectrum this theologisation is reflected in the
doctrine of the Trinity, and in a narrower scope this theologisation is realised in the
discussion about the divinity of Jesus Christ in the first volume of his christology
(CD IV/1).
2. Envisioning the 'from below' in the 'from above'
Our insistence that epistemology precedes methodology is basically (without
simplifying its implication!) to express that the content critique of Barth's
christology leads us to the fact that he was envisioning the movement 'from below
to above' while he was approaching the matter from the aspect of the 'from above
to below'. The aim of the approach 'from above' is the humanity of Christ, that is,
the christological movement 'from below to above' which is mainly dealt with in
the second volume of christology (CD IV/2). Considering Barth's christology from
this aspect of envisionment, it would be proper to say that, for Barth, the
christology 'from below' could be rather the centre of his christology in spite of
our full awareness of the unyielding and such an overriding element of the
christology 'from above' in it. This is one of the points of what we mean by a re¬
discovery of the significance of 'from below' in Barth's christology. This
15
(CD IV/l, 238). Barth's reference to the Gospel stories as the verification of this knowledge
indicates what is the true leaning ground and therefore the last resort of his whole christology. We
will spell out the significance of this indication in chapter five.
16 This term appears in the second christology volume (CD IV/2, 154-264; KD 173-293) of his
trilogy. However it is perfectly legitimate to employ the term at this stage of our discussion since
Barth means by the 'Son of Man' this 'Royal Man\ The christological significance, and its insight,
will be intensely dealt with in chapter five.
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envisionment is adduced in his entitlement of chapter 14 of the Church Dogmatics
(IV/1) in which he does not entitle the chapter abstractly, for example as 'God, The
Servant as Lord' or 'Logos, The Lord as Servant' etc., but specifically Jesus Christ,
The Lord as Servant. This envisionment becomes clear as we read Barth's
understanding of the deity of Christ:
The meaning of His deity-the only true deity in the New Testament sense-cannot
be gathered from any notion of supreme, absolute, non-worldly being. It can be
learned only from what took place in Christ. Otherwise its mystery would be an
arbitrary mystery of our own imagining, a false mystery. It would not be the
mystery given by the Word and revelation of God in its biblical attestation, the
mystery which is alone relevant in Church dogmatics. Who the one true God is,
and what He is, i.e., what is His being as God, and therefore His deity, His 'divine
nature,' which is also the divine nature of Jesus Christ if He is very God-all this
we have to discover from the fact that as such He is very man and a partaker of
human nature, from His becoming man, from His incarnation and from what He
has done and suffered in the flesh. For-to put it more pointedly, the mirror in
which it can be known (and is known) that He is God, and of the divine nature,
is His becoming flesh and His existence in the flesh (CD IV/1, 177 ea).
Thus Barth declares that 'In their [false gods'] otherworldliness and
supernaturalness and otherness, etc., the gods are a reflection of the human pride'
(CD IV/1, 159). What is the significance of this statement?
Firstly, we must come to terms with the fact that Barth articulates the
cruciality of the humanity in christology while the main focus of his discussion is
upon the divine movement 'from above'. The whole content of the argument of the
'from above' is based upon the humanity of Christ and not the deity per se.
Secondly, to appreciate the significance of'from below', we should not bypass the
time-span involved in the writing the Church Dogmatics. Barth wrote the first
volume of christology in 1953, the second in 1955, and the third in 1959. Then in
between the second and the third volume of christology he announces The
Humanity ofGod in 1956. The first volume deals with the story of incarnation, the
second discusses the story of exaltation, and the third portrays the prophetic insight
of the two events of christology. What interests us here is that Barth already speaks
of the non-otherness or non-supernaturalness of God which points to Tow'
christology in the first volume of 1953, while he is still talking about the
incarnational story 'from above'. We recall that this insight of the togetherness of
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God is clearly expressed about three years later in The Humanity ofGod in which
he officially admits the christological paradigm shift from the divinity to the
humanity. This envisionment indicates that the movement 'from above', the 'high'
christology, does not point to itself but to the movement 'from below' to above, the
'low' christology. Reconciliation consists in the humiliation of the Son of God and
the exaltation of the Son of Man. This means that reconciliation is the exchange of
God's righteousness for human unrighteousness initiated by Him {CD IV/1, 75-78).
But ' The first is obviously the means or the way to the second'' {CD IV/1, 75 ea).
Here again, concerning our thesis, it is significant to note that this statement, which
signals the gravity of the 'from below' in connection with the 'from above',
appears while he was discussing about the significance of the 'from above' in his
christology. Indeed, Barth's whole christological argument, seen from the
perspective of our thesis in particular, is pointing to a specific content, that is, the
movement 'from below to above'. This is what Barth denotes when he lays out the
corner-stone of his christological statement; that he deliberately referred to the
name Jesus Christ at the climax of the discussion about the meaning of Immanuel,
and not at the outset, in order to demonstrate that 'Everything moves towards' {CD
IV/1, 21) Jesus Christ. Our insistence that Barth envisioned the 'from below' while
he was still discussing the 'from above' is well vindicated as we hear his statement
that 'We could not even draw our first line, that which runs from above to below,
without touching this question [from below to above], and even being deeply
involved in it, in our final discussion of the Church and faith' {CD IV/2, 9 ea).
Methodologically, one may locate a certain view of christology at the
beginning or at the end of discussion, or one may approach christology with a
certain aspect of it. But if we seek the meaning or purpose of the disposition or
method of approach, especially in the case of Barth's christology, the significance
of the methodology dwindles considerably. Differently put, the precedence of
epistemology over methodology points to the fact that that to which Barth's
christology points is not the methodology per se which represents a christology
'from above down', but is the humanity of Christ, the christology 'from below up'.
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Hence the judgement based purely on the approaching methodology alone would
lose its veracity. Methodology itself cannot and should not be the criterion or the
last word for our judgment, because in the case of Barth's christology 'the former
[from above to below\ aims at the latter [from below to above] and the latter is
grounded in the former.'17 Methodology cannot simply postulate the author's
intention and aim. Rather, in the case of Barth, christological methodology serves
and confirms christological epistemology by reflecting upon the already known fact,
i.e., the life-act of the earthly Jesus. The christological interest of Barth is not of
the methodology of this christology per se, of how the christology to be
approached, but of the christological agenda or hidden intention. Barth acknowl¬
edges well of the fact that methodology is a relative18 tool which is employed to
achieve a particular goal. For him, systematisation is one of the dangers in
formulating christology or in dogmatics as a whole. What determines christology
or dogmatics is not its method, but its object or content. Any systematic clarity or
certainty must be subject to its object. If christology is dependent on
17
'dafi jene aufdiese zielt, diese durch jene begriindet isT (CD IV/1, 122 ea.; KD IV/1, 134).
18
The following acknowledgments also implicitly express that the method of approach cannot
be the absolute indicator in judging the content: 'there is no theology without risk' (CD 1V/2, 10);
theology is a theologia viatorum (CD 1II/4, 34, 46); 'the choice of the dogmatic method cannot in
any circumstances be made with the intention of procuring for the dogmatician an assured platform
from which he can survey and control it' (CD 1/2, 867), because the '[christological] centre is not
something under our control, but something which exercises control over us' (CD 1/2, 866).
Sykes presumes that Barth's fear of any systematised christology has to do with his early
critique of Schleiermacher's method in terms of the Romantic 'principle of the centre,' the principle
in which Schleiermacher attempted to reconcile the two opposites, regarding them as the virtue of
theology (S.W. Sykes (ed), 'Barth on the Centre of Theology' in: Karl Barth. Studies of his
Theological Method [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979], p. 51; for an overall survey and criticism on
Barth's theological method see pp. 1-54).
With regard to the relativity ofmethodology, Wingren adequately points out that 'talk about
the theological method obscures the situation. ... When the theological procedure is conceived of
correctly and realistically, it becomes entirely relative, adapted to a specific situation when certain
problems are the object of discussion ... ' (Gustaf Wingren, Theology in Conflict [Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg, 1959], p. 80). David H. Kelsey's work on The Use ofScripture in Recent Theology
is developed in agreement with this view of G. Wingren. This view is that Kelsey deals with the
problem of theological methodology, not by doing 'theological methodology' as such, but by
referring to some theologians' methods, since there is not, and cannot, be the normative
methodology in theological science (David H. Kelsey, The Use of Scripture in Recent Theology
[London: SCM Press, 1975]). (=Kelsey, Use ofScripture)
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systematisation, the freedom of the Word to decide its own priorities would be lost.
Of course theologians need to choose a certain system or method to express their
views. But method should not be regarded as that which validates the object. For
'... we cannot know Jesus Christ without realising from the very outset ... the
inadequacy of all analogies to His own becoming and being' (CD IV/2, 58 ea);
'The particular danger of dogmatics is to think schematically' (CD IV/2, 7).
Therefore 'openness' is the best possible attitude in 'doing' christology (CD 1/1,
853-884).
The fact that epistemology determines methodology becomes implicit in
Barth's acknowledgment that the scheme of Church Dogmatics should not claim
the absolute authority, otherwise it would be building another tower of Babel in
theology.'9 As for his christology, methodology points to the epistemology,
whereas epistemology reflects and forms the methodology. For Barth, taking the
traditional pattern of Logos christology is nothing but a process ofqualification that
Jesus Christ is the true Reconciler. To this extent, to say that Barth's christology
is more a christology from below' or 7ow' christology than it is a christology
'from above' or 'high' christology could perhaps be a more appropriate20
judgment in the light of what the 'from above' means in his theology. Additionally,
our appraisal of the meaning of the approaching method that is for many a 'from
above' might indicate Barth's implicit protest against the trends of the contempor¬
ary Western theological circle at a time when the historical critical method came
to dominate Western theology as well as the heritage of theological ways of
19
In view of the constantly increasing extent of the Dogmatics Barth occasionally asked
himself whether he was building Solomon's temple or the tower of Babel. 'I am quite sure that the
angels sometimes chuckle at my enterprise; but I would like to think that the chuckle is well
meaning' (Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His life from letters and autobiographical texts [London:
SCM Press, 1976], p. 374; 'I see ... the Church Dogmatics, not as a conclusion but as the opening
of a new conversation' - about the question of the right course for theology' (=ibid., 488).
20
It is very important, as far as a proper understanding of our thesis, that this comparative
judgment indicates that we do not deny the 'from above' element in Barth's christology. What we
mean by this is a rediscovery of our reemphasis on the significance of the 'from below' element
in his christology. As such our attempt lies on a reassessment of Barth's christology, and as such
whole theology in terms of a fairer evaluation.
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thinking (and this still seems to be the case in many ways). We are fairly
convinced, with respect to the question of methodology versus epistemology
particularly in the case of Barth's christology, that theological presupposition and
interest determines methodology more often than the other way around.
II. The Meaning of Immanuel
We argued that judging Barth as having a christology 'from above' on
account of his incarnational approach is too weak to sustain its implication and
consequence. And for Barth, incarnation means Immanuel, 'God with us,' and vice
versa. Immanuel is the correspondent expression of the act of incarnation. In other
words, it is the conceptual exposition of the divine act of incarnation. In this way
it frames and sums up the overall content, direction, and meaning of incarnation.
Moreover the term is a good instruction of the true incentive of christology on the
whole. Hence it is inevitable for us to scrutinise what Barth means by Immanuel.
1. Immanuel: the Clarification of the Subject Matter of Christology and the
Description of Humankind being the Centre of Christology
1) The Primacy of the Immanuel
According to Barth, the divine incarnation 'from above' is the 'free act of
the faithfulness of God.' This act of God is the 'subject-matter, origin, and content'
of the message received and proclaimed by the Christian community (CD IV/1, 3).
This free and faithful act of God refers to Immanuelf Christian theology deals
with various issues. But the message of Immanuel as fulfilled in the atonement is
the 'heart,' 'centre,' and 'core'22 of Christian theology, because it deals with the
21
Isaiah 7:14; 8:8, 10.
22
(CD IV/1, 3-4). The atonement is the 'centre' and 'proper' subject of the Christian message,
and other events are 'purely contingent,' having only a relative significance. For the former concerns
all humankind, whilst the latter concerns individual humans (CD IV/1, 46).
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eternal life of humankind. This implies the fact that God out of His pure grace
bridged the unbridgeable gulf by Himself becoming a human being like us. For this
reason, Immanuel is not general grace, creation, preservation, dominion etc., but the
'redemptive grace of God' (CD IV/1, 8-9).
This being the case, the pivot of the statement of Immanuel does not depend
upon humankind but on God. Humankind is always learning the message of
Immanuel since it is God who initiates and establishes the act. In such a way,
Immanuel is 'primarily a statement about God and only then and for that reason a
statement about us men.'23 Truly Immanuel forms an 'inner circle' among others
of His life and actions. As such it is 'the telos' (CD IV/1, 8) of all the acts of God.
So even from the standpoint of us human beings it does not refer to the existence
of human beings in general but a 'special' will and work of God (CD IV/1, 8). It
is in this way and in this sense that the Christian community proclaims 'We with
God' when it proclaims 'God with us'.24
2) The Significance of the Locus and the Gravity of the Humanity of
Jesus Christ and as such ofAll Humankind: the Aim of the Incarnation
However, we should not overlook Barth's emphasis on the other aspect of
the meaning of Immanuel. If this means that God is with us, then it presupposes
that human beings 'are' also a part of the event. It tells us that the being and the
life-act of God stands in a relationship to our own being and life-act. That is to say,
'He does not will to be God without us, that He creates us rather to share with us
2j
(CD IV/1, 4-5). The atonement in Jesus Christ is 'primarily ... the great act of God's
faithfulness to Himself and therefore to us' even though it is the atonement that overcomes human
sin (CD IV/1, 47).
24
(CD IV/1, 15-16). If God is with us, does He really exist? If He does, how? According to
Barth, God exists only through His self-revelation: 'God is ... only through Him,' i.e., 'only from
Him and to Him' (CD IV/1, 6). This implies two points. First, we cannot prove or postulate the
existence of God, because God exists only through His se^-revelation. Second, His being 'with us'
is the power and truth of His incomparable being, which is proper to Him alone because His act
of Immanuel is totally His freedom and His freedom: 'God cannot be forced to give us a part in His
divine being' (CD IV/1, 9).
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and therefore with our being and life and act His own incomparable being and life
and act, that He does not allow His history to be His and ours ours, but causes
them to take place as a common history' (CD IV/1, 7).
It is illuminating in connection with our thesis that the particularity of the
event of Immanuel has to do with the universality of the salvation of humankind
(CD IV/1, 8). For this reason general (contingent) history (Historie) becomes a
redemptive history, a history with meaning and dynamism (Geschichte). Indeed
Immanuel means that salvation is intended and ordained for humankind. This
ordaining of salvation for humankind is the 'original' and 'basic' will of God, the
'ground' and 'purpose' of His will as Creator.25
Certainly it is first of all God who has incarnated Himself to the world and
is with us, and we are nobody unless He is with us. But so what? If Barth really
means what he says, then this declaration is an obvious clue for our thesis. This
declaration of Immanuel not only shows us the direction of christology, but also
plays the pivotal role for the importance of the humanity in christology since the
true humanity of all humankind is based upon that of Jesus Christ. Further if this
announcement is the ultimate meaning of Immanuel, then this announcement must
be the hermeneutical criterion for our understanding of the meaning of the divine
incarnation and christology as a whole. Thus in empowering the significance of
this original will and this purpose of God's will, Barth notes that the event of
Immanuel differs from the 'blind paradox of an arbitrary act of the divine
omnipotence of grace' (CD IV/1, 12). It is a determined act of self-obedience to
accept the ordination of humankind which it resisted. God defends and vindicates
His glory in doing so.26 Accordingly 'the "God with us" carries, with all serious¬
ness, a "We with God"' (CD IV/1, 14). Pointing to such a significant role for and
place for humankind Barth asks if 'God with us' does not include 'We with God',
25
{CD IV/1, 9). 'God creates, preserves and over-rules man for this prior end and with this
prior purpose' {ibid).
26
'We cannot fully understand the Christian 'God with us' without the greatest astonishment
at the glory of the divine grace and the greatest horror at our own plight' {CD IV/1, 13).
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how can it really be understood as a 'God with us' {CD IV/1, 14)? Indeed 'in that
one Man' {CD IV/1, 14-15 ea) God has made Himself the Giver and gift of our
salvation. Through the work of this man Jesus our true humanity is established
which is the very content of our salvation. In such a way all humankind do also
stand in the centre of Barth's christology. To stress humankind as being at the
centre27 Barth declares:
It [the establishment of our true humanity] is not a small thing, but the greatest
of alt. ... And it is this 'We with God' that is meant by the Christian message in
its central 'God with us,' when it proclaims that God Himself has taken our
place,28 that He Himself has made peace between Himself and us, that by
Himself He has accomplished our salvation, i.e., our participation in His being
(CD IV/1, 15 ea).
Barth's understanding of reconciliation is also an illuminating point with
regard to the point of humankind as being the centre of the divine incarnation,
'from above'. By definition reconciliation is the 'restitution' of a 'fellowship'
which once existed between God and humankind. Reconciliation is the 'realisation'
of the 'original purpose' {CD IV/1, 22) which was once defied. According to him,
this 'fellowship' which is now fulfilled in Jesus Christ is the content of the
covenant: 'I will be your God, and you shall be my people.'29 This covenant is
a covenant with the whole community of Israel and not with a particular partner.30
This character of a community-orientated covenant adduces the universal character
of the covenant. According to Barth, the covenant is the presupposition of the
reconciliation. This means that the covenant is a single, self-sufficient, independent,
27 This means an inclusive sense between God and man and not an exclusive sense between
God or human being.
28
The meaning of this will be explored in the late discussion.
29
Jer 7:23, 11:4, 30:22, 31:33, 32:38; Ezek 36:28 (CD IV/1, 22). The covenant has both
mutual and unilateral aspects: God's free choice for His people, the community's free choice of this
God as its God for itself, and an initiative willingness on the part of God with a subordinate
obligation on the part of Israel. Yet Barth favours the free divine initiative of the covenant and its
gracious character. He views the act of Yahweh from its formation of'Israel' in the earliest period
to the return of the captives from exile, as the fulfilment of this covenant. This whole picture is the
series of positive, critical, and negative deductions of the covenantal content. It is an 'example' and
'commentary' in Barth's whole consideration of the doctrine of atonement, and reconciliation (CD
IV/1, 22-26). Further, Barth sees the qualification of the content of the covenant in terms of its
'universal' character, its 'mission' oriented, and its 'forgiveness of sin' (CD IV/1, 26-34).
30
2 Sam 7:5-29; Deut 5:2, 29:14 (CD IV/1, 24).
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free work of God in itself, which is not identical with the divine work in creation.
The achievement of the reconciliation is not the highest evolutionary continuation
or the crown and completion of the positing which God has willed and accom¬
plished distinct from Himself.31 The eternal will of God, the reconciliation, does
not follow or derive from all the reality distinct from God, but 'underlies' and
'precedes' it.32 This is what makes Jesus Christ so new with regard to all that
precedes Him in the creaturely world. Jesus Christ cannot be deduced from the
world since He himself is the Creator.33 That the covenant is the presupposition
of reconciliation highlights the unalterable self-determination of Jesus Christ to be
the 'fellow' and 'friend' of humankind {CD IV/1, 50). This reflects the fact that the
covenant is established first of all with the humanity of Christ before the creation.
This antecedent character of the covenant suggests it being the universal covenant.
For the a priori-ness, the event before the creation, implies the 'all-inclusiveness'.
In other words, if the covenant is set up with the humanity of Christ even prior to
the creation of all humankind, then the humanity in christology should be at the
centre of christology and not on the periphery. Further, if the antecedent covenant
reveals the universal grace in virtue of the humanity of Christ, then all humankind
must also be the centre of christological consideration. The 'all humankind' implies
the 'unconditional, eternal and divine validity' {CD IV/1, 46) of the atonement.
This unconditional validity alone prompts us to commit ourselves to talk about the
jl
(CD IV/1, 49). Here Barth parts company with Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher deduced and
interpreted the being of Jesus Christ from the being of man and the world, instead of the other way
round. According to Barth, He derives the atonement from creation, instead of creation from
atonement. Schleiermacher understands the final Word as being on the evolutionary process of finite
being and development. Barth contends that 'there is no continuation or evolution whatsoever
between a new creation and new man (Gal 6:15; 2 Cor 5:17; Eph 4:24)' and creation and man, or
between the first Adam and the last Adam (1 Cor 15:44f.) (CD IV/1, 50).
39
(CD IV/1, 50). The existence and work of Jesus Christ does not follow from the gracious
act of divine providence. 'It is for the sake of Jesus Christ that creation takes place and God rules
as the preserver and controller of world-events' (ibid). If the atonement is the act of divine freedom,
sovereignty, and love, 'The Christian dialectic of covenant, sin and reconciliation cannot therefore
be subjugated at any point to the Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis' (CD IV/1,
80).
33
'He is in it [creation] but He is also quite different from it. He stands over against it
[creation] as the One who was from the beginning' (CD IV/1, 50).
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atonement. To be logical, if the atonement truly aims at, and de facto encircles, all
humankind unconditionally, then dealing with it within christology is not merely
an option but a necessity. In other words, if the atonement does not concern
humankind as a necessity and its concern is to be conditional, there cannot be true
and really serious talking about the atonement and, as such, christology, no matter
how great or gracious the event was. But what does Barth say about this?
Knowing the articulation and the context of the text, it is true to say that the true
value, and therefore the seriousness, of our commitment to speaking of christology
derives from the fact that the atonement is not only of God with the humanity of
Christ, and as such of all humankind, but also of the humanity of Christ, and as
such of all humankind with God. So Barth draws our special attention to this by
continuing immediately after the above statement: 'But the atonement is the very
special history of God with man, the very special history of man with God. As such
it has a particular character and demands particular attention. As such it underlies
and includes, not only in principle and virtually but also actually, the most basic
history of every man' (CD IV/1, 157 ea).
Moreover, Barth's understanding of the nature of the subject, the Reconciler,
is instructive for our contention too. He does not elaborate his christological
description under the title 'christology' so to speak, but under the doctrine of
reconciliation.34 This implies that the subject of christology does not stand for
j4
Moltmann criticises Barth's christological application of &7TOKaTakkdcrCTSiv. According to
Moltmann, the term d7toKaxaA.kd octsiv hardly played any central role in the early Christian
community. On the contrary, the righteousness of God is the central concept of the New Testament.
Moltmann argues that Barth reduced christology to a 'reconciliation christology' and thus depended
too heavily upon the concept of 'reconciliation'. In such a way Barth 'functionalised' christology
in terms of'reconciliology' (Moltmann, The Way ofJesus Christ [London: SCM Press, 187).
Apparently the critique of Moltmann is quite correct since Barth justifies his view of the
exchange to the term &7iOKaTakA.ctaCTeiv. But we need to ask whether Moltmann does not under¬
estimate the intention of Barth to entitle his christology as a doctrine of reconciliation instead of
'christology'. Following his christological train of thought it becomes clearer that Barth is truly
concerned with the relevance of christology for human beings by this specific entitlement.
Differently put, we are speaking of christology because it involves us more comprehensively and
inclusively than any other theological subjects. Perhaps this is also the reason why Barth's theology
overall is more christologically oriented than that of any other theologian. Moreover we must not
overlook the fact that Barth does deal with the righteousness of God and the kingly rule of God in
his christology, and this is specifically seen in the third volume of his christology (CD IV/3,2).
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itself but essentially for the humanity in christology and as such for all humankind.
The sovereign action of divine reconciliation and the reconciled humanity are both
in this Jesus Christ. 'As this One He is the subject of the act of reconciliation' (CD
IV/1, 126 ea). Only for this reason, 'The atonement takes precedence of all other
history' (CD IV/1, 157). This is what Barth's definition means; that the reconcili¬
ation is the 'exchange' of the humiliation of God and the exaltation of humanity.
That is to say that the aim of the reconciliation is for this 'exchange' and nothing
else. Thus to speak in exaggeration which we regard as necessary for the purpose
of our thesis, the exchange of humiliation and exaltation means that God humanised
Himself in order to 'divinise'35 humanity: 'As in Him God became like man, so
too in Him man has become like God. As in Him God was bound, so too in Him
man is made free. As in Him the Lord became a servant, so too in Him the servant
has become a Lord' (CD IV/1, 131). Thus, as far as Barth's christology is
Incidentally, was the employment of the concept 'exchange' not rather a precise content
of the realisation of the righteousness of God which is, for Barth, the kingly rule of God? Let us
assume that the righteousness of God is the central concept of Scripture. But what is that? If we are
not mistaken, his christological reference to the 'exchange' is an attempt to explicate the content
of the meaning of the actualised righteousness of God in a concrete or relevant manner. We must
realise that Barth does develop his christology in terms of the kingly rule of God which is, for him,
the righteousness of God in a very concrete manner. Barth intensively develops the reality of the
righteousness of God under the title The Royal Man in the second volume of his christology (CD
IV/2). He then further elaborates on the subject of the righteousness of God in the third volume of
his christology (CD IV/3,2) in which its reality is eschatologically but concretely developed in the
light of Christian ethics. Therefore Moltmann's criticism that Barth developed a so-called 'reconcili¬
ation christology', implying that he 'soteriologised' christology in its functional term is highly
debatable, so much so, that we are not convinced at all that Barth 'marginalised' the issue of the
righteousness or the kingdom of God by 'centralising' the issue of reconciliation (soteriology) or
that he pushed christology even to the level of a soteriological function.
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Of course Barth notes that the exaltation of the Son of Man is by no means a divinisation
of humanity but a 'fellowship' with the Son of God: 'not divinised man, but man sovereign and set
at the side of God, in short man exalted by God' (CD IV/1, 134; IV/2, 71). But, as for Baillie, to
approach christology with His humanity would face a problem of identifying the human life of Jesus
of Nazareth with the very life of God Himself (D.M. Baillie, God was in Christ [Faber, 1948], p.
87). In contrast, Meyendorff insists that the divinisation of human nature does not mean its
elimination, but rather it comes to a full humanity. So the christology 'from below up' to the
mystery of Christ is 'the point where the post-Chalcedonian Byzantine thought meets the modern
christological concerns' (John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought [New York: St
Vladimir's Seminary, 1969], p. 165; also Byzantine Theology [New York: Fordham University
Press, 19833] [=1974], pp. 32-41, esp. 40-41, cf. 149-165). For a more detailed discussion see
chapter four, pages 12-15.
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concerned, humankind is not placed in a secondary rank, and nor should it be
treated as such, but it shares the centre. Precisely speaking, humankind is not that
which 'should be' in the centre of Barth's christology, but that which indeed is in
the centre of it. This is what Barth indicates when he says that 'It is in this
recognition that we are committed to a genuine regard for this centre of the
Christian message and the Christian faith. Without it we cannot attain to the joy or
certainty or freedom to which we are summoned by this event' {CD IV/1, 46).
Barth's understanding of the qualification of the concept of the covenant
which is the unconditional forgiveness of our sins36 also shows where the main
concern of his christology lies. The true greatness of the divine covenant lies in the
fact that it aims at humanity, i.e., in the forgiveness of human sin and in
reconciliation with God. The 'new' and the 'everlasting'37 covenant, after all, tells
us what the covenant truly means. God changed the form of covenant in such a
way that He Himself takes the full responsibility for the lack of human correspon¬
dence, 'He Himself will turn them to Himself {CD IV/1, 33). God fulfils and
vindicates the covenant so that human beings become totally free and new. What
is left to them is the 'freedom of obedience' {CD IV/1, 33) as His covenant partner.
Specifically, the new covenant means the unconditional remittance of human sins
(Jer 31:34b). It is in such a way that the new covenant becomes a 'perfect
covenant' {CD IV/1, 33) as it is humankind who becomes free and new as such.
Barth states: '... in this way and on this basis God will break the opposition of His
people, creating and giving a new heart to the men of His people, putting His Spirit
in their inward parts, making the observance of His commandments self-evident to
them ... and in that way completing the circle of the covenant' {CD IV/1, 33).
Indeed 'ultimately God has nothing but forgiveness' {CD IV/1, 34). That
humankind is the centre of the divine movement 'from above' in terms of its
direction and purpose is well expressed when Barth says that 'It is apparent at once
36 'For I will forgive their iniquity, and 1 will remember their sin no more' (Jer 31:34b).
37
Jer 31:3If., 32:38f.; Ezek 11:19f.; cf. Deut 30:6 {CD IV/1, 32-33).
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that the formula "God everything and man nothing" ... is not merely a 'shocking
simplification' but complete nonsense' (CD IV/1, 89). For '... the meaning and
purpose of the atonement made in Jesus Christ is that man should not cease to be
a subject in relation to God but that he should be maintained as such-that he should
be newly created and grounded as such' (CD IV/1, 89). Indeed, 'the forgiveness of
sins is the central meaning of the divine action in the passion of Jesus Christ' (CD
IV/1, 256). Therefore if the significance of humankind and it being the centre of
christology in and through the humanity of Christ is down played, the Immanuel
based upon the covenant of grace would become meaningless. This is what Barth
implies when he relentlessly underlines that the incarnation is the fulfilment of the
covenant based upon the free grace of God. Here too our thesis is concerned with
the aim of the covenant. Thus Barth reminds us of the real issue of the covenant
by saying that 'There is no question of a dissolution [between the old and the new
covenant] but rather of a revelation of the real purpose and nature of that first
covenant' (CD IV/1, 32 ea).
Our rediscovery of the significance of the 'from below' element in Barth's
christology in view of the aim of the incarnation (Immanuel) proves to be perfectly
proper as we come to terms with Barth's description of the 'from above' movement
of christology in light of its 'from below' movement. Barth notes that his second
volume of the Church Dogmatics (IV/2) which is all about the 'from below'
movement of christology, deals with the 'the exaltation of the this servant [Jesus
of Nazareth] to be the Lord ... ' (CD IV/2, 28 ea). Here we need to give our special
attention to the last phrase 'to be the Lord.' Jesus Christ did not become the servant
to be the servant. In other words, the goal of His humiliation, 'from above to
below' is not the end in itself. The movement 'from above to below' is for the sake
of the movement 'from below to above'. Whereas the movement 'from above' is
only the beginning point of christological discussion, the movement 'from below'
completes the beginning movement. So Barth stresses that 'We cannot stop at an
abstract theologia crucis, for this is full already of a secret theologia gloriae. ...
When we say "Jesus Christ" we have no option but to look at this movement from
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below to above as it takes place in Him, at His exaltation.'38
God came into the world 'from above' in order to judge the world. And the
glory belongs to God as the reconciliation has taken place in Jesus Christ. 'Yet ...
They [biblical witnesses] do not put God abstractly at that heart of the message, but
man with God. And it may well be a temptation and even dangerous to overlook
this, to know better, to try to oppose to the continually threatening anthropomonism
a no less abstract theomonism' (CD IV/2, 10). Christology is all about the
fulfilment of the broken covenant based upon a 'secret of grace' (CD IV/2, 42) and
therefore upon an 'inconceivable overflowing of the grace of God' (CD IV/1, 67).
This fulfilment is the form and the content of the overflowing grace of God seen
as the 'so perfect act of love' (Jn 3:16, 2 Cor 5:19, cf. 70-75) (CD IV/1, 72).
However, 'How can even the most perfect decision ... be the origin of the covenant,
if it is made in the absence of the one who must be present as the second partner
at the institution of the covenant to make it a real covenant, that is, man?' (CD
IV/1, 66). The telos of this divine judgement was the redemption of humanity. In
other words, the telos of the divine incarnation 'from above' and judgment was
nothing but for the sake of the human exaltation 'from below' and redemption in
and with the humanity of Christ (CD IV/2, 6). Human being is more than a mere
object of the divine work in christology: 'In his spontaneity as such he is an object,
but he is more than that. For as an object of the truly and effectively reconciling
grace of God, in his own particular, subordinate and secondary place and manner
and function he is also a subject of this whole occurrence' (CD IV/2, 4 ea). 'There
can be no question of a second truth side by side with the first. There is only the
one mighty truth of the reconciliation of the world with God as it has taken place
in Jesus Christ. ... In the strict sense, we are not even dealing with another part of
the one truth. It [the divine action 'from above' and the human action 'from
38
{CD IV/2, 29; 'Er kann also nicht in einer abstrakten theologia crucis stecken bleiben, denn
eben sie istvoll heimlicher theologia gloriae. ... Wer "«Jesus Christus» sagt, dem bleibt janichts
Anderes iibrig, als auch auf diese in ihm stattfindende Bewegung von unten nach oben, auf seine
Erhohung ... zu blickeri" {KD IV/2, 29-31).
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below'] is indivisible' (CD IV/2, 5). To see the 'two elements' in one is to do
justice to the truth of christology in all its repletion. So it is a matter of seeing the
old in a new way: 'We have not to consider a second thing, but the first one
differently' (CD IV/2, 5). For human beings do not stand on the margin, but are
there with God 'at the very centre' of christology (CD IV/2, 5 ea). '... the specific
danger of modern Evangelical dogmatics ... is that it will overlook or fail to take
seriously the side of the biblical witness which concerns reconciled man as such-
constructing a doctrine of [christology] in which the man reconciled with God is
basically absent, or at any rate invisible' (CD IV/2, 7).
III. Under the Umbrella of Deus pro nobis
Another corresponding term of Barth's for incarnation is seen in 'Deus pro
nobis.' The referent of Immanuel and Deus pro nobis is incarnation. Having dealt
with the former term, here we will probe into the meaning of the latter term.
Barth sums up and explicates the whole act of reconciliation in terms of
Deus pro nobis. In doing so, he proposes the view that Jesus Christ is the 'pre-
existent Deus pro nobis' (CD IV/1, 53). This means that God is by nature not for
Himself but for humankind. This nature of God is manifested in the divine self-
incarnation, i.e., flesh. We will argue that Barth has a christology 'from below',
'low', to the extent that, first, God is by nature for us; second, this nature of 'for-
us-ness' is demonstrated by nothing other than in and through the flesh; and third,
the divine movement 'from above' is for the sake of human exaltation 'from below
to above'.
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1. The Meaning of the Statement that 'God Truly Became a Human Being'
To be flesh means to exist with the people in a state of perishing before
God. The New Testament witnesses that the Son of God was a human being and
as such 'He stands under the wrath and judgment of God, He is broken and
destroyed on God. It cannot be otherwise' {CD IV/1, 175). The Son of God in His
'unity' with the man Jesus of Nazareth exists 'in solidarity' with the humanity of
suffering Israel. This means that
In Him [the man Jesus ofNazareth] God has entered in, breaking into that circulus
vitiosus of the human plight, making His own not only the guilt of man but also
his rejection and condemnation, giving Himself to bear the divinely righteous
consequences of human sin, not merely affirming the divine sentence on man, but
allowing it to be fulfilled on Himself (CD IV/1, 175).
It is God Himself who takes all39 human sufferings upon Himself. This being and
act is the 'mystery of the "deity of Christ"' {CD IV/1, 177) which is 'new in
relation to all general concepts of God ... and to that extent in a way which is not
perceived or known' {CD IV/1, 176). The divine incarnation means God's 'direct'
revelation 'in the secret of the man Jesus of Nazareth' {CD IV/1, 176).
Barth, at this juncture, raises three fundamental theological questions, and
as such christological questions, in describing the divine movement 'from above'.
The questions are of the incarnation in its possibility, in its necessity, and in its
relevance, which will be dealt with in the following section III. We will now unveil
these three fundamental issues, since these questions constitute the very content of
the christology 'from above', and as such what these constitutions mean in
conjunction with our thesis.
1) The Possibility of the Incarnation
Having asserted that God became flesh, the question arises: how is it
possible for a holy God to become a sinful human being? If we accept Paul's
j9
The difference between His suffering and human sufferings in the Old Testament is that
whereas the latter consists in the antithesis between the righteous God and humanity's acceptance
of bitter things from Him without grumbling, the former consists in the elimination of the antithesis
by allowing all the human bitterness of its suffering to fall upon Himself (CD IV/1, 175).
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avowal, that all human beings are sinners, where does that leave the man Jesus of
Nazareth who is confessed to be the Christ? If we accept that He is sinless,40 does
the incarnation not suggest a strange half-human being and half-divine being? From
a human point of view the divine incarnation is not possible at all since God is God
40
Barth gives a new understanding of sin and sinlessness. Traditionally sin was understood in
a biological sense or as abstract and absolute purity, morality, and virtue. But according to Barth,
Jesus was a man as we are. His condition was not different from ours. He took our flesh, the
'nature' (CD IV/1, 258) of humankind. 'His sinlessness was not therefore His condition. It was the
act of His being in which He defeated temptation in His condition which is ours, in the flesh' (CD
IV/1, 259 ea). 'All the purity of His human action depends upon the purity of this [Royal Man's]
life-act of His. ... the sinlessness of Jesus was not a condition of His being as man, but the human
act of His life working itself out in this way from its origin' (CD IV/2, 92). In other words, Jesus
is sinless not due to the inherited physical body but due to the free act ofobedience to the Father's
will unto death. He did not refuse the necessity of God's judgment and remission of human sins,
but accepted that God was doing right (CD IV/1, 257-283; IV/2, 58). Similarly, Pittenger supposes
the sinlessness of Jesus in terms of His 'love-in-action' and 'acceptance' of His vocation. In an
attempt to understand the sinlessness of Jesus, Pittenger argues that, since a human being is a
dynamic creature, it should be understood in terms of 'becoming' rather than 'being.' Humanity
exists 'on the way to becoming' by moving towards the realisation of fulfilment or potentiality. This
'becoming' in movement implies the fact that humanity exists in what it chooses. Hence, humanity
does not sin of itself but by its act of choice. Only this understanding of human existence exempts
the Christian (and Jewish) God from being an immoral God. For if humanity is sinful of itself or
soon after its birth (which is accepting so called 'original sin'), then God cannot avoid His
responsibility for human sin however we argue. It should also be noted that this futuristic
understanding of humanity would keep our confession of the 'goodness' of creation (Norman
Pittenger, Christology Reconsidered, [SCM Press, 1970], pp. 45-65).
Fundamentally speaking, the sinlessness of Jesus originates from His divinity (CD IV/2, 92-
96). Like His existence, the sinlessness of His human essence is grace. The grace of the origin of
Jesus means that 'the basic exaltation of his human freedom to its truth, i.e., to the obedience in
whose exercise it is not super-human but true human freedom' (CD IV/2, 92). He could not sin
'Because and as He was man only as the Son of God, it [sin] was excluded from the choice of His
acts' (CD IV/2, 93). He 'lived as a man in this true human freedom ... for obedience' not knowing
or having any other freedom (CD IV/2, 93). At this point Barth argues that this unique reality of
the humanity of Jesus does not contradict the concept of true humanity. A striking point is that this
unique reality rather contradicts all other actualizations of this concept of true humanity (CD IV/2,
95). 'It [the sinlessness of Jesus] consists in His actual freedom from sin itself, from the basis of
all sins' (CD IV/1, 258). That is why He could forgive sins and transgressions. 'Without sin' means
that He 'did not will' to sin and 'did not' sin even though He shared our mode of existence (CD
IV/2, 92-93, 58) even though He was so tempted. He became a sinner only as He bears human sin
upon Himself. By bearing our sins in this way He exists in solidarity with us in our lostness.
However this raises some questions. Firstly, are we sinners because we will to sin? Paul's
lamentation caused by his unwilled sins may suggest this. Secondly, why is it that we do sin even
though we too exist by the grace of God? Does Barth apply two types of graces here? If Jesus was,
and is, sinless because He did not will to sin and did not sin, then could He have been 'fully
human'? As Barth says that He is also a creature, would this not mean that Jesus was 'created', not
to have will to sin and not to sin, and as such He would have possessed a different 'kind' of
humanity rather than a different humanity in 'degree'?
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and human being is human being.
The uniqueness of Barth's christology consists in his view of the possibility
of the incarnation. Barth argues that, as far as the Subject of incarnation is God, the
possibility of the divine self-incarnation must be perceived from the standpoint of
God, 'Quo iure Deus homo?,'' and not from the standpoint of human beings. This
implies that human beings cannot limit the acts of God to the parameters of human
reason. If God were fully understood by human reason, then God would be no
more than a mere object of human reasoning. Barth thus underlines that the only
possibility of incarnation is to be found in the divine freedom of love. God is not
His own prisoner but free and sovereign, as witnessed in the Philippians 2:7-8. This
free act of love demonstrates that God is, by nature, for human beings. His free
incarnation is then, the revelation of the greatest glory of God Himself because
incarnation manifests His true nature that He is free in lovef
Barth recognises two possible misinterpretations of the possibility of the
divine self-incarnation. Firstly, one may regard His incarnation as a 'non-historical'
(CD IV/1, 157) event. To hold the view of 'non-historical,' which denies the
actuality of God's incarnation, is tempting in the cause of guarding the 'absolute
authority' and the 'trueness' of God. To wit, God must remain as God somewhere
above human reality in order to sustain His absolute dominion over human beings,
and thus God's incarnation should be impossible. At the same time, to deny God's
incarnation would be convenient, for then we would not need to take any risks in
our faith. In fact, we could not have seen or experienced His incarnation. As we
have discussed in the earlier chapter, faith is the venture of acceptance of the
witnesses of Scripture.
Barth rejects the view of a 'non-historical' revelation for the following
reasons. To deny the divine incarnation would be to envision the authority of God
41
(CD IV/1, 187-192; IV/2, 84-85). Freedom does not imply love. But love presupposes
freedom, since love is not static but dynamic. To put divine freedom and love together, '... in God
freedom is the form of love, but love is the content, the body offreedom' (Christoph Schwobel,
'Imago Libertatis: Human and Divine Freedom' in: God and Freedom [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1995], p. 80).
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in the human category of possibility, which thus also denies our reconciliation
itself. So Barth spurns the view of a 'non-historical' incarnation by stressing that
the incarnation is 'the very special history'42 of God with humanity in which the
impossibility became reality, that the holy God became a sinful man by taking all
human sin upon Himself. This reality was the result of God's definite decision and
the Son's infinite obedience, and thereby the man Jesus of Nazareth Himself
constantly 'attests'43 to His unity with God. Jesus Christ, through becoming a
human being, has demolished humanity's false view of true divine authority by
showing that true divine authority is in humiliation. This being the case, any supra-
natural or other-worldly gods are the reflection of human 'pride.' Human pride
rejects this humiliated God, not only because it is an unbelievable event, but also
because human beings do not want to lose their autonomy by accepting a
humiliated God.44 To keep the autonomy of humankind in rejecting the humiliated
42 The history of incarnation is not a contingent event in that it is a simple fact or event which
once happened 'there' and 'then'. Rather, the history of incarnation has meaning, since it is the
content of a determined divine will and act based on God's covenant. So Barth uses the term
'Geschichte' rather than 'Historic in order to stress the dynamism as well as the significance of the
event. Geschichte means story. This implies that our task is to 'recount' or 'repeat' this significant
history as story, in order to understand it, since human thought and language cannot grasp the event
of reconciliation {CD IV/1, 175: KD IV/1, 171; CD IV/3.1, 165-166; Barth, 'The Gift of Freedom,'
in: The Humanity ofGod [1961 [1956]), p. 81). (=Barth, Gift)
43
God is known in 'His self-exposition' {CD IV/2, 39). Jiingel paraphrases it: in revelation
God 'interprets' Himself. To wit, God interprets through God, that is, 'self-interpretation' (Eberhard
Jiingel, God's Being is in Becoming [1976 [=1964]], p. 95).
44
{CD IV/1, 159; KD IV/1, 173: 'HochmuT). As for Barth, this 'pride,' standing in contrast
to the Son's 'obedience,' is the overall concept of human sin. The consequence of humanities pride
was the 'fall.' For Barth's intensive discussion of sin in terms of 'pride' see {CD IV/1, 142, 358,
412-419, 421-423). Niebuhr and Tillich also share Barth's view of sin: (Reinhold Niebuhr, The
Nature and Destiny of Man 1 [London: Nisbet, 1941], pp. 198-220; Paul Tillich, Systematic
Theology II [London: SCM Press, 1978], pp. 47-50).
Yet McFadyen asserts that to understand sin as essentially 'pride' is 'problematic' and even
'error.' This view of sin regards 'pride' as the 'primal' and 'basic' form of sin. In so doing, it
construes divine and human freedom as 'competitive.' And this view of sin equates any human
'self-assertion' as sinful. Yet human 'pride' is not the basic or the root, of sin like idolatory but is
'a form' of idolatory, because the essence of human 'pride is 'actually a particular misdirection' of
self-worship. 'Pride' need not be equated with all acts of human self-assertion, self-protection or
self-retrieval, because they could, at times, create positive conditions for the right worship of God
even though 'pride' constitutes a sin. Instead, sin is the denial of God and refusal to praise God;
the opposition to and assault on God's freedom (Alistair McFadyen, 'Sins of Praise: The Assault
on God's Freedom' in: God and Freedom, (ed) Colin E. Gunton, [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995],
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God means that humanity wishes to justify its unbelief by which it effectively
remains lord of itself.
According to Barth, God's definite decision and the Son's indefinite
obedience come from the inner decision of the Godhead. The inner decision
constitutes the 'genuine article' (CD IV/1, 193) of theology since it is the work of
divine ontology. The most significant inner decision is that the truth and actuality
of our atonement is based upon the sameness of the one who decided to be
humiliated and the one who was humiliated. Namely, this congruence manifests the
immovable determination of God to be incarnate and the undeniable reality of our
reconciliation, because the incarnation is the self-actualisation of the self-decision
of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Hence His incarnation can neither be that of
a victim driven to and fro by the dialectic of His nature, nor by inescapable fate.
The incarnation was nothing other than 'the inner necessity' of the freedom of God.
This means that God is always His own Master, 'His own counterpart,' and 'co¬
existent with Himself (CD IV/1, 192-195; 201). In this view, Barth redefines the
notion of the divine unity. The unity of the Godhead is dynamic and alive, and this
can in no way infer a static sense of solidarity or singleness. Unity means God's
fellowship, i.e., relationship. This understanding is undergirded by the incarnation
as the incarnation corresponds to His inner being, that is the relational being of the
Trinity. The trinitarian freedom is relational freedom. This ontology alone is the
inner possibility of the incarnation.45
p. 36, 54).
However, McFadyen's unclear explanation rather spoils the reasonableness of his critique on
the traditional view of sin as 'pride.' It is, for example, not clear what he means by 'pride' as
'actually a particular misdirection' of self-worship. Does McFadyen mean that humanity's self-
worship is 'not real' idolatory but 'a form' of idolatory, because self-worship is 'a particular,' and
thus only one of many misdirections? More confuing is that he holds idolatory as the root of sin,
and idolatory is 'worshipping something or someone instead of God'. But at the same time he does
not seem to regard 'pride' as idolatory by defining 'pride' only as 'a form of idolatory.'
Incidentally, it is not clear why, and how, the concept of'transcendence-immanence' should become
his hermeneutical basis in developing the 'divine freedom and human freedom' and 'freedom and
sin' (ibid., 32-56, esp. 33-36).
45
{CD IV/1, 164-166). Incarnation is, as such, the activation and the revelation of Christ's
deity, His divine Sonship (CD IV/1, 201-210). This insight of'relational ontology' is developed by
Jiirgen Moltmann. According to Moltmann the doctrine of the Trinity would be more meaningful
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Secondly, Barth repudiates the attempts to regard the possibilities of the
divine self-incarnation noetically and logically as human paradox, or ontically as
the divine self-contradiction, a 'cleft' or 'rift' or 'gulf in between His being and
His act.46 Such possibilities could have been based upon God's determination to
be 'God against God'.47 Thus the cry of Jesus Christ on the cross (Mk 15:34)
would have meant God's disposal of Jesus Christ for good. However God does not
come into conflict with Himself.48 'God gives Himself, but He does not give
Himself away.'49 The problem is that if we were to understand the possibility of
incarnation in terms of paradox, then we may assume or even postulate the scheme
of human paradox as a necessity for the possibility. Ultimately humanity will
categorise the act of divine self-incarnation into the human ratio. Humanity,
however, cannot impose any necessity upon God. If it insists that it could, then
humanity would create another god with whom we would remain unreconciled. For
any god created by human imposition is nothing other than the god of human
desire.50
Further, to ground the possibility of the divine self-incarnation upon a divine
if we were to perceive it as a 'relational being' rather than as a 'substance.' In such a way, the
doctrine of the Trinity undergirds the kingdom of God as the trinitarian kingdom. This insight serves
the three theological grounds: firstly, to overcome the schism between the different Church
traditions; secondly, to see the meaning of human suffering in connection with the question of the
existence of a living God; thirdly, social and economic justice (Jiirgen Moltmann, The Trinity and
the Kingdom of God [London: SCM Press, 1981], pp. 1-222).
46 '... noetisch mit dem Faktum einer Kluft, eines Risses und Abgrundes in Gott selber,
zwischen seinem Sein und Wesen in sich und seinem Tun und Wirken ... ' (KD 1V/1, 201).
47
(CD IV/1, 183-185; 'Gott wider Gotf KD IV/1, 201). Interestingly enough, Moltmann uses
the phrase 'Gott gegen Gott' which is the crucial insight of the crucified God. Moltmann sees the
'Gott gegen Gott' as the trinitarian act of a 'theological trial (theologischer Prozess)' (Jiirgen
Moltmann, The Crucified God [London: SCM Press, 1974 [=1973]], pp. 151-153).
48
'He makes His own the being of man in contradiction against Him, but He does not make
common cause with it' (CD IV/1, 185).
49
(CD IV/1, 185). 'Gott gibt sich hin, aber nicht weg und nicht auf (KD IV/1, 202). 'When
He [God] dies in His unity with this man, death does not gain any power over Him.' 'He overcomes
the flesh in becoming flesh' (CD IV/1, 185). Because He was 'dying the death,' overcoming the
death.
50
(CD IV/1, 185-186). 'He becomes and is this [the true God being's being truly identical with
the obedient man Jesus of Nazareth] without being in contrast to His divine nature ... but in
contradiction to all human ideas about the divine nature' (CD IV/1, 199).
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self-contradiction is untenable. Self-contradiction produces nothing but another
contradiction, and thus the former being differs from the latter being. The truth and
actuality of our atonement depends upon the fact that God does not become another
deity in His incarnation or He would not dissolve Himself into the world.51 Self-
contradiction therefore does not give us the reliability or the authenticity of God
being the true Reconciler.52 Self-contradiction leads to self-destruction as there is
contradiction within itself. To safeguard the true possibility of God's incarnation
from such misunderstandings, Barth contends that in God there is nothing like
paradox, antinomy, diversion, inconsistency, or the possibility of such things. A god
who has such contradictions is the result of human projection, and not the revealed
God. For any self-contradictory god has no true power to reveal itself fully and
completely since it cannot have a definite act and voice on account of its inner
contradiction.53 If God's humility is not a capricious or accidental choice but a
free choice,54 and if what the human person Jesus does is God's own work, then
His self-emptying is not an alien act, a 'novum mysterium'55 for God at all. In
other words, the true deity and the Lordship of Christ consist in the freedom that
His existence in the forma servV does not cease to be Lord and Creator in His
existence in the forma Dei' and vice versa.56 These forms are a matter of the
'different modes of the one personal God.'57 'The true and living God is the One
51 'Die Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit unserer Verso tinting hangt daran, daft es so und nicht anders
ist. Der die Welt mit Gott versohnt, mufi der eine Gott selber in seiner wahren Gottheit sein. Sonst
wiirde sie nie mit Gott versohnt' (KD IV/1, 211).
52
(CD IV/1, 193). Otherwise He cannot be the Subject of our reconciliation since He would
be no more than like us.
53
1 Cor 14:33 (CD IV/1, 186-187).
54 'It [the act of atonement made in the man Jesus of Nazareth] can demand obedience because
it is not itself an arbitrary decision but a decision of obedience. That is why it is so important to
see that this is the character of the self-humiliation of God in Jesus Christ as the presupposition of
our reconciliation' (CD IV/1, 195).
55
(CD IV/1, 193). Though it is very strange to us, it is never strange to God (CD IV/1, 178-
180).
56
(CD IV/1, 181). This resulted in Barth's rejection of the Nestorian separation of the divine
and human natures (ibid).
57
'modus': 'Seinsweisen' (CD IV/1, 205; KD 224). The incarnation is 'the act of God in His
mode of being as the Son' (CD IV/2, 43). Barth here turns to his trinitarian hermeneutics for an
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whose Godhead consists in this history, who is in these three modes of being the
One God, the Eternal, the Almighty, the Holy, the merciful, the One who loves in
His freedom and is free in His love' (CD IV/1, 203). That is to say, the 'sovereign
grace,' the 'free love' (CD IV/1, 193) of God alone is the possibility of divine self-
incarnation. Our reconciliation has its being with, and anchors itself in, this divine
free initiation.'8
appropriate expression. According to Barth, God is not only immanent ad intra but also
transcendent ad extra. Seen from the obedience of Jesus Christ, incarnation is a matter of 'the
mystery of the inner being of God as the being of the Son in relation to the Father' {CD IV/1, 177;
cf. 194). From the point of view of that form, that character of the obedience, incarnation is a matter
of 'mystery of His deity in His work ad extra, in His presence in the world' (CD IV/1, 177). God
has this freedom of condescension as well as concealment of His Godhead without any loss,
diminution or alteration {CD IV/1, 180).
58
Davaney and Williams argue that Barth's emphasis upon the divine sovereignty and freedom
leads us to a notion of the God-world relation in purely dichotomous terms, which eventually
divests the concept of divine power, freedom, and love of their social content. Thus tensions arise
between divine action, human integrity and responsibility (Sheila Greeve Davaney, Divine Power.
A Study ofKarl Barth and Charles Hartshorne [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986], pp. 1-100; R.D.
Williams, 'Barth on the Triune God' in: Karl Barth - Studies ofhis Theological Methods, ed. S. W.
Sykes [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979], pp. 147-193). Similarly, Biggar argues that Barth's
awesome emphasis upon the divine grace 'removes the deep and mysterious seriousness of human
moral responsibility, and accordingly diminishes human dignity' (Nigel Biggar, The Hastening that
Waits. Karl Barth's Ethics [Oxford, 1993], p. 162). An even a harsher comment is that 'Barth seems
... to reduce man as created by God to an empty and impotent vessel into which God later pours
his grace ... ' (Arnold Come, An Introduction to Barth's 'Dogmatics' for Preachers [Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1963], p. 152)
However we see that Barth states that 'Being, human thanksgiving, has the character of
responsibility' {CD III/2, 174), humanity is subject to 'pure spontaneity' {CD 111/2, 174), because
God '... has not ... made [humanity's] obedience physically necessary or disobedience physically
impossible' {CD III/l, 266). Also, Gunton, in reference to the Church Dogmatics: II/2, 76, 177, 585;
III/1, 175; IV/1, 89, 91, holds that Barth's understanding of God fully admits human freedom and
therefore allows room for human responsibility and autonomy (Colin E. Gunton, 'The Triune God
and the Freedom of the Creature' in: Karl Barth: Centenary Essays, ed. S. W. Sykes [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989], pp. 46-66). Webster also shares a similar view with Gunton
observing that Barth's understanding of freedom is not primarily a matter of will or choice
considered either as ends in themselves or as essential marks of human dignity. Rather, for him,
'moral freedom is consent to the necessary character of the moral order of God: it is "situated
freedom"' (John Webster, Barth's Ethics ofReconciliation [Cambridge, 1995], 227). For a recent
discussion about the issues on God's freedom, human freedom, divine sovereignty, and human
responsibility, see (Colin E. Gunton ed., God and Freedom [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995], pp.
1-133; a similar view is shared by Macken, but with some critical questions (John Macken S.J., The
Autonomy Theme in the Church Dogmatics [Cambridge University Press, 1990], pp. 22-182, esp.
60-69, 154-159, 159-182).
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2) The Necessity of the Incarnation and the Crucifixion
The witnesses of Scripture tell us that God became a human being in order
to save the world. In other words, God had to become incarnate in order to
concretely end the world's self-destruction since the world was self-destructing by
attempting to become its own master. But this does not mute the question as to why
God's salvific act had to be in this way? Did He not have other ways of reconciling
the world with Himself in lieu of becoming flesh and suffering a bloody death? In
short, was the incarnation and such a bloody crucifixion really necessary?59
Barth hears the great positive answer through the 1 John 4:14 'the Father
sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world' with concern for 'order' and 'peace'
(CD IV/1, 216-217). But this is the answer of the grace of God. This means that
the grace of God is not a cheap grace, but dear enough to send His Son as the
Saviour of the world. Humankind set up its own authority against God by seeking
its justification from itself and not from God.60 But this achieved nothing other
than the killing of the innocent man, Jesus of Nazareth. Necessarily therefore God
had to encounter humankind in flesh and face it as the ultimate Judge.61 What
59
This question had already been raised by St. Anselm in terms of'Cur Deus homo?' in: (The
Library ofChristian Classics, Vol. X. [London: SCM Press, 1956], pp. 100-183). God did not have
to become a human being. But when He did that, He manifested His divine omnipotence {ibid., 150-
155). Whereas, for Barth, the incarnation and crucifixion was the divine necessity out of His free
love.
For an excellent presentation of the analysis, critique, and suggestions about the traditional
models of soteriology in connection with the question of the necessity of the incarnation and
crucifixion see (Thorwald Lorenzen, 'The Meaning of the Death of Jesus Christ' in American
Baptist Quarterly 4 [No.l, 1985], pp. 3-34). Likewise, Mclntyre supposes that the bloody
crucifixion was inevitable since 'love already entails suffering'. For a discussion about this issue
of the necessity see (John Mclntyre, The Shape ofSoteriology [Edinburgh: T.&.T. Clark, 1992], pp.
1-129) in which Mclntyre analyses the thirteen traditional models of soteriology, which interestingly
include the motif of the 'liberation' in the Liberation Theology. In sum, the gist of the book is that
any single model cannot sufficiently answer the question of why God become incarnated and was
crucified. Although each model has its own message therefore, all thirteen models require to be
taken together in order to provide the complete soteriological future.
60
'Not all men commit this[=these] sins, but all men commit this sin which is the essence and
root of all other sins' (CD IV/1, 220).
61
'If He were not the Judge, He would not be the Saviour' (CD IV/1, 217). Barth refers to the
following passages for Jesus Christ's involvement of being the Judge: Matt 3:12, 8-9, 14-15, 7:24f.,
10:32-34, 38-39, ll:20f., 23:13-36; Mk 1:4-5; Lk 3:7, 10f., 12:49; Jn 3:36, 12:48, 5:22, 24, 27, 30,
9:41, 15:22-24; Ac 10:42, 17:30f., 2 Cor 5:10; 2 Tim 4:1; Rev 1:16; Heb 12:29; Rom 1:18-3:20
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happened after the incarnation is that the Son of God fulfilled the requirement for
the righteous judgment on humankind by Himself taking its place of condemnation
and destruction as a human being. His taking its place means that the Judge was
judged. He was capable of doing this because He was a human being like us {CD
IV/1, 222-223). This judgment took place once and for all, and as such, it measures
all human righteousness and judgment. So it is the 'ultimate judgment' {CD IV/1,
219). At this point we have to note that Barth underlines that the ground of this
eschatological event, the incarnation and the crucifixion, is the humanity of Christ:
'It [incarnation and crucifixion] took place in the one man' {CD IV/1, 223). The
event occurred in the world at a 'definite place' and a 'definite point of time'
{kairos).62 God took a visible responsibility for His creation, albeit He did not have
to. This unnecessity implies that God had to vindicate being the true Creator by
defending Himself. God is primarily pro se and then pro nobis et pro me {CD IV/1,
212). Yet we have to be careful not to misunderstand this statement as if God exists
exclusively for Himself. Rather this is to say that the act of the incarnation and the
crucifixion is nothing but the free grace of God Himself. This indicates how
serious63 human sin is and how serious the determination of God is to eliminate
it. The honour and glory of God is offended64 not because His holiness is
damaged, but because His people are estranged from Him. That is to say, that God
{CD IV/1, 217-219).
62
{CD IV/1, 223). Here again, when we consider the true ground of the eschatological event,
we must point out that charging Barth as having a christology 'from above', or 'high' christology,
is too superficial. In addition, we must note that, for Barth, meaning and interpretation does not
precede fact or history. The significance, the meaning or the interpretation, is based upon the
historical fact. The event of the incarnation and crucifixion is a unique and singular historical
occurrence {CD IV/1, 223-225).
6j
'The very heart of the atonement is the overcoming of sin' {CD IV/1, 253).
64
This issue of divine honour has already been raised by Anselm of Canterbury. But the
difference is that, whereas Anselm is mainly concerned with God's divine honour itself from the
sovereignty of God, Barth observes the divine honour from the standpoint of the love of God
(Anselm, 'Why God became Man?' in: The Library ofChristian Classics, Vol X. [1956] pp. 100-
183, esp. 119). The offence which God felt, which resulted in His incarnation and crucifixion, is
the 'mystery of His mercy' which is also the 'mystery of His righteousness.' Cur Deus homo?
Because He did not take the unreconciled world lightly, but 'in all seriousness. He did not will
[=undertake] to overcome and remove it from without, but from within' {CD IV/1, 237).
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defends Himself because He is by nature for human beings: 'He is mindful of man
because ... His own glory and man's salvation, man's salvation and His own glory,
are not two things but one.'65 His defense, that is His self-vindication, stands for
nothing but for our salvation: 'He does not become "for us" when there is some
self-fulfilment either with or after Him, but He is for us in Him' (CD IV/1, 229 ea).
This is what Barth means when he says that God is primarily for Himself but being
for Himself He is for us.66 So if we push to brinkmanship, this divine self-
vindication needs to be understood in terms of 'divine ordination (gottliche
Verordnungf (CD IV/2, 290; KD 322) based upon 'divine necessity and
freedom'67 or 'divine right (gottliches RechtY (CD IV/1, 10; KD 9). The divine
self-incarnation and crucifixion takes place in the 'inner necessity of the freedom
of God and not in the play of sovereign liberum arbitriumf68 His vindication of
us which is based upon the 'divine necessity' is most vividly manifested in the
crucifixion. The crucifixion explains the what of Deus pro nobis which entails four
65
(CD IV/3.1, 228). This identification is the 'divine self-purpose' (CD IV/1, 212). Barth notes
such a mysterious self-vindication of self-glory in this way: 'If we will not accept the fact that God
is also and primarily pro se, we shall find it hard to understand what it means that in being pro se
He is also pro nobis, and therefore pro md (ibid).
66
(CD IV/1, 212-223). God being 'for us' means that He took our place to save us without any
co-operation on our part. Salvation does not need any completion because it has already been
perfected. Reconciliation, thus, is not one act among other divine acts, but it is the central act (CD
IV/1, 239; 211-283).
67
(CD IV/1, 239; 'gottliche Notwendigkeit und FreiheiC KD 263). Moltmann revises the
traditional views of atonement theories: satisfaction theory, ransom theory, expiation theory. The
problem and limit of these sacrificial theologies, according to Moltmann, is that they attempted to
resolve sin by 'objectifying' it. This attempt adopted the system of scapegoat which led us to
understand the necessity of the crucifixion in a legalistic concept: 'sin will be pardoned only when
it has the same amount or quality of compensation'. But Moltmann insists that sin has to be
understood in 'relational' and 'personal' terms, because it is not the objectified sin, but humanity
that needs to be justified and pardoned. Hence God suffering death on the cross must be understood
in these relational and personal terms. In other words God did not suffer death on account of this
legalistic reason, but because His loving relationship with us is too great to be broken and too
personal to bypass us (Jiirgen Moltmann, The Spirit of Life [London: SCM Press, 1992], pp. 132-
136).
68
(CD IV/1, 195). The event has to do with the 'divine commission,' 'divine execution,'
'divine order,' and 'divine obedience' (ibid).
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fundamental elements.69
Firstly, that Jesus Christ was crucified means that humankind rejected God
in order to be its own Judge, and strove to control its relationship with God and its
fellow-human beings in accordance with its own values of good and evil. But
allowing the crucifixion, God rejected human rejection and as such became the
Judge.10 Moreover, the crucifixion shows that the result of humankind being its
own judge brought nothing but the death of Jesus. Thus the crucifixion paradoxi¬
cally declares humankind to be false judges. This means that the crucifixion is
God's negation of human negation by judging human judgment (CD IV/1, 231-
235).
Secondly, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ means that He took the place of us
sinners.71 This is difficult to accept no matter how we explain it. But what we
could at least say is there are three directions to the fact. First, if Jesus Christ made
our evil case His own, He is the 'supremely objective source of knowledge' in the
sense that 'In face of [facing] Jesus Christ we are forced to a simple recognition
of the nature of evil as that which is against God, and of the fact that we do it' (CD
IV/1, 240). Second, He entirely deals with our evil case as the 'Representative' (CD
IV/1, 241). Third, this being the case, there is nothing more we can seek and do
even as evil doers (CD IV/1, 242-244).
Thirdly, that Jesus Christ is for us means that He suffered and was crucified
to death.12 Barth draws our 'very special attention' (CD IV/1, 244) to the
69
Barth employs juridical terms for the explanation of the content of the crucifixion. He
acknowledges using other terms as apossibility too: financial terms (Mk 10:45; 1 Pet 1:18; Tit 2:14;
Rom 3:24; Gal 3:13, 4:5), military terms (Mk 3:27; Col 1:13; Eph 6:1 If.), or cultic terms in the
Hebrews, Johannine writings, and Pauline epistles (CD IV/1, 274).
70
It can also be said that 'He is the Priest who represented us' (CD IV/1, 275).
71
It can also be said that 'He gave Himself to be offered up as a sacrifice to take away our
sins' (CD IV/1, 277).
72
In cultic terminology this is equivalent to saying that 'He has made a perfect sacrifice' {CD
IV/1, 281). Barth believes that the death of Jesus Christ on Golgotha alone is the 'one mysterium,
the one sacrament' {CD IV/1, 296). This view extends to rejecting baptism, including infant
baptism, and eucharist as sacraments. Barth distinguishes the baptism with the Holy Spirit and the
baptism with water to order to indicate that the Church ceremony of Baptism is not a Christian
sacrament, but a human action. The reason why Jesus Christ alone, i.e., His death alone, is the
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crucifixion since it is the aim of the divine movement 'from above', the way of the
Son of God into the far country. The crucifixion is not a fate but the self-
determined act of God Himself. The crucifixion is the 'true fulfilment' (CD IV/1,
244) of God's for-us-ness in Jesus Christ. In such a way the divine movement
'from above' is completed in this event of crucifixion.73 To be specific, what took
place in this passion is our 'reconciliation' and 'atonement' with God, and 'conver¬
sion' to God.74 As such, 'all theology lives by the fact that the cross of Jesus
Christ is itself the work and therefore the wholly sufficient Word of God.'75
Fourthly, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ was the righteousness of God.
Humankind is created to be free in its obedience to God. Yet it disobeys God and
forfeits its freedom through disobedience. This is the unrighteousness of human¬
kind. Whereas Jesus Christ who is God Himself obeyed even to death - 'the
freedom of God Himself, has the character of obedience' (CD IV/1, 258) - in order
to regain the original righteousness of humankind. The crucifixion in this way
demonstrates the righteousness of God Himself. The righteousness of God is that
whereas humankind insists on the death of sinners God insists on the life and
forgiveness of sinners. As such, the crucifixion is the ultimate judgment of divine
Christian sacrament, is that He and the event of crucifixion alone makes people Christian, through
the power (baptism) of the Holy Spirit. 'Baptism responds to a mystery, the sacrament of the history
of Jesus Christ, ... It is not itself, however, a mystery or sacrament' (CD IV/4, [1969:1968] 102).
(=CD IV/4). For Barth's careful demythologisation of the traditional understanding of baptism see
(CD IV/4, 103-128) Eberhard Jiingel's reflection on Barth's understanding of baptism see ('Karl
Barths Lehre von der Taufe. Ein Hinweis auf ihre Probleme,' [1968] in: Barthstudien. okumenische
Theologie, Band 9 [Ziirich-Koln: Gutersloher Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn, Benziger Verlag, 1982], pp.
246-290; cf. pp. 291-314).
7j The 'completion,' 'true fulfilment,' and 'the act of God Himself indicates the universality
of the particular event. If the event is truly a completing and fulfilling act of God Himself, and it
happened only once, then the event should claim its universality not in spite of, but because of, its
particularity. If this were not the case, then a second or third event of crucifixion would have to
occur as the first event is not powerful enough to embrace all the world once and for all. Also, to
this extent, our situation has 'objectively been decisively changed' irrespective of human recognition
(CD IV/1, 245).
74
(CD IV/1, 250-251). 1 Cor 11:25; Lk 22:20; Mk 14:24; Matt 26:28; Rom 5:If., 10; 2 Cor
5:18f.; Col 1:20, 22; Eph 2:14, 16; 1 Pet 3:18; Heb 10:19f., (CD IV/1, 252).
75
(CD IV/1, 250). Accordingly the content of the Christian proclamation is "crucified God"
and it is pro nobis: 1 Cor 1:18, 23, 11:26; Rom 8:32, 14:15; Gal 2:20; 1 Pet 2:21; 1 Thess 5:9; Heb
2:9; Jn 15:13, 10:11 (ibid).
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love and therefore perfect love. In this way Barth's whole theology converges into
his theological axiom that all theology depends upon the 'theologia cruris.'16
Barth, concerning the suffering and death of Jesus Christ, admits there could
be much more painful and unjustly sufferings than that of Jesus' in world history.
However, the unique and special thing about the passion of Jesus Christ consists
of the person and mission of Jesus Himself. He is the 'eternal God' the Judge, and
yet He stands to be judged. The subject of judgment becomes the object of
judgment. The crucifixion is not simply the humiliation of a relatively innocent
creature, nor is it a question of theodicy: How can God will or permit crucifixion
in the world which He has created good? It is the suffering and 'dishonouring' {CD
IV/1, 246) of God Himself. It is a matter of the answer to the question that in this
76
{CD IV/l, 284-288, 250). We would prefer the word crucifixionis to the conventional word
crucis since we suppose the former conception is much more vivid and dynamic in conveying the
power and the meaning of the Golgotha event, whilst the latter phrase is somewhat abstract and thus
has much more of the flavour of symbol.
Moltmann also affirms that the theologia crucifixionis is the 'centre' of all Christian
theology (Moltmann, The Crucified God 204, 153). Seeing the crucifixion from atrinitarian perspec¬
tive, the cry of Jesus on the cross 'My God, why have you forsaken meT also means 'My God, why
have you forsaken yourselfV {ibid., 151). The centrality of the crucifixion in Christian theology is
the retrieval of Luther's theology of cross that 'in Christ crucified is the true theology and the
knowledge of God - 'In Christo crucifixio est vera theologia et cognitio Del (Martin Luther, 'The
Heidelberg Disputation XX' [1518] in: The Library ofChristian Classics Vol XVI. [1962], p. 291).
'The Almighty exists and acts and speaks here in the form of One who is weak and impotent, the
eternal as One who is temporal and perishing, the Most High in the deepest humility' {CD IV/1,
176). Only the true God can humiliate Himself even into 'dying the death {[den] Tod sterben)' {CD
IV/1, 130; KD 142).
Further, the theologia crucifixionis, which is God's self-manifestation of His for-us-ness,
rejects any attempt to understand the incarnation and crucifixion as an anthropological,
psychological or sociological myth. Theologia crucifixionis remythologises all demythologisation
of the event of reconciliation {CD IV/1, 273). We see Barth's significant view when he says that
'To put it ["Truly this man was the Son of God" (Mk 15:39)] in epigrammatic form, the "handing
over" of Jesus on the morning of Good Friday was the founding of the Church as a Church of both
Jews and Gentiles, and therefore of a missionary Church' {CD IV/2, 263).
Incidentally, what Barth means by this phrase 'dying the death' is that although the
crucifixion means that God 'gave Himself up' for us, this 'giving up' is by no means God 'giving
Himself away' {CD IV/2, 260). God truly experienced death on the cross. But death is not the final
word for Him. This dual emphases that on the one hand God really died on the cross, and yet on
the other hand death is not the last word, is what Barth intends when he says that the resurrection
means that Jesus Christ came not only from 'dying {Sterbeny (God's true experience of death), but
also from 'death {Tod), (death is not the last word for God) in the most stringent sense {CD IV/2,
151-152; KD 169).
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humiliation God is supremely God by being alive in the death. Moreover, this
human passion was not confined within itself but reaches out to all humankind as
the redemptive judgment of God and, as such, as the reconciliation of the world
with God. The passion does not merely have to do with something or some issue
but has to do with everything. Through the passion God confronted and shattered
not merely the consequences of sin and death but sin and death itself, the 'eternal
death.'77 The passion re-established the broken original relationship between God
and humankind. So it is 'the comprehensive turning in the history of all creation'
(CD IV/1, 247). This is how the passion of Jesus Christ is distinguished from all
other passions. With respect to the validity and authenticity of this assertion, Barth
insists that the theologia crucifixionis is self-explanatory since the crucifixion of
Jesus is itself the wholly sufficient work and Word of God.78
But we ask, at this point, about the theological necessity of His crucifixion.
For we cannot simply postulate the horrible crucifixion as the only alternative for
our reconciliation. Barth is clear about this point, and he asserts that Scripture does
not give a clear theological explanation on this question. With reference to Luke
24:26 'Christ should suffer these things,' Barth affirms that His death was
necessary to overcome the obstacle of human sin, that is, 'rebellion'79 of
humankind against God. Sin is, in its character, the reason for human death. The
atonement was to judge this death. Barth, in the light of Isaiah 53:5, portrays well
his understanding of punishment and the necessity of His death by saying that 'My
77
(CD IV/1, 247). Hence 'p°wers' such as s'n> ev'f death, and fear are powerless. For Barth's
view of this issue see {CD II/l, 590, 552; CD III/3, 289-368), in which Barth constantly articulates
that evil has no ontology, and it can objectively be perceived only in the grace and the crucifixion
of Jesus Christ.
Human faith is an affirmation of this self-explanatory event and does not add anything to
it. It calls for proclamation and explanation, not to augment the event, but to recollect it with joy
and thankfulness. In this sense its very self-explanatory content demands an explanation: 'intellectus
fidei' (CD IV/1, 259-260).
79
(CD IV/1, 253). Although the necessity of the crucifixion is ultimately the 'divine necessity'
(CD IV/1, 10), Barth also finds the reason for the necessity of the crucifixion in terms of human
sin: Matt 26:28; Lk 23:34; Jn 6:51; Ac 20:28; Rom 4:25, 5:9, 6:1 Of., 8:3; Gal 1:4; 1 Pet 3:18; Jn
1:29; cf. 1 Jn 3:5; Heb 2:14, 9:14, 28; 1 Pet 2:24; 1 Jn 1:7; Tit 2:14; Rev 7:14; Eph 1:7, 2:16; Col
1:14, 2:13, 2:14f., 2:11; 1 Cor 15:3; 2 Cor 5:17, 5:14-15 (CD IV/1, 255-256).
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turning from God is followed by God's annihilating turning from me. When it is
resisted His love works itself out as death-dealing wrath.'80 The decisive thing is
not that He suffered instead of humankind, but that He has made an end81 to us
as sinners and therefore to sin itself. For this reason it is important to understand
this passion as the 'radical divine action' (CD IV/1, 254) which destroys the root
of evil in the world. Thus Barth says:
... this worst becomes an instrument in the hand of the merciful and omnipotent
God for the creation of the best. For the sake of this best, the worst had to happen
to sinful man: not out of any desire for vengeance and retribution on the part of
God, but because of the radical nature of the divine love, which could 'satisfy'
itself only in the outworking of its wrath against the man of sin, only by killing
him, extinguishing him, removing him.82
God had to demonstrate His obedience, freedom, and death for human disobedi¬
ence, enslavement, and life because human sin was too serious and radical to be
dealt with lightly and because God is for us. The saving power of the radicalness
of the crucifixion manifests in the fact that the human situation has objectively83
changed even if human beings are unaware of it. So the real problem and therefore
question is not the necessity but our capacity of understanding as the two events
of the incarnation and the crucifixion are too great to be understood.
Thus far, the trend of Barth's discussion is centred mainly around the
explication of the fact of the passion and crucifixion and its meaning for God and
for all humankind. If Barth had ended his christology here, then it would most
80
(CD IV/1, 253). 'Meiner Abwendung von Gottfolgt Gottes vernichtende Abwendung von mir.
Seine Liebe wirkt sich da als todbringender Zorn aus, wo sie zuruckgestoften wircC {KD IV/1, 279).
81
'What took on the cross is the last word of an old history and the first word of a new' (CD
IV/1, 176 ea). Barth rejects the satisfaction theory believing that it provides no clue to the scriptural
witnesses. Also the substitution theory, that is that we are spared from suffering our punishment
since Jesus suffered instead of us, is seen as an insufficient description of the meaning of the
crucifixion {CD IV/1, 253).
82
{CD IV/1, 254). lEs mufite und sollte urn dieses Besten willen dem siindigen Menschen eben
dieses Schlimmste widerfahren - nicht aus irgend einer gdttlichen Verge!tungs-und Rachsucht,
sondern kraft der Radikalitat der gdttlichen Liebe, die sich selbst nur eben in der volligen
Auswirkung ihres Zornes gegen den Menschen der Siinde, nur eben in seiner Totung, Ausldschung
und Beseitigung «genug turi» konnte' {KD IV/1, 280).
83
The issue of objectivity will be dealt with in the discussion of the noetic event, the
resurrection.
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likely be a christology 'from above' and it would have been difficult finding any
clues for the christology 'from below'. But the important thing is that Barth clearly
points out the necessity of the crucifixion in such a way that the passion was
inevitable due to Christ's life-act.
According to Barth, considering Jesus' {Royal Man's) relationship to God,
His life-act and His proclamation of the kingdom, it is not really surprising that
there could be the No of most radical rejection, a most categorical repudiation and
a most resolute resistance on the part of the Jews. The Jews were not more wicked
than the rest of humankind. In fact, they were much better than their heathen
contemporaries. But the cause of passion was not a matter of disputable details, or
a matter of developments and innovations which could be more or less accepted or
rejected. It was not a matter of small revolutions but the one great revolution.
Everything was at stake. It was a matter of life and death. Neither people of that
time nor of our age could accept Jesus' questions and challenges. Thus it was
inevitable that Jesus should be met by this typical repudiation and resistance on the
part of Israel. Necessarily He had to suffer and be crucified.
Similarly, all the pride of Israel (Matt 23) was at stake when Jesus came up
against it. Israelite's pride had to be either destroyed or defended at all cost. What
Jesus could say was nothing but woe if He had to speak at all. What was at stake
was humankind against God. Humankind's cause against God had to be defended
in all circumstances and at all costs. However, as Jesus is the God Incarnate, Jesus
fought this defense battle for human beings. So the rejection and attack on Jesus
in His own home town (Lk 4:22f.) is only a prelude to this passion story {CD IV/2,
261-263; KD 289-291). In short, Jesus's passion and crucifixion was inevitable due
to His revolutionary life-act 'from below' which brought such a radical challenge
to all human systems, values, customs, and ideas.8/1
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We will resume a more intensive discussion about this aspect of Christ's revolutionary life-
act in chapter four.
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2. The Ontic Event through the Noetic Event and the Noetic Event in the
Ontic Event
We are not attempting here to discuss the whole issue of Barth's view on
the resurrection of Jesus Christ for that would involve another thesis. Nor are we
going to contrast or compare the crucifixion of Jesus Christ with the resurrection
of Jesus Christ or vice versa. Our aim is to pick up one of the theological insights
of the two events of the crucifixion and the resurrection for the purpose of our
thesis.
1) The No for the sake of the Yes
We saw, on the one hand, that the central theme of Barth's whole
christology is the theologia crucifixionis. It is the canon of all theology and as such
christology. Thus in understanding the efficacy of the reconciliation, Barth
especially stresses that the event of our reconciliation is completed in and through
the crucifixion. '... nothing can be added by us in time or in eternity' (CD IV/1,
296) to the crucifixion in order to complete our reconciliation. For the crucifixion
is an ontic event of our reconciliation. We also see, on the other hand, that 'the
whole meaning of and character of the whole Christ-occurrence [is] attested by it
[the resurrection], ... the whole New Testament thinks and speaks on the light of
this event, and to understand it [crucifixion] we must be prepared to think with it
in the light of this event [resurrection]' (CD IV/1, 299). What does Barth mean?
What is the value of the resurrection then?
According to Barth, the resurrection is the noetic event of the ontic event.
By raising85 the Son, the Father approves and accepts the Son's obedience to
death.86 The resurrection is the Father's 'validation,' 'justification,' and 'verdict'
85
Scripture witnesses the resurrection of Jesus Christ in the two different ways: 'God has
raised Him from the dead' (Rom 10:9); and 'he [Jesus] has risen from the dead' (Jn 21:14).
86
The resurrection 'crowns (kront)' and 'reveals (offenbarty the obedience (CD IV/1, 334; KD
368). 'It was a second act of justice after the first to the extent that it was the divine approval [die
gottlicher Validierung] and acknowledgment [die Anerkennung] of the obedience given by Jesus
Christ, the acceptance [die Annahme] of His sacrifice, the proclamation and bringing into force of
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of the Son's act.87 In this way the resurrection announces and proclaims the event
of reconciliation which happened to the world in God Himself. The ontic event is
known to the world that our reconciliation is achieved by the crucifixion. Since the
resurrection has this noetic character the contemporaneity of the event of the
reconciliation, with respect to the time and space difference, centres not upon
human recollection or upon the Church tradition but upon the event of the
resurrection. 'The eternal action of Jesus Christ grounded in His resurrection is
itself the true and direct bridge from once to always, from Himself in His time to
us in our time' (CD IV/1, 315). For He is the Lord of all time (Heb 13:8; CD IV/1,
314). So the resurrection is the answer to the question of the relevance and the
efficacy of the event of reconciliation for humankind.88
the consequences [die Proklamation und das Inkrafttreten der Folge], the saving consequences, of
His action and passion in our place' (CD IV/1, 305; KD 337).
87
'die Validierungl 'die Rechtfertigung,' and 'das UrteiP (CD IV/1, 313; KD 345).
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For the complexity of Barth's view of the resurrection of Jesus Christ see (CD II1/2, 441 -
493; CD IV/1, 296-357; CD IV/2, 131-154; CD IV/3.1, 281-324; The Resurrection of the Dead
[London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1933], pp. 15-223). Barth resumes his discussion on the
noetic power of the resurrection under the heading The Direction of the Son (CD IV/2, 264-377)
in order to discuss the relevance of the crucifixion, which is the ontic event of the reconciliation.
In discussing this, Barth highlights the holistic power of this Royal Man, that is, that He not only
did reconcile us but He also fully makes His deed known to us. What illuminates us, with regard
to our thesis, is that such a holistic event is grounded, and took place, in this Royal Man who is the
'human proof (CD IV/2, 290). In such a way, this Royal Man is the sole Integrator, or the concrete
dual manifestation, of the 'from above' and the 'from below'. For a discussion of this Integrator,
see chapter 4, II, I.
In parenthesis, Barth spells out the direction of the Son in the following manner. The Son,
the Royal Man, directs us three ways:
1) A definite place is fixed: we are His (indicative) and therefore are what we are
(imperative). This is the Taw of the grace' (CD IV/2, 364). The power of the Royal Man in, and
through, the work of the Holy Spirit brings humankind back to their own beginning, from which
alone they live. It does not burden them with any other 'ought' than that of their liberating 'may'
(CD IV/2, 365). Barth thinks that perhaps Ephesians 6:10 ('Be strong in the Lord, and in the power
of his might') expresses the heart and totality of what has to be said from this first point of the
direction of the Son (the Royal Man), and therefore of the work of the Holy Spirit, the ontology and
the dynamic of what we have here called His incarnation (CD IV/2, 366-367). Additionally, the
indicative and imperative are mentioned already in Church Dogmatics (IV/1, 317-322) in terms of
human responsibility while Barth was discussing the resurrection.
2) The direction of the Royal Man in and through the work of the Holy Spirit involves
warning and correction. We have already been freed from the bondage of sin. Yet we often behave,
and even pretend, as if we are not freed yet. The work of the Spirit does not allow this pretext, by
constantly reminding us who we are (CD IV/2, 367-372).
3) The direction of the Royal Man in and through the work of the Holy Spirit is a definite
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To characterise the act of reconciliation, while incarnation and crucifixion
are negative events, resurrection and exaltation are positive aspects of the event of
reconciliation. The former which are 'from above' are ontic events and the latter
which are 'from below' are noetic events. Barth sees these as two aspects of the
one event. Here our argument comes. We saw that, apparently, Barth notes that the
responsible Christian christology has to consider both aspects of the 'from above'
and the 'from below' together. Nonetheless, we observe that Barth's christology is
a christology 'from below', Tow' christology, rather than a 'from above', 'high'
christology, as we give its content critique (Sachkritik), i.e., as we consider the
meaning and the purpose of his christology. If Barth's christological direction and
goal ends up with the movement 'from the above', i.e., with the crucifixion itself,
then his christology should be a christology 'from above'. For Barth's christology
begins with the divine movement 'from above' and then finishes with the
crucifixion. The christology fully stops at this point of death. Barth's christology
would be a one-sided divine act 'from above to below', from incarnation to
crucifixion since there is no further thing to proclaim.
However, Barth's christology cannot be labelled simply as a christology
instruction which demands our most concrete obedience. The Holy Spirit causes and summons us
to test ourselves, our situation, our possibilities, and our choices. This is the task of theological
ethics. But the Holy Spirit is more than a professor of theological ethics. His instruction is a
concrete assignment which has an authority and stringency which cannot be compared with any
other instruction. In the face of this instruction there can therefore be only the most concrete
obedience. His instruction is the command of the living God which has to be heard directly and
continuously by the community and the individual Christian. Therefore, the work of the Holy Spirit
cannot enslaved by humankind into any general law, subjected to any regulation, or pin-pointed in
a written code. There can be a question of the objectivity or validity of the work of the Spirit and
human responsibility. Yet Barth suggests abandoning this question because it has to do with the
power and lordship of the living man Jesus who is the true Son of God. He [the Spirit of Jesus]
always confronts us as this 'Other.' It is always a new, strange and superior work confronting
human caprice: 'It is always the power and lordship of this One, the royal man' (CD IV/2, 373).
'As instruction the direction of the Holy Spirit says Yes and Forward at the very point where in its
capacity as correction it says No and commands us to halt and retreat. ... It unmasks and rejects
man's lack of freedom, but it also discloses and magnifies his freedom' (CD IV/2, 374).
It is worth noting that what Barth ultimately means when he talks about the work of the
Holy Spirit as the authoritative and sovereign and definitive work, is nothing other than the work
of the man Jesus of Nazareth, the Royal Man. For Barth such an emphasis on the trinitarian
hermeneutic surmounts Rosato's claim that Barth's christology is not trinitarian and therefore lacks
the equal and fair treatment of the Spirit as Lord.
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'from above' because the ontic event, christology 'from above to below', is not an
end in itself but points to the noetic event, the movement 'from below to above'.
The crucifixion is the 'No of God.' But it stands for the 'Yes of man.' For Jesus
Christ is the 'Yes of God' spoken in the world and has become a 'part of world
history' {CD IV/1, 257). Hence the importance is that God has spoken the No not
for the No but for the sake of Yes: 'God says No in order to say Yes. His Word is
the Word of that teleologically established unity of the death and resurrection of
Christ' {CD IV/1, 347). The wrath of God is thus nothing other than the 'fire of
His love' {CD IV/1, 94). The suffering and death of Jesus Christ is 'only a negative
form of the fullness of a positive divine righteousness' {CD IV/1, 257) and a
'negative event with a positive intention' {CD IV/2, 310). The No of God, the
divine act of the from above is not for itself but for the Yes, the from below. The
'No of God is only the hard shell of the divine Yes' {CD IV/1, 264). And this Yes
is nothing but the resurrection which presupposes the No. The resurrection is then
the answer to the prayer of Jesus 'Abba! this cup will be removed as you wish.'
The resurrection is the 'disclosure of its [life-act and crucifixion of Jesus] meaning'
{CD IV/1, 268). Indeed, the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead was the
'revelation and meaning and purpose of the obedience demanded from and
achieved by Jesus Christ.'89 The noetic event was necessary for two reasons. First,
it took place lest we believe that death or sin is the last word. The resurrection is
the final revelation of the fact that sin and death are 'non-being.'90 Second, God
wanted to give His eternity in an 'earthly form,' 'the inner and secret radiance of
His glory an outward radiance in the sphere of creation and its history' {CD IV/1,
308). But ultimately this necessity also corresponds to that of the necessity of the
incarnation and the crucifixion, that is, the divine necessity which is the free
89
{CD IV/1, 312-313 ea). 'IVir haben gesehen: die Auferweckung Jesu Christi von den Toten
als eine zweite, andere, neue gottliche Tat war die Offenbarung des Sinns und der Absicht des von
.Jesus Christus verlangten und geleisteten Gehorsams und also seines Todes' (KD IV/1, 345).
90
(CD IV/1, 305; CD II/l, 590, 552; 'das Nichtige (nothingness).' Barth, in facing non-being,
i.e., evil which causes sin, fear, and death, sees a dilemma that we can neither overestimate the
power of evil nor underestimate it. However, evil has no ontology, and it can objectively be
perceived only in grace and in the crucifixion of Jesus Christ {CD II1/3, 289-368).
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activity of the love and the grace of God {CD IV/1, 309). The noetic event
interprets the ontic event.
Nevertheless, many people tend to down play the importance of the noetic
aspect of Barth's christology by singling out the divine self-revelation in
humiliation. In this biased view many people are inclined to say that Barth's
christology is a christology only 'from above'. Certainly this view is not a fair
assessment at all when we turn to what he says: 'God says No in order to say Yes.
... The community lives by the fact that the first and the final Word of God is this
Yes' {CD IV/1, 347 ea). The crucified and the risen and the living Jesus Christ is
God's Yes to humankind which includes God's No {CD IV/1, 349). But 'it is a
mistake to hear the No independently, as the final word, with a validity which is
absolute' {CD IV/1, 349). 'The No pronounced in the cross of Jesus Christ can and
should be heard and accepted only as the necessary and in the true sense
redemptive form of His Yes,' because death has no autonomous or definitive or
absolute significance {CD IV/1, 350). The Yes is 'the purpose of the No' {CD IV/1,
350) because 'this second step [resurrection: Yes] is the goal of the first [cruci¬
fixion: /Vo].'91 In virtue of this purpose christology is an inclusive christology and
not an exclusive christology. In other words, an appropriate and responsible
christology aims at humankind, and as such deals with humankind; without this
emphasis, christology is of no use {CD IV/1, 354-355). This is, as we mentioned
before, the reason why Barth deals with christology not in a separate title
'christology', but in The Doctrine of Reconciliation. 2 Moreover, it is not the act
'from above to below', from incarnation to crucifixion, which announces that the
One who suffered for us is not destruction or death but life, it is the act 'from
below to above', from resurrection to exaltation {CD IV/1, 347). It is not the
crucifixion itself, but the Easter event which tells us what sin and death are. As
such the resurrection is the 'axiom of all axioms' {CD IV/1, 346) in christology.
91
(CD IV/2, 356): '... dieser zweite Schritt ja das Ziel schon des ersten is? (KD 398).
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This shows us how seriously Barth treats the humanity of Christ as well as all humankind.
We will come to this point in the next chapter.
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IV. Against the Implication of 'functional christology': Jesus Christ is
Himself God the Reconciler
We are to remember the views of Charles T. Waldrop, Wolfhart Pannenberg,
Robert Jenson, and John Macquarrie. The unanimous assertion of these scholars is
that the divinity in christology dominates in Barth's christology with the implication
that the humanity in the christology had a merely functional role for the event of
reconciliation. This implies that that particular Jesus of Nazareth is not God
Himself. The view that Barth's christology is a christology 'from above' arises
from the implication that Barth has a 'functional christology'. Verifying this issue
of 'functional christology' is crucial not only for our thesis itself but also for an
accurate understanding of the theology of Karl Barth, for his entire theology stands
or falls according to how we understand his view of divine revelation.
1. Jesus Christ as God Himself
According to Barth, christology must develop and present the doctrine of
reconciliation in light of Jesus Christ alone 'as the beginning and the middle and
the end' (CD IV/1, 125). The decisive thing about the incarnation is that its work
and effect is not a mere restoration of the 'status quo ante' i.e., more than a
'restitutio ad integrum' (CD IV/1, 13). The incarnation is 'the coming of salvation
itself, the presence of the eschaton in all its fullness' (CD IV/1, 13). For the God
of Immanuel is not merely playing a 'functional role' for the human reconciliation.
This idea would simply mean that there is a God who 'controls' the humanity of
Jesus Christ. Then Barth's christology would be nothing but a 'functional christol¬
ogy', i.e., in this case, Jesus would not be God the Reconciler Himself but might
even someone merely employed for the task of reconciling work. On such a view,
Barth's christology fall into the docetic heresy - an implpication that would
certainly have surprised Barth himself. On the question of 'functional christology',
however, Barth makes his stance crystal clear in the preliminary statement of
christology.
The man in whom God Himself intervenes for us, suffers and acts for us, closes
gap between Himself and us as our representative, in our name and on our behalf,
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this man is not merely the confirmation and guarantee of our salvation, but
because He [Jesus Christ] is Goct3 He is salvation, our salvation. He is not
merely the redeemer of our being but as such the giver and Himself the gift of its
fulfilment and therefore the goal and end of the way of God,94
To clear out any possible suspicion of him having a 'functional christology' Barth
firmly declares that 'It [the name Jesus Christ] is not a name which has to be
pronounced for the sake of completeness or adornment. It is there at the very heart
of it as the central and decisive Word' (CD IV/1, 20). Jesus Christ is the vere Dens
vere homo.95 As He alone is the true God and the true human being, He alone is
the true Reconciler between God and humankind. There is no true Reconciler
behind or beyond this Jesus Christ. In the event of reconciliation 'He Himself is
present as actuality, as His own witness. He Himself, by His Spirit, is its guarantor'
(CD IV/1, 17). To this extent we understand the doctrine of reconciliation not as
the doctrine of reconciliation about Jesus Christ but as the doctrine about
reconciliation of Jesus Christ. This self-presence is the power of the doctrine of
reconciliation and as such the source of our talking about the doctrine of
reconciliation.
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'... this one man [the Jesus of Nazareth] ... is the Son of God who is one with God the
Father and is Himself God'; 'Nun ist ja dieser eine Mensch ... der Sohn Gottes, der mit Gott dem
Vater eins und also selbst Gott ist' (CD IV/1, 170; KD 185-186 ea).
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(CD IV/1, 13-14 ea). 'Jesus Christ is God, God as man, and therefore 'God with us' men,
God in the work of reconciliation' (CD IV/1, 22).
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'The mystery of Jesus, the Son of Man, that He is primarily the Son of God the Father, and
as such Himself God, and then, and as such, also the Son of Man' (CD IV/2, 347); 'As God the
Father and the Son is one God, the two acts are, in this sequence [humiliation and exaltation], the
one incontestable living act of God, the act of the one free love which is His essence and work both
inwards and outwards' (CD IV/2, 359 ea); 'It is God Himself in lowliness, temptation, suffering,
rejection and death. It is God Himself as the Lord become Servant. But it is also God Himself in
the exaltation and majesty of this one man. ... God does what this man does. Or rather, this man
does what God does' (40-41); Jesus Christ is the 'total (die gauze)' and 'complete declaration of
God (die vollkommene Aussprache Gottes)' (CD IV/3.1, 99; KD 110).
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2. Jesus Christ the Epistemic Ground and not an Epistemic Principle
The name Jesus Christ is more than a mere 'epistemological principle' of
the message of Immanuel. Otherwise,
... the Christian message will at once degenerate into the self-declaration of an
ecclesiastical form of redemption instituted indeed by Him but now self-resting
and self-motivated, or into a devotional and ethical system taught indeed by Him
but self-justified and self-sufficient. ... And when this happens, the Christian
message as such will no longer have anything individual or new or substantial to
say to man (CD IV/1, 21).
The claim is that if we regard the name Jesus Christ only as an 'epistemological
principle' then the name becomes a 'recitation of myth' (CD IV/1, 21). But the
Christian message does not speak of myth but of the concrete name Jesus Christ.
We must realise that the Christian message does not at its heart express a concept
or an idea, nor does it recount an anonymous history to be taken as truth ... . This
means that all the concepts and ideas used in this report (God, man, world,
eternity, time, even salvation, grace, transgression, atonement and any others) can
derive their significance only from the bearer of this name and from His history,
and not the reverse. ... They can serve only to describe this name - the name of
Jesus Christ.156
Barth does not use the name Jesus Christ as a kind of means for his christological
reflection. His standpoint is firm against any suspicion of promoting a 'functional
christology', even if it is by implication. The Christian message does not know and
proclaim Jesus Christ 'merely as the representative and exponent of something
other' (CD IV/1, 21). To name Jesus Christ is not a 'mere courtesy,' nor is the
name of Jesus Christ to be used as a 'symbol' or 'sign' which has a certain
necessity on historical grounds, and a certain purpose on psychological and
pedagogic grounds. When the Christian message employs the name of Jesus Christ
it is not simply referring to a 'contingent fact of history' which is the 'vehicle' of
an 'eternal truth of reason', but to the Reconciler Himself (CD IV/1, 21). 'He
| Jesus Christ] is the authentic Revealer of God as Himself God. ... He is nothing
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(CD IV/1, 16-17). The 'God with us' might be only 'a postulate, a pure speculation, a myth'
without the name Jesus Christ: 'Ohne diesen Namen [Jesus Christus] ist es ungesichert, ungeschiitzt,
jedem Verdacht, es mochte ein Postulat, eine freie Spekulation, ein Mythus sein, ohne weiteres
ausgesetzP (KD IV/1, 16). Only this name Jesus Christ validates the actuality of a report of Deus
pro nobis (ibid., 17).
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less or other than God Himself, but God as man.'97 To stress that Jesus Christ is
the first and eternal will of God {CD IV/1, 51), and as such He is God Himself,
Barth holds that
... since we are now concerned with the revelation and dealings of God, and
particularly with the atonement, ... it is pointless, as it is impermissible, ... that we
ascribe to this person another form than that which God Himself has given in
willing to reveal Himself and to act outwards. If it is true that God became man,
then in this we have to recognise and respect His eternal will and purpose and
resolve ... behind which we do not have to reckon with any Son of God in
Himself, ... with any other Word of God than that which was made flesh. ... He
is the decision of God in time ... which was made from all eternity (CD IV/1, 52).
Barth does not stop here. '... if Jesus Christ is not the one Word of God from all
eternity, ... how can we really ... not [take] it seriously as His eternal will, ... to
which therefore we must hold?' {CD IV/1, 52). Jesus Christ is the 'full' and 'final'
{CD IV/1, 65) revelation of the being of God since He is the 'God-man' {CD IV/1,
135). In reference to John 1:1 Barth raises a counter question: 'Can we interpret the
"Son" here as the "Revealer"?' The definite answer is that the Son was God.98
Barth exposes his clear cut rejection of 'functional christology' in his
awareness of the problematic nuances of the word 'obedience' when used of the
Son and also in his consciousness of the danger of Modalism. On the one hand, the
term 'obedience' might be taken to imply a subordinate status for Christ, and so
Subordinationism. This would mean then the man Jesus of Nazareth is not the true
God, but an inferior being behind whom a superior and true God stands. Here the
true deity of Jesus Christ is jeopardised. On the other hand, Modalism tries to
maintain the true deity of the humiliated Christ. But Modalism interprets the being
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(CD IV/1, 128-129, cf. 130). Similarly, Jesus Christ is the 'content' and 'form' of the divine
will and decree (CD IV/1, 50, cf. 51). For Barth's biblical reference to object 'functional
christology' see (CD IV/1, 44, cf. CD 129).
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(CD IV/1, 71). 'In and through the being of man there immediately meets us at this point
the being of God also. ... This cannot be said of any other creatures. ... Here in man, i.e., in this
man, the vision and concept of the Creator are both direct and immediate in the creature. In the case
of this creature there is no need to reflect about God. God is present and revealed as this creature
is present and revealed' (CD III/2, 68 ea). Surely, there are words which testify that Jesus is in the
Father and the Father in Him, meaning that they are always one of two (Jn 10:38, 14:10, 20:17,
21:23). But this is the penultimate word. The ultimate word, with regard to the relationship between
the Father and the Son, is that the Father and the Son are one (Jn 10:30, 17:11, 22). As such, that
the Son is 6 k\5pioq means that He is 6 Gsdq (CD III/2, 63).
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of this Christ as a mere mode of appearance or revelation of the one true Godhead
(and that not His proper being), besides which there are the other modes of the
ruling Father and also of the Holy Spirit. Here the true and proper being of Jesus
Christ is impoverished. The problem is, as Barth asks, that if the Jesus of Nazareth
is not the true God Himself 'what is the value of the true deity of Christ, what is
its value for us?' (CD IV/1, 197). The two attempts resulted in separating the
immanence of God from the economy of God. That is that the divine immanence,
the being of God in Himself, differs from the economy, the being of God in
revelation. In other words, the revealed God differs from the actual being of God.
This would mean that Jesus Christ cannot be our Reconciler because He is not the
real God. We will have to wait until the real Reconciler comes. So Barth affirms
that Jesus Christ is the 'author' and 'finisher' (CD IV/1, 197) of reconciliation. Not
only separating, but even distinguishing between, the divine immanence and the
divine economy is repugnant to the ontology of Jesus Christ. For 'He is in time
what He is in eternity .... He is in our lowliness what He is in His majesty ... . He
is as man, as the man who is obedient in humility, Jesus of Nazareth, what He is
as God' (CD IV/1, 204). This is what homoousios means for Barth. Otherwise the
work of salvation is distinguished from His proper being as worldly, and as such
the work of salvation does not touch God Himself. God the Reconciler is
'identical'99 (CD IV/1, 199 ea) with the humiliated man Jesus of Nazareth. Here
the use of the term 'identical' conflicts with Robert Jenson's contention that the
being of the man Jesus of Nazareth is at best 'identical' with God if He does such
and such. What Jenson means is that Jesus Christ is not the true God Himself but
'very like' God. That is to say that Barth 'functionalised' christology for the
purpose of the event of reconciliation. In fact Barth uses the term 'identical'
often100 to express the ontic being of Jesus Christ throughout the Church
99
Accepting that the Jesus of Nazareth had to be crucified, Barth points out that both
Subordinationism and Marcionism suffered a loss of credibility as they tried to dodge His
crucifixion (CD IV/1, 195-200).
100
Eg. 'A Christ ... who was not identical with the Jesus of Nazareth ... would not be the
Christ Jesus' (CD IV/1, 135); 'The Son of God who is identical with this man; der mit diesem
Menschen identisch ist' (CD IV/1, 163; KD IV/1, 178, [1953]); 'but they are practically and in
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Dogmatics. Yet this is by no means to say that the two different 'persons' is what
Robert Jenson implies, but rather a matter of God's 'mode' of being and act.
Barth's stance in regard to this issue extends to his understanding of
Christian hope. The ground of the Christian hope derived from the completion of
reconciliation consists in the fact that Jesus Christ is Himself the pledge, the
content of the pledge. Barth explains it in the following manner:
He [Jesus Christ] Himself as the eternally living God is also the eternally living
man. The world is reconciled and converted to God in Him in the fact that He is
this man, not merely in distinctness and antithesis in relation to God, but also in
participation in His being and work, not merely in responsibility to Him, but with
a responsibility for His cause, not merely as His servant and friend and child, but
as a ruler in His kingdom {CD IV/1, 115).
The particular man Jesus of Nazareth gives us not only promises but is Himself the
'content'101 of the promise. Barth continues to argue the point in such an
emphatic way that
It is a terrible thing if at this point, at the last moment, we ignore Him [Jesus
Christ] as though He were only a means or instrument or channel, and look to
something different from Him, some general gift mediated by Him, regarding this
as the object of Christian hope, the future posited for the world and man. ... If we
look aside here, trying to understand the waited and expected being of man and
all creation in the service of God only as the manifestation of a general idea of
man or of being, we shall betray the fact that for our recalling and appealing to
the name of Jesus Christ earlier - indeed from the very first in our discussion of
the being of reconciled man - we have not really been thinking or answering in
relation to Him, but have been developing an anthropological concept which we
have found elsewhere and to which we have simply given a christological
superscription {CD IV/1, 116).
Therefore Jesus Christ manifests the divine promise of the future of the being of
humankind not nominalistically but truly and actually.102 He is not only the ontic
effect identical; sondern die sich praktisch und faktisch gegenseitig decken {CD IV/1, 161; KD
176); 'this man [Jesus], is the one in whose identity with himself we must recognise at once the
identity of God with Himself (CD III/2, 68, 71); also (CD IV/2, 97, 98, 99, 100).
101
(CD IV/1, 115-116). 'He does not merely go into lowliness, into the far country, to be
Himself there, as He did in His turning to Israel. But now He Himself becomes lowly. He Himself
is the man who is His Son. He [the Son of God] Himself has become a stranger in Him [the Son
of Man]' (CD IV/1, 170).
102
'... we have to take seriously the New Testament witness to the being of the one true God
in Jesus Christ; the realistic and not the nominalistic sense [der realistische, nicht nominalistische
Sinn]. ... everything depends on our accepting and following out in all its realism in the New
Testament presupposition 'God was in Christ' [Wieder hangt natiirlich Alles daran, dafi wir diese
neutestamentliche Voraussetzung: «Gott war in Christus» verstehen, mitmachen, in ihrem
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but also the noetic revelation of the event of reconciliation. Barth reminds us of the
view that 'We have already been on our guard against the possibility of regarding
and treating the name of Jesus Christ in a purely "nominalistic" way, as a formal
historical or symbolical sign of the event of atonement' (CD IV/1, 122-123).
Barth's emphasis upon the totality of His being and work confirms further
our thesis. Separation of the person and the work of Jesus Christ is unacceptable.
If the work of Jesus Christ is separated from His person, then we cannot be certain
whether the work is truly His work or someone else's because the work could then
be of a different person.103 It would be impossible to believe in Jesus Christ as
the true Lord and as such the true Reconciler. Jesus Christ is 'very God-man' and
He is 'this One and not another. His being as this One is His history, and His
history is this His being. This is the truth which must light up the doctrine of
reconciliation as Christology' (CD IV/1, 128).
Jesus Christ is not a formal or a functional aspect of christology but is
Himself the 'form' as well as the 'content'104 of it. In this way He is the 'guaran¬
tor' of our reconciliation in the sense that He mediates the efficacy of the event. It
also speaks for itself, in the sense that the work of reconciliation is not left to
humankind alone as if its efficacy relied on its acceptance. On the contrary, the
event constantly speaks for itself and as such completes its task.
Barth's refusal to treat the person and the work of Jesus Christ as merely
instrumental and as such of 'functional christology', is clearly shown in his
discussion of 'The Way of the Son of God into the Far Country' (CD IV/1, 160-
210). According to Barth, the humanity of Jesus is 'not simply a better man, a more
Realismus nachvollziehen]. If we grant this ... we have to follow the New Testament in
understanding the presence and action of God in Jesus Christ as the most proper and direct and
immediate presence of and action of the true God in the sphere of human world and world history'
(CD IV/1, 198 ea; KD IV/1, 216-217).
IOj
(CD IV/1, 127). Barth, with this view, keeps the danger of Arianism or Pelagianism in mind
(CD IV/1, 128).
104 While Mclntyre, in understanding revelation, distinguishes content and form Claude Welch
sees them together (John Mclntyre, The Shape of Christology [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966],
pp. I54ff.; Claude Welch, In This Name: The Doctrine of the Trinity in Contemporary Theology
[New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952], pp. 163ff.).
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gifted, a more wise or noble or pious, in short a greater man,' but the 'qualitatively
different' One. He is the 'Lord,' 'Lawgiver,' 'Judge,' 'a final Word,' 'the Saviour,'
'the Messiah.'105
That Jesus is God is not a religious valuation (attribution) attached to Him
by humankind but a recognition ofHim as He was. Barth rebuffs the view that sees
Jesus Christ the Reconciler in terms of an 'attachment of religious valuation' to the
man Jesus of Nazareth. '... the heavenly Father, His kingdom which has come on
earth, and the person of Jesus of Nazareth are not quantities which can be placed
side by side, or which cut across each other, or which can be opposed to each
other, but they are practically and in effect identical' (CD IV/1, 160). The early
Church community was confronted with the particular man Jesus of Nazareth 'on
the presupposition of His majesty' (CD IV/1, 162). Calling the particular man Jesus
of Nazareth God or Messiah 'has nothing to do with the free apotheosis of a man'
(CD IV/1, 162). The peculiar place and function of the man Jesus of Nazareth was
not a 'hypothesis' or a 'religious experiment' (CD IV/1, 162). Jesus Christ being
God Himself and as such the true Reconciler Himself consists in the fact that 'They
[New Testament Christians] do not try to crown Him in this way, but they
recognise as the One who is already crowned, ... He Himself continually attests
Himself as such' (CD IV/1, 162). The man Jesus of Nazareth reveals 'His unity
with God.'106 He is 'the King of His kingdom, and therefore "by nature God"'
(CD IV/1, 163).
105
(CD IV/1, 160). Barth refers to the following passages to reject any view of functionalising
christology: Col 2:9; Jn 5:23; Cor 1:2; Rom 10:12; Ac 9:14, 21; 22:16; Jn 20:28; Ac 7:59; 2 Cor
12:8; Jn 14:13f., (CD IV/1, 160).
106
(CD IV/1, 163). 'The fact that He is this can be known only as He Himself reveals it, only
by His Holy Spirit' (CD IV/1, 163). To this extent, 'His form as a man is regarded and described
rather as the concealing of His true being, and therefore this true being as the Son or Word of God
is a hidden being' (CD IV/1, 163).
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3. Anhypostasis and En/iypostasis in view of Settling the Ontic Ground of
Christology in terms of the Unity of the Two Natures
One of our arguments in this chapter was that Barth did not undermine the
full humanity of Christ. Yet Barth deals with the anhypostasis-enhypostasis
controversy in which he states that the Son of Man exists only as the Son of God
exists. Does this frustrate our thesis?
Traditionally, it would seem that the doctrine of anhypostasis is inimical to
the 'from below' approach. It ascribes to Jesus a real humanity without regarding
Him as a human being like us. It accepts the full humanity of Christ in body and
soul. But the manhood stands only as the One to whom the divine Word united to
it.107 Christ's manhood is impersonal. Thus, for anhypostatic christology, the
christology 'from below' is merely 'a degradation of the divine Person rather than
exaltation of the human nature'.108 The anhypostatic view sees christology
basically as an ontological concern in which humanity is taken into divine
experience. For the anhypostatic view, 'person' is not a psychological concept but
essentially an ontological one.109
In contrast, the doctrine of enhypostasis is more compatible with the 'from
below' approach. The divinity possesses humanity within itself. Enhypostasis means
'the incorporation ... of the human person into the 'person' (hypostasis) of
God'."0 Such language asserts that human life completely grounded in God is not
any less a human life. It does not result in the loss of any aspect of being truly
107
E.L. Mascall, The Theology and the Gospel ofChrist (London: SPCK, 1977), pp. 121-138,
esp. 130.
108 While christology 'from below' is closely related to the rejection of nature language,
anhypostatic thought is neo-Thomist (Calvert, From Christ to God 7).
109
Yet Baillie, who approaches christology 'from below', doubts any concept of impersonal
humanity, because 'it is nonsense to say that he is 'man' unless we mean that He is a man' like us.
Further, Baillie points out that depicting a full or real human being in ontological terms is bound
to be docetic (Baillie, God was in Christ 87). Nobuhara also critiques this ontologically oriented
christology with a view of analogia actionis (Tokiyuki Nobuhara, 'Analogia Actionis: A New
Proposal for Christology "From Below"' in: Union Seminary Quarterly Review [1986], pp. 269-
285).
1,0 'The purpose of such a suggestion is to draw attention to the truth that people are created
by God and that man in particular can become aware of God's indwelling' (Calvert, From Christ
to God 7).
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human. Such an idea lays a foundation for that possibility without the traditional
tension between humanity and divinity. This indicates that to view 'from above'
and 'from below' as so different from each other is not necessary. So the attraction
of an enhypostatic approach is that it asserts the real humanity of Christ without
excluding his divinity at the same time.111
Barth refers to the doctrine of anhypostasis-enhypostasis sporadically
throughout his writings.112 What is presupposed in these issues, even though their
emphases differ from each other, is that both anhypostasis and enhypostasis stand
due to the divine assumption (CD 1/2, 163). Literally speaking, anhypostasis stands
for impersonalitas of the humanity of christology. Jesus Christ exists as a human
being because and as God makes human essence as His own. The human nature of
Christ has no personhood of its own since it is prepared and actualised by God. The
humanity of Christ is not an autonomous personal being, but exists directly in and
with the one God in the mode of existence of His Logos. While enhypostasis stands
for the personalitas of the humanity of Christ, this humanity has personhood or
independent existence as a human being. But this human nature is real only in its
union with Logos, in the person of God's Son.113
Pursuing an appropriate understanding, however, we need to know the
content as well as the context of the issue lest we distort what Barth meant. Apart
from The Gottingen Dogmatik, a first indirect statement of the issue emerges in
section II, God the Son of the Church Dogmatics 1/1 in which Barth acknowledges
that the person of Jesus Christ is 'subordinate to the Creator' (CD 1/1, 412).
111
According to Calvert, what is common to both theories is that they seek to assert the full
humanity of Christ within the Chalcedonian framework and use the traditional language of classical
christology (Calvert, From Christ to God 7-8).
112
The anhypostasis-enhypostasis was used by Hippolytus and it emerged at the Second
Council of Constantinople in 553 to guard against the idea of a double existence of Christ as Logos
and as Man, an idea inevitably bound to lead either to Docetism or to Ebionitism (CD 1/2, 163). For
Barth's understanding of anhypostasis-enhypostasis see (CD 1/1, 408-415; KD, 374-381, CD 1/2,
149-150, 162-165; KD, 163-164, 177-80, CD II/l, 271, 284, 286; KD, 304, 319, 321, CD 1II/2, 55-
71, esp. 69-70, CD IV/2, 49-50, 74 92-93; KD, 80; Table Talk 49; The Gdttingen Dogmatics:
Instruction in the Christian Religion, Vol 1, ed. H Reiffen, trans. G.W. Bromiley [Michigan:
Eerdmans, 1991], pp. 90, 157, 163).
113 CD IV/2, 49; Gdttingen Dogmatics 157.
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Between the Reconciler and the Creator 'the relation of subordination ... is present'
0CD 1/1, 413). This view seems simply to undermine the full humanity of Christ
itself in terms of enhypostasis-anhypostasis. Yet we must know that this view is
completed only with the conclusive remarks: 'But again this subordination and
sequence cannot imply any distinction of being; it can only signify a distinction in
the mode of being1 (CD 1/1, 413 ea).
The second arrangement of the issue appears in the subsection Very God and
Very Man in section 15 of The Mystery ofRevelation in the Church Dogmatics 1/2
in which Barth brings up the issue of anhypostasis-enhypostasis, and where he
faces the compatibility of the two natures of Jesus Christ, given the fact that 'His
manhood is only the predicate of His Godhead' (CD 1/2, 162). This presupposition
seems to support the divinity in christology at the expense of the humanity, for the
divinity is dominant over the humanity. Yet here too Barth does not plunge into
this statement in order simply to underestimate the importance of the humanity of
Christ. For we must not in any way forget the framework of Barth's Theological
hermeneutics; Barth takes up the issue in light of a trinitarian perspective, i.e., of
the unity of the two natures. That is why Barth mentions manhood as being the
predicate of Godhood under the presupposition that 'This Man Jesus Christ is
identical with God because the Word became flesh in the sense just explained [that
is that the humanity of Christ has an independent existence only in its unity with
God], Therefore He does not only live through God and with God. He [This Man
Jesus Christ] is Himself God' (CD 1/2, 162). Barth's articulation of the unity
implies that the humanity in christology can never be down-played because the two
are one.
The third treatment of the issue arises in the sub-section Jesus, Man for God
under the bracket of Man as the Creature of God in the Church Dogmatics III/2.
The issue is explained in the midst of his discussion about the human nature of
Jesus Christ by way of six points. First, this human being, Jesus, is identical to God
Himself. So to think about the humanity of Christ is impossible without thinking
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of God too."4 Second, the meaning and purpose of His presence and revelation
in this human being is the deliverance of all humankind. God's presence in Christ
means that the history of deliverance is enacted, and thus it may be known {CD
III/2, 68-69). Third, God's distinction of this human being Jesus does not infringe
upon His own sovereignty. He does not lose Himself in the human being of Jesus.
His deliverance is always the act of His freedom and love. His deliverance is a
demonstration of His 'transcendence,' His greatness and His deity, and as such
confirms His being as the true Creator {CD III/2, 69). Fourth, since God is
sovereign in His presence in this particular creature, its distinction means that it
exists in the lordship of God. The humanity of Christ does not exist outside this act
of sovereignty but within it. He is there just as God is there {CD III/2, 69). Fifth,
the human being of Jesus is not neutral in the face of the divine action, in its
relation to the history of the divine deliverance enacted in it, because it is distin¬
guished by the fact that it lives within the lordship of God. Sixth, in sum, the
distinctiveness of this man Jesus consists in the fact that He exists for God. That
the humanity of Jesus exists for God means that it exists for divine deliverance and
therefore for the freedom and love of God. It is the 'privilege of... this man' {CD
III/2, 71). In this way, the humanity of Jesus surpasses all other creatures.
Apparently, these six points seem to find Barth simply in favour of
anhypostasis and enhypostasis so that the humanity of Christ tends to be of
secondary importance whilst His divinity is of prime importance. However, we
should not misunderstand the point Barth makes. To deal with the issue of the
humanity of Christ, Barth first of all affirms that the humanum of Jesus Christ
exists in the form of actual human being. Under this affirmation, Barth questions
114
(CD III/2, 68). Here McCormack's view, in reference to Barth's statement that 'The Lord
... has to be present in this veil [Verhitllung] without restriction and diminution' from Unterricht
in der christlichen Religion: Prolegomena 169, that the humanity is 'indirectly identical' with the
divinity is highly questionable; as McCormack's interpretation is based solely on the early stage of
Barth's theology. Probing into Barth's further development of anhypostasis-enhypostasis, the prime
concern is the unique unity of the two natures. Incidentally, McCormack's thesis is a good survey
of the early theology of Barth. But the thesis is inadequate to convey a proper picture of Barth's
christology since it lacks his later development of it (Bruce Lindley McCormack, A Scholastic of
a Higher Order Parts 1, [Princeton Theological Seminary, New Jersey, 1989], p, 318).
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how the full truth of His humanity is qualified in spite of the apparent contradic¬
tion that He is distinct from us and yet He is also a real human being. Further
Barth even questions whether this theologumenon may not be superfluous. Keeping
these two questions in mind, Barth develops his view as follows. God has not
changed Himself in the human being Jesus Christ. The real divine sonship of the
man Jesus is true in virtue of the divine initiative and act of humility which is
intrinsically impossible {CD IV/2, 50). What does Barth mean? Is this simply to
bolster anhypostasis and enhypostasis, betraying a christology 'from above' in
terms of the domination of the divinity over the humanity?
To a certain extent, of course, Barth provides a clue to sustaining a
christology 'from above' or 'high' christology by stressing enhypostasis-anhypost-
asis and particularly by anhypostasis. Barth's provision to such a clue is found at
least on his two points: the humanity of christology is actualised by God, and God
did not change Himself into a human being but remains God in spite of the fact
that he truly became a human being. These two points seem to provide obvious
evidence of Barth's having a christology 'from above', because overall God is pre¬
valent.
At this juncture, we need to know the context of this argument for a proper
understanding of the issue. Specifically, the issue of anhypostasis-enhypostasis is
dealt with in the fourth of the six points {CD III/2, 69-70). Apparently, the purpose
of the fourth point is to say that the humanity of Jesus Christ exists as God exists
in Him. Yet, we must not bypass the other side of the emphasis that 'Man, this man
is the imminent kingdom of God ... ' {CD III/2, 70). Indeed, 'God is present and
revealed as this creature [human being] is present and revealed' {CD III/2, 68 ea).
Barth notes that the aim of God becoming a human being is to deliver humankind.
But at the same time Barth points out that the humanity of Christ is not an object
of deliverance lest, he undermine its saving significance at all. 'There can be no
question of divine grace imparted to it [the humanity] in the sense that it needs it,
but only in the sense that it [the humanity] may itself be the active grace of God.
It is not just the locus or sphere of this deliverance'' {CD III/2, 70 ea). To safeguard
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the full humanity of Christ Barth continues:
Nor is this creature [the man Jesus] merely the instrument of the divine aid. The fact that
through him God helps each and every man does not mean that He merely uses this
creature for this end [the deliverance of all humankind]. No distinction can be made
between what this creature is and what it does, between what God does through this
creature and what He does in it. For this creature is in the Word of God (CD III/2, 70).
Further, the issue of anhypostasis-enhypostasis is discussed in the Church
Dogmatics IV/2 where the main theme is the exaltation of the Son of Man. The
issue is discussed in a detailed explication of the theme that 'this One, God, the
Son, became and is also man' (CD IV/2, 44-50). The sum of this theme is this:
God becoming a human being is entirely His own act. This 'becoming' is a 'once-
for-all perfect' (CD IV/2, 46) event in time. Thus our speaking of Jesus Christ is
an 'actuality' which is already behind us, and not a possibility which is ahead of
us. The character of this divine act is a 'unity' in which there exists the 'becoming'
and 'being' of God the Son in human nature. The unity exists because it is God
who 'assumed' and 'adopted' human essence to Himself and sustains it, and not the
other way around (CD IV/2, 46-47). So the report of John 1:14 is irreversible. What
God assumed is a human being, 'a man.'"5 But He is 'the humanum' of all
humankind, because God did not change Himself into a human being in order to
remain as Reconciler, and because there is only One 'the Father's Son, by nature
God' and not a strange dual existence of God and human being (CD IV/2, 49).
With this, Barth reiterates the doctrine of anhypostasis-enhypostasis.
1
(CD IV/2, 47). Here Waldrop's view that Barth does not call the human nature which God
assumed 'a man,' loses its cogency (Charles T. Waldrop, Karl Barth's Christology Its Basic
Alexandrian Character [Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1984], pp. 58-59). For Barth, the terms 'human
nature,' 'humanity,' or 'humanum' mean the same thing: '... whether we speak of nature, or being,
or essence, or kind, or simply of humanity, or like Jn. 1:14 of "flesh," the important thing is that
we should keep in the background for the moment the idea and concept of 'a man' («ein
Mensch»). What became and is in the divine act of the incarnation is, of course, a man' even
though He is 'opposed to all other men' as He is 'the humanum of all men' (CD IV/2, 47-48 ea;
KD IV/2, 51-52).
Incidentally, the reason for Barth maintaining that Jesus is 'the' human being of all human
beings in spite of His being the fully human like us consists in two facts: first, otherwise the Son
of God surrendered Himself to this human being and is thus no longer is God and therefore no
longer becomes our Reconciler; second, He did not exist as One, but in a duality, in which the Son
of God exists alongside this individual human being, so that we will have to accept one of these
absurd alternatives (ibid). It is also instructive to notice that in this statement, flesh being 'a man'
is defined out just before the issue of anhypostasis-enhypostasis christology is raised (ibid).
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Certainly, as we mentioned before, Barth deals with the doctrine of
anhypostasis-enhypostasis under the presupposition that the terms are debated on
the basis of divine incarnation. Nevertheless, what Barth wants to say overall does
not simply to support the doctrine itself, but goes beyond the issue. According to
Barth, the doctrine of anhypostasis-enhypostasis will constantly appear, firstly, as
far as we remain in unbelief that God does surrender Himself to this human being
although He truly became a human being like us. He is true God and true human
being and yet He is not two beings but One being, however contradictory this
might seem. Secondly, the issue arises because it is the great mystery, 'the
Christian sacramentum' (CD IV/2, 50).
Observed from this angle, Barth's clarification of the issue of anhypostasis-
enhypostasis is by no means intended to depreciate the full or autonomous
humanity of Christ per se, in order to underscore a christology 'from above' or
'high' christology as such. Rather, it is meant to explain what the true being, the
true ontic ground of Jesus Christ is. This is what Barth means when he says that
the fact that He is a person, a soul, a body, and a temporal being does not make
Him a real human being. 'It merely indicates His possibilities as man. He becomes
and is real man, and is there as such as God is there in Him' (CD III/2, 69).
Moreover it is important to realise that the issue is concerned with the fundamental
question of christology: what makes christology christology? Working out the issue
was motivated by what Barth perceives to be a theological necessity, that is, to
safeguard christology from becoming a general anthropology. Barth asks 'what
kind of a happening and being is this [Christ]?'. He then answers:
From the nature of the acting Subject our first lesson is that it is God's own act,
the free disposing of the Creator over the creature, without cause or merit or co¬
operation on the part of the creature. Mankind itselfhas not produced Jesus Christ
as the realisation of the possibilities. ... It was not itself the active subject in His
becoming.116
In such a way, 'There can be no question of man himself being the ground of this
116
{CD IV/2, 45 ea). This statement has an implication for the rejection of Mariology: 'Even
the fiat mihi of Mary is preceded by the resolve and promise of God. It is confirmed His work, but
it did not add anything at all to it' {ibid).
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unity [of humanity] with His own [divinity] as an autonomous principle alongside
and in face of God' (CD IV/2, 46). Otherwise the human creature would occupy
the place of God the Creator. This safeguard shows us how and where the real and
fundamental issue lies beyond the question of whether Barth holds an anhypostatic-
enhypostatic christology.
Barth's treatment of this issue has two main functions. Firstly, Barth means
to say that it is God who creates the humanity assumed and not vice versa: 'He
exists because the Son of God appropriated and actualised His special possibility
as a Man' (CD 1/2, 150).
Here, special attention must be given to John Macquarrie's point of view.
Macquarrie, in reference to Barth's statement that '... his divine essence is that
which is originally proper to him, and his human essence is only adopted by him
and assumed to it ... the determination of his divine essence is to his human, and
the determination of his human essence from his divine (CD IV/2, 70),' argues that
Barth undermined the full humanity of Jesus Christ.117 Macquarrie means by this
that Barth has a christology 'from above'.
However, this accusation is very implausible. Barth notes that the Son of
God who became the Son of Man is by no means two different beings, but one
being: '... since the Son of God became this Man, He is not another or second
being in Jesus Christ alongside of the Son of God' (CD 1/2, 150 ea). What are we
to say to this? If Barth professed the existence of two persons by positing the
humanity alongside the divinity, then judging him as having a christology 'from
above' on the basis of anhypostasis-enhypostasis would have made sense. For the
issue already presupposes two persons so that the chief question would be 'who
depends upon whom?' And in fact, humanity's dependence upon divinity permeates
the whole discussion in Barth's christology. But is this all? Again, does Barth not
go beyond this scheme of anhypostasis and enhypostasis by unequivocally stating
that the Son of God and the Son of Man are one person? If the Son of Man is
117
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nothing other than the Son of God, indeed, if the humanity actualised is the God
Actualiser, what on earth is the use of this issue of anhypostasis-enhypostasis?
Does the issue stand simply to frustrate the proper humanity in christology and as
such to advocate Barth's christology as a christology 'from above'? How would we
interpret Barth's statement in respect of the Subject matter that 'God the Son is the
acting Subject in this event' (CD IV/2, 46 ea) and not simply 'God is the acting
Subject in this event'?
The second function is to show us that the true locus and the role of the
existence of all humankind is imaginable only in the light of the origin of the
humanity of Christ: '... it is impossible to understand ourselves [directly] in this
identity [with God]' (CD III/2, 71). These two purposes are well summed up in the
following statements:
Deriving from God, man is in God, and therefore for God. ... Man is essentially
from God and in God. When we say this we are speaking of the man Jesus. We
cannot say quite the same thing of man generally and as such. But we cannot
speak appropriately about man generally and as such until we learn that the
essence of man as seen in Jesus, is to be for God (CD I1I/2, 71).
For these two reasons, that is, that the humanity of Christ is essentially from and
in God, and, general anthropology is feasible only when it is seen in the light of
the humanity of Christ, Barth discusses the doctrine of anhypostasis-enhypostasis
under the subtitle Jesus, Man for God (CD III/2, 55-71). The reason for Barth
speaking of anhypostasis-enhypostasis is not to reduce an independence or
autonomy of the humanity of Jesus Christ, but to demonstrate the origin as well as
the purpose of all humankind with the help of the origin of the humanity of Christ.
What Barth wants to do is to differentiate clearly between God and humanity, the
Reconciler and the reconciled. If Barth did not clarify the fact that the origin of the
humanity of Jesus Christ is not the humanity itself, but God, then he would have
ended up by saying that the humanity itself and, as such, all humankind, could be
and, as such, is God, and thus any human being could become the Reconciler. This
would mean that any human could become the subject of christology. This is
exactly what Barth wanted to avoid. And what he implies when he says that
christology is not general anthropology and vice versa. The intention of the
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discussion about anhypostasis-enhypostasis is to testify that the man Jesus of
Nazareth is 'the reality of a divine act of Lordship' (CD 1/2, 165). Barth thus states
the reason for dealing with the issue of anhypostasis-enhypostasis in the following
manner:
It is in virtue of the eternal Word that Jesus Christ exists as a man of flesh and
blood in our sphere, as a man like us, as an historical phenomenon. But it is only
in virtue of the divine Word that He exists as such. If He existed in a different
way, how would He be revelation in the real sense in which revelation is intended
in Holy Scripture? Because of this positive aspect, it was well worth making the
negation a dogma and giving it the very careful consideration which it received
in early Christology {CD 1/2, 165 ea).
In addition, it is illuminating that Barth underscores the cruciality of the humanity
of Jesus Christ immediately after the sketch of anhypostasis-enhypostasis (CD 1/2,
165-171). This indicates that Barth never undermined the full humanity of Christ,
as some allege.
Truly, seen from the aspect of divine prevalence, Barth uses many similar
words to those cited by John Macquarrie which could be good evidence for his
assertion that Barth has a christology 'from above': 'As the Word of God becomes
flesh He assumes or adopts or incorporates human being into unity with His divine
being, so that this human being, as it comes into being ... ' (CD 1/2, 160 ea) etc.
Nevertheless, the idea of'adoption,' 'proper,' 'to,' and 'from' is not simply
to uphold a christology 'from above' as Macquarrie insists. It is rather to show how
the humanity of Jesus becomes and as such is God Himself. Our insistence proves
to be even more convincing when we turn to Barth's discourse on The Mystery of
Revelation. The humanity of Christ is dealt with from the perspective of his
theological axiom that 'the Word became flesh'. The 'became' implies that the
Word became 'participant' in human nature and existence. This means that the
humanity of Christ does not exist on its own, but exists because the Son of God
came into this particular human being. Thus this human being was never a reality
by Himself. 'It is not (in the adoptionist sense) as if first of all there had been a
man there, and then the Son of God had become that man' (CD 1/2, 149).
Otherwise divine incarnation would mean either that there are two persons or two
subjects in the 'one' human being, or that any human being could have been the
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Christ as we have already mentioned. So to clear up this issue and at the same time
to maintain the full humanity of Christ Barth states:
Not two juxtaposed realities - a divine and then a human, or even less a human
and then a divine - constitute the essence of man, this man, but the one, divine
reality, in which as such the human is posited, contained and included. Man, this
man, is the imminent kingdom ofGod ... . Similarly, the kingdom ofGod is utterly
and unreservedly this man. ... This is the distinction which is His and His alone
(<CD II1/2, 69-70 ea).
Moreover, the idea of 'adoption,' 'from - to,' and 'proper' should be understood
in the light of Barth's preference of the Word 'assumed' flesh to the Word
'became' flesh."8 Again, the preference means that the intention of Barth's use
of ideas like 'adoption' is to safeguard christology from three possible misunder¬
standings. First, God does not cease to be God in becoming a human being. This
is a matter of the sovereignty of God. This particular human being Jesus of
Nazareth is God Himself although He became a true human being like us. Second,
the fact that God the Creator 'takes over' the human being of the creature 'into
unity with Himself seems absurd and inconceivable. Yet this absurdity and
inconceivability did become actuality (CD 1/2, 160-161). Third, viewed from the
standpoint of trinitarian christology, the idea that Jesus Christ is the Mediator
between God and human being does not mean He is a third being or a midway
point between the two, but rather that He is the 'God-Man, in such a way that He
is God and Man. This 'and' is the inconceivable act of 'becoming' in the
incarnation' (CD 1/2, 161 ea). Therefore, the becoming of the Word cannot mean
the 'origination' of the third between Word and flesh, but only the 'assumption' of
the flesh by the Word."9 In short, Barth's insight concerning anhypostasis-
enhypostasis does not affect our thesis since the appropriation of the doctrine is
intended to settle the ontic ground of christology in terms of 'the utter uniqueness
of this unity of divine and human nature' (CD 1/2, 163) rather than to support
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(CD 1/2, 161 ea). Barth notes that, whereas the Nestorian error was in its separation of the
two natures, the Eutychian error was in its identification of the two natures (CD 1/2, 161-162).
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'high' or 'low' christology itself.120
Summary
The method of approach or starting-point, as far as Barth's christology is
concerned, cannot be the definitive or final basis to judge Barth to be a 'high-
christologian'. The charge is an over-simplification of the issue, since what matters
is not the method of approach or starting point, but its referent. Indeed, Barth's
emphasis upon the divine incarnation and his approaching christology from the
Logos concept does not support a 'high' christology as such. Rather it is a matter
of t/zeological and therefore christological clarification. In other words, Barth begins
his christology with the divine incarnation, the incarnation of the Logos, 'from
above', to demonstrate the true content of christology even though its referent was
the Royal Man Jesus of Nazareth. We must not at any rate forget that the
overriding concern, not to mention his christology {CD IV/1-3), of the entire
Church Dogmatics was the Subject matter: 'who is the Subject of christology, and
as such of the whole of theology?' Barth, by revelation, does not mean an assumed
deity or an ambiguous Logos concept, but the particular human being Jesus of
Nazareth, the pivotal figure of all 'low' christology. The one who verifies the so-
called 'Logos' or 'incarnation' or 'revelation' is none other than the particular
human being Jesus of Nazareth. In short, Barth's clarification of the Subject matter
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There are two different observations on Barth's reason for dealing with the doctrine.
McCormack views that Barth deals with the issue in order to respond to the question 'how can God
fully be in history and in time without fully becoming identical with it?' (McCormack, Scholastic
Order 318-319, cf. 316-336). Whereas MacDonald holds that 'Barth's motivation is no less than
to preserve the sui generis theological realm from non-theology.' So '... it is a misconception to
think of Barth's appropriation of the enhypostasis-anhypostasis along the dimension high/low
Christology' (Neil Beaton MacDonald, Karl Barth and the Metatheological Dilemma. Barth,
Wittgenstein and the Metadilemmas ofthe Enlightenment [Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh
Ph.D. Thesis, 1994], pp. 112, 111).
McCormack's observation is only partly correct, for it misses the rest of the motivations
which we mentioned on our third points in page 59 (cf. 62). We should add that the problem with
MacDonald's view is found in its obscurity as to how the theological realm could be preserved from
a non-theological realm in terms of anhypostasis-enhypostasis. See (ibid).
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of christology is done in prospect of its verification. Having recognised this,
evaluating Barth's christology as a 'high' christology on the basis of the method
of approach alone is very much open to debate. Methodology cannot and should
not be postulation for its own sake but should be a 'means.' The fact that Barth
begins his christology with the divine incarnation, 'from above', is to be understood
in terms of the need for clarification of who Jesus Christ was and how a genuine
christology is related to this 'who'. The christological movement 'from below', i.e.,
Tow' christology, also governs Barth's understanding, and therefore his presentation
of the movement 'from above', i.e., 'high' christology. The concern of Barth's
christology is not the method of approach but its agenda and interest.
The term Immanuel is, for Barth, a more than adequate phrase to describe
the divine act of incarnation. This 'God with us' is thoroughly christological. The
primacy of Immanuel is God. Yet this divine primacy does not relegate humankind
from being the central interest and aim, but rather highlights it in the strongest and
securest manner. The surety and actuality of our reconciliation with God cannot be
based upon ever capricious humankind but upon the ever faithful God. An
equivalent expression for Immanuel is Deus pro nobis. The incarnation, crucifixion,
and resurrection are the visible and undeniable actualisation of Deus pro nobis. God
does not become for humankind but is for it, in that God is by nature for
humankind. This implies, for the purpose of our thesis, that the christological
movement 'from above', 'high' christology, means nothing but a further emphasis
of the movement 'from below', Tow' christology. This implication, analogically
speaking, is intensified by the fact that the No which represents the negative
movement 'from above to below' took place for the sake of the Yes which is
constituted by the positive movement 'from below to above'. This insight is further
reflected by Barth's preference for referring to the christological topic not as
'christology', but as The Doctrine ofReconciliation which signifies christologically
the importance of the humanity of Jesus Christ, and consequently of all humankind.
The epistemic ground and the content of this knowledge of Immanuel is
nothing other than the man Jesus of Nazareth. This means that the name Jesus
Christ, in describing the event of revelation, is used in a real way and not in a
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nominal way. This belies the view that Barth's christology is a 'functional
christology". For Barth, the term 'identisch' (identical) means 'is': the man Jesus
of Nazareth is the revelation of God Himself. In this way, Jesus Christ is the very
content of our reconciliation and thus the 'guarantor' of our reconciliation.
Barth's appropriation of the doctrine of anhypostasis-enhypostasis tends not
to support a 'high' christology or a christology 'from above', so to speak. Barth
refers to the older doctrinal formula in order to settle the issue of the unique unity
(einzigartig Einheit) in the sense of its union (Vereinigung) of the two natures, in
spite of the fact that what constitutes christology is not human beings but God. As
such, the emphasis of the issue lies not on the domination of God but on the unity
of God and man. So Barth's safeguard to stop christology from being appropriated
as general anthropology is feasible in virtue of this unity, despite the fact that the
particular Jesus Christ was a true human being (ein Mensch).
CHAPTER FOUR
Standing the Royal Man in the Centre of Barth's Christology
I. Beyond the Scheme of 'Bothness': both 'from above' and 'from below'
Seeing Barth's christology from a wide spectrum, John Thompson's view
is perfectly correct when he describes Barth's christology not as one solely 'from
above' but as both 'from above' and 'from below'. Indeed, based on this scheme
of both 'from above' and 'from below', his christology consists in the sovereignty
of divine grace in Christ, and in the establishment in Christ of Man as the righteous
partner of God. So it is no surprise when we encounter his christology in the
framework of reconciliatory exchange, d,7toKaTaAA,d aasiv, of the exinanitio of
God and the exaltatio of humanity.
It was God who went into the far country, and it is man who returns home. Both
took place in the one Jesus Christ. It is not, therefore, a matter of two different
and successive actions, but of a single action in which each of the two elements
is related to the other and can be known and understood only in this relationship:
the going out of God only as it aims at the coming in of man; the coming in of
man only as the reach and outworking of the going out of God; and the whole in
its original and proper form as the being and history of the one Jesus Christ (CD
IV/2, 21 ea).
Having underlined this framework of exchange Barth even declares that 'It
[christology] is primarily and properly this human Subject, who, as the object of
the free and liberating grace of God, cannot be only an object in the event of
atonement, but also becomes an active Subject.'1 Here we must therefore question
why Barth emphasises this 'bothness' despite his uncompromising standpoint that
'
(CD IV/2, 19). Indeed, 'The New Testament obviously speaks of Jesus Christ in both these
way: ... from above downwards, the other from below upwards. It would be idle to try to conclude
which of the two is the more original, authentic and important. Both are necessary' (CD IV/2, 135).
Similarly, 'It is true enough that the event of atonement is wholly and utterly a movement from
above to below. But it is also true that this truth encloses the further truth that the atonement is
wholly and utterly a movement from below to above, the movement of reconciled man to God' (CD
IV/2, 6; cf. 4); 'It would be a strange Christology which did not give the same attention to the true
humanity of Christ as to His true deity, or, ... to His royal office as to His high-priestly office, to
the exaltation of the Son of Man' (CD IV/2, 19). Significantly enough, again, Jesus Christ being
both the electing God and the elected human being corresponds exactly to the current emphasis that
the Son of Man is not only a mere 'object' of christology, but also the 'Subject' of christology.
Incidentally, the English edition conveys Barth's meaning well by rendering the term Subject with
capital S in contrast to the small o for the term object. This is because Barth, by the term 'Subjekt'
and 'Objekt,' underlines the humanity as being the true agent of christology rather than being a kind
of 'puppet' or simply a 'follower' of the divinity (KD IV/2, 19).
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the Subject of christology is divine movement 'from above', from without human
possibility or reality, and not 'from below', from within human possibility or
reality? What does this mean for our present concern?
1. The 'from above' in the 'from below'; Realising the Envisionment of the
'from below' in the 'from above'
Barth deals with the christology 'from below' in terms of the life-act of the
konigliche Mensch, the Royal Man. The phrase expresses both the divinity and the
humanity of Jesus Christ.2 What triggers our mind is that whereas the aspect of
'above' (CD IV/1) is built up with the content of 'below', divinity in terms of
humanity, the aspect of 'below' (CD IV/2) is set up with the content of 'above',
humanity in terms of divinity. Admittedly this chiasmic development is a
demonstration of the indispensability of the twofold3 'from above' and 'from
below'. In fact this indispensability undergirds the unio hypostatica which resulted
in the term 'God the Son (Gott der Sohnf (CD IV/2, 48; KD 53). This framework
of bothness alerts us to make two observations. On the one hand, it is a sheer error
to insist that Barth's christology is a christology 'from above'. Indeed, the
framework of Barth's christology that responsible christology consists in the
exchange of both 'from above' and 'from below' diametrically opposes this view
of 'high' christology. On the other hand, this framework apparently endorses John
Thompson's view that Barth's christology is a christology both 'from above' and
'from below'. Certainly Barth affirms this bothness by referring to the concept of
'exchange'. Barth vindicates Thompson's view:
If we could speak of the reconciling God and reconciled man only by looking
upwards and downwards from Jesus Christ, and constantly looking back to Him,
The man Jesus is the Royal Man because He is not merely a human being, but 'the' human
being (CD IV/2, 180).
3
Theologically speaking, this is the application of his trinitarian scheme. Christologically
speaking, this is the realisation of vere Deus et vere homo. Soteriologically speaking, this is the
actualization of the 'exchange' of divine humiliation and human exaltation. Eschatologically
speaking, this is the basis of the responsible Christian life (CD lV/3,2; Barth, The Christian Life).
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we can speak of Jesus Christ only as we consistently keep before us the one whole
event of the covenant between God and man fulfilled by Him, and therefore of
both the above and the below {CD IV/1, 123).
However, we cannot avoid the question of the ground for these two
movements of one event, since it is so important for a correct understanding of
Barth's christology. On what basis does Barth speak of this event, and what is its
content? Concerning this question, it is crucial to turn to Barth's declaration that
if we are to understand the meaning of the incarnation, the 'from above to below',
we have to understand the cry of Jesus on the cross: the meaning of the
incarnation is plainly revealed in the question of Jesus on the cross: "My God, my
God why hast thou forsaken me?"'4 What does this mean with regard to our
question of the christological ground? Knowing the context of the argument and
reflecting upon the content of his whole christology this statement suggests two
points.
Firstly, God came and was real flesh. Flesh in the language of Scripture
means that humankind is sinful and therefore stands under the 'divine verdict' and
'judgment' {CD IV/1, 165). The flesh is 'the concrete form of human nature and
the being of man ... as unreconciled with God and therefore lost' {CD IV/1, 165).
The humility of the Son of God and the corresponding majesty of the Son of Man
coincide as they are represented in the events of Gethsemane and Golgotha {CD
1V/2, 292). 'The only thing is that we must not measure Him by a preconception
of what is divine' {CD IV/2, 95). Indeed, according to Barth, our conventional
understanding of true God is completely shattered by this event of the crucifixion
of God Himself. If we have to summarise what Barth means by true Theology and
as such true christology we may say that only the true God could let Him be
crucified:
Everything depends on our accepting this presupposition [that God is crucified in
Jesus Christ], on our seeing and understanding what the New Testament witnesses
4 ' Was Inkarnation bedeutet, wird offenbar in der Frage Jesu am Kreuz\ "Mein Gott, mein
Gott, warum hast du mich verlassen" {Mr 15:34)' {CD IV/1, 185; KD 202 [1953]). For Moltmann
this cry is 'special divine [God's] pain' which is God's experience of 'hell' (Moltmann, The Spirit
of Life 136).
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obviously saw and understood, the proper being of the one true God in Jesus
Christ the crucified. ... Therefore we must determine to seek and find the key to
the whole difficult and heavily freighted concept of the 'divine nature' at the point
where it appears to be quite impossible ... the fact that Jesus Christ was obedient
unto death, even the death of the cross. It is from this point, and this point alone,
that the concept is legitimately possible.5
Secondly, we remember that for Barth the crucifixion is the ontic event of
christology to the extent that the work of reconciliation is completed in the
crucifixion itself.6 Thus reconciliation does not require any complementary event,
5
(CD IV/1, 199). Subordinationism and Modalism suffered from the evasion of this
crucifixion of Jesus Christ (ibid)- 'He [God] differentiates Himself from all false gods (among
whom the god of Islam is especially characteristic in this respect) by the fact that He is not a
prisoner of His own exalted status, but can also be lowly - not in the surrender but the affirmation
of His divine majesty' (CD IV/2, 42).
6
'His work, His being and action [and crucifixion, and therefore reconciliation], were not
augmented by His resurrection. ... His work [reconciliation] was finished' (CD IV/3.1, 282); 'It
[reconciliation] is a completed fact [in and through the crucifixion], to which nothing can be added
... [or] taken away by us in time and in space' (CD IV/1, 296 ea; cf. IV/1, 245, 290). So 'The
resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ are the revelation which corresponds to this completion
of his work' (CD IV/2, 141).
Moltmann's difficulty with this view of Barth is that if Christ's resurrection has not given
'added value' to the crucifixion 'Christ's resurrection is then reduced to "the Father's judgment" and
becomes the legitimation category for the cross of the Reconciler.' 'If the whole salvation of the
world has 'already been accomplished' in Christ's death on the cross, as Barth mentioned, then the
New Testament's futurist assertions about salvation are meaningless' (Moltmann, The Way ofJesus
Christ 318). Barth's view of the resurrection of Jesus lacks its futuristic dimension, i.e., 'the
eschatological orientation of the christian faith' by categorising Christ's eternity (the parousia of
Christ) to the three modes of time: past-present-future (ibid., 318). Paul does not speak about an end
of history that has already taken place. He speaks about 'an End-time process' which the resur¬
rection of the crucified One has set in motion (ibid., 319). Resurrection does not say 'restitutio in
integrum through reconciliation,' but through the new creation (Rev 21:4) (ibid., 188-189).
Consequently, Barth's christology is too much influenced by the theologia crucifixionis whereby
the centrality of the theologia resurrectionis is decentralised. Moltmann's critique is agreeable on
the basis of his reference to Barth's statement so far.
Yet it is equally true that Moltmann overlooked Barth's constant articulation of the centrality,
precisely speaking the 'unity,' of the resurrection with the crucifixion (CD IV/2, 282). At the same
time, Barth notes that the Easter event did not take place 'after' the crucifixion but 'on' the
crucifixion. This Easter event is the 'new' act of God and not an addendum to the crucifixion: 'His
resurrection did not follow from His death, but sovereignly on His death' (CD IV/1, 304 ea). In
parenthesis, such a critique is caused partly by Barth's dialectic style of contention throughout his
theology. For instance, although Barth emphatically emphasises that the resurrection did not
augment anything to the crucifixion, he also says that 'Thus the resurrection and ascension add to
what He was and is and to what took place in Him-they add to what was to be seen in Him' (CD
IV/2, 133 ea).
Rahner also notes the equal magnitude of the resurrection with the crucifixion in a similar way
to Barth: 'The resurrection of Christ is not another event after his passion and death ... the
resurrection is the manifestation of what happened in the death of Christ' (Karl Rahner, 'Dogmatic
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even the resurrection. Barth's description below shows how important and therefore
central the event of the crucifixion is for him in spite of his full recognition of the
importance of the resurrection.
The word 'cross' is a description of the whole existence and divine likeness
and activity of the man Jesus. Yet it is the cross which 'controls (beherrschtf and
'penetrates (durchdringtf and 'determines (bestimmtf this whole divine likeness
and activity of the man Jesus (CD IV/2, 249; KD 276). 'The cross is the sign under
which it [divine likeness] must be seen both as a whole and detail' (CD IV/2, 248).
As the Gospels put it, the Royal Man was not welcomed but rejected and then
suffered and was crucified. The Gospels did not expunge the story of the passion
and crucifixion from the story of Jesus. On the contrary, the Gospels stated that His
death is 'a problem of the first magnitude. It is, in fact, the problem which
epitimises all problems of His existence and relationship to God and His life's
work' (CD IV/2, 251). Nevertheless the Gospels integrated the story of the passion
with the Royal Man's life-act that went before.7 They gave the crucifixion a
particular emphasis as the necessary result of the life-act that went before. 'In the
whole of the New Testament He is the Crucified, enclosing in Himself the whole
of His being within this limit [that post-Easter Jesus is absolutely identical with
pre-Easter]. Faith in Him is faith in the Crucified. Love for Him is love for the
Crucified. Hope in Him is hope in the Crucified' (CD IV/2, 250; KD 277). All the
positive things of Jesus is characterised by and based on this final negative event.
'We have not seen the Jesus of Gospels and the whole of the New Testament
properly if we do not finally take account of the fact that the light in which we
have tried to see Him is the light ofHis death as it shine forth in His resurrection,
and that it is in this way that it is the light of His life, the light of the world' (CD
Questions on Easter' in: Theological Investigations IV [London: Darton & Longmann, 1966], p.
128).
Barth's understanding of the crucifixion in such a way that the crucifixion was the result or
consequence of Christ's life-act, the way He lived, clearly reveals where Barth's christological
hermeneutic anchors. For the cruciality of the question of how He lived see The Life Act of the
Royal Man as the Hermenentical Filter for Barth's Christology in chapter 5.
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IV/2, 250 ea).
Barth has constantly reminded us of the fact that the purpose of the
incarnation is the reconciliation of all humankind. This purpose is achieved in and
through the crucifixion. This means that the event of crucifixion was the kairos, the
very decisive moment, in which our reconciliation not only happened but was also
completed. Because if the God who was crucified on the cross is the God who
alone has the exclusive authority for our reconciliation, then no other reconciliatory
events or signs can be more perfect and more decisive than that of the death of God
Himself. Moreover, all the christological movements, whether 'from above' or
'from below', point to this very moment. That is to say, 'What we have called the
way of the Son of God into a far country and the homecoming of the Son of Man,
and what older dogmatics called the exinanitio and exaltatio of Jesus Christ, are
one and the same event at the cross' (CD IV/2, 292 ea). This is why Klappert
disagrees with Pannenberg's understanding of Barth's christology as a christology
'from above' in view of having an Logos-flesh christology. According to Klappert,
Barth's christology consists in the unity of the incarnation and the exaltation. So the
importance of God coming into the 'far country' for Barth is not to interpret it as
the history of the 'coming down' and the 'going up' in which the 'coming down'
predominates. Rather, as for Barth, the importance of this movement lies in the
location of the crucifixion because it is the content and the revelation of both
movements. By this Klappert means that for Barth, crucifixion is the basis for his
christology: 'das Kreuz ist, weil das Integral der Geschichte Jesu Christi, der Ort
der Offenbarung der Gottheit Jesu' Hence Klappert argues that Barth's christology
cannot be a christology 'from above', but rather a christology 'from below'.8
8
(B. Klappert, 'Die Christologie K. Barths als Anfrage an die Christologie der Gegenwart' in:
Freispruch und Freiheit [1973], p. 256). For the same reason, Klappert goes beyond R. Bultmann's
view of the crucifixion. For Bultmann, the importance of the crucifixion is that 'it happened,' but
he does not show any historical interest nor give credibility to the consideration of the historical
setting of the crucifixion. Klappert points out that we must ask, as Barth did, 'What happened?'.
It is not sufficient to say that there 'was' a salvific event, crucifixion. The crucifixion is the salvific
event because it is the event of Jesus Christ, Jesus ofNazareth. As such, Barth's christology is a
christology 'from below' in a strict sense (ibid., 245-262).
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Assuming that Barth's christology is represented without bias, this view of the
kairotic moment attracts our special attention. By the term 'kairotic moment' we
emphasise more the dynamism of the act itself rather than the Gestalt of the event.
The term is more about the content itself rather than its ground which upholds the
content. So we now ask on what ground did this ontic event take place? Further,
how could we know that 'God was in Jesus Christ' or 'God was crucified'?9
Indeed Barth's whole christology begins with the divine incarnation. But what kind
of incarnation does Barth speak of? Does Barth not mean by the Son of God who
went to the 'far country' specifically this Royal Man, the particular Jesus of
Nazareth? This particular Jesus is the 'origin,' 'content,' and 'norm' of the divine
direction (CD IV/2, 3). According to Barth, the humanity of Christ is an 'objective
fact' which gives christology its 'ontological reference' (CD 1/2, 165). That is to
say, 'Every question concerning the Word which is directed away from Jesus of
Nazareth, the human being of Christ, is necessarily and wholly directed away from
Himself, the Word, and therefore from God Himself, because the Word, and
therefore God Himself, does not exist for us apart from the human being of Christ'
(CD 1/2, 166). The event of human salvation took place 'in the concrete event of
this visitation ... in the man Jesus' (CD IV/1, 192 ea). Acknowledging this
significance, Barth states that:
'Jesus Christ for us' means as this one true man Jesus Christ has taken the place
of us men, of many, in all the authority and omnipotence and competence of the
one true God, in order to act in our name and therefore validly and effectively for
us in all matters of reconciliation with God and therefore of our redemption and
salvation, representing us without any co-operation on our part (CD IV/1, 230 ea).
For Barth, the theologia crucifixionis and the theologia resurrectionis are the two
underpinnings of christology. So the whole discussion of the first volume of his
christology (CD IV/1) focuses upon the theologia crucifixionis, the divine
movement 'from above to below'. Yet, significantly enough, the humanity of Christ
is eminent even within the discussion of the divine crucifixion. In other words, the
9
This question of knowability was dealt with in chapter 3. For Barth's overall discussion about
this issue see the doctrine of God (CD 11/1-2).
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divinity of Christ is revealed in its humanity. In this view Barth underscores the
necessary element of the 'abasement' and the 'jeopardising of every man' in the
course of explicating the divine crucifixion.10 This paradoxical emphasis upon the
importance of the humanity of Christ is highlighted as Barth maintains that:
It is not merely a matter of some harmless idea of God, the comfortable
transcendence which we can know and which makes us exalt ourselves all the
more consciously. No it is a matter of the concrete form of a fellow-man
occupying that place which we all think it our sacred right to occupy. Abasement
by an abstract 'god' is a safe enough matter which we can turn to our own glory.
But abasement by God in the flesh, in the person of this fellow-man, is a
dangerous matter. It is a real and concrete abasement. If this man is my divine
Judge, I myself cannot be judge any longer. ... In the history of this man it came
to pass that I was relegated from the sphere in which I wished to judge and placed
in the sphere in which I can only see and hear and learn what the judgment really
is by which I have to judge myself. And that means that I am jeopardised {CD
IV/1, 233 ea).
Indeed, it is this humanity of Christ who becomes and thus is the ontic ground of
the ontic event, the crucifixion. Hence, apart from this humanity of Christ the
power of the crucifixion would become utterly senseless and the efficacy of the
event would be utterly irrelevant no matter how great the crucifixion would be.
Further, the fact that Barth first of all addresses the significance of the humanity
of Christ in his discussion of the crucifixion is instructive (CD IV/1, 232-273). To
note the humanity of Christ as the ontic ground of the crucifixion Barth thus states:
He did not take the place of this man merely as God but as man: 'to fulfil all
righteousness,' to do right at the very place where man had done wrong, and in
that way to make peace with man, to the triumph of His faithfulness, to His own
magnifying in creation and by the creature. The Word became flesh that there
might be the judgment of sin in the flesh and the resurrection of the flesh {CD
IV/1, 237).
We saw that for Barth the crucifixion is the 'aim' of the whole divine movement
'from above'. As such the crucifixion is the centre of his christology. God had to
don flesh for this crucifixion. At this juncture, Barth emphatically reminds us of the
fact that:
we are dealing with an act which took place on earth, in time and space, and
which is indissolubly linked with the name of a certain man. The history of
10
{CD IV/1, 232-233). By doing this God ends the 'greatness' and the dream of 'divine
likeness' of humankind. Therefore humankind must see another human being at the very place
where it finds its own 'glory' and 'grandeur'.
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religious and cultic speculation knows of other suffering and dying gods, and the
similarity with these pictures forces itself upon our attention. But the Gospel does
not speak of a passion ... in a heavenly or some purely imaginary space and time.
They indicate a very definite point in world history which cannot be exchanged
for any other. They point to its earthly theatre. They do not speak of a passing
moment in the occurrence of a myth which is cyclic and timeless and therefore of
all times. They speak of a unique occurrence for which there is no precedent and
which cannot be repeated (CD IV/1, 245 ea).
As for Barth, it is very important to note that the passion of Jesus Christ is from
the very first the act of God, the divine act 'from above', as we have noted
throughout the discussion. But when we see the train of argument, the act of God
is not simply to advocate his christology as a christology 'from above' as such. On
the contrary, the articulation of the passion of Jesus Christ as being the divine act
is to highlight the fact that human sin is done away with not only on a
phenomenological or a resultant level which resolves only committed sin, but on
the fundamental and drastic level, i.e., the annihilation of the sin itself of the adp^
assumed as sinful flesh, as involving what we might call originale peccatum (CD
IV/1, 253-256).
Barth does not explicate the two critical phrases like Deus pro nobis or
Immanuel from a vague theological or christological axiom. As he clearly notes,
'From the very first we have not thought of His being abstractly, but per
definitionem as belonging to us and us to it [Him]. Again, from the very first we
have thought of His activity per definitionem as His activity for us, pro nobis' (CD
IV/1, 284). The terms are the disclosure or recognition of that which Us' (CD IV/1,
249) as it appears to humankind. And the same is true of Christian faith and
proclamation. All these derive from the concrete facticity and truth of the
crucifixion. So Barth articulates: 'We cannot be content to define the passion of
Jesus Christ as the act of God for us, however true that may be, but we must go on
to define the act of God for us as the passion of Jesus Christ. In this, and this
alone, is the act of God for us. With this there stands or falls the truth of Christian
experience' (CD IV/1, 249). The crucifixion took place nowhere but in that
particular Jesus of Nazareth. What does this say for our thesis?
Barth's christology, with respect to its responsibility and its tangibility, leads
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nowhere but to this ground, this 'from below'. There is even no point of speaking
about his christology apart from this ground. For we recognise 'the divine in the
human' {CD IV/2, 96), the 'from above' in the 'from below'. Incidentally, Barth
even believes that our understanding of sin and the justification of humankind can
be developed only in the light of this christological basis." Yet this basis is not
something which relies on an ambiguously claimed divinity but on 'the anthropo¬
logical sphere. For it is in this sphere that the atonement made in Jesus Christ has
taken place.'12 Christology 'from above' was possible and actual only on this
anthropological basis, the christology 'from below': 'If Jesus Christ is not also true
man, how can the true God have condescended to us in Him? How does He really
take our place as the Son in the power of God? How does He do for us what only
God can do for us in our place?' {CD IV/2, 25). Only the humanity of Christ
'demonstrate[s] and confirm[s] the true deity of God' {CD IV/1, 259). Because
'God Himself speaks when this man speaks in human speech. God Himself acts and
suffers when this man acts and suffers as a man. God Himself triumphs when this
One triumphs as a man' {CD IV/2, 51). So Barth points out that 'it [the older
Reformed Christology] did not have the same emphatic interest in the presence of
the divinity in the humanity of Jesus Christ.,u Undoubtedly, christology is about
the act of God, the act 'from above to below' as Barth constantly emphasised.
"
Sin is 'pride (Hochmuty (CD IV/1, 358-478; KD 395-531) in contrast to the obedience
(Gehorsam), and humiliation (Erniedrigung) of the Son of God (CD IV/1, 157-210; KD 171-311),
'sloth (Tragheit)1 (CD IV/2, 378-483; KD 423-546) in contrast to the diligent witness of the Son
of Man to His exaltation and as such our exaltation into the fellowship with God (CD IV/2, 20-377,
esp. 264-377; KD 20-422, esp. 293-422), and 'Falsehood, liar (Luge, Falschery (CD IV/3, 368-461;
KD 425-531) in contrast to the Son of Man being the true Witness, and as such the Guarantor of
our reconciliation with God (CD IV/3, 165-367; KD 188-424). For an eye-view of Barth's whole
christology see Jungel's diagram (Eberhard Jiingel, Karl Barth, a Theological Legacy [Philadelphia
& Pennyslvania: The Westminster Press, 1986], pp. 48-49).
12
'Eben in ihm [in anthropologischen Bereich\] hat sich ja die in Jesus Christus geschehene
Versohnung ereigneT (CD IV/1, 283; KD 312).
13
(CD IV/2, 68 ea; KD 73): '[/«] der Praesenz ... der Gottheit in der Menschheit Jesu ChristiL
Barth's constant reminiscence of the rejection of Docetism may also undergird our view in
connection with the presence of the divinity in the humanity. God was truly incarnated 'from
above'. But where to? It is only in this Jesus of Nazareth, 'from below to above', that God and His
movement 'from above' is undeniably revealed.
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'But,' Barth says, The Son of God ... becomes and is Jesus of Nazareth ... . We
have, therefore, to say quite unreservedly that Jesus ... is ... God by nature' (CD
IV/2, 71). The act of divine reconciliation fulfilled nothing except in and through
the human being Jesus Christ: '[I] had no desire to seek ... the reconciliation of the
world with God, elsewhere but in the humanity assumed by God, and therefore in
the man Jesus ofNazareth' (CD IV/2, 68-69 ea).
Here we need to remember the scheme of Barth's christology as we are
concerned with the centrality of the humanity in christology as the ontic ground of
christology. Barth's christological axiom is that christology itself is useless unless
it has to do with humankind. This axiom is well reflected in the summary of
Barth's christology that God exalted human essence into Himself as He assumed
human flesh. This event of assumption and exaltation took place nowhere but in
Jesus of Nazareth: 'It is the history in which God Himself became and was and is
and will be very man in ... Jesus ofNazareth' (CD IV/2, 69 ea). Therefore Barth
adequately announces that 'The fact that the man Jesus is the whole basis and
power and guarantee of our exaltation means that there can be no place for any
other in this function, not even for the mother of Jesus' (CD IV/2, ix-x ea). Indeed,
'Everything [christology] moves towards this cross. And everything [whole life-act
of Jesus] took place in this crucifixion - the whole reconciliation, the whole
restoration of peace, between man and God' (CD IV/2, 290). In this way the
passion and crucifixion of the Son of God constitutes the climax of the christology
'from above', and the early Church community (in the light of the resurrection!)
found this crucifixion to be the 'coronation' of His Kingship and 'the victor of
death.'
However, this definitive 'form' of the 'from above' (not to mention the
'from below') was the 'human proof (CD IV/2, 290 ea) of the Royal Man. It was
this new covenant - our reconciliation through His crucifixion - which is formated
in this human proof of the Royal Man, that the early Church community actually
proclaimed. It was 'He [the Royal Man who] inaugurated His kingdom as a
historical reality' (CD IV/2, 291 ea). Undoubtedly Barth's whole christology and
I. Beyond the Scheme of 'Bothness': both from above' and from below' 127
as such whole theology focuses upon this crucifixion which is the climax of the
christological movement 'from above'. Yet what Barth at the same time reminds
us is that such a central event took place nowhere but in the human form, in the
Royal Man. Truly the only ontic ground for such a central event of the crucifixion
is this 'human proof this Royal Man. Only for this concrete placement, 'from
below', do we know, and can we say, that there was a christology 'from above'.
This means that the humanity of Christ is the very ground of the realisation of
divinity. Hence 'we must be content to recognise what is divine ... at the very point
where it is human history ... in the way of Jesus of Nazareth. ... It [That the Word
assumed flesh] brings us to the beginning of a way on which we have to
accompany this history, recognising the divine in the human' (CD IV/2, 95 ea; cf.
IV/2, 296). Truly Barth's christology will stand or fall depending on whether we
accept this implication, because, 'He is not God to us, nor can He be known or
glorified or loved or worshipped by us as God, except in ... the human flesh' (CD
IV/2, 101). Barth even goes on to say that 'Without this [humanity] ... even the true
God would be to us as a hidden God, and therefore in practice no God at all' (CD
IV/2, 101). Insofar as this very ground of realisation is correctly evaluated Barth's
christology could possibly be more than its ostensible scheme of 'both' 'from
above' and 'from below'. In this precise sense it is likely to be more appropriate
to view Barth's christology rather as a christology 'from below'.
Concerning the question of how we are to understand the event of the
incarnation, Barth lays the greatest emphasis on the act of the divine majesty. The
meaning, basis, and power of the incarnation, the temporal (human) being, is the
act of divine majesty. The event of the incarnation is not a realisation of one of the
possibilities immanent in the created cosmos, but the concrete actuality in the
cosmos. But it is an 'absolutely new event,' a 'new act of God,' because in this
event 'Got/' becomes 'man\ the 'Creator' 'creature!' without ceasing to be God
the Creator (CD IV/2, 37).
But how do we know this event as a unique event and how do we interpret
it? According to Barth, we acknowledge this unique event only as God allows us
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to know it since His act of majesty alone is the 'ratio essendi and 'ratio
cognoscendf {CD IV/2, 37). This typical argument could be good evidence for
those who see Barth's christology as a christology 'from above', because all things
are worked out within the Godhead and actualised by God Himself 'from above',
not from the human possibility and reality. However, Barth does not intend here to
support such concepts as a 'high' christology. Instead, his intention is to clarify his
fundamental premise that christology matters because it is the very act of God
Himself. For the purpose of our thesis we ask further, what kind of divine act of
majesty does Barth speak of? Barth's own statement provides a clearer, more
authentic answer and to this we refer for our own verdict:
It [human recognition] will not think that it can master this object, ... but will find
itself mastered by it [object, the divine act of majesty], ... The presupposition of
this knowledge of the man Jesus is the participation of the knowing subject in the
new thing which makes this One this man within the cosmos. And the presupposi¬
tion of this participation is that the ground of being of this One penetrates and
transcends of itself the limits of the sphere of what we can see and interpret and
know ... . But this means that ... the man Jesus speaks for Himself, expounds
Himself and gives Himself to be known, so that He is ... known and recognised
as the One He is {CD IV/2, 39 ea).
The 'self-repetition' and 'self-reflection' of the divine act of sovereignty is this
human being Jesus {CD IV/2, 39). This knowledge is 'the knowledge of faith in
Jesus Christ, the true man' {CD IV/2, 41 ea). To this extent the event of incarnation
is the event of 'His own self-exposition' {CD IV/2, 39).
Further we may argue that Barth's christology is overall a christology 'from
above' because his constant emphasis lies upon God who became a human being
not only under the theme of the christology 'from above' {CD IV/1), the
humiliation of the Son of God, but also under the theme of the christology 'from
below' {CD IV/2), the exaltation of the Son of Man. That the Creator became a
creature is the great Christian 'mystery' and 'sacrament' {CD IV/2, 40). Reconciled
man originated from the human being Jesus Christ because God became a human
being without ceasing to be God. If God changed Himself into a human being there
would be no majesty, power, or mercy in this action. 'Everything depends upon the
fact that in the doing of this work He [God] is always the One He [God] is' {CD
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IV/2, 40). In fact Barth's supreme emphasis in considering the nature of the
incarnation is that it is not humanity which adopted divinity but divinity which
assumed humanity. Hence God and not humanity is the active subject per se (CD
IV/2, 45-47). As far as its character is concerned, the divine act 'from above' is the
'only ground' of this being and becoming: 'Flesh became and is the Word only to
the extent that the Word became and is flesh. The exaltation ... is always grounded
in God's humiliation. ... Hence ... It [the Christology from below] takes place
because and as the latter [the Christology 'from above'] takes place' (CD IV/2, 47).
Similarly, 'His [Jesus Christ's] divine essence ... causes ... the existence of the man
Jesus of Nazareth. ... Hence it is "from above to below," and only then ... "from
below to above"' (CD IV/2, 62-63, par. 71).
Nevertheless, we must not misunderstand this contention as standing simply
for a christology 'from above', because Barth speaks of this christological ground
only with reference to 'His [Jesus Christ] self-revelation and self-exposition as the
true man' (CD IV/2, 40). This suggests that we cannot think of this 'high'
christology without this Tow' christology. The prime aim of this argument is to
articulate that God does not change Himself into a human being. Concurrently, the
revealed God does not live in a dual existence of God and of human being, and nor
is He some strange third being who is neither divine nor human (CD IV/2, 49, 63).
Were this to happen God would cease to be the Reconciler.14 According to Barth,
deifying the humanity of Christ is not necessary for two reasons. Firstly, if the
human essence of Christ is deified, He cannot really be the Mediator between God
and humanity, as He would not have a legitimate (proper) point of contact with
14
(CD IV/2, 63). Following the Reformed tradition the two natures are a matter of modes of
one being, the unio hypostatica, and not the unity of the two natures (CD IV/2, 63-66). In
expressing the hypostatic union of the two natures Barth employs the concept of 'God the Son (Gott
der Sohn)' (CD IV/2, 48, 50; KD IV/2, 53), 'the divine humanity (die Gottmenschheit)' (CD IV/2,
52, 57; KD 56, 61). In addition, for Barth, this hypostatic union has an implication of the
indispensable relationship of God with humankind, and as such of Christ with His Church. This is
the result of viewing the issue from the perspective of the totus Christus. But this indispensability
based on the totus Christus is by no means to reverse or mix the predicate (humankind or Church)
with the Subject (God). This totus Christus is the reminder that the hypostatic union is to be known
in its uniqueness compared with all other unions (CD IV/2, 60).
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human race (CD IV/2, 89). The second reason is that He is 'also and primarily the
Son of God' (CD IV/2, 94). Further, deifying the humanity of Christ was
impossible for Him as the Son of Man (CD IV/2, 153).
Consequently the idea of union consists 'with its presupposition of the
genuine distinctiveness of divine and human essence, and therefore the rejection of
the thought of any identification or identity of the two' (CD IV/2, 63). Incidentally,
this rejection of any identification of the two is not to be confused with Barth's
argument that Jesus Christ is God. What Barth talks about here is the nature
(Natur) or essence (Weseri) of divinity and humanity itself. As far as the natures are
concerned, human is human and divine is divine because 'each of the two natures
... has its own determination' (CD IV/2, 70) and 'Each has its own role' (CD
IV/71). Jesus Christ as God has these two natures without altering one unique
nature (essence) into the other. This is what Barth means when he says that 'The
Son of God is the acting Subject who takes the initiative in this event, and not
either His divine or His human essence.'15
Our standpoint that Barth commenced his christology with the history of
divine incarnation on account of the clarification of the ontology of christology
turns out to be even more cogent when we inspect the content and meaning of
'revelation' in Barth. Throughout Church Dogmatics, the revealed God is the
sovereign, free, and loving God. This definition provides the basis for the first part
of his christology (CD IV/1). Specifically, the characteristic attributes of the
revealed God are underlined in the discussion about the possibility and necessity
of incarnation. Our previous recognition of Barth's unveiling christology in terms
of the doctrine of reconciliation instead of a separate 'christology' implies that
responsible christology cannot be dealt with on its own but only in relation to
humanity (CD IV/1, 124), first of all with the humanity of Jesus Christ and then
with all humankind. This identity of interlocked christology between God and
humanity corresponds to Barth's later view which highlights the togetherness of
15
{CD IV/2, 70). Barth refers this view of the union of the two essence to the Chalcedonian
definition; dciuyxuTcoq: inconfuse and &Tp67tiotq: immutabiliter {CD IV/2, 63).
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God and humanity in The Humanity ofGod. The event of reconciliation took place
'not only to the world but also in the world' (CD IV/1, 198 ea). To paraphrase that,
it would mean that the 'to', 'from above', is seen and made tangible through the
'in', 'from below'.
It is worth noting that Barth, in his letter to Gerrit Cornelius Berkouwer on
the 30th of December 1954, prefers his theology to be referred to as The Freedom
ofJesus Christ rather than The Triumph ofGrace. Having thoroughly read the book
which appeared in 1954, Barth answers Berkouwer's critique thus:
'I'm a bit startled at the title, The Triumph ... Of course I used to use the word
and still do. But it makes the whole thing seem so finished, which it isn't for me.
The Freedom ... would have been better. And then instead of ... Grace I would
much have preferred ... Jesus Christ. My intention, at any rate, has been that all
my systematic theology should be as exact a development as possible of the
significance of this 'name' (in the biblical sense of the term) and to that extent
should be the telling of a story which develops through individual events' - the
story of struggle, but a victorious one.16
Admittedly the term grace is an abstract noun whereas Jesus is a proper name
which points to a specific human being. Analogically speaking, the divine
movement 'from above' could be categorised as abstract reality since the concept
and the reality of the 'from above' signifies something which is beyond human
sight and experience, whereas the concept and reality of the 'from below'
represents something which is tangible in human sight and life. This implies, for
our thesis, that the 'abstract' or 'ambiguous' movement 'from above' becomes
concrete reality through the movement 'from below'. The former needs to be seen
only from the latter perspective as long as Barth replaces the abstract entitlement
by the concrete name.
The second purpose of the argument is to reject the Mariology of the Roman
Catholic Church as we read the preface of Barth himself that 'The content of this
book might well be regarded as an attempted Evangelical answer to the Marian
dogma of Romanism - both old and new' (CD IV/2, ix). 'Even the fiat mihi of
Mary is preceded by the resolve and promise of God. It confirmed His work, but
16
Busch, Karl Barth 381.
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it did not add anything at all to it' (CD IV/2, 45). The truth of the hypostatic union
lies in the fact that the divine essence is 'originally proper' to Him and His
humanity is 'only adopted' by Him (CD IV/2, 70) since 'Mankind itself has not
produced Jesus Christ as the realisation of one of its possibilities' (CD IV/2, 45)
but it is God who assumed flesh. Hence the assumptio carnis is a matter of divine
'determination (Bestimmungf and not of'alteration (Verdnderungf (CD IV/2, 84;
KD 92). This means that whereas the humiliation of the Son of God means a
humanisation of His divine essence, the exaltation of the Son of Man does not
mean a divinisation of His human essence (CD IV/2, 71).
We need to recall Barth's preliminary remark on the danger of the element
of christology 'from below' with respect to our present issue. Barth asks whether
a line of thought 'from below to above' does not espouse the way of 'theological
humanism, moralism, psychologism, synergism, and ultimately an anthropocentric
monism' (CD IV/2, 8). He also reminds us of the following dangers and problems:
1) immanentist theology of the pious man over the last two centuries including the
Reformation theology itself which failed to think first of all from God to man; 2)
existential theology (theology by existentialism) which denied the primacy of God
over human being, so that the gracious condescension of God to human being is
made quite impossible; 3) the human being reconciled with God and by God has
often become a human being reconciling itself with itself, the religious human
being, self-complacent and self-explained; 4) and Roman Catholicism still entices
us as the classical compendium of all these errors. In short, 'the theologia crucis,
in which the true theologia gloriae has its roots, may easily be destroyed by a false
theologia gloriae' (CD IV/2, 8-9). Barth notes that he could possibly take
Christian mysticism, Pietism, Reformed Enlightenment, or Schleiermacher as an
example for a possible destruction of the theologia crucifixionis by a theologia
gloriae. Yet Barth takes up the example of monasticism as a danger in dealing with
the exaltation of man (CD IV/2, 11-20). No human beings or their works deserve
to be called a 'saint' or to be 'canonised' by another human being. They should
remain a human being no matter how holy and righteous they may be. No human
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being deserves to be divinised, since it has rather been exalted to 'fellowship' with
God. 'The problem of reconciled man, like that of the reconciling God ... has its
roots in the identity of the Son of God with the Son of Man, Jesus of Nazareth'
(CZ) IV/2, 19). Does this preliminary remark not make the issue clear enough?
In line with these two precise dangers Barth further rejects the communicatio
idiomatum {CD IV/2, 73-83) in favour of the commimicatio gratiarum {CD IV/2,
84-104). The reason for his rejection is this. The term communicatio is supposed
to mean the human nature's full possession and use of the full glory of the divine
when the human nature needs the divine nature. Thus the communicatio is supposed
to mean the omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence of the humanity of Jesus
Christ. This interpretation may mislead us to think of the two natures in terms of
'unity {Einheity rather than 'union {Vereinigung)., 17 Consequently, the phrase
communicatio idiomatum divinises humanity by way of its implication.
This misunderstanding in viewing union in terms of unity could imply the
inversion of'above' and 'below', earth and heaven, finite and infinite, and God and
human being. Moreover, the communicatio idiomatum either mixes the two natures
to the extent that the human is deified, or separates the two natures to the extent
that this deification isolates the two natures from its dynamic history by describing
it only statically in and for itself. The consequence of the deification of the
humanity of Christ is even more serious as we recognise that if the humanity of
Christ is divinised, then all humankind can also be divinised. This would imply that
we do not need a Reconciler. After all, christology would become an 'imitative
general anthropology' {CD IV/2, 82) in which christology would have, for the most
part, only an exemplary function in consolidation of mystic anthropology.18 The
17
{CD IV/2, 73-83). This communicatio idiomatum resulted in Hegel, L. Feuerbach, and
Biedermann identifying the divine essence (nature) with the human essence (nature) which led them
to having an Alexandrian christology {ibid., 83). The 'union {Vereinigung KD 67)' of divine and
human essence has taken place in Jesus Christ from the divinity's 'unity {Einheit KD 67)' with the
humanity. Also, Barth uses the term 'unity' basically to designate the two movements, and the term
'union' for the two natures.
18
Barth perceives that this inversion is wittingly or unwittingly the root of German idealism
which was actualised in Hegel, Feuerbach, and Schleiermacher (ibid).
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issue is not about the divinity of humanity, but the humanity of divinity, 'the
humanity of Godf9 Naturally, the mutual determination of the two essences stand
in this distinction: 'His divine essence is to His human,' and 'His human essence
from His divine.'20 The human essence is set in a 'perfect fellowship'21 with the
divine essence through 'mutual participation.'22
Here we again encounter John Macquarrie's contention. In reference to 'the
divine is originally proper to Him' and 'the human is only adopted by Him'
Macquarrie argues that Barth underrated the full humanity in christology. In such
a way Barth has, according to Macquarrie, a christology 'from above' even though
he talks of The Humanity of God. Macquarrie even expects the divinity of
humanity, implying the divinisation of human essence in criticising Earth's
christology. But having noticed the reason for such expressions, the credibility of
Macquarrie's critique is highly questionable.
Barth's phrase of 'originally proper (urspriinglich eigenef and 'adopted
(.angenommenef in the statements quoted, by no means 'undermine' the full
humanity of Christ at the expense of His divinity as Macquarrie asserts and some
others imply. Needless to say, this emphasis is a matter of clarifying the whole
Subject of christology. But to resolve this assertion we will turn to the statement
of Barth himself. According to Barth, God did not exist as a human being from all
eternity. On the contrary, God existed as a human being because it is God who
19
'die Humanitat Gottes' {CD IV/2, 72; KD 78).
20
(CD IV/2, 70; KD 76): 'Indent sein gottliches Wesen das ihm urspriiglich eigene, sein
menschliches aber das von ihm angenommene'' and 'es handelt sich urn die Bestimmung seines
gottlichen Wesens zu seinem menschlichen hin und es handelt sich um die Bestimmung seines
menschlichen Wesens von seinem gottlichen her.' Here we notice that whereas the original text does
not overtly emphasise the terms 'vo«' and 'zm,' the English translation renders the terms with
explicit emphasis.
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'die vollkommenste Gemeinschaft' (CD IV/2, 72; KD 78). The resurrection and ascension
are the first, particular, and temporary revelation of this fellowship (CD IV/2, 100).
22
(CD IV/2, 72). Barth discusses the 'mutual participation' in the three terms: 'impartation'
(CD IV/2, 73-84; 'die Mitteilung' KD 79-91) of the two essences which corresponds to the Lutheran
doctrine the communicatio idiomatum; 'election' (CD IV/2, 84-104; 'die Erwahlung' KD 91-115)
which corresponds to the communicatio gratiarum; and 'common actualisation' (CD IV/2, 104-116;
'die gemeinsame Verwirklichung'' KD 115-129) of the two essences which corresponds to the
communicatio operationum.
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assumed flesh. God 'adapted' and 'empowered' (CD IV/2, 98) the humanity of
Christ for the service of mediation and the attestation of divine potestas and
potentia and not human. God does not have to deify the humanity of Christ. The
humanity of Christ is the 'form (Gestalt),' 'organ (Organ),' 'clothes (.Kleid),' and
'temple (Tempel)'23 of this divine assumption of grace. In such a way the
humanity of Christ remains truly human like us and is not deified. Macquarrie's
insistence that Barth undermined the full humanity of Christ might be legitimate
had Barth said that God divinised the humanity of Christ through the exaltation of
humanity. For the reality or the identity of pure humanity would then no longer
exist, since the divinisation of humanity means the dissolution of humanity. But
Macquarrie's view is highly questionable as Barth constantly affirms the pure
humanity of Christ throughout the discussion of christology. Strictly speaking,
therefore, the humanity and, as such, the life of Jesus Christ is a 'history' or 'event'
and not an 'appropriated state' (CD IV/2, 99).
In describing the 'common actualisation' of the third element of the divine
exaltation of humanity into fellowship with Godhead, Barth reinterprets the
traditional concepts of unio, communio, and communicatio. The 'common
actualisation' means, firstly, that Jesus Christ does not exist only 'in conjunction
with' but also 'in the strictest relationship' (CD IV/2, 115) of the one with the
other: 'The divine expresses and reveals itself wholly in the sphere of the human,
and the human serves and attests the divine' (CD IV/2, 115). Secondly, the two
essences always actualise themselves 'as the one and the other' (CD IV/2, 115).
This common actualisation which the older dogmatics called the communicatio
operationum (CD IV/2, 104-116) notes that from the very first Barth has
understood the doctrine of the incarnation as an 'operatio' between God and
23 (CD IV/2, 101; KD 111). In this particular respect, Mclntyre observes Barth's christology has
a Nestorian overtone (John Mclntyre, The Shape of Christology [SCM Press, 1966], p. 160),
whereas Pittenger shares Barth's rationale by arguing that Jesus was the genuine historical figure
who lived a concrete human life with all its limitations, 'yet with all its possibility of serving as the
the organon ... or fully personal human instrument for God' (Pittenger, Christology Reconsidered
44).
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mankind, fulfilled in Jesus Christ as a union of God with humanity (CD IV/2, 105).
This operatio implies that the reality of Jesus Christ is identical with this event of
operatio, communicatio operationum. What this involves is as follows.
In delineating the person of Christ, Barth keeps company with the older
dogmatic concepts of unio, communio, and communicatio, or with the traditional
doctrine of the two states. The terms unio, communio, and communicatio speak of
actions, events, and operationes. However, Barth re-interprets the view of
phenomenology in terms of a history, because the theme of christology is not a
phenomenon, or a combination of phenomena, but a 'history.'24 The movement
'from above' and the movement 'from below' are 'not two different and successive
states,' but the history of'two opposed but strictly related moments' which 'operate
together' and 'mutually interpret one another' (CD IV/2, 106). Moreover, in
rejecting the view of static states, Barth points out that we must not see the
humiliation and exaltation as separate or different states: He was first humiliated
and not yet exalted; then He was exalted and no longer humiliated. This view tears
apart the unity of descent and ascent (CD IV/2, 110). As for Barth, the exaltation
begins and is completed already in and with the humiliation, and vice versa. These
simultaneous events are the 'inter-connexion' {CD IV/2, 110).
This reinterpretation of the life-act of Jesus Christ as a 'history' or 'event'
and not a state, is what Barth means when he says that revelation is not a naturally
given fact but a new event of gift every moment.25 This is what Barth says when
he points out that the humanity of Christ must be understood in terms of 'history'
rather than a 'nature' {CD IV/2, 26). This is what Barth means by humanitas itself
being in motion, from the far country back to the home {CD IV/2, 29). Having
understood the divine self-revelation as a history or event which is manifested in
and through the life-act of Jesus Christ, 'There is no reason to mistake the pure
24 ' Wir haben ... jene ganze Phanomenologie zuriickiibersetzt in den Bericht von einer
Geschichtd {CD IV/2, 106; KD 118).
25 Karl Barth, Table Talk (1962) recorder and ed. John D. Godsey, 92-93; 'revelation always
means revealing ... ' {CD 1/1, 321, 306, par. 371; The Christian Life: CD IV/4, Lecture Fragments
(1981 [19792= 1959-1961]), p. 236).
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humanity of Jesus Christ in relation to the empowering which comes to His human
essence by the electing grace of God. We insist that its function is that of an organ
of the Son of Man who is also and primarily the Son of God' (CD IV/2, 98). For
this reason Barth clarifies that 'the Subject of atonement and therefore of
incarnation, Jesus Christ, is the Son of God. This is the reason and compelling
power of this history. This is the meaning and force in which what happened in this
history has and is eternal and temporal being' (CD IV/2, 65). Thus Barth warns us
not to describe Jesus Christ as the 'God-man (Gottmenschenf, and His essence as
'divine-human (gottmenschlichf or 'divine-humanity (Gottmenscheit),' because the *
word 'God-man obscures' the novum of the act of God (CD IV/2, 115; KD 128).
This is what Barth means as he proceeds to say that 'The one Word of Jesus Christ
is His self-expression as God's eternal Word, and it is also the corresponding, but
not identical, word of the proclamation of this man as humanly articulated and
conditioned' (CD IV/2, 116). In other words, 'The divine is still above and the
human below' (CD IV/2, 116). But to be more specific there is even more to say
on what we have previously mentioned in terms of the necessity of safeguarding
the nature itself from the danger of its mixture, and, as such rejecting the Mariology
of the Roman Catholic Church. We suppose that stressing the divine act was also
necessary in order to re-confirm the antecedent validity of the work of reconcili¬
ation. If humankind contributed something to the work of reconciliation then the
power and validity of our reconciliation cannot be guaranteed, since they are not
only sinners but also capricious.26
26
For this reason Barth stresses the power and warrenty of humankind's reconciliation, not
primarily on their faith in, or acceptance of, the fact of reconciliation, but on the prophetic office
and work of Christ in terms of 'Jesus Christ the Guarantor' (CD IV/3).
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II. The Centrality of the Royal Man
1. The Royal Man, the Sole Integrator of 'high' Christology - the Concrete
Dual Manifestation of Christology both 'from above' and 'from below'
We have said that as far as the visible and responsible ground of christology
is concerned the issue is about the humanity of divinity (die Humanitat Gottes) and
not the divinity of humanity. Notably Barth also describes the Royal Man, as 'the
divine humanity.'27 Yet these two different appellations by no means implies a
contradiction. It rather undergirds the true centrality of the Royal Man, because this
Royal Man is this divinity, the divine humanity. He is the human divinity and the
divine humanity. To apply this view for our thesis first of all demonstrates that this
Royal Man integrates all the elements and aspects of 'high' christology into
Himself. Further this Royal Man represents not only the movement 'from below to
above' but also 'from above to below'. In such a way this Royal Man reveals
Himself to be the sole integrator of both 'from above' and 'from below'. The
important point is that Barth brings these two aspects together neither in a celestial
being nor even in the concept of Logos itself, but in the earthly reality of the Royal
Man. Incidentally, our previous comment that the divinity is revealed nowhere but
in the humanity of Jesus Christ is not to say that the humanity is a kind of husk
within the divine kernel. On the contrary it constitutes the very content. Christology
stands only on its 'historical identity.'28 The reconciliation is achieved in such a
27 'die GottmenschheiC (CD IV/2, 52, 57; KD 56, 61).
28
(CD IV/1, 67). If the historical identity is so important for Barth's christology, a question
of the vulnerability of history is possible. In other words, would his christology have been different
from the present one if the historical setting of Jesus Christ was different? This question of the
vulnerability of history is a question of whether Barth understands the history of reconciliation as
a contingent or a necessary event. Contingency implies undeterminativeness or no plan. If the
history is contingent, then hardly any gravity of this particular historical identity would be left to
rely on it in terms of its finale potentia or its authenticity. Thus Barth affirms that the history of
reconciliation is not a contingent but a necessary event. This affirmation is well expressed in his
special emphasis on Jesus being a Jew, in particular. This emphasis implies the following points.
Firstly, that Jesus of Nazareth is a Jew reveals an indispensable continuity between the Old
Testament and the New Testament. He was a fulfilment of promise. This suggests that the divine
incarnation is not an arbitrary or contingent event which could be easily compared with any other
general event and then finally dissolved in it, but a determined event. It is not any generalised view
of the man Jesus but a particular Jew was the Word who became the Saviour of the world. 'His
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way that 'God keeps faith in time ... with all men in this one man' (CD IV/1, 67
ea). And what Barth meant this 'one man' is specifically by the life-act of this
Royal Man. We need to recollect the fact that Barth not only integrates the two
movements into this Royal Man as the Gestalt of his whole christology, but he also
actually envisions this integration in terms of this life-act of Royal Man. For this
precise reason, and only for this precise reason because we also do affirm that
Barth's christology is a christology 'from above' as well, this Royal Man is the
centre in Barth's christology, and, as such his christology is a christology 'from
below'. If we deny that the Royal Man manifests the divinity of the man Jesus of
Nazareth, then what we are also saying is that Barth 'functionalised' christology.
This implication is so critical that we doubt whether we could bear this implication
without affecting not only Barth's christology but also his whole theology.
Again, those who suppose that Barth has a christology 'from above' could
be even more firmly encouraged by the following observation. Barth, in explicating
the meaning of the assumptio carnis (CD IV/2, 44-116), supremely and therefore
constantly reminds us of the fact that the assumptio carnis is 'an absolutely new
universality is revealed in this particularity' {CD IV/1, 167). Secondly, Jesus suffers 'essentially'
and 'necessarily' {CD IV/2, 172) since the history of reconciliation is a fulfilment of the covenant
made by God with the Israelites who was unfaithful and disobedient to Him. To see the Jesus of
the New Testament in line with the Old Testament 'prevents the rounding off the picture of Jesus
into a kind of ideal-picture of human existence.' Jesus', being the particular Jew, shows us that the
history of atonement (redemption) is 'the history of the passion.' This is the meaning and purpose
of the linking of the New Testament with that of Old Testament witness. As such the Old Testament
is an 'authentic commentary' {CD IV/1, 168) to, and 'indispensable presupposition' {CD IV/1, 173)
of, the New Testament. Doctrinally speaking, this means that the witness of the New Testament
does not allow any kind of Docetism {CD IV/1, 168). Docetism attempts to nullify the concrete
truth of the history of atonement as the history of passion. Theologically speaking, this means, for
Barth, that the event of atonement took place 'on earth' {CD IV/1, 168). Christologically speaking,
for the purpose of our thesis, this means that we cannot think of the greatness of the divine
movement 'from above', and therefore christology itself, outside the divine manifestation 'from
below'. This is what Barth means when he says that 'The particularity of the man Jesus in
proceeding from the one elect people of Israel, as the confirmation of its election, means decisively
that the reconciliation of sinful and lost man has, above all, the character of a divine condescension,
that takes place as God goes into the far country' {CD IV/1, 168). At best, if we could infer and
modify this view of history at all without any sophistication, we might say that the content of the
message would be the same even if its form could be different from the event of two thousand years
ago.
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event,' 'a new act of God.'29 Further, the 'meaning,' 'force,' and 'reason' for
dealing with this reconciliatory history exist in the fact that it is God who is the
Subject of this history (CD IV/2, 65). In short, Barth has a 'high' christology
because his christology is possible and is actualised solely by the divine act of
incarnation 'from above' and therefore all the rest are secondary matters. This view
is true but needs clarification.
Undoubtedly, we do also affirm that Barth's christology consists, by and
large, of a 'high' christology. However, if we are to appreciate this 'high'
christology more fully and accurately we cannot stop our examination here. For
Barth says much more than this 'from above' element in his christology. To get a
fairer glimpse of this 'high' christology we need to know the context of this
constant emphasis. Barth's emphasis upon God as being the sole Subject emerges
in the course of his exposition about the historical fulfilment of the concept of
incarnation. In this explication Barth articulates that God truly assumed existence
as a human being. Then he concludes that the historical fulfilment of the concept
of incarnation is the 'secret of the becoming and being of the existence of Jesus
Christ' (CD IV/2, 44, cf. 36-44). Having come to this conclusion, Barth goes into
a detailed exposition of the meaning of this assumptio carnis with the four points:
1) this one God became and is also man (CD IV/2, 45-50; KD 47); 2) there is only
the 'one God the Son (Einer Gott der Sohn),' and not two existences (CD IV/2, 50-
60; KD 53, 67); 3) the divine and human essence are 'united (vereinigtf in the one
Jesus Christ (CD 60-69; KD 64); 4) God 'exalted' human essence into a 'perfect
fellowship' with Himself, starting with the humanity of Jesus Christ and then all
humankind.30 In this explication Barth particularly acknowledges the difficulty in
accepting the third point that the divine and human essence were and are united in
the one Jesus Christ. However Barth argues that we will have to encounter this
29 'ei« schlechthin neues Geschehen , 'eine neue Tat Gottes' (CD IV/2, 37; KD 39).
J°
(CD IV/2, 69-116). 'In His being as man God has implicitly assumed the human being of
all men. In Him not only we all as homines, but our humanitas as such-for it is both His and ours-
exist in and with God Himself (ibid., 59).
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unique Subject in the 'acknowledgment and recognition and confession of its
particular truth,'jl because, this unique Subject comes to us as this Royal Man, as
this concrete human being. As this unique Subject is so concrete He 'demands
(forderty this statement of unitedness (CD IV/2, 61; KD 66) as an actuality in
concreto and not as a possibility of general truth or as the metaphysical union in
abstracto. Otherwise, Barth says, his christology would be simply a speculative
christology.
Along this clear cut line that divine is divine and human is human, Barth
further develops the fourth point of perfect fellowship in terms of 'impartation
(MitteilungY (CD IV/2, 73-83). Divine essence imparts itself to that of humanity
and human essence receives the impartation of divine since it is God who assumed
humanity. So there is no divinisation of humanity, but only a perfect fellowship in
virtue of a 'mutual participation' through a 'complete openness (ganzliche
Offenheity (CD IV/2, 70; KD 80) from the two natures. In short, the order
(priority) 'God and human being' is not to be reversed as 'human being and God'
in their relationship. Yet we must not overlook that Barth, in the course of this
emphasis upon divine initiative, reminds us of the fact that 'Again, whatever
belongs to divine or human essence, whatever characterises or distinguishes the one
or the other as such, is to be seen concretely in Jesus Christ, and to be thought and
said concretely of Him' (CD IV/2, 74).
Also, we must pay full attention to Barth's deliberate use of the term 'God
the Son'32 in lieu of the Son of God (der Sohn Gottes) in describing this unique
Subject. The term 'God the Son' not only adequately expresses the true ontology
of God being ad intra but also fully and concretely reveals His being ad extra. This
implies, for Barth, that the true God must be constituted in the correspondence
between the conceptual God and the real God. Having implied this necessity of
31
The logical step of the three terms are: firstly, accept (anerkennen) it, secondly, recognise
(erkennen) what the person accepted, and then thirdly, confess (bekennen) what the person
recognised (CD IV/2, 61; KD [1955] 66).
32
'Gott der Sohri (CD IV/2, 50, 62; KD 53, 67 etc.).
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correspondence, Barth refers to the term Royal Man as the concrete manifestation
of this correspondence. Differently put, it is important to note that Barth integrates
all the element of 'high' christology into this Royal Man, the aspect of this 'low'
christology. Having clarified who this Subject is, Barth then turns to the actual life-
act of the Royal Man in order to give clear evidence for his theoretical clarification.
In short, Barth integrates all the Gestalt of christology into this Royal Man: 'Our
starting-point here is the first and final fact that the being of this Royal Man Jesus
was not only identical with the glory of God in the highest, ... but also identical on
earth with peace among men as the object of the divine good-pleasure.'33
Moreover Barth, in accounting the 'common actualisation' of divine and human
essence under the communicatio operationum as a narrower sense (CD IV/2, 113-
116), notes that neither the divine essence nor the human essence is actual of itself.
On the contrary, both the divine and the human essences are actual only in virtue
of the identity of the Son of God with the Son of Man in the person of Jesus
Christ, the Royal Man. Hence, this common actualisation is the novum of both
divine and human essences. In this one person? Yes. 'The One who acts and speaks
is One. And as such He guarantees the common nature of His self-actualisation as
this divine and human novum, the unity of the great novum in its twofold form (CD
IV/2, 114). In such a way, the Royal Man is the dual manifestation of both 'from
above' and 'from below', God's perfect fellowship with human being and human
being's perfect fellowship with God (CD IV/2, 167).
Who then is this Royal Man who alone integrates the christology 'from
above' and therefore manifests both 'from above' and 'from below'? What makes
Him the sole integrator and dual manifestation? We will explore these questions in
the next section.
3j
(CD IV/2, 158). The covenant broken by Israel and the whole of humanity is maintained in
nothing but 'the life-act of this one man' (CD IV/2, 167).
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2. The Royal Man, the Proper Content of Christology
According to Barth, this Royal Man 'is created "after God" (Kara 0sov).'
He is the sikcov (Col 1:15), the 'reflection' and 'image' of God Himself.34 He
exists 'analogously (analog)' to the mode of the existence of God (CD IV/2, 166;
KD 185). As such, He is and reveals the 'Nevertheless of the Creator' (CD IV/2,
167). Barth advises us not to trivialise the fact that the Royal Man is the reflection
and image of God. The reason for this advice is that this identity has the following
significant insights for a proper understanding of the Royal Man.
1) The Identity of the Royal Man
That the Royal Man is the 'image' and 'reflection' of God Himself implies,
first ofall, that He shares 'the strange destiny (das wunderliche Los)' of God (CD
IV/2, 167; KD 186). The Royal Man, in His conformity with the existence and act
of God, faithfully represented the most miserable God who is the most Almighty:
His power in weakness, glory in lowliness, victory in defeat, richest in poverty,
exaltation in humiliation, genuine unity with God in drastic isolation and
estrangement from God, life in crucifixion. This strange destiny in its drastic way
was necessary so as to manifest the 'genuine incarnation' of the Word in the most
concrete way (CD IV/2, 167-168; KD 186-188). Here Barth points out that the
inevitability of this history is not always grasped even though it is often stated. The
One who was despised not only in His own country, but also among His family
(Mk 6:4); the One who became an 'offence' to those around Him: the people of
Nazareth (Matt 13:39), John the Baptist (Matt 11:16), His disciples (Mk 14:29); the
One who was crowned with thorns by the Roman soldier and was mocked on the
cross; and finally the one who was forsaken not only by the people but also by God
- this One is this Royal Man. It is this Royal Man who entered into this most
radical isolation from God in this world. In other words, by the God who entered
34
'widerspiegelt und abbildet' {CD IV/2, 167, 179; KD 200).
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into this world 'from above' Barth means this Royal Man who genuinely reveals
true being of God the Revealer in this form of strange destiny as a servant.35
Secondly, the Royal Man sharing His destiny with God is uncompromisingly
demonstrated in His 'partiality.'36 The Royal Man, in His conformity and
'distinctive solidarity' with the poor and weak God, became 'almost to the point
of prejudice,' divine partiality for the poor, the weak, and the low. The Royal Man
'ignored (voriibersah)'37 all those who were mighty, high, and wealthy in favour
of the weak, meek, and lowly; the just for sinners; and Israel for the Gentiles.
Necessarily, then, 'We do not know God at all if we do not know Him as the One
who is absolutely opposed to our whole world' (CD IV/2, 179-180). In other
words, 'we do not really know Jesus ... if we do not know Him as this poor man,
as this ... partisan of the poor (Parteiganger der Armeri), and finally as this
revolutionary' (CD IV/2, 180 ea; KD 200). Therefore, 'If we think we know Him
in any other way, what we really know ... is only the world itself, ourselves, the old
Adam. In the man Jesus, God has separated Himself from this misinterpretation'
(CD IV/2, 180). In such a way of partiality, the Royal Man fulfilled God's
'transvaluation'38 of the worldly values and views. This transvaluation is seen in
the witness of New Testament writings, but especially in Luke and James.39
Thirdly, the conformity of the Royal Man with God is further highlighted
35
(CD IV/2, 168). Barth, at this point, draws our special attention to the fact that God entered
this world in the form of a servant and not a Lord. This hidden kingly rule could not remain hidden.
For His lordship could not be compromised, but only confirmed, by all this history. The knowledge
that His lordship is revealed rather in this terrible and most miserable history derives from the
witness of the Holy Spirit. If this were not the case His history could also have been one of many
human histories which have been lost in world history, and with similar events, if there are any {CD
IV/2, 168). In this way, the saying in Matthew 11:29, in which Jesus described Himself as 7ipati<;
and Tcorsivdt; rrj KapSfa, is not moralistic self-boasting, but His confession of the humiliation of
the Son of God put into effect by Him as the Son of Man, of the genuine incarnation of the Word
as it took place in Him {CD IV/2, 167-168).
36
'parteiisch' (CD IV/2, 168-171; KD 188-191).
37 Barth plays on words here. He uses the word voriibersah ('ignored') instead of ubersah
('overlook') in order to stress the divine partiality {parteiisch) for the weak and the oppressed {CD
IV/2, 179; KD 188).
38
'Umwertung' (CD IV/2, 168-169; KD 188).
39
1 Cor l:25f.; 2 Cor 8:9, 12:9 (CD IV/2, 169-171).
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in His 'revolutionary character (revolutionaren CharakterY towards the orders of
life and value around Him (CD IV/2, 171-180; KD 191-200). He did not organise
a new party or join any of the existing parties. Neither did He represent any
political, moral or religious programmes. He was detested by all these, although He
did not particularly attack any of them. The reason for their dislike is that 'He set
all programmes and principles in question.' He did this simply because He
'enjoyed' and 'displayed' a 'royal freedom.'40 He did not oppose any 'system';
any worldly systems or structures in order to reform them. As He is the image of
this God and exists as the mode of the existence of God, He ruthlessly exposed the
darkness and limit of human systems and orders. He simply revealed the limit and
frontier of all these things by making use of this freedom of the kingly rule of God
to cut right across all these systems. It was for this reason that the freedom of the
kingly rule of God is simply He Himself which shed these systems and orders. He
therefore inevitably clashed with these orders and systems. As a result, the
provisional and relative character of the worldly systems and orders, and their
'secret fallibility' were occasionally but unmistakeably disclosed. What made His
revolutionary character far more radical than any other possible revolutionary
characters was the freedom itself. This freedom could not be classified from any
worldly point of view, for His freedom stands against the belief that low is low and
high is high, or good is good and bad is bad. This paradoxical fact that God gives
Himself to the world, yet without being bound to any of the worldly systems or
orders, is what makes His life-act all the more revolutionary, and as such an
40
'konigliche FreiheiT (CD IV/2, 172; KD 191). This revolutionary character, which questions
all human thoughts and values, resembles the character of Post-modernism which too is cynical to
all the modern worldly values and systems in its principle: The Royal Man Jesus is the invading
kingly rule of God Himself. As the coming of the new kingdom He transvalues all the worldly
values or views. In such a way His life-act was revolutionary in its character. This character
corresponds (more or less) to the post-modernism which is basically a movement of 'de-
construction' of modern systems of thoughts or values. Post-modernism is cynical. Likewise, the
kingly rule of God ruthlessly revealed the darkness of human systems or orders, and its limits. The
kingdom puts all (not only modernism) the worldly structures or systems in question. Incidentally,
that the phrase theologia viatorum in Christian theology also affirms all the human systems and
thoughts, including (Christian) theology, is relative and never should be a fixed truth.
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'unmistakeable sign, of His freedom and kingdom and over-ruling of history' (CD
IV/2, 172-173). In short, the overall character of the Royal Man's life-act was
revolutionary, a 'radical antithesis (radikaler Gegensatz)' (CD IV/2, 177; KD 197)
although He seems to endorse a status quo of all the systems, orders or structures
of the world: a 'passive conservatism' (CD IV/2, 173-179).
Fourthly, this strange, revolutionary, and partial life-act of the Royal Man
is ultimately for humankind. His strange destiny was for our reconciliation. His
revolutionary life-act was to reveal the true world value and view. His partiality
was to unfold and reveal what kind of God He is. In this way the most powerful
Yes is spoken in and through the life-act of the Royal Man even though the Yes
includes a powerful No. Thus His 'image' and 'reflection' is the 'image' and
'reflection' of the Yes of God to humankind and to the world. This divine Yes
manifests the faithfulness, love, glory, and solidarity of God with the cosmos. The
divine Yes echoed by this Royal Man is the 'divine Word of comfort' for human
misery (CD IV/2, 180). Indeed 'His weapon against it [sin] is the Gospel.'
Therefore His life-act is the Gospel itself.41 In short the whole life-act of the
Royal Man is the 'correspondence' to and 'parallelism' of the will and action of
God in the creaturely world (CD IV/2, 166-192).
2) The Life-act of the Royal Man as the Kingly Rule of God Per Se
A proper understanding of the identity of the Royal Man necessarily
involves an understanding of His work as well, since His life 'was'42 His act.
Thus the life-act of the Royal Man has the character of history (CD IV/2, 193; KD
214). In other words, the Royal Man's distinctive correspondence and parallelism
are actual, seen, and comprehended by His life-act. This implies two things.
Firstly, His life-act was His Word in both a concrete and a comprehensive
41
For Barth's hermeneutical references on the argument see (CD IV/2, 181-192).
42 t Indent sein Leben seine Tat war' (CD IV/2, 193; KD 294).
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sense (CD IV/2, 194-209). The Royal Man used ordinary human words and not
special language or any distinctive terminology. The early community felt free to
listen to his human words. The community of the Gospel did not hesitate to receive
the sayings in the different versions. No one seems to have thought historical
exactness worthwhile when the Aramaic originals were interposed into the Greek
texts (Mk 5:41, 7:34, 15:34). In the Greek texts Jesus used not only the terminology
of later Judaism but also on occasion that of extra-Judaic Hellenism {CD IV/2, 194-
195). The human Word of Jesus was accepted as a supremely particular and
distinctive Word, even in its formal and material similarity with so much of
Rabbinism, even in the different versions given by the Evangelists, and even in its
translation into Hellenistic thought forms and language. Through all these prisms,
He enlightened and instructed the community 'as the royal Word of the royal man
concerning the royal dominion of God' {CD IV/2, 195). This was done with an
originality which could not be diminished by any Judaistic or Hellenistic covering.
His community heard Him speak. In this way, it was not only the community, but
also the whole cosmos, that was confronted with the primary and dominating aspect
of His life-act, and therefore Himself. The community heard His Word as the Word
of reconciliation intended and directed for it (CD IV/2, 195) as the New Testament
describes it in terms of soayysTT^eaOcu, 8i5aaKStv, and Kripocrasiv.43
Jesus Christ Himself is both the One who brings good-news (euayysA,i<^6-
psvoq) and the soayyeXiov itself (Ac 10:36; Rom 1:1; Mk 1:14); the good-news
that speaks of God (objective genitive) and the good-news that God Himself has
spoken in the world (subjective genitive). In other words, suocyys>aCpa0ai naturally
speaks of God, as the man Jesus speaks of Him. And conversely, it is God Himself
43
{CD IV/2, 195-209). Four general observations of these three terms are: (i) All the three
terms are applied absolutely. So the readers of Jesus' saying know its clarity, (ii) They converge
strongly although they are not synonymous, (iii) The words apply to both Jesus Himself and His
disciples. So they characterise the action of the totus-Christus, to which His community belong; to
the earthly form of His body, (iv) In the Gospels and Acts, one of these terms are always given the
first place which denotes the accompanying acts of Jesus: IdaBca, 0spa7iepEiv, 6kP&AAsiv tcc
Saipovia. But the first without the second, and not the second without the first {CD IV/2, 196).
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who has spoken and awakened this man to speak.44 Scripture witnesses to Jesus
Christ Himself as being the content of Gospel and salvation itself45 This implies
that Jesus Christ Himself is the kingly rule of God.46 Therefore there is no point
in arguing whether the dpxrj xou suayysAiou 'Ipcroo Xptaxou as the beginning
of the Gospel that Jesus proclaimed (subjective genitive) or as the beginning of the
Gospel that proclaimed Him (objective genitive). For they both converge in Jesus
Christ (CD IV/2, 196-198).
The distinctiveness of the New Testament's SiSdaKsrv lies in its call to
repentance although its apparent content and form were like the teaching of rabbis.
Like all other rabbis, Jesus did look back to the Old Testament and taught it.
Nevertheless, for Jesus the Old Testament was not merely the record of a normative
past, but it was also the book of the present and the future (CD IV/2, 198-199).
When Jesus was teaching, His presence was not one among other times, but
fulfilled kairos to which all the past and the future word and event can move. 'The
new thing in His teaching was the fact that ... He Himself was there' (200).
The KripoacjBiv of Jesus was not about 'moral rearmament,' or a zeal for
wanting to better things and to know more. Nor was it a plan for the moral and
sacramental elevation and development of humanity, even to the point of its
deification. The 6t6daKstv of the New Testament is not a pedagogic action (CD
IV/2, 203). Although the New Testament has similarity to the ancient Greek
KfjpuE,, the New Testament's term has 'the point of conjunction of this concrete
past and the concrete future' (CD IV/2, 203). So it had something to say about the
dawning of the new age, the forgiveness of sin, the coming kingdom, the grace and
wrath of God, a radical conversion and renewal ofman, or God becoming man (CD
IV/2, 202). The event of the Exodus and entering into Canaan had always to be
44 Matt 11:3f.; Lk 4:17f.; Eph 2:14, 17 (CD IV/2, 197).
45 Lk 2:1 Of., 4:17f.; Gal 1:16; Ac 8:35, 5:42, 10:36, 1 1:20, 17:18; Eph 2:14, 17, 3:8; 1 Pet
1:1 If.; Matt 11:3f; Jn 5:39, 45f. (CD IV/2, 200).
46 Lk 22:30, 23:42; Jn 18:36; Eph 5:5: 1) paacn.A.sta too Xpiaiou kccI 0eoo; Mk 9:1 is
replaced by Matt 16:28 and Ac 8:12, 11:9f; Matt 21:9; Lk 19:38; Ac 28:31; Rev 12:10 (CD IV/2,
197-198).
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commemorated in the words of the Old Testament, but they could not be
'proclaimed' as the great acts of salvation. They were the lasting promise of the
fulfilment of salvation but they are not themselves the fulfilment (CD IV/2, 204).
The New Testament has this salvific character as the point of conjunction between
the concrete past and the concrete future in its form as kerygma. It is this is the
conclusive and definitive language, meaning 'decision' which the New Testament
means by 'preaching.' Where the teaching of the New Testament differs from all
others is in His teaching that 'you see and hear what many prophets and righteous
desired to see and hear and could not hear or see' (Matt 13:17). 'Jesus does not
speak of someone or something that comes. He is Himself the One who comes, and
with His coming there comes everything that is to come' (CD IV/2, 205). Jesus
does not speak of an assumption of power which has still to come, but of that
which is accomplished as He Himself comes. His speaking was a definitive act and
vice versa. This identity is something which is more than ordinary human speech.
If the Christian kerygma is greater than any other human speech it is the case only
because it is about this Jesus Christ (CD IV/2, 205). This is what Paul means when
he says that Christian preaching is the Word of the cross (1 Cor 1:18), that is, the
Word of reconciliation (2 Cor 5:19). Paul's Gospel is the kerygma of Jesus Christ,
the Gospel which is proclaimed by Jesus Christ and therefore which proclaims
Himself (CD IV/2, 208).
Secondly, His Word was also wholly His activity not alongside the fact that
it was His Word, but 'as' His Word (CD IV/2, 209-247). Namely, His concrete
activity always accompanies the accounts of His concrete speech as an 'inner' and
'basic necessity' (CD IV/2, 209-247). As for Barth 'it is quite impossible to think
of... His concrete work as accessory or subordinate; as something which demands
only identical consideration and can at a pinch be overlooked' (CD IV/2, 209). His
activity was 'the light of the truth of His speech kindling into actuality.'47 'More
pertinently, it is the demonstration of the coincidence, or identity, of His
47 'das in die Wirklichkeit hineinleuchtende Licht der Wahreit seines Redens' (CD IV/2, 209;
KD 232).
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proclamation of the kingdom of God, the lordship of God, the divine coup d'etat,
with the event itself.'48 It is not for nothing that His activity was accompanied by
His Word, not alongside the Word but as His Word. For this accompaniment of
activity dismantles the illusion that 'only a Word' or 'a spiritual event would do
enough' for the fulfilment of its purpose by immediately accomplishing the
corresponding change in the physical, visible, and palpable circumstances of the
world. His Word is not an ambiguous or abstract Word, but is a concrete action
and individual history. This concreteness implies that a definitive Word is spoken
in the unequivocal form of a definitive action. As such His Word is spoken in
power. The activity of Jesus has always the characteristic that it is still His
preaching of the Gospel in this total and cosmic form. What is distinctive about this
activity is that it is always the revelation of His human existence among other
human beings (CD IV/2, 209-211).
3) The Uniqueness of the Miraculous Nature49 of the Act of the Royal Man
The acts of the Royal Man differed from acts of other human beings since
they were 'miracles (WundertatenY (CD IV/2, 211; KD 234). The Gospel narratives
describe the presence of an 'extraordinary reality (aufierordentlichen Wirklichkeitf
although there are some ordinary realities.50 His activity was 'paradoxical' in its
character (Lk 5:26). This paradoxical character in the fact that astonishment,
amazement, opposition, and fear was the response to the new thing that the Royal
Man proclaimed in His Word and introduced in His existence. The people around
Jesus were brought to confess Him 'as the sum of human being and seeing and
understanding' (CD IV/2, 211) despite the fact that they could neither explain His
48
'Sein Handeln ist, sachlich gesagt: der Erweis jener Koinzidenz, ja Identitat seiner
Verkiindigung des Reiches, der Machtergreifung, der Herrschaft Gottes mil diesem Geschehen selbst
und als solchem, (CD IV/2, 209; KD 232).
49 'WundercharakteC or 'supernatural character («supranaturale» Art)' (CD IV/2, 212; KD
235).
50
Lk 2:43; Mk 10:16, cf. 9:36, 11:If.; Jn 13:1 f. (CD IV/2, 210-211; KD 233-234).
II. The Centrality of the Royal Man 151
activity nor did they understand it.51
Barth admits that there were and could be found many reports of astonishing
and extraordinary events or miracles in the time of Jesus. Yet the New Testament
writers were not interested in comparing them with the activity of Jesus nor in
having his activity rivalled, trivialised, or relativised by the accounts of god.
Despite all the unavoidable similarities of the extraordinary activities of Jesus to
those of some of His contemporary's accounts of wonders (miracles), His activity
was neither attacked by these contemporary's accounts, nor does the account of His
activity need to attack them. They are on a 'different level' (CD IV/2, 212-214).
Scripture makes virtually no mention of them at all, with the exception of the
reference to the action of the disciples of the Pharisees. Paul also mentions that
there are many gods and lords (1 Cor 8:5).52 However, the acts of Jesus attested
to in the New Testament are, in their unity with the good news, 'absolutely
different' (CD IV/2, 215; KD 238) from all other human or cosmic occurrence,
usual or unusual, ordinary or relatively extraordinary. In relation to all other normal
or abnormal events they are 'absolute miracles (absolute Wunder)' for which even
the word supernatural or supranatural is not really adequate. It is only as such that
they can be credible in the New Testament sense. What makes His life-act
absolutely unique? According to Barth the miraculous and alien thing which takes
place in the acts of Jesus is the kingly rule of God:
The new thing of the kingdom of God is not the extraordinary, the inconceivable,
the supernatural, the heavenly or the other-worldly of an epitome of formal
transcendence, of an absolutely superior omnipotence which encounters man
51 Barth at this juncture also points out that this incomprehensible reality, and yet its
confrontation with people, also applies to His word as well. Those who heard were confronted with
the same new thing whether they believed or not. The Sermon on the Mount (Matt 7:29) is no less
a miraculous Word - the incomprehensible erruption - than the raising of the young man at Nain
(Lk 7:1 If.). So keeping Rudolf Bultmann's view of demythologisation in mind, Barth states that
'Those who try to throw doubt on the distinctive action of Jesus, as recorded in the Gospels, by
referring it to the sphere of mythology, must ask themselves whether in the first instance it is not
His teaching, as recorded in the same Gospels, that must be referred to this sphere. For it leaves no
less to be desired - and perhaps much more - in terms of normal apprehension' (CD IV/2, 211 ea;
KD 234).
52
In fact there are, and should be, many more extraordinary events outside the New Testament
if God is the God of the universe.
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anonymously, and therefore of the empty secret of his existence (CD IV/2, 215;
KD 238-239).
For the above understanding of the kingdom of God is merely the 'sum of all the
false gods imagined and fabricated by man' (CD IV/2, 215). This 'empty secret'
is not the absolute miracle at all. For the absolute miracle reveals itself as such in
order not to give any pretence of denial or misunderstanding of the absolute
miracles. A true miracle is an open secret and not an empty or hidden secret. In the
same way, the ordinaryness, the naturalness, the conceivability, and the this-
worldlyness that confronts the kingly reign of God, is not just the epitome of the
creatureliness ofman and the limitation of his capacity, experience and knowledge.
For the kingly reign of God, who is the Creator of humankind, cannot be merely
a negation of his creatureliness. His coming is more than just an invasion of this
creatureliness. There is this negation and corresponding penetrations.
Considering the presence of the kingly rule of God, and as such, all the
peculiarity53 of the miracles, the miraculous life-act of the Royal Man cannot so
easily be equated with the relative 'miracles' which are bound in past and present
time. The action of the Royal Man is the unique miracle and power of the kingly
rule of God. Indeed 'the miracles of Jesus, as the miracles of the kingdom of
God'54 reject any simple, direct, or approximate identification with any human
5j
(i) The majority of the miracle-stories indicate that Jesus does not take the initiative in His
performance. Jesus does not 'make' miracles; He does them. Miracles did not occur intentionally
(ii) Jesus does not make use of any therapeutic techniques like physical, psychological, or magical
in miracles of healing, (iii) Jesus did not perform miracles for His own interests, (iv) Jesus' miracles
were not a welfare programme - to improve the human lot or condition - continuing after the
miracles and as such creating an institution, (v) The miracles of Jesus are the 'cosmic actualisation
of His kerygma,' and are performed in the twofold context: service to faith and the call to faith.
Their significance lies in its indissoluble connection of proclamation, miracle, and faith, for an
actualization of His Word, as a call to repentance and faith, (vi) The transparent character of the
miracles of Jesus are seen, not only in the Johannine Gospel, but also belong to the connection
between proclamation, miracle, and faith. The Evangelists are not only wishing to say that this or
that happened in this or that concrete actualisation of the kingly rule of God, but are also wanting
to say that Jesus gave us a model or 'original' of certain situations in the history of the
development, being, formation, and work of the community for which the disciples are charged with
the continued proclamation of the Gospel, the kingdom and Jesus' own name. In this respect, the
miracles are not accidental but are meaningful historical acts (CD IV/2, 216-218; KD 239-242).
54
'Die Wunder Jesu a!s die Wunder des Reiches Gottes' (CD IV/2, 216; KD 239).
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antitheses and miracles. This alone characterises the actions of the Royal Man as
absolute miracles as opposed to those miracles which took place and still take place
in our human antitheses, world (CD IV/2, 216).
What is the kingly rule of God, and what does Barth mean when he says
that the acts of Jesus were the miracles of this kingly rule? To Barth, the general
trend or the nature of the miracles of the Royal Man holds the answer. The acts of
the Royal Man are 'acts of power (Machttatenf (CD IV/2, 219; KD 243). They are
done with a 'divine' and 'unconditional freedom' (CD IV/2, 219), and thus they are
absolutely sovereign, alien, incomprehensible, and transcendent in relation to all
other forms, orders, and developments. So the acts of the Royal Man cannot be
measured by human thought or scientific and natural laws. With the power of God
the Royal Man does miracles in His service. To be precise, however, the miracles
of the Royal Man are the revelation of 'the power of God' itself because the
completely transcendent and alien power of God is revealed most concretely in and
through the Royal Man. The kingly rule of God is a dialectic reality and dialectic
reality. This implies that the kingly rule of God is not a fixed state but a dynamic
event in history. For the same reason, the kingly reign of God is not another realm
which is waiting to come into the world but another reality which is present in the
world here and now. In this way the acts of the Royal Man are characterised by
both mysteriousness and familiarity. A completely astonishing and new light is shed
on the human situation. The kingly rule of God is therefore the 'miracle of
miracles' which not only embraces all His miraculous acts but also empowers them.
This miracle is that which encountered human beings as the unconditional power
of God in the miracles of Jesus. The miraculous life-acts of the Royal Man are the
actualisation of His Word (CD IV/2, 220-221). This concrete reality of the kingly
rule of God comprises five things.
Firstly, the kingly rule of God uncovers the nature of humankind. It is in
every sense 'unfortunate' and suffering. The whole cosmos may not be totally sick.
But the miracles of the Royal Man cannot be brought into a proper focus and
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genuinely seen or understood apart from this aspect of misfortune and suffering.55
Secondly, the miracles (life-act) of the Royal Man are concerned with the
evil and deadly existence of humankind. His miracles aim to remove its prison of
death. As such it is 'radically blessed' by His miracles. The important thing which
the miracle stories tell us is not that the human person is a sinner (sinful), but that
it is a sufferer (suffering). The Royal Man does not first look at its past, and then
at its present tragedy in the light of the past. On the contrary, from its present He
creates for it a new future. He does not ask about its sin. He helps and blesses quite
irrespective of sin. Barth sees no trace of the statement that 'the wages of sin is
death' (Rom 6:23) in the miracle stories. The miracle stories should not be painted
in ethical colours as has been done by the Western Church. Ethicising the miracle
stories is indeed expressly excluded (Jn 9:2f.; Lk 13:1). The cxfi^saBai has nothing
whatever directly to do with the conversion of the 'saved'. It means that human
beings are healed, made whole, normalised in the elemental sense. There is only
one instance in which physical healing has to do with sin (Mk 2:If., 5, 11). But
even here there is no demand for repentance, but sin is annulled without examin¬
ation. Again, there is only one story - the sick man at Bethesda for 38 years -
which has a subsequent reference of physical healing to sin (Jn 5:14). Yet here too
the point of story is the sovereign removal of the infirmity and not about a warning
not to sin. There is no question of an ethical purpose on the part of the Royal Man,
or of an ethical insight on the part of human beings. Truly, there is no mention of
sin at all in the rest of the stories. They are taken seriously only as they are poor,
tragic, and suffering creatures (CD IV/2, 222-224).
Thirdly, in the miracles of the Royal Man, God is always directly interested
in human beings as His creatures. The miracles reveal that human beings are His
in spite of its sin. God was present in such an unexpected way that He was there
when we think He 'cannot' and 'should not' be present, beyond our common sense
and value. This is what constitutes the strangeness, incomparability, and uniqueness
55
Mk 2:17, 1:40, 47, 9:22f.; Matt 4:24, 8:17, 25, 15:30, 17:27; Jn 2:If.; Lk 5:3f. (CD IV/2,
221-222).
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of the kingly rule of God over all other miracles in the world (CD IV/2, 224-225).
Fourthly, in the act of the miracles of Jesus, God places Himself at the side
of human beings and their suffering. As such He suffers human suffering (CD IV/2,
225-232). God engages Himself in the 'nothingness,' which is sin and death, in
order to save humankind from it. In short, 'His [the Royal Man T] action is first and
foremost the Gospel in action. Only then is it the new Law ...' (CD IV/2, 226).
In the Gospel of John, the Royal Man works in the name of the Father (Jn
10:25). Strictly speaking it is the indwelling Father Himself who does the
miraculous (Jn 14:10). So they are the 'works of God' (Jn 9:3). The acuteness of
the Royal Man's, works56 in defence of His freedom, as the One who does the
works of God, reflects the severity of assault and His work against the rule of
'nothingness' in the cosmos.57 To sum up, the miracles of the Royal Man take the
offensive form ofmilitary action, fulfilled by Jesus in the service of God. They are
the declaration and manifestation of the nature and character of the kingly rule of
God. His coming kingly rule is the defiance of the power of destruction which
afflicts human beings. What is new and incomprehensible in them (and in us) is
that God is a God who for the sake of human beings cannot rest on the sabbath but
enters into the very root of human sufferings and confronts all these sufferings.
Thus the sabbath truly became the day of worship, joy, and peace (CD IV/2, 232).
56
Jn 5:9, 8:12, 9:4, 14f.; Lk 13:10f„ 14:If.; Mk 3:4-5; Matt 16:3.
57
The three examples of the Royal Man's engagement in the reality of human nothingness are
seen in the death of Jairus' daughter (Mk 5:38f), the widow of Nain (Lk 7:14), and Lazarus (Jn
1 l:39f): The reason for Jesus' severity in that house of death is that He alone makes the decision
of 'His solitary No to death, in the power of His solitary Yes to the omnipotent mercy of God' (CD
IV/2, 226-227). It is exactly the same when He abruptly halts that funeral procession just outside
the gate of Nain (Lk 7:14). In the story of the raising of Lazarus (Jn ll:33f.), Jesus' weeping
demonstrates His solidarity with the mourners, 'sympathetically bearing the burden of the whole
age' (CD IV/2, 227). His weeping means that He is fighting tor them, a strict repudiation of the
cause of their, and His, weeping. It is itself a resolute No to this reality. He has the power because
He is the resurrection and life. In addition, Jesus' exorcisms also reveal the 'total' and 'absolutely
victorious clash of the kingdom of God with nothingness, with the whole world of the chaos
negated by God, with the opposing realm of darkness' (CD IV/2, 230). At this point the miracles
of the Royal Man invaded that which was introduced into the cosmos by the sin and guilt of human
beings (CD IV/2, 230). The peculiar feature of the Royal Man's rebukes (Mk 1:25, 5:8; Lk 4:36)
is 'the absolute radicalism of the attack of Jesus in reflection of that vexation of God Himself (CD
IV/2, 231).
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Fifthly, above all, the miracles of the Royal Man are 'gloriously free grace,'
as the truth and reality of God Himself {CD IV/2, 232-247). Jesus was really
interested in the suffering and misery of human beings rather than in the cause of
human misery or in the bad side of human beings, viz. human sin. God Himself
comes for the sufferers.58
Our analysis of the life-act of the Royal Man thus far clearly shows us that
we cannot underestimate Barth's continual emphasis that the constituency of the
Royal Man s secret character is His conformity with God. In other words, His
miracles are unique in virtue of the kingly reign of God 'from above'. The Royal
Man exists simply in His service of God. Moreover, it is also an authentic
impression that what is still dominant and determinative in the life-act of the Royal
Man is the divine power 'from above'. Hence Barth's christology 'should be' a
christology 'from above'.
However, how could we interpret such a clear cut and stringent statement
that 'He [the Royal Man] comes as the king[ly rule] of God in person {CD IV/2,
216 ea)? The presence of the Royal Man meant the presence of the kingly rule of
God. This is what makes Him absolutely unique and unforgettable. As such the
Royal Man was GKdvboAov {CD IV/2, 161). The Royal Man Jesus is the kingly
rule of God: 'Jesus, the kingdom of God'59 interprets and determines all. In short
'He [the Royal Man] was the kingdom of God'60 brought on earth. That is to say,
the truly verifiable identity of the kingly rule of God is found in nothing other and
nowhere else than in this Royal Man, this christology from below'. Our observa-
58
(CD IV/2, 232). Barth criticises the Protestantism which followed Calvin and Luther, the
monastic moralism of Western Catholicism, and the Eastern Church, for their reducing the joy of
the kingly rule of God. The Gospel, the kingly rule of God, is far more than moral or ethical. The
self-revelation of God demonstrated in the acts of the Royal Man cannot properly be understood
without considering the free grace of God {CD IV/2, 233).
59
'Jesus, das Reich Gottes' (CD IV/2, 189; KD 210). '... Jesus Christ and the kingdom of God
are all open to comparison. ... But in Jesus Christ ... we have to do with the eternal basis and
temporal fulfilment of the covenant ... . In Him we have their beginning, their meaning, and their
goal, the centre which unites and carries the whole, both creation and covenant' (CD IV/2, 58).
60
'In dieser Hingabe war er das aufErden gekommene Reich Gottes ("In this sacrifice He [the
Royal Man] was the kingdom of God brought on earth")' (CD IV/2, 184; KD 205).
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tion will be further justified as we hear Barth's definite answer to the
epistemological question 'how do we know that our exaltation is true and actual?'.
According to Barth, our knowledge does not come from Scripture although it is the
'proper' and 'final basis,' neither does it come from Church and its tradition, or
from symbols and myths, or from the history of Christian theology, but only from
the existence of Jesus Christ, particularly from His resurrection, the noetic event
(CD IV/2, 118-153). At this point Barth clearly acknowledges that none of us has
sat in the divine counsel (CD IV/2, 119). 'We cannot, therefore, speak a priori, but
only retrospectively' (CD IV/2, 119 ea) of the existence of Jesus Christ (in God's
eternal election of grace). The existence of Jesus Christ is the 'normative ground
of knowledge.' This means that 'the only source of the knowledge of the eternal
will of God is the knowledge of His act fulfilled in time ...' (CD IV/2, 119 ea).
Indeed 'The classical doctrine of the two natures speaks of the one Jesus Christ,
and only in Him. And it does this a posteriori, with a reference to Him, to the Son
of God actually existing in the flesh. It does not derive from a known a priori, a
superior possibility, but only from the given actuality, from Him Himself (CD
IV/2, 62 ea). Incidentally, it is also important to note that this epistemological
question was raised while Barth was discussing the life-act of the Royal Man, that
is, His identity, the newness (uniqueness) of His life-act, and His life-act as the
kingly rule of God itself. In other words, what he means by a posteriori christolo-
gy, the christology 'from below', is this Royal Man. So much so, then, that what
truly matters is this a posteriori christology rather than the a priori christology.
Namely Barth's christology from above' derives from nowhere else but from this
below\ Again, as we have mentioned in chapter III, section A, what actually
enables Barth to begin his christology is this from below'' element rather than the
'from above' element, albeit he begins methodically with a christology 'from
above' which emphasises the 'from above' element of christology.
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3. The Status of the Humanity of Christ in Christology
Barth deals with the issue of the true humanity of Christ in the course of his
emphasis that the origin of the humanity of Christ is His divinity. The humanity of
Christ does not exist of itself. The Son of Man exists in virtue of the 'address' (CD
IV/2, 84) of the grace of the Son of God Himself to and in the Son of Man.
Therefore there is no direct or indirect identification of the two natures other than
through their 'effective confrontation (wirksame Konfrontationf (CD IV/2, 87; KD
96). In expressing the union (Vereinigung), and not unity (Einheit), of the two
essences in this way, Barth favours the concept of the communicatio gratiarum
since this address is consisted in the grace of God - as mentioned already (CD
IV/2, 84-104).
Does Barth's understanding of the status (origin) of the humanity of Christ
undermine the true humanity of Christ, as Macquarrie would say? What Barth truly
has in his mind is not to advocate such as a 'high' christology, but to ensure that
humanity itself cannot be the subject of a responsible christology. This is because,
again, any general anthropology could otherwise become the subject of a
responsible christology. This would imply that God would be replaced by humanity
at any time according to its wish and handling. This severe danger is exactly what
Barth has fought against throughout his theology in the name of divine self-
revelation. At the same time, if we are to understand Barth's favourite phrase the
communicatio gratiarum, then we cannot overlook the statement that 'We must
realise that this [the grace both given to Him as man and received by Him as man]
can be done only with reference to ... the particular history which took place in
Him [the Royal Man]' (CD IV/2, 89). What does this mean?
The importance of the humanity in Barth's christology is clearly stated in
his introduction to the Royal Man. Barth notes that he has 'always envisaged an
explanation of this fact [the life-act of the Royal Man].'61 For Barth, the christolo-
61 'eben auf die Erklarung dieses Faktums war es dabei abgesehen.' The English word
'always' is, in the German text, not explicit, but only implicit (CD IV/2, 155 ea; KD 174).
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gical starting point is the existence and history of this Royal Man. Scripture tells
us that God is Lord. He, as such, rules His people and cosmos. However Barth
notes that both this envisionment and the statement of the divine dominion is
possible 'only in the concrete juxtaposition,'62 in the person of this Royal Man.
The Royal Man belongs to 'the substance of the whole'63 christology, and in this
view, Barth points out that the older dogmatics was more interested in the divinity
of Christ rather than in the humanity. Therefore, according to Barth, responsible
christology must give an 'independent consideration'64 of the humanity of Christ.
His humanity occupies the 'central position' {CD IV/2, 156) in the four Gospels,
and especially in the Synoptics, as the subject of the declaration: '"Truly this man
was the Son of God (Mk 15:39)".' That the life-act of the Royal Man is 'the
substance' of his whole christology implies two points.
On the one hand, Jesus of Nazareth the Royal Man, is completely like all
humankind. He has a 'human (Adamic) nature,' 'humanitas,' which is 'flesh'
stamped by human sin. He 'is also the creature of God' {CD IV/2, 90). He is 'only
one of countless other men' {CD IV/2, 114) as He exists in 'human being
{menschlichem Sein)' and 'essence {Wesen),' and in 'our nature {anserer Art)' and
'kind {Naturf {CD IV/2, 50; KD 53). Jesus Christ is the concrete form of a
historical relationship between humanity and humanity {CD IV/2, 180). In short,
the humanity of Christ is different from us not in kind, nature, or essence, but in
degree. As the bearer of this human being He was and is the Mediator and
62
'anders als im konkreten Gegeniiber.' The term 'only' in the English translation is
paraphrasing of the German text (CD IV/2, 155; KD 174).
63
'geradezu die Substanz des Ganzeii (CD IV/2, 156; KD 174).
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(CD IV/2, 156). Having already mentioned the importance of the humanity in christology,
Barth first of all stresses the actual existence of the Royal Man: (1) He was present in a way which
all people could see and hear. He was absolutely alien and excitingly novum. In this respect He was,
and made, history (CD IV/2,156-157); (2) He was present in a way that not only demanded decision
from human beings, but He created the need for that choice (CD IV/2, 157-159); (3) He was there
in such away which could not be forgotten (CD IV/2, 159-163); (4) His presence was 'irrevocable'
(CD IV/2, 163-166).
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Reconciler between God and us.65
On the other hand, the Jesus ofNazareth the Royal Man is completely unlike
all humankind. He is 'the' (CD IV/2, 36) true human being. This complete
unlikeness consists in His being the Son of God, in the unlikeness of His humanity
and ours (CD IV/2, 27-28). This, particularity in relation to the humanity of Christ,
is not a matter of a 'quantitative unlikeness of degree,' i.e., wiser, greater, more
pious, stronger, etc., between His particular humanity and ours (CD IV/2, 28). His
decisive difference consists in the fact that there took place an exaltation of the
humanity. The exaltation means 'the history of the placing of the humanity
common to Him and us on a higher level,' distinct from us not only in 'degree' and
'quantity' but 'in principle' and 'quality.'66 'This is the secret of the humanity of
65
According to Barth, to confirm that the particular Jesus Christ is a true human being like us,
is both right and necessary. It is right because it is true. It is necessary to shun every kind of docetic
christology. This implies that 'Every sound christological discussion will necessarily start not only
with an explanation of the vere Deus which declares the equality of Jesus Christ with God, but with
an explanation of the vere homo which declares His equality with us. It will always have to keep
this at the back of its mind, and take it into the strictest account in the later development of the
doctrine' (CD IV/2, 25-26). We must be, at this point, clear that this later development is all about
the life-act of the Royal Man.
(CD IV/2, 28). We may raise the question as to whether Barth is saying that the humanity
of Christ is different from us in degree or in kind. But what Barth virtually says is both. This dual
statement was the corollary of his christological axiom that Jesus Christ is vere homo and vere
Deus. Namely He had to be distinct from us in kind because He is God, and therefore He is 'the'
human being. But at the same time He had to be different from us in degree, because He truly
assumed human flesh, and thus He is 'a' human being. In other words, Jesus' being both like us
and unlike us, consists in the fact that He is 'completely like us as a man, He is completely unlike
us as the true man' (CD IV/2, 69). He is totally unlike us because His humanity alone is fully
determined by the grace of God (CD IV/2, 89), but He is like us as He is accessible and
recognisable as our 'Brother' among many brethren.
Here we face a dilemma of theological logic. From a vintage of human logic this dual
statement is in fact the limit of Christian dogmatics and theology as a whole. For it is very difficult,
from a human point of view, to understand that both a complete God and a complete human being
are in one person. So what we could say, in facing the logical impasse, is that, for Barth, theological
language is not a scientific language but a doxological language, viz. fides quaerens intellectum.
Further, Christ being 'the' (CD IV/2, 36) true human being has a soteriological significance
as well. If this particular Jesus of Nazareth is to be the Saviour or the Reconciler of the whole
cosmos, then He has to be 'the' true human being of all human beings. We could believe in Him
alone because all humankind will have a genuine reason for their hope for the recovery of their true
humanity, since He is the true humanity. If this were not the case there would be no reason for
believing in Him alone. As He is the true human being, He strikes all humankind, and as such has
a universal character. In short, He is qualified to be the representative of all kinds of human beings
as He is 'the' true human being.
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Jesus Christ which has no parallel at all in ours. This is the basis and power of the
atonement made in Him on this side - as it is seen from below, from man' {CD
IV/2, 28). For the same reason that Jesus is the true human being, His humanity is
not to be determined by a general anthropology. Rather true humanity must be
understood and determined by the humanity of Christ.67 That is to say, the status
of the humanity of Christ stands on the fact that '... He would not be like us at all,
but only unlike. Everything depends again upon the fact that in His unity (Einheit)
with God this man is in full likeness to us, and only in this likeness unlike us, man
in a very different way from ourselves' {CD IV/2, 40; KD 43).
4. Understanding the 'Historical' Jesus
If we insist on our contention that, for Barth, the historical life-act of the
Royal Man is the ground for his christology is correct, we may easily raise the
following questions. Why was Barth then uninterested in the question of the
historical Jesus? Why did Barth begin and develop his christology in view of the
incarnation of the Logos 'from above' instead of beginning and developing his
christology upon the 'historical' Jesus?
Let us be clear about this issue. First of all, for Barth, the historicity of Jesus
is the presupposition of christology. Barth affirms the impossibility of reconstruct¬
ing the historical Jesus in orderly and biographical way in view of the modern
understanding of history. The New Testament presents 'only a fragmentary picture';
67
(CD IV/2, 26). 'What human nature is ... can be learned only with and from Him, just as
it is only with and from Him, and not from a general concept of deity, that we can learn what God
is, and therefore His divine nature' (CD IV/2, 26). Again, for this precise reason of safeguarding
christology from becoming a general anthropology, or its becoming the basis of christology, Barth
deliberately began his christology with the 'from above' aspect prior to dealing with the 'from
below' aspect, even though what he eventually kept in mind as a referent of the christology 'from
above' was the christology 'from below.' Barth, in fact, deals with anthropology and harmartiology
in the light of christology.
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it lacks 'external coherence' (CD IV/2, 165). So it is difficult to grasp its historical
continuity and inner coherence from a modern historical and biographical point of
view. Is Scripture a character sketch then? Barth believes that a real human person
is seen and described in the witnesses of the New Testament. But He cannot be
generally categorised since it is so singular, unique, and alien. The New Testament
tradition could not possibly give us materials for a biography or character study.
However, its truth and verity are based upon its 'inner coherence (innere
Einheitlichkeitf in spite of its 'external inconsistencies (aufiren Uneinheitlichkeity
(CD IV/2, 193; KD 214-215). This inner coherence is what differentiates these
Gospels from other attempts in proving that they were trustworthy and could
therefore be used as a rule or canon for the true consideration of the man Jesus.
What the Gospel narratives present is the 'totality' of the activity of Jesus from an
'unmistakeable unity of the picture' (CD IV/2, 193). The important thing of the
New Testament is that it not only speaks 'about' the Royal Man, but also 'from'
Him, because, 'As its theme He was also its origin, as its theorem its axiom' (CD
IV/2, 166). The New Testament could attest (and not prove) Him as a human
being. With this view, Barth contends that he has:
presupposed as the 'New Testament' - not naively, but deliberately and conscious¬
ly - a fixed form of the tradition denoted by this term; not a form which is
hypothetical, but one which is as a whole well-known to us historically. We have
thus refrained (again deliberately) from any critico-historical construction or
reconstruction of this presupposition (CD IV/2, 248).
The issue of 'history' is the subject of a long debate. And yet what Barth means
by history is 'actual fact' in time and space. The humanity of Christ accompanies
the divinity of Christ throughout the christological movement. It is used as the
actual constitution for a responsible christology.
To be sure, the assumptio carnis is Barth's overriding emphasis throughout
Church Dogmatics. But the primary emphasis of Barth is that it is God who
assumed a humanity. This implies, in relation to the question of history,68 that not
68
We are concerned only with Barth's view of the New Testament, and not with the history
of textual criticism or history in general or in particular.
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only the Bible, but any modern historian who wishes to sketch the biography of
Jesus in view of the modern concept of history, must necessarily fail in its goal.
Human beings cannot portray the 'vertical movement'69 of this particular Jesus
Christ. If His life-act were only human, then writers could have written it much
more easily in terms of history. But since He presents Himself as God, our attempt
to sketch His life-act in terms of our modern concept of history will fail. Therefore,
our attempt to present this peculiar life-act historically either in literary or pictorial
arts can only be a 'catastrophe.'70 Barth uncompromisingly presupposes the
historical Jesus, and therefore the truth and actuality of our reconciliation based on
this historicity of the event of reconciliation. 'To try to grasp it [reconciliation] as
supra-historical or non-historical truth is not to grasp it at all. It is indeed truth, but
truth actualised in a history and revealed in this way as such - revealed, therefore,
as history' (CD IV/1, 157). This premise enables Barth to turn to the Gospel
narratives for his argument that the life-act of the Royal Man was historically
trustworthy.
Then it is doubtful whether Barth was really uninterested in the quest for the
historical Jesus. Barth presumes that the incarnation and its life-act are historical
in the sense of its facticity in time and space. Thus it is not really necessary to raise
the quest for the historical Jesus, or undertake a historical reconstruction of Jesus,
in order to verify the trueness of the biblical narratives.71 As for Barth, human
means of description cannot postulate themselves as the last resort for the
ascertainment and verification of the truth of the event. This is not only on account
of the limit of human reason and language, but also due to the nature of the event
itself. In other words, human perception and language are not adequate to perceive
and describe the act of God, i.e., that which Barth calls the 'vertical movement.'
69
'die vertikale Bewegung' (CD IV/2, 102; KD 113).
70
(CD IV/2, 102-103). For this reason there can be no question of using the picture of Christ
as a means of instruction in the Church (ibid).
71
Nonetheless, we may still raise a question that if Barth presumes the historical Jesus, and
therefore does as little New Testament research as in fact he does, then is he not, basically,
uninterested in the quest for historical Jesus? Has he not all he needs for dogmatic purposes?
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However, we here face with a difficult question as to how Barth could
develop his christology on the assumption that he is dealing with the historical
revelation, Jesus Christ, and yet not allow that revelation ot be the object of
ordinary historical 'cognition'? How can he say that that particular Jesus Christ is
historical event and yet not allow for the use of historical-critical method in
theology? For though it is obvious that the historical-critical method itself cannot
yield faith in Jesus Christ as the God-man, might not the method itself be allowed
as a possible means of understanding the 'historical' act of God truly as a
'historical' event? At this point, we note that we are not fundamentally concerned
with this question of revelation (divine act) vs. history (human reality) because this
question is beyond the scope of our thesis as it has been outlined. Nevertheless, we
might possibly outline an answer to the question as follows.
The inadequacy of human language in conveying the revelation is well
expressed in Barth's early debate with Adolf von Harnack in 1923. According to
Barth, Scripture witnesses to 'genuine' revelation. This means that Scripture does
not witness to a somewhat 'concealed religious possibility of man,' but to the
'possibility of God'. Namely, it is God who acted under the form of human
possibility as 'reality'. In other words, God became a 'human-historical reality' in
the 'person of Jesus Christ'. Yet the sheer fact of the assumptio carnis by no
means entails that this event can be an object of 'human-historical cognition,'
insofar as 'this reality,' i.e., the reality of God is involved. For this reason, 'The
existence of a Jesus of Nazareth ... which can of course be discovered historically,
is not this reality'. A word or deed of this Jesus, historically understood, would be
nothing other than the realisation of a human possibility, and would not be 'this'
reality. The historical reality of Christ, as revelation, is 'not the "historical Jesus"
whom all too eager historical research had wanted to lay hold of in disregard of the
every warnings made in the [biblical] sources themselves. ... Nor is it, as you
[Harnack] said, an imagined Christ but rather ... the Christ who is witnessed to as
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the risen one.'72 This is the '"historic Jesus Christ".' To this extent, Barth refers
his understanding of revelation to Pauline christology that 'So from now on we
regard no one from a worldly point of view. Though we once regarded Christ in
this way, we do so no longer' (2 Corinthians 5:16).
What interests us here is Barth's view of revelation. For Barth, this
revelation is not any historically investigatable or identifiable entity, but the act of
God. Barth distinguishes revelation from history, seeing that there is no continuity
between them. God is God and man is man. Otherwise, there is no 'God' as such,
but there would only be divinely disguised humanity or human imagination. What
then does Barth mean by revelation in history?
We may get a clearer view of Barth's understanding of revelation in his
perception of Scripture. For Barth, Scripture is not the divine word itself, but the
words of 'human witnesses' to revelation. Witness is 'not absolutely' identical with
the object of its witness. But, at the same time, in this limitation, the Bible 'is
simply revelation as it comes to us, mediating and accommodating itself to us' {CD
1/2, 457-463). When we really obey and listen to its words, then it 'becomes' for
us the 'actual presence and event' of revelation. So if we want to understand the
Bible as a real witness of divine revelation, we always face the dilemma between
the distinction and the unity between witness and the object of witness.
According to Barth, however, we can avoid this dilemma when we do not
ignore 'its [revelation's] humanity for the sake of its divinity. We must not ignore
it any more than we do the humanity of Jesus Christ Himself. We must study it
[the humanity of Christ], for it is here and nowhere that we shall find its divinity'
{CD 1/2, 463). Indeed, Scripture is the human words spoken by specific people at
specific times in a specific situation, in a specific language and with a specific
intention. To read and expound Scripture historically is, therefore, perfectly
legitimate {CD 1/2, 464). But this legitimacy does not mean that human beings, by
historical study, can penetrate to God's word as such. Rather, it means at best that
72
Revelation and Theology. An analysis of the Barth-Harnack correspondence of 1923
(Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 44-46.
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we are 'prepared to listen' and understand and expound. We should not confuse this
preparation with the listening.
Are there, then, any 'hermeneutic principles' for interpreting the Bible?
What is the source of the hermeneutic teaching? For Barth, the hermeneutic
principles do not occur from any considerations on the nature of human language
etc., and therefore from general anthropology. There is no such thing as a 'special
biblical hermeneutics' because the hermeneutic principles are not dictated by
Scripture. The divine Subject of the Bible, i.e., revelation itself alone is the
principle of hermeneutics in expounding the Bible (CD 1/2, 466). For if we accept
that it is only by revelation that revelation can be spoken in Scripture, then the
scriptural witnesses must itself be attested by what it attests (CD 1/2, 469). This
means that the rule of interpreting the Bible is to understand it 'as a human word
in the light of what it says' (CD 1/2, 466). As such, a 'truly historical' understand¬
ing of revelation (Scripture) must correspond to this rule. The 'historical'
understanding does not simply mean to study the biblical expressions, the linguistic
and factual context of the Bible, or the biblical figures in their historical reality.
The best results of such studies would generally be to get a certain clear knowledge
of some figures in their concrete state, of their personality and piety in connection
with their roles in specific historical circumstances, etc., which of course cannot be
despised as something worthless (CD 1/2, 466-467). The apostle Paul is the
example of the fact that Scripture indeed has a very definite humanity expressed
in it. But this humanity (historical fact) does not speak of itself, but of God's
revelation.
In exegesis, 'the mystery of the sovereign freedom of the substance' alone
must summon us to hear the historical revelation, the divine act, which is realised
in the historical person of Jesus Christ. In face of this subject-matter there can be
no question of our achievement or confident approach which masters the matter;
rather, we are mastered by the subject-matter. We can investigate the humanity of
the word, the historical form of the divine revelation, but we cannot confuse the
divine revelation with the biblical words themselves, or with the human quality of
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the Bible. Thus the notion that complete impartiality is the most fitting and best
disposition for true exegesis is simply 'comical.'' To this extent, the fact that the
biblical words can be the medium of divine revelation is something peculiar,
something which can be understood only in terms of the 'analogia fidei {CD 1/2,
470-471). Consequently, as far as a proper understanding of the 'divine revelation'
in Scripture is concerned, there is no possibility of a 'general hermeneutics,' such
as that provided by the 'historical-critical method,' but only this 'special hermeneut¬
ics', that is, that the Bible must be interpreted only by the revelatory substance by
the biblical words {CD 1/2, 472).
What we can see thus far is that Barth's main concern was to safeguard the
uniqueness of the divine self-revelation by preventing any identification of with any
physical or, indeed, metaphysical reality. Although Barth undoubtedly notes that
'the actualisation of the act of God which took place once and for all in Jesus
Christ' {CD 1/2, 531), he rejects any simple identification between the divine
revelation and Jesus of Nazareth. It is not that this particular Jesus of Nazareth is
not the historical person in whom God revealed Himself at a particular time and
space. Rather, Barth wishes to underline the fact that we know this Jesus as Christ,
not because the words and deeds of Jesus tell us so, but because God enables us
to confess Jesus as 'Christ' and 'Lord'. The story of Jesus cannot be the scandal
unless God works in it through the work of the Holy Spirit. Barth's primary
concern seems to be fundamentally with his theological axiom that the divine
revelation, which includes the 'moment' of its subjective realisation in human faith
{CD 1/1, § 12), cannot in any way be identified with or possessed by or fixed in a
certain person or reality. God remains God, although God truly revealed Himself
in the person of the Jesus of Nazareth. God does not dissolve into the person of
Jesus or into any past manifestation in history, but always remains God. In such a
way, revelation is new every moment. It must also be pointed out that since Barth
does affirm Jesus of Nazareth as the historical manifestation or as the divine
revelation in person, the issue whether or not he was uninterested in the 'historical'
Jesus does not seem to crucially undermine our thesis. For if he affirms the
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historical reality, then the issue of the historical Jesus would be basically a matter
of christological methodology rather than of christological content, which echoes
our previous discussion that, as far as Barth's christology is concerned,
epistemology precedes methodology (pp. 45ff.). Again, it seems quite evident that
Barth is concerned primarily with the theological (dogmatic) principle, that is, that
we know and confess the particular Jesus of Nazareth as the 'Lord' and 'Christ' not
simply by our knowledge of the historical Jesus narrated in Scripture, but
fundamentally by the work of God the Holy Spirit. If God did not reveal Himself,
then nothing could be known as divine revelation or as the Word of God at all, not
even Jesus of Nazareth or the Bible. If God does not work, the biblical stories are
merely past history, incapable of yielding faith in Jesus of Nazareth as God-man.
This is why Barth is very sceptical about with the historical-critical method.
We might conclude, therefore, that it might be more correct and fair to say
that Barth was more concerned with this theological principle or axiom than that
he was not interested in, or that he ignored the importance of, the question of
history. The logic of his argument is so concentrated and persistent on this one
aspect, that he hardly has much room to discuss other aspects. This surely turns out
to be both a merit and demerit of his theology; it becomes a merit insofar as
Barth's christology is so consistently and thoroughly developed in this way, and it
becomes a demerit insofar as his christology consequently lacks the consideration
of counter-questions and aspects. Nevertheless, it may be that Barth's revision of
his theological outlook in the Humanity ofGod should provide for us the last word
and the best possible solution to our problem. For here, he acknowledges that his
early view of the divine revelation was only partly correct, as in fact we cannot
possibly and practically talk of this divine revelation apart from the humanity of
God in Jesus of Nazareth. But the revision proposed was never fully developed.
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Summary
We have argued that Barth's christology consists of the two elements, 'from
above' and 'from below'. This dual element derives from an understanding of
christology in terms of the doctrine of reconciliation, and the exchange of divine
incarnation and human exaltation in terms of the servant as Lord and the Lord as
servant. Both are two forms of one event. This dual perception within a single
christology implies that responsible christology cannot stand itself on one element
or on the other but must stand on both together. This clear cut dual constituency
demonstrates, first of all, that it should be highly questionable whether Barth's
christology is 'simply' or 'more or less' a christology 'from above' or a 'high'
christology as many theologians insist.
As far as the apparent framework of Barth's christology is concerned, it is
quite fair to understand Barth's christology as one from both 'above and below'.
However, our in-depth critique of the content of this framework forces us to go
beyond this 'bothness' in our understanding of Barth's christology. According to
Barth, the theologia crucifixionis, the below christology, is the centre of christology
since all the christological movement and content, and therefore the gravity of
whole christology, lies on this event. Indeed, for Barth, the true meaning of the
incarnation, the 'from above' element, is revealed in nowhere but the theologia
crucifixionis, in the 'from below'. This means, for the purpose of our thesis, that
the only responsible ground of christology is this christology 'from below'. The
'high' christology is built on nothing but this Tow' christology. In other words,
Barth's christology 'from above' embodies nothing but the christology 'from
below'. The 'high' christology is possible and has its power, only due to this 'low'
christology. To put it differently, Barth views the divinity ofChrist, the incarnation
of the Word of God, in and through the humanity of Christ and vice versa.
But, to be more precise, Barth means by the Tow' christology to highlight
the historical life-act of the Royal Man. This life-act of the Royal Man is not
merely a predicate of his christology, but rather the Subject of it. The reason is this.
By definition, christology is to speak of Jesus Christ. But what He acts and speaks
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is that God assumed flesh for the reconciliation of the world to Himself. The
central theme of the speech and life-act of Jesus Christ, the Royal Man, was the
kingly rule of God, reconciliation. This reconciliation is manifested through the
historical life-act: a revolutionary life-act and, unique miracles aiming at, both the
physical and spiritual healing and liberation of people. This historical manifestation
implies that reconciliation is not a future event to be waited for but something
already realised in some sense here and now. As such, His life-act was itself a
holistic reconciliation. This holistic reconciliation which is realised in the life-act
of the Royal Man with the kingly rule of God, is the righteousness of God. And
this righteousness of God is Gospel. Here what strikes our mind is this. All the
critical phrases, such as the kingly rule of God, and the righteousness of God or
Gospel, are about the concepts and realities of 'high' or 'from above', since these
will hardly have to do with human possibilities or realities, with the 'from below'.
Nevertheless, it is significant to notice that these 'high' concepts and realities are
integrated into this historical life-act of the Royal Man, this 'low' christology. This
Royal Man is the very content and revelation of these 'high' concepts and realities.
In other words, all these crucial concepts and contents are converged only this
concrete being, this christology 'from below'. This implies that, for Barth, even the
concept such as 'high' or 'from above' does not stand in his christology apart from
this Tow' christology. To this specific extent, we may even possibly suppose that
his christology could be rather a christology 'from below' or a Tow' christology.
Barth's undeviating emphasis upon the divinity being the Subject of
christology, does not indicate a 'high' christology in the sense that it is God who
comes 'from above' who dominates in christology, and thus that the humanity is
dissolved in it. More specifically, Barth's statement that whereas the humanity of
Christ 'is adopted' by the divinity of Christ, the divinity of Christ is 'proper' to
christology' by no means undermines the full humanity of Christ, as Macquarrie
asserts. Rather, here underlies a fundamental theological axiom which cannot be
compromised. This emphasis was necessary for him in order to safeguard
christology from becoming merely a general anthropology. Humanity per se cannot
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be an independent issue or even worthy of consideration for responsible christolo-
gy. This implies that Mariology cannot be an appropriate subject in christology
either. If christology could be discussed in terms of general anthropology, then it
would be meaningless to talk of christology, because christology is necessarily
concerned with the issue of the reconciliation (salvation) of God with humankind.
(Of course Macquarrie's observation to a certain extent vindicates itself if it is
singled out from the whole context of Barth's theological insights. But his
observation that Barth undermined the full humanity of Jesus Christ and as such
espouses a christology 'from above' is highly questionable in the light of Barth's
theological context and insights.) Christology deals with the particular existence of
the Reconciler - with Jesus of Nazareth. Thus the emphasis is a matter of the
clarification of its Subject matter rather than a patroniser of 'high' christology as
such.
Indeed, Barth integrates all the elements of 'high' christology into this
historical life-act of the Royal Man, the christology 'from below', and then re¬
presents this 'high' christology in terms of this Tow' christology. This Royal Man
plays the pivotal role in his whole christology. In such a way, it stands in the centre
of Barth's christology.
CHAPTER FIVE
Examining Christology 'from above' in light of Earth's Theological
and Christological Paradigm Shift and Re-orientation in 'Natural Theology'
This chapter is designed to examine the tenability of the accusation of 'from
above' in light of Barth's theological and christological paradigm shift and his re¬
orientation towards natural theology. Our consideration of Barth's christology from
this aspect is vital since it will prevent us not only from going astray from the train
of Barth's christological Gestalt, but it will also sift out our pre-conceived ideas
(whether right or wrong) about Barth's christology.
I. The Paradigm Shift from the Divinity to the Humanity
1. The Change of Christological Direction
We saw that some perceive Barth to be holding a christology 'from above'
on account of his affirmation of the 'absolute qualitative difference' between God
and humanity. Hence we have to scrutinise whether this reason is sustainable.
First of all, we have to realise that Barth's lecture on The Humanity of
God,] delivered at the meeting of the Swiss Reformed ministers' Association in
Aarau on September 25th of 1956, appears to be a new hermeneutical vista of his
christology. Barth admits that his early theology treated the humanity of God on
the periphery rather than in the centre, at the expense of the 'wholly otherness' of
God from the world (HoG 38). This means that any sound christology must deal
with the humanity of Jesus in the centre of christological reflection.
The grave concern of Barth, in the lecture, is to derive the knowledge of the
humanity of God from the knowledge of His divinity. Barth recognises that his
emphasis on the wholly otherness of God had been triggered in order to challenge
the tendencies of anthropocentric and religionistic understandings of God in the
nineteenth until the early twenteeth century {HoG 39). The theme of theological
studies was human piety and culture instead of divine grace and freedom. The
'
Hereafter HoG.
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Christian God was replaced by the Christian religious man. To speak of God meant
to speak of human revelations, wonders, faith, and works. Consequently, God the
Creator, the Lord, and the Reconciler was reduced merely to a notion of piety. The
issue, according to Barth, is that the theme of Scripture is not one of human
religions or religious moralities nor its own secret divinities. The theme of Scripture
is the absolutely unique act of God in relating Himself to humankind. Therefore the
otherness of God was necessary lest He be understood as confined to, or even
dissolved into, the Christian religious self-consciousness (HoG 39-41). Accordingly
the early theology had a 'critical' and 'polemic' character (HoG 38). To this extent
Barth's discussion about The Humanity of God is a matter of a 'genuine revision
(.RetraktationY {HoG 41) of the divinity of God. This revision involves a new
beginning in terms of a better and fuller understanding of the early theology.
Barth admits that his early views of wholly other, perpendicular breaking
in from above, infinite qualitative difference, the vacuum, the mathematical point,
the tangent, and the Scripture's only one theological interest, namely the immediate
forgiveness of sin from above downwards, are only partially right (HoG 42-43). He
affirms his mistake that he absolutised, abstracted, and set God over against
humankind, and in such a way that the Christian God has greater similarity to the
god of philosophers rather than to the God of Abraham, Isac, and Jacob (HoG 45).
This eventual mistake was occasioned by the fact that the new knowledge of
revelation was too exciting to be handled in a totally right way at the time {HoG
44).
Having noticed the early mistake, Barth asserts that the true meaning and
power of the deity of the living God is found in His 'dialogue' and 'togetherness'
with humanity. God is not a divine 'being-for-Himself but exists as a 'partner' of
humanity {HoG 45). This implies that the true God cannot be thought of apart from
His being for humanity. 'It is precisely God's deity which, rightly understood,
includes his humanity.' In sum what Barth means by the Humanity of God is 'His
free affirmation of man, His free concern for him, His free substitution for him'
{HoG 51).
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2. The Particular Jesus of Nazareth as the Only Epistemological Content
and Ground for the Humanity of God
Barth asks how we know that the true deity embraces the humanity? In his
view, the only epistemological ground for the knowledge of the humanity of God
is Jesus Christ. We know that we are not dealing with God in abstracto, nor with
humanity, and neither are we dealing with an inhuman God, in virtue of the fact
that Jesus Christ is vere Deus vere homo. In Him, humanity and God are not in
isolation, but meet together and are together. These two natures of Jesus Christ
constitute the mutuality of the divine covenant: humanity's loyal partner as true
God, and God's loyal partner as true humanity. This mutuality establishes the
skeleton of christological movement (content): the humiliated Lord and the exalted
Servant; the Word spoken from the loftiest transcendence and the Word heard in
the lowest immanence. In this oneness of Jesus Christ, we affirm that God is the
Mediator and the Reconciler between Himself and humanity, the Guarantor of
God's free grace and humanity's free gratitude, and the realisation of the justice of
humanity before God, and as such the Kingly Rule of God. Moreover, exactly in
this way it is Jesus Christ who makes known2 that He is also the 'Revealer' of His
being both the Mediator and the Reconciler. Viewed in this way, the humanity of
God is nothing but a ' Christological statement' (HoG 47).
What does Barth mean when he says that 'the question [of who and what
God is] must be, who and what is God in Jesus Christ, if we here today would
push forward to a better answer' {HoG 47)? Does this statement not see Jesus
Christ as being the epistemic ground for a responsible and appropriate talk of God?
That is to say, 'It is when we look at Jesus Christ that we know decisively that
God's deity does not exclude, but include, His humanity'3 So Jiingel aptly states
2
{HoG 46-47). 'How the freedom of God is constituted, in what character He is the Creator
and Lord of all things, ... we must always learn from Jesus Christ' {CD IV/1, 129).
3
{HoG 49). 'His deity encloses humanity in itself. ... It would be the false deity of a false God
if in His deity His humanity did not also immediately encounter us' {ibid., 50).
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that Barth's theology is based on the actuality 'at least cognitively.'4 Does Barth's
new understanding of the issue of the 'otherness of God' not after all nullify
Macquarrie's assertion and therefore nullify the label 'from above'? He seems to
find difficulty accepting the clear cut statement of Barth instead of problematising
and suspecting it in accordance with his own impression. It is questionable
therefore whether Macquarrie's assertion would not be considered a christological
eisegesis or a theological postulation.
II. Against an Ambiguous 'Logos Christology': The Election of the Humanity
of Christ as the Genuine Beginning and Content of Christology
We saw that Barth understands the exaltation of the Son of Man as the
christological movement 'from below'. But an important thing is that, for Barth, the
doctrine of the election of grace is the theological ground for this christology 'from
below'. This implies that as far as the genuine beginning and the actual content of
christology is concerned, Barth's christology works significantly 'from below' as
well as 'from above'. The reason is this.
According to Barth, the particular Jesus of Nazareth is both the Subject and
the object of the election of grace, namely, He is not only the elected human being
(Eph 1:4) (CD II/2, 116-123), but He is also the electing God (Jn 1:1-4) (CD II/2,
94-115).5 What tells us, after all, that Jesus Christ's is both the Elector and the
elect is that God ascribed the election to all human beings and the reprobation to
the humanity of Christ (CD II/2, 163). That is to say, the election of grace means
4
Jiingel, 'The World as Possibility and Actuality' [19722] in: Theological Essays, [Edinburgh:
T. &. T. Clark, 19892], p. 102.
5 This twofold view unveils Barth's christology as being a trinitarian one. There was the choice
of the Father to give up the Son, the choice of the Son to be obedient to the Father, and the resolve
of the Holy Spirit not to be 'isolated from' this decision of election (CD 11/2, 101).
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the rejection of the elected Son and the election of humankind. No human being is
rejected other than the man, Jesus. The crucifixion is the actualization and
concretisation of the execution of this merciful exchange. In other words, the
election of grace means the merciful exchange of the humiliation (crucifixion) of
the Son of God and the exaltation (resurrection) of the Son of Man. Hence the
doctrine of predestination is nothing other than the doctrine of the election of grace.
As such the doctrine of election stands for 'the sum'6 of the Gospel.
6
'It is in Him [the particular Jesus ofNazareth] that we see this exchange. For He is both [the
electing God and the elected human being] . ... He is God's eternal, twofold predestination, from
which everything else, all God's other purposes and therefore all occurrences, proceed, and in which
all things have their norm and end' {CD IV/2, 32).
Thus to believe and to talk about divine predestination means faith in the non-rejection of
humankind {CD II/2, 164). Obviously this is a challenge to John Calvin's understanding of the
'double predestination' as the 'dreadful decree' {Christian Institutes, lll.xxiii.7) {=Inst) which was
originated by Augustine: 'God has elected some to save and rejected some to perish for eternity'
(Augustine, 'To Simplican - On Various Questions. Book 1 [395-396]' in: Augustine: Earlier
Writings [1953], pp. 388-391, 395); For Calvin's justification of the 'double predestination' as the
'dreadful decree' in view of the biblical references see {Inst., III.xxx.5).
One of Barth's initial aims in his argument over the doctrine of election is to oppose this
double decree (Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine ofGod: Dogmatics Vol. I, trans. Olive Wyon,
[London: Lutterworth Press, 1949=1946], p. 348).
We see a hermeneutic conflict between Calvin and Barth with regard to the 'double
predestination.' Both Calvin and Barth hold Jesus to be the 'speculum electionis' {Inst., lll.xxx.5;
CD 11/2, 64-65, 60, 96-98). But the content of their understandings differ from each other even
though they refer to the same Scripture.
Calvin maintains, presupposing that Jesus Christ is the 'supreme Judge and Master' {Inst.,
III.xxii.7) as He is both the 'Mediator' and the 'author' of election (Jn 13:18) {Inst., III.xxii.8), the
double election, an election for some and the rejection of others, in reference to the 'sayings of
Jesus' (Jn 6:37, 39, 44-45, 65; 17:6, 9, 11-12; esp. Matt 15:13). This double predestination is even
more strengthened by Romans 9:13-18, Ephesians 1:3-4, and by the texts: 1 John 2:19; Acts 13:48;
Romans 9:22 {Inst., III.xx.7,10,11,13). The 'little flock' (Lk 12:32) represents the elected people,
namely, they are the people to whom 'the knowledge of the secret of the kingdom of heaven have
been given' (Matt 13:11), and of whom 'God foreknew' (Rom 8:29) {Inst., III.xx.10). Moreover
Calvin confirms his view of the double predestination by emphasising that the divine election for
some is purely His grace, namely, the election is the election of the unmerited people (2 Tim 1:9;
Rom 9:15-16; Jn 15:16) {Inst., III.xxii.2).
While Barth interprets the doctrine of election in terms of the three biblical references: John
1:1-3, Ephesians 1:42, and 2 Corinthians 1:18-20. Particularly 2 Corinthians 1:18-20 is the
hermeneutical key to resolving the problem of double decree for Barth. In view of 2 Corinthians,
the message of Romans 9-11 is understood as the divine Yes and not the combination of both Yes
and No. In other words, ultimately the election means only Yes to human beings. The word
7ip69eai<; (used in Rom 8:29, 9:11; Eph 1:11) re-ascertains this divine Yes. The unity of the divine
essence does not have such a parallelism of election and rejection. Otherwise the 'good-news' would
be nothing but the 'bad-news'. In this view, Barth asserts that Calvin's 'double predestination' is
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Here the subject of our thesis comes to expression. By definition, christology
is human being's speaking of the being and act of the particular Jesus of Nazareth.
So it is very natural to have various christologies according to different understand¬
ings in terms of interests, aspects, and emphases in all ages. Nevertheless if we
concede that the true value of our speaking of Jesus Christ in terms of 'christology'
is due to His work of reconciliation (salvation), then we must trace our christology
back to the doctrine of the election of grace. In other words, if we assent that the
primary message of the being and act of Jesus Christ is good-news, christology will
have to refer back to the election of grace. This election of grace is not only the
very beginning of this good-news {CD IV/2, 33), but is also the very content of this
merely a 'speculation' {CD 11/2, 13-18). Seeing Jesus as the electing God Himself, the passage 'For
he chose us in him [Jesus] before the creation' (Eph 1:4) rather re-emphasises the election as the
Gospel, divine Yes {CD 11/2, 66-67).
Here we find some interesting points. Firstly, both Calvin and Barth chose not to be
speculative or biblicist in dealing with the issue of election {Inst., lII.xxi.2-3; xxiii.2; xxiv.4; CD
II/2, 52). Yet Barth accused Calvin of being 'speculative' in this matter {CD II/2, 18). Secondly,
whereas for Calvin the prayers and the 'sayings of Jesus' are the authentic ground for the double
decree, Barth subordinates them to the fact that Jesus Himself is the electing God (Jn 1:1-3, 17:10,
14:1b, 10, 4:34, 14:10, 3:35, 17:2, 6:45b, 44, 37 etc.) {CD II/2, 106). While Calvin refers the
doctrine of predestination to the 'sayings of Jesus' which apparently speak of both election and
rejection, Barth primarily refers it to Paul (2 Cor 1:18-20) and John's (Jn 1:1-3, 14) interpretations
of Jesus, which talk of the divine Yes to humankind and of Jesus being God Himself. Having taken
a different hermeneutical perspective, whilst Calvin counts the phrase 'in him [Jesus] (Eph 1:4) as
having an exclusive meaning (No), Barth holds the phrase as having an inclusive meaning (Yes).
This resulted in Calvin's insistence upon the double decree on the basis of literal interpretation, and
in Barth's determination to abandon this 'dreadful decree' on the basis of Paul and John's
interpretations of the election. Thirdly, Calvin does not mention John 1:1-3 at all, which plays such
a significant role in Barth's understanding of double predestination. So Barth charges Calvin with
not taking Jesus as the electing God Himself. This implies, fourthly, whereas Calvin interprets the
doctrine of double predestination from what the incarnated Jesus (post-existence of Jesus) says,
Barth interprets the double predestination in view of the pre-existence of the humanity of Jesus.
Namely, for Barth, the double predestination means that God has elected the pre-existed humanity
of Christ, in whom all human beings are elected, and at the same time God has rejected Him on
behalf of the death of all human beings, which is revealed in the crucifixion of the post-existence
of Jesus.
According to Balthasar, as the election of grace is 'summa evangelii,' the election is the
'heart-beat of Barth's theology ... the key to understanding God's whole Revelation in creation,
reconciliation, and redemption' (Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth [1971], p.
156); Seeing the election in such a way, 'man can only gain, God can only lose.' After all the
'triumph of grace' is a 'triumph of losing' (G. C. Berkouwer, The Triumph ofGrace in the Theology
ofKarl Barth [Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956], pp. 105, 107).
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good-news as it declares the unconditional election of God for all human beings.
As the election of grace manifests itself to be the beginning as well as the content
of the good-news in such a way that the election is the antecedent event of the
humanity of Christ, then precisely speaking, Barth's christology begins with the
election of this humanity of Christ in spite of the fact that the context of
christology is the doctrine of God. That is why Barth states that the election of
grace is the 'eternal beginning' {CD IV/2, 31) of all the discussions about
christology. This christological commencement, with regard to our thesis, suggests
that to mark Barth's christology as one 'from above', with a view to the fact that
he bases it on the 'Logos christology', the incarnation from the pre-existent Logos
'from above', is not entirely accurate. The 'good-news', which is the message of
the christology overall, had already begun and had been actualized within God
Himself even before the incarnation 'from above'. In fact, since Barth's christolog¬
ical beginning and content is worked out within the Godhead before the creation,
then it might be more proper to characterise his christology as one 'from within'
or 'from before' than as one 'from above'.
This christology 'from above' becomes a different matter when it is put in
a dogmatic setting: 'what does it say after all?' At this juncture we need to
remember what the message of the exaltation of the Son of Man, the christology
'from below', was.
As we have seen, for Barth, the earthly life-act of the Royal Man was the
revelation of the kingly rule of God. The first and final message of this kingly rule
of God was the proclamation of the justification of unjustifiable and unworthy1
human beings. The proclamation of such an impossible and unmerited justification
was the righteousness of God, that is, the good-news. At the same time we could
also see that for Barth the election of the humanity of Christ was 'the sum' of the
Gospel. In other words, since God in His grace has chosen all humankind in the
7
Is 1:2, 4; 30:1, 9; Jer 3:2If.; Hos 11:2; Mai 1:6 {CD IV/1, 171).
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election of the humanity of Christ even before the creation, the election is valid for
all humankind irrespective of their recognition and confession of it. This irrespecta-
bility of the election of grace is beyond human understanding and, as such, is a
mystery. At this point it is important to note that for Barth the historical life-act of
Christ, the christology 'from below', is the concrete and specific description of this
election of grace. In such a way both the election of grace and the life-act of the
Royal Man qualitatively correspond to each other in terms of their prime and
conclusive content.8 But this qualitative correspondence does not mean that Barth's
christology could be understood easily by either means: either from the view of the
election of grace or from the view of the life-act of Jesus Christ. Rather this
correspondence is to say that, after all, either the christology 'from above', 'from
within', or 'from before' are about this 'from below', this specific election of the
humanity of Christ. For, insofar as Barth's christology, and not Theology, is
concerned, the humanity of Christ is posited as the actual substance in terms of his
christological commencement and content.
Certainly, since the election of the humanity of Christ and the life-act of
Jesus Christ was worked out within the Godhead from all eternity, we may also say
that the christology 'from eternity' or 'from within' interpret the christology 'from
below' and not vice versa. In other words, for Barth the christology of meaning-
exposition, the christology 'from above', may be antecedent to the christology of
content-exposition, the christology 'from below'. But we must not overlook the fact
that Barth's recognition of this theological context came into being not because the
doctrine of election dictates it to us, but because the particular life-act of Jesus lived
this on earth, 'from below'. This observation becomes evident when we see his
christology standing firmly in the historical life-act of the Royal Man, the content-
exposition of christology. Otherwise christology will be merely a human
o
This qualitative correspondence is what Barth means when he says that the election is not a
'contingent fact of history (zufallige Geschichtstatsachey but the 'historical event (geschichtliche
EreignisY (CD IV/2, 3 I; KD IV/2, 32).
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speculation which could have nothing to do with the christology of Scripture and
of the Church (CD IV/1-3). Of course it is the Son of God who is elected Son of
Man, but by understanding the elected Son of Man as the electing God Himself in
terms of the Trinity, Barth emphasises the true relevance of the election of God and
its unfailing validity on account of this manhootf of Jesus Christ. In short, as
Barth sees a clear correspondence between the election of the humanity of Christ
and this life-act of Jesus the Royal Man, we will have to say rather, that Barth's
christology begins with the christology 'from below' rather than the ambiguous
'Logos christology', the christology 'from above', because his christology begins
precisely with the humanity of Christ.
III. D/sclosing a New Horizon for the Tlteologia Naturalis
In our previous analysis we saw that some theologians characterised Barth's
christology as one 'from above' on account of his rejection of the theologia
naturalis. For them, Barth's christology is one 'from above' because he admits 'no
way from man to God, no natural theology' in spite of his approval of 'some
affinity' between God and humanity when he revises the 'absolute qualitative
difference' between them in terms of The Humanity of God.w
But the above description of the reason for labelling a 'high' christology
9
A question arises as to 'what stage?' of the humanity of Christ. Barth is not clear about this.
But as a corollary of our contention, we are more likely to understand his view as an 'adult stage'
of the humanity of Christ. Our stance will certainly have a problematic implication that Barth
therefore has a 'mythological christology'. According to Macquarrie, the personal pre-existence of
Jesus in 'heaven' is not only mythological, but it is also destructive of his true humanity
(Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought 57). Similarly, Mascall argues: 'It is the axiom that,
whatever the Church and its greatest thinkers may have thought throughout the ages, it is impossible
for the Son of God to be on the one hand divine and pre-existent and on the other to have really
become man' (Mascall, Theology and Gospel of Christ. An Essay in Reorientation 126).
10
Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought 284; cf. Jenson, God after God 71.
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invokes a question: what has the issue of natural theology to do specifically with
the christological issue 'from above' or 'from below', for natural theology is
concerned primarily with human understanding of God, Theology, and not Jesus
Christ, christology?
It is true that Barth's theology of revelation rejected any possibility of
human knowledge of God in, and through, nature too, viz. 'from below', asserting
that divine self-revelation 'from above' alone makes its knowledge possible. But,
as we have noted already, we must remember Barth's clear cut statement that this
issue of God is the issue of Jesus Christ, christology. Moreover, for Barth, the
doctrine of God is fundamentally the explication of revelation. And this revelation
is the Word of God, Jesus Christ. A legitimacy of dealing with the issue of natural
theology in conjunction with our thesis is perhaps well indicated in Barth's
argument below: 1) There is no 'general revelation' in nature, conscience, and in
history, since the scriptural revelation is the sole norm of human knowledge of
God, and source of human salvation, because there is one complete revelation in
Christ and not one in general or a particular one; 2) There is no grace of creation
and preservation active from the creatures, as Christ is the exclusive saving grace
of God, otherwise we will have to acknowledge more than one grace of Christ; 3)
There is no natural law from creatures in which humankind could recognise the will
of God, which is normative of human action.11
What strikes us in these three points is that, for Barth, the issue of natural
theology emerges because of christology. The ability to know God becomes an
issue because Jesus Christ, and thus christology, claims to be the complete
revelation of God Himself. Hence it is eligible to deal with Barth's view of natural
theology in our thesis.
11
Natural Theology Comprising 'Nature and Grace' by Prof. Emil Brunner and the reply 'No'
by Karl Barth (London: Geoffrey Bles, The Century Press, 1956 [=1946]), pp. 20-21. Trans. Peter
Fraenkel from: Nein! Antwort an Emil Brunner (Miinchen: Christian Kaiser Verlag), 1934.
(=NaTheo!)
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1. Karl Barth the 'Anti Natural Theologian'
In view of Barth's theological axiom, his theology is characterised as a
'theology of revelation'. By definition, revelation theology means that humankind
can know, and therefore speak of true God only when God reveals Himself. In
other words, human beings cannot know the true Word of God, Jesus Christ, on the
basis of nature unless the true Word addresses itself to human beings. This so-
called 'revelation theology' is dealt with particularly in Barth's Doctrine of the
Word ofGod {CD 1/1-2) and The Doctrine ofGod {CD II/1-2) with great intensity
and systematisation. These two doctrines are de facto a detailed exposition of this
theological axiom. The point is presented most sharply, however, in the debate with
Emil Brunner in natural theology {NaTheol 1-128). We will confine our comments
to the latter for our present purpose.
Barth's discussion of natural theology consists of six main contentions: (1)
Humanity's imago Dei is entirely obliterated by its sin; (2) 'General revelation' of
God in nature, in the conscience, and in history, is to be rejected since scriptural
revelation is the sole norm of human knowledge of God and the exclusive source
of human salvation, because there is only one complete revelation in Christ and not
one general and one special. Scriptural revelation alone is the norm of human
knowledge of God; (3) There is no grace of creation and of preservation active
within the creation of the world because Christ is the only saving grace of God;
otherwise we would have to acknowledge more than one grace of Christ; (4) There
is no lex naturae from creation in which humanity could recognise the will of God
which is normative of human action. There is no such natural law which can be
introduced into Christian theology as God's order of preservation; (5) Humanity
does not have a 'point of contact {Anknupfungspunktf for the saving action of God.
If it had, then this would contradict the exclusive activity of the grace of Christ; (6)
The new creation is not a perfection of the old, but a replacement of the old by the
new which comes exclusively into being from without {NaTheol 20-21). What
interests us the most for our thesis is the second issue.
According to Brunner, there is 'general revelation' in nature, in the
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conscience, and in history. The world is the creation of God and He is known by
all His works. Needless to say, Scripture does expect believers to participate in the
praise of God through general revelation. God leaves the 'imprint (Stempeiy of His
nature upon whatever He does. Hence the creation of the world is at the same time
'a revelation, a self-communication of God.'12 Nowhere does Scripture say that
human sin has destroyed the knowledge of God in His works, although it is true to
say that the knowledge of God is affected by sin.
The same is true of what is called 'conscience,' i.e. the consciousness of
responsibility. Human beings can sin only because they somehow know the will of
God. A being which does not know the law of God would not be able to sin. 'The
knowledge of the law of God is somehow also knowledge of God' (NaTheol 25).
'The difficult question is therefore not whether there are two kinds of revelation.
... The question is rather how the two revelations, that in creation and that in Jesus
Christ, are related' (.NaTheol 26). At the same time, however, Brunner underlines
the fact that this revelation in creation is not sufficient for humankind to know God
in such a way that this knowledge brings salvation. Referring to Paul, he notes that
sin makes humanity dull, so that it 'misrepresents the revelation of God in creation
and turns it into idols.' Yet in faith, humanity is able to speak of a 'double
revelation: of one in creation' (NaTheol 26), but since faith is awakened by Jesus
Christ, the revelation of Jesus Christ Himself far surpasses the revelation obtained
in the faith of humanity. Further, the revelation of Jesus Christ Himself points to
a third revelation, the 'beatific vision,'13 which is totally different from Himself
and yet confers upon His direct revelation its ineffable perfection.
This means that the word 'natural' is to be understood in a double sense: an
'objective-divine' and a 'subjective-human-sinful' (NaTheol 27). In other words,
12
{NaTheol 25; Natur und Gnade 12). It is important to notice that Brunner's 'revelation, i.e.
self-communication' has no virtual difference from Barth's 'free communication of Jesus Christ,'
i.e., 'revelations' or 'words' or 'lights.' Our notice becomes clear throughout the section III. Dis¬
closing a New Horizon for the Theologia Naturalis.
'das Schauen von Angesicht zu AngesichT which literally renders as 'The vision from face
to face' (Emil Brunner, Natur und Gnade zum Gesprach mit Karl Barth [Tubingen: Verlag von
J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 19352], p. 14). {=Natur und Gnade 14)
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the word 'nature' can be applied in two ways: the 'permanent capacity' for
revelation as God has bestowed upon his works, and what sinful humanity makes
of this in its ignorant knowledge. God has implanted an image of Himself in
humanity; indestructible, and yet always obscured by sin. God did not leave
humanity and nature without witness; He is concerned for them who live outside
the sphere of special revelation. Nevertheless, Brunner concludes: 'Only the
Christian, i.e. the man who stands within the revelation in Christ, has the true
knowledge of God' (NaTheol 27).
Facing Brunner's repudiation, Barth clearly puts his standpoint over against
Brunner's. According to Barth, Brunner's view is nothing but a classical example
of a 'theology of compromise' (NaTheol 69). By the ''theologia naturalis'' Barth
means every positive or negative formulation of a system' which claims to
interpret divine revelation, whose 'subject,' however, differs from the revelation in
Jesus Christ, and whose 'methocT thus differs equally from the exposition of Holy
Scripture (NaTheol 74-75). Unfortunately, according to Barth, such a natural
theology is seen in Brunner's approach. The latter's viewpoint amounts to a 'fatal
mistake,' because, the so-called 'theologia naturalis'' cannot be an independent
subject within real theology. To reject natural theology means not to admit it as a
separate problem in theology. The rejection of natural theology comes about
through nothing less than fear of God, and results in what can only be a complete
lack of interest in this matter. If natural theology is allowed to become of interest,
then one's approach is no longer centred upon the true basis of all Christian
theology in Jesus Christ. It is by this acceptance or rejection that truth is known,
the Gospel is expounded, God is praised, and the Church is built.14
14
(NaTheol 74-77). 'Natural theology is always the answer to a question which is false if it
wishes to be "decisive".' For the issue of natural theology is a 'quite secondary' and 'rwimportant'
question. 'Only the theology and the church of the antichrist can profit from it' (ibid., 128). Barth's
contention is fair enough, especially when we see this argument in connection with his uncompro¬
mising theological canon that 'human beings can know God only when He reveals Himself. Yet
our counter question is whether Barth does not, by implication, limit God within the category of
His direct revelation. If our counter question is legitimate, Barth's view would be a contradiction
to his argument that the Word of God is spoken through true words, in and through the natural
events, as the noetic power of the resurrection is too great to be imprisoned within the witnesses
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Barth, having thus defined the concept of 'natural theology' and its
theological locus, tackles Brunner's view. Brunner argues that the world is
'somehow recognisable' to humanity as the creation of God, that 'humankind
somehow know the will of God.' 'The creation of the world is at the same time
revelation, self-communication of God' {NaTheol 25). Hence real knowledge of
God through creation does happen without special revelation, though only
'somehow' and 'not in all its magnitude.' The true triune God is known by all
humankind without Christ, without the Holy Spirit, even though human knowledge
is distorted and dimmed by its sin so that God is 'misrepresented' and 'turned into
idols.' There are two kinds of revelation, but both reveal the one true God.15 Only
in this affirmation can it be asked 'how the two revelations, that in creation and
that in Jesus Christ, are related' (NaTheol 26).
Here Barth asks whether Brunner's view that human knowledge of God is
'somehow' darkly and dimly distorted makes sense. Is it, for example, Brunner's
opinion that idolatry is but a somewhat imperfect preparatory stage of the service
of the true God? Moreover, Barth is not sure at all if Brunner can consistently
maintain that this real knowledge of the true God does not bring salvation. Also,
how can Brunner insist on the 'entire loss' of the 'material' imago Del6 if
of the sphere of the Bible and the Church alone.
This last sentence requires a clarification as this may mislead readers to believe that Brunner
treated the two on the equal level. What Brunner meant by the revelation in the creation is not the
revelation of God Himself in Jesus Christ. It is only the 'imprint (Stempel)' of God Himself. Our
clarification is vindicated as Brunner clearly states that 'The difficult question is ... not whether
there are two kinds of revelation. ... The question is rather how the two revelations, that in creation
and that in Jesus Christ, are related' (NaTheol 26).
Brunner disagreed with Barth about the imago Dei by distinguishing it in terms of'formal'
and 'material' imago Dei. According to Brunner, the 'formal' side of the imago Dei is still
maintained in humanity, albeit the 'material' side of the imago Dei is abolished by sin. The reason
for the maintenance of the formal side lies in humanity still being the subject, the rational being of
all creation, and in its responsibility (NaTheol 22-24).
However, according to Barth, Brunner's disagreement means nothing except humanity's
'likeness to God' is undestroyed, and this undestroyed formal likeness to God is the objective
possibility of the revelation of God. As for Barth's understanding, what matters for Brunner is the
humanum, its rationality and responsibility which is not demolished by sin, since humanity is
humanity even though it sins. However, Barth asks if this means that humanity's reason is more
'suited' for defining the nature of God than anything else in the world. Barth understands Brunner
as affirming this point. The problem with this affirmative impression lies in Brunner's contradictory
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humanity 'somehow' knows the true God from His creation? Barth even wonders
whether Brunncr did not add something, a practically-proved-ability to know God
in a way which is relevant to salvation, to the human 'capacity for revelation
(Offenbarungsm achtigkeit).' If so, this would counter Brunner's confession of the
Reformers' doctrines of original sin, justification, and Scripture.17
acknowledgement that 'humanity of itself can do nothing for its salvation' (ibid., 79). Further, if
Brunner truly meant that 'Materially the imago is completely lost, ... and there is nothing in him
which is not defiled by sin,' what does he mean by the 'capacity for revelation'? - Incidentally,
while Brunner uses the word ' Wortmachtigkeit (capacity for words or speech),' Barth understands
it as the 'Offenbarungsm achtigkeit (capacity for revelation).' How can the assertion of this fact serve
at all to make revelation something more than divine grace? Barth is not in the least convinced if
Brunner could reconcile the above view with his unconditional acceptance of the Reformer's
principle sola scriptura-sola gratia without a contradiction (ibid., 79-80).
Importantly enough, here we notice a different understanding of the sola-gratia between
Brunner and Barth. For Brunner, the sole grace is such because God preserves the 'formal' imago
Dei in humanity notwithstanding its entire loss of the 'material' imago Dei. For Barth however, the
sole grace is such because God creates human capacity for revelation. If this were not so humanity
would have no way to have true knowledge of Him. That is to say, whereas Brunner appropriates
the sola-gratia in view of God's 'imprinting' or 'leaving' capacity for revelation in humanity, Barth
appropriates the sola-gratia by focusing on God's act of 'new creation' of human capacity for
revelation.
17
Incidentally, Barth asserts that Brunner distorted the Roman Catholic and Calvinistic
perception of the theologia naturalis. Brunner's assertion that '[In Roman Catholic theology] the
theologia naturalis is derived from reason alone' by which nature is entirely comprehensible and
accessible, is wrong, because Barth sees that in Roman Catholic theology, reason is left entirely sick
and incapable of any serious theological activities without grace. Reason serves to produce
theological activities only when it is illumined, or at least provisionally illuminated, by faith. Also,
Barth believes that Brunner has a false idea of the evangelical and reformed doctrine of the
theologia naturalis. This false idea is due to Brunner's insufficient appreciation, and one-sided
perception, of Luther and Calvin. Barth articulates that a '"true" theologia naturalis can exist only
where man's eyes have been opened by Christ' (NaTheol 95-97).
Brecher sees the reason for Barth's rejection of natural theology in his understanding of
Anselm. According to Brecher, Barth had to incline natural theology because he indulged so much
in Anselm's overriding emphasis on faith in conjunction with reason: 'For I do not seek to
understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand. For 1 believe this also, that
'unless I believe, I shall not understand' [Isaiah vii 9]' (Proslogion I, p. 115). Belief in, or
conversion to, God is entirely a matter of faith and not reason. Rational assent to Christian tenets
can be given only after the appropriate 'leap of faith' (Kierkegaard's idea). So all theologians can
do is to present what they take to be the case (Brecher, Anselm's Argument 44-45).
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2. Disclosing a New Horizon for the Theologia Naturalis
Our analysis thus far clearly shows Barth's straightforward rejection of
natural theology not only in its possibility but also in its actuality. This firm
dismissal may perhaps justify the attempt of theologians to understand him as the
champion of 'anti-natural theologians'.
It is, however, important to recognise that Barth opens up new insights into
the issue of natural theology in the context of his christology, for he resumed the
discussion some three decades later in the context of The Doctrine of Reconcili¬
ation. By dealing with the issue of natural theology again in the context of
christology, Barth shows his theological consistency, for his early emphasis was
that the issue of natural theology cannot be dealt with as an independent theological
topic, but only as secondary to, or as a part of, christology.
To be specific, Barth returns to the question of natural theology in the third
volume of his christology (CD IV/3.2, 97-164) in which the propheticum officium
of christology is dealt with under the heading Jesus Christ, the True Witness.
Barth's overriding emphasis of this section is that the reconciliation not only
happened, but that it also speaks for itself throughout the ages. This self-communi¬
cation is demonstrated through the noetic event, the resurrection. As the actuality
of the reconciliation is made known to humankind by Jesus Himself, humanity can
neither excuse itself of its ignorance of the actuality of the reconciliation nor can
it nullify it. As such, Jesus Christ is the true Witness and therefore the Victor in
this constant battle between human denial and divine affirmation. To understand
Barth's new insight into natural theology in a larger perspective, this overriding
emphasis appears in the context of the contention that 'true words,' that is 'the self-
communication of Jesus Christ,' not only exist, but they are also spoken in and
through the secular events outside the Scripture and the Church. To see the context
of Barth's retrieval of this issue of natural theology in a narrower perspective, the
issue was recounted while he was explaining the implicit meaning of the exclusive
confession that 'Jesus Christ is the one true Word of God' under the subsection
Jesus is Victor.
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The implicit aspect of the confession is that in Scripture Jesus Christ
declares Himself to be the one Word of God, but the Bible as such is not the one
Word of God. The activity of the Church, its doctrine and instruction, and its
worship is to make Him known as the one Word of God. Also there are many
histories, gifts and operations of Jesus Christ determined in individuals or in groups
by Him. Yet this exclusive statement does not mean that in them there are no other
words which are not notable in their way (CD IV/3.1, 97-98). In stating this, Barth
effectively acknowledges the legitimacy of one of the major issues of natural
theology which he had previously rejected. This acknowledgement becomes clearer
when he affirms the existence ofother words by discussing their relationship to the
one Word of God (CD IV/3.1, 110). According to Barth, true words may also be
spoken extra muros ecclesiae.n There are two kinds of words alongside the one
Word: Scripture and the Church, and words spoken outside Scripture and the
Church.19 What is of greatest interest here is the acknowledgment that there are
true words spoken outside Scripture and the Church.
According to Barth, there really are true words spoken outside Scripture and
the Church which are to be 'regarded as true words'20 in relation to the one Word
of God. As Jesus Christ does speak through the medium of such words, the
Christian community which lives by the one Word 'not only may but must accept
the fact that there are such words and that it must hear them too'21 notwithstand¬
ing its life by this one Word. True words outside Scripture and the Church are
spoken 'from a different source and in another tongue.'22 In point of fact, the
Church should be grateful to receive other true words also from without, in very
18
'dab solche anderen wahren Worte auch extra muros ecclesiae' (CD IV/3.1, 110; KD 122).
19
Biblical words have the character of a constant and universal authority to the extent that they
are also an abiding whole which is given to the community throughout its history, and in which
Jesus Christ accompanies it through this history. The biblical word is the 'concrete vinculum pacts'
of the Church in every age and place. Hence it is the 'regular way' (CD IV/3.1, 131) to which we
are directed.
20
'als mit wahren Worten zu rechnen' (CD IV/3.1, 114; KD 128).
21
'... darf nicht nur, sondern mufi damit rechnen, dafi es solche Worte gibt und dafi auch sie
sie zu horen hat' (CD IV/3.1, 114-115 ea; KD 128 ea).
22
'von anderswoher und in anderer menschlicher Sprache' (CD IV/3.1, 114-115; KD 128).
III. Disclosing a New Horizon for the Theologia Naturalis 189
different human words, in secular parables (im Gleichnis profaner Worte) (KD
128), even though it is grounded in, and ruled by, scriptural witnesses to this one
Word. The Church has no reason to refuse this kind of stimulation and direction
'whatever its origin or form.'23 If the community declines, in advance, these alien
witnesses to the truth, it will lead to ossification. 'The [Christian] community is not
Atlas bearing the burden of the whole world on its shoulders' (CD IV/3.1, 115).
The Church has to learn through these true words of a very different origin and
character. With this view Barth even asserts that the community would be 'foolish
(tdrichtf if it closed its ears to them (CD IV/3.1, 116; KD 129). That is to say, true
words are dependable and therefore Christians 'can (konnenY and 'must expect
(miissen erwarten)' that His voice will also be heard outside Scripture and the
Church (CD IV/3.1, 117; KD 130).
Of course Barth, at this point, notes that his acknowledgement of true words
outside the witnesses of Scripture and the Church does not necessarily involve an
appeal to a so-called 'natural theology', i.e. a knowledge of God given in and with
the natural force of reason or to be attained in its exercise (CD IV/3.1, 117). The
reason is that by way of natural theology humanity could attain only 'abstract
impartation' concerning the knowledge of God the Creator and the Reconciler of
all things, and human responsibility towards Him. What Barth has in mind is
attestations of the 'self-impartation' of the God who acts as Father in the Son by
the Holy Spirit, or words like Scripture and the Church which can be claimed as
'parables of the kingdom' (CD IV/3.1, 117). What Barth means by his reluctance
to accept the label of natural theology in spite of his affirmation of true words
outside Scripture and the Church is that the capacity of Jesus Christ to create these
human witnesses is not restricted to His working on and to prophets, apostles, and
His community alone. His capacity transcends the limits of this sphere (CD IV/3.1,
118). In other words, 'what was and is possible for Him in the narrower sphere is
23
'woher sie auch komme und in welcher fremden Zunge (CD 111/3.1, 115; KD 128)
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well within His powers in the wider.'24 It is possible for God to raise up witnesses
from this world of tarnished untruth, so that true words are uttered and heard even
where it might seem impossible.
To put the over-arching power of the Word differently, as the resurrection
of Jesus Christ proclaims that the Word of reconciliation not only happened in the
past but it also speaks in the present, the Word of reconciliation has the full force
to encompass the whole of humankind before, during, and after the event of
proclamation. As this proclamation transcends all time and space the Word of
reconciliation binds humanity essentially, internally, and absolutely, and not
accidentally or partially. None of humanity can escape from His light, even though
it might flee away from His light and thus sin against Him (CD IV/3.1, 154).
Consequently, all living persons are potential hearers of the Word of God due to
the noetic power of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, although they might say that
they have not heard it yet, or refuse to hear it. If this were not the case, He would
not be risen (CD IV/3.1, 155). 'It [the Word] cannot then be subjected to any
criterion of truth different from itself. It is itself the criterion of all different truths.
Declared by God, it authenticates itself (CD IV/3.1, 160). In short, the Word
necessarily embraces all time and space as it has spoken as 'the final truth (die
24
(CD IV/3.1, 118). Barth refers the narrower sphere to the Bible and the Church, while he
refers the wider sphere to 'secularism (Profanitat)' (CD IV/3.1, 118; KD 132) which approximates
either to a pure and absolute form, or mixed and relative one. A pure and absolute form of
secularism is hostile, not only in so-called heathen territories, nor in a confessed atheistic culture
or ethics, but also in the greatest proximity to the Christian Churches, or even in Christendom.
Whereas a mixed and relative form of secularism can be seen in the countries or people that have
been in some way reached and affected by the Gospel and the Church tradition to varying degrees.
In this sphere there will be human words which attest the one Word of God, and thus can be
regarded as a parable of the Kingdom (Gleichnis des Himmelreiches) for this sphere can always be
explained as an 'echo' or 'positive answer' to the speech of Jesus Christ, attested by the ministry
of the Christian community. But this relative secularism might be an even greater resistance to the
Gospel for the very reason that it is used to being confronted by, and having come to terms with,
it, and thus is able more strongly to consolidate itself against it, making certain concessions and
accommodations no doubt, parading in large measure as a world of Christian culture, but closing
its ears the more firmly against it, and under the sign of a horrified rejection of theoretical atheism,
cherishing more radically and shamelessly a true atheism of practice. This greater resistance is found
in the obduracy of Israel (Rom 9-11). If true words are to be heard and uttered from such a mixed
and relative secularism, the so-called 'Christianised' or 'Christian' culture or society needs the same
miracle as the absolute secularism or militant godlessness needs (ibid., 120; KD 134).
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finale Warheitf because it is 'the truth itself (die Wahrheit selbst)' {CD IV/3.1,
160; KD 182).
However, we must notice that Barth's emphasis upon this transcending
power and its efficacy in the finality of this Word is by no means the nullification
of the actual existence and validity of true words, and therefore their existence is
merely a possibility and not an actuality. Rather Barth wishes to underline the
actual existence of true words in spite of their problems, limitations, and dangers.
There are problems and dangers in listening to these true words of the
secular events or words. True words can never declare themselves as God does.
Their declaration exist only in their limited, conditioned, and finite nature {CD
IV/3.1, 163). They are not essentially, internally, and absolutely binding, even
though they also bind. They neither give humanity freedom, nor do they speak of
real judgment and loss or of real grace and salvation. They speak only of the
constants of existence {CD IV/3.1, 156). True words are not a statement concerning
the one Word nor a further development of the assertion that Jesus Christ is the one
true Word {CD IV/3.1, 136). This means that they are not the self-revelation of
God, although they can be truths or words or even 'revelations' {CD IV/3.1, 139).
There are worldly words, but there is no worldly Word in which creation expresses
itself in its unity and totality. From this angle, true words make themselves known
'only as partial truths, that none of them is the one whole truth' {CD IV/3.1, 159).
True words are possible in virtue of the 'living' and 'self-developing seed' of the
Word of God {CD IV/3.1, 121). True words, the 'free communications of Jesus
Christ in world events,'25 which come to the community through them lack the
'unity {Einheity and 'compactness {Geschlossenheity and therefore the 'constancy
{Konstanzy and 'universality {Universal itcity of His self-revelation {CD IV/3.1,
131; KD 148) even though they are uttered, claimed, and respected as true words.
True words then might be salutary and necessary for a certain situation in the past.
Yet it might also be that the community has still to receive very different words
25
'den freien Kundgebungen Jesu Christi im Weltgeschehen' {CD IV/3.1, 131; KD 148).
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from world events as directed by its Lord (CD IV/3.1, 131). What is said here and
now is not His final word, but that of another time; not in self-contradiction, but
in a very different situation He may well have another new word of this type. Also,
while true words in world events apply virtually and potentially to the whole
community, it is not at all the case that at every time and in every situation the
community is able and ready to hear with a single ear and receive with a single
heart. There are words which need decades and even centuries to be finally, and
even then only approximately, heard and recognised throughout Christendom. This
time-consuming procedure is not only due to the stupidity and limitation of human
beings, but also due to the non-self-evident character of the true words: 'the
character of its words as products of the omnipotent prophecy of Jesus Christ, is
nowhere and never self-evident' (CD IV/3.1, 132). It is even possible that true
words may sometimes be spoken and heard but not received at all in the
community. Therefore, although these words may be heard, their truth must always
be tested by the criterion to which Barth has referred (CD IV/3.1, 132-133). In
short, the problem of creaturely words, the free communications of Jesus Christ in
the world events, are their partiality and relativity in their power, validity, and
efficacy. Hence there must be criteria25 to discern true words from false words.
For Barth, nevertheless, it is important to recognise that God uses the
creature as the setting for the Word of reconciliation (CD IV/3.1, 136). There are
26 There are three formal criteria: 1) Its 'harmony [fits in] (einfugen)' at some point with the
whole context of the biblical message as centrally determined and characterised by Jesus Christ (CD
IV/3.1, 126; KD 141-142). No true word can replace or emulate the biblical messages. If it is true
'a' word, it will be a 'good' and 'authentic commentary' (CD IV/3.1, 126), sounding out the word
of the Bible. It will not lead its hearers away from Scripture, but more deeply into it; 2) Dogma and
confessions ofthe Church. This is the secondary authority of the fathers and brethren of the Church.
If true wuids lead lo a breach with them, they show themselves to be false words. There are hardly
any true words which go beyond the dogma and confessions of the Church (CD IV/3.1, 126-127);
3) Its fruits. The fruits, if they are true words, will have the character of affirmation and criticism,
address and claim, a summon to faith and a call to repentance, and therefore to Gospel and Law.
They will show themselves to be genuine parables of the kingdom in this unity of confirming and
yet shaming, frightening, unsettling, and correcting words. When Christianity is called to repentance
it is a criterion that has to do with a true word addressed to it in order to upbuild the community.
The words are true only if they are the one by which the community is comforted in the true and
New Testament sense (CD IV/3.1, 129).
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true words spoken in and through nature and world-events, because God uses His
creatura as the 'setting' or 'theatre' for the work of reconciliation (CD IV/3.1,
136). Likewise, humankind can also speak of the life-act of Jesus Christ only in
relation to specific events in the world and only in the form of the narration of
history and histories. Certainly this theatre cannot be identified with the life-act of
Jesus Christ, with its regular mediation in Scripture and the existence of the
community, or with His extraordinary forms of His presence and action. For the
creatura is distinct from God the Creatur although it is actualised by Him {CD
IV/3.1, 137). The cosmos has its own dynamic and movements. But whereas the
cosmos is dominated and characterised by the rotation and return of many things,
reconciliation 'impinges upon and determines the cosmos from without.'27 This
Word of reconciliation is His 'creative grace {schopferische Gnadef in which the
persistence and constancy of the cosmos exists {CD IV/3.1, 138; KD 156). As the
proclamation of the Word of reconciliation is a new event to the world, the act of
the Word itself differs from the words spoken in and through the creatura.
We may say, therefore, as a fact that there are true words outside Scripture
and the Church in spite of the problems and dangers implicit in such an affirmation.
Our contention proves to be legitimate as we read that the 'simple point' is that true
words are 'given' to humankind and to the cosmos. The cosmos as such 'has {hatf
its own lights and truths and therefore its own speech and words whether or not
humanity affirms its knowledge {CD IV/3.1, 139; KD 157). The self-witness and
lights of true words are 'not extinguished by the corruption of the relationship
between God and man through the sin ofman' {CD IV/3.1, 139 ea), they are not
extinguished by the Word, and their force and significance are not destroyed. On
the contrary, as the cosmos persists in all its forms and media before, during, and
after the epiphany ofJesus Christ, true words also speak before, during, and after
this epiphany. The reason is that 'As the divine work of reconciliation does not
negate the divine work of creation, nor deprive it of meaning, so it does not take
27
'betritt und bestimmt ihn von Aufien her' {CD IV/3.1, 138; KD 156).
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from it its lights and language, nor tear asunder the original connection between
creaturely esse and creaturely nosse.,2S These words are the 'luminosity («Helligk-
eit»Y of the creatura {CD IV/3.1, 139; KD 158). In such away, the creatura not
merely exists but it also speaks to human beings and thus gives itself space to be
perceived by human beings: 'In respect of man it can and must be said that the
world created by God is also (although not merely) a text which may be read and
understood, and at the same time its own reader and expositor' {CD IV/3.1, 141).
The quality of this divinely created terrestrial being is what is meant when Barth
speaks of created words, the free communications of Jesus Christ in the world
events, which bring 'illumination' and 'enlightenment.'29 These words prevent the
world from being merely dark, or being plunged into absolute gloom by the sin of
man. They tell us that there is still a measure of brightness in spite of the darkness
of human sin. They are not divine disclosures nor eternal truths, 'but since these
words are actually spoken and heard, the world neither is nor can be absolutely
dumb or deaf. ... that even the worst communication does not completely fail to be
28
{CD IV/3.1, 139; KD 157). Here comes a theological dilemma. If we are going to insist on
the assurance of our reconciliation, we cannot deny the ontological continuity that God the
Reconciler is also God the Creator. If this were not the case, we could not be certain about our
reconciliation as we may perhaps have to wait for our true Lord, the Creator, who alone could
become our true Reconciler. To negate this ontological continuity, that God the Reconciler is also
God the Creator, would imply a discontinuity between the 'old' and 'new' creation. Affirming this
discontinuity between the 'old' and 'new' creation would inescapably imply the fact that, after all,
His 'old' creation is nothing but a 'mistake', for otherwise He would not have made the 'old'
creation a completely new one. This affirmation would necessitate our reconsideration of the
traditional understanding of the omnipotence of God. To avoid these two problems we will have
to accept the ontological continuity that God the Reconciler is also God the Creator. Nonetheless,
if we have to accept this ontological continuity, what does Barth's view of a discontinuity that the
'new' creation is not an amendment of the 'old' creation, but a replacement of the 'old' one by the
'new' creation, mean since humankind still continues to sin, and therefore are still sinners in spite
of the fact that it is a 'new' creation? Further, how could we concretely understand this newness
of our reality without the 'old' creation? Incidentally, Barth is not clear as to whether his emphasis
on the 'complete newness' of humankind, i.e., a replacement of the old by the new and not a
perfection of the old, means the negation or replacement of the 'old' creation.
29
'Lichtungen und Erleuchtungen {CD IV/3.1, 141; KD 159). The English translation omitted
the word 'und Erleuchtungen' which could be rendered as 'enlightenment'.
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communication and may perhaps become better.'30 Indeed, 'We actually live with
them. We cannot live without them' {CD IV/3.1, 141; KD 160). The cosmos is
'intelligent {intelligent).' Hence it addresses its reason to the grasping of these lines,
the 'continuities {KontinuitatenY and 'constants {KonstantenY of the one in the
many, the general in particular, the steadfast in change, the recurrent in alteration,
the identical in the different, to humankind {CD IV/3.1, 142; KD 160). Certainly
they are not the Word of reconciliation, the prophecy of Jesus Christ itself. No faith
is needed to grasp these words but only the limited gift of 'common sense' {CD
IV/3.1, 143; KD 161). True words are not a covenant of God with human beings
which is declared and perceived, but 'only a kind of divinely ordained concordat
between the world and itself.'31 They cannot produce parables of the kingdom of
God. And they cannot be compared or considered together as if, for all their
differences they were only two rays from one and the same light {CD IV/3.1, 150-
152). The meaning of the existence of the world is that it is the 'fitting sphere
{geeignete RaumY and 'setting {SchauplatzY of the great act of God, i.e., His
overflowing love for human beings. True words do not speak of the great act of the
love of God, nor of His covenant of grace. Their shining, their declaration, is
strictly confined to the service for which they are ordained and empowered by the
one true Word. Yet they are 'something {nicht nichts).' Along with many other
things they also 'have' and 'maintain' this 'immanent peace,' and they display them
as a 'created light' of their 'created stability' {CD IV/3.1, 143; KD 161-162).
Again, as God the Reconciler is also God the Creator of the intelligent world, true
words must be understood in relationship with the true Word. The Word 'cannot
possibly result in the exclusion of the latter [the self-attestations of the creature],
30 ' Es ist aber, da diese Worte geredet und vernommen werden, nicht an dem, da/.i die Welt
einfach stumm and taub ware oder werden konnte. Darauf dafi diese Worte nicht aufhoren, geredet
and vernommen zu werden, beruht es vielmehr, dafi die Welt nicht schlechthin sprachlos and
vernuftlos werden kann, dafi auch die schlechteste in der Welt stattfindende Kommunikation nicht
aufhort, Kommunikation zu sein und moglicherweise auch bessere Kommunikation werden kann'
(CD IV/3.1, 141; KD 160).
31 'nur so etwas wie ein von Gott angeordnetes Konkordat der Welt mit selber' (CD IV/3.1,
143; KD 161).
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seeing they derive their force from the same God' (CD IV/3.1, 152). As the one
Word and Light is spoken, it is echoed and reflected in and through the cosmos,
which is not created accidentally but with a view to the reconciliation and therefore
to this revelation. 'What is reflected in them as they perform this service is the fact
that the Creator is faithful to His creature with the eternal faithfulness which is
active and powerful and revealed in His act [of grace] and revelation of grace in
Jesus Christ, and which He has sworn to it with its very creation.'32 In other
words, the truth of God 'challenges (problematisierty and 'relativises (relativiertf
the truths of the creature and yet also the truth of God 'institutes (instaurierty and
'integrates (integrierty the truths of the creature (CD IV/3.1, 153; KD 174).
Therefore, the Church must be ready to hear them and receive what they say as a
'corrective (Korrektivy of the tradition of the Church, as an 'impulse (Motiv)' to
its reformation, and as a 'commentary (Kommentary on Scripture (CD IV/3.1, 130;
KD 146). Unmistakeably, the uttering and receiving of such true words are part of
the history of the Church. So the Church through its history experiences His self-
disclosure by His constant address, in the power of the Holy Spirit, through the
witness of His prophets and apostles, and therefore by means of the biblical word
(CD IV/3.1, 130). But the Church also experiences 'His free communications in the
parables of the kingdom which come to it through the general history of the world
around it.'33
With this view, Barth emphasises the importance of true words in the
following sense. God wills that 'it [lights and words] ... should be taken up and
used in the service of His Word, and given a part in its work' (CD IV/3.1, 156; KD
178). 'The positive thing which takes place in the confrontation of the little lights
of creation with the great light of its Creator is that they are not passed over or
32 ' Was sich, indem sie ihm dienen, in ihnen spiegelt, ist dies, dafi der Schopfer seinem
Geschopf treu ist: in der ewigen Treue, die in seiner Gnadentat und Gnadenoffenbarung in Jesus
Christus kraftig, wirksam und manifest wird, die er ihm aber schon mit seiner Erschaffung
geschworen hat' (CD IV/3.1, 153; KD 174).
33 'seine freien Kundgebungen in dem sie umgebenden Weltgeschehen in den ihr von dorther
begegnenden Gleichnissen des Himmelreiches' (CD IV/3.1, 130 ea; KD 147).
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ignored, let alone destroyed or extinguished, but integrated in the great light. They
are not incapable of this integration,'34 for they are created by God (CD IV/3.1,
156). For this reason, they are even binding to a limited yet unmistakeable degree
even though their orders, directions, force, values, and validity are only in terms of
this world.
And the integration, the description to service, which comes to the self-witness of
the creature in its encounter with the self-witness of God, consists in the fact that
it is taken up by the latter, and that its limited power to bind can be invested with
the absolute power of the Word of God, or conversely that the absolute power of
the Word of God can invest itself with the limited power of creaturely self-witness
(CD IV/3.1, 157; KD 178-179).
In this way, they 'can (konnenf conceal their divine force, value, and validity in
the relative force, 'and yet in this very concealment be God's self-declaration and
as such absolutely binding' (CD IV/3.1, 157; KD 179). they are thus integrated and
instituted into His 'direct service (direkten Dienstf and set in a relation in which
they do not stand of themselves. They 'can (konnenf thus be truths which 'shine
as expressions' of the one truth (CD IV/3.1, 157). Again, they are not 'true words'
on their own, but they are true words only as 'genuine witnesses' to, and
'attestations' of, the declaration of Jesus Christ Himself (CD IV/3.1, 123).
Metaphorically speaking, while the one Word of God is the 'centre (Mittef of the
circle, the words are the 'periphery (Peripherief of the circle (CD IV/3.1, 122; KD
137). In this qualified sense, therefore, the Church must be prepared to hear true
words 'even in the words and voices of world-occurrence,' 'not as an alien sounds
but as segments of that periphery concretely orientated from its centre and towards
its totality, as signs and attestations of the lordship of the one prophecy of Jesus
Christ, true words which we must receive as such even though they come from this
source.'35 This means that the one Word, the sovereignty of Jesus Christ, is not
34
'Das ist das positive, was sich in der Konfrontierung der kleinen Lichter der Schopfung mit
dem grofien ihres Schopfers ereignet: sie werden nicht iibergangen, nicht ignoriert, geschweige denn
zerstort und ausgeldscht. Sie werden dem grofien Licht integriert. Sie sind solcher Integrierung nicht
unfdhig' (CD IV/3.1, 156; KD 178).
35
"auch in den Stimmen und Worten des ... Weltgeschehens,'' 'Wir haben uns dann darauf
gefafit zu machen, tatsachlich - nicht irgendwelche fremde und fremdartige Laute, sondern (als
Segmente jener Peripherie in konkreter Ausrichtung von ihrer Mitte her und auf ihre Totalitat hin)
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limited to the gift and commission of the Church alone. They are 'taken up into
association by Him.' So they 'can' acquire their 'distinctive orientation (eigentiimli-
che RichtungY (CD IV/3.1, 159; KD 181). Not in any synthesis (Synthese), but in
connexion with (Zusammenhang) the Word of God, they 'can' point beyond their
diverse statements to a unity and totality of creation which 'will not differ' from
the unity and totality declared in the Word of God (CD IV/3.1, 159; KD 181). With
this view Barth even declares: 'What they say can so harmonise with what He
Himself says that to hear Him is to hear them, and to hear them to hear Him.'36
Creation acquires this power of speech as the Word speaks through and in it (Ps
19:1, 4). In short, creaturely words, the intelligent world in virtue of the free
communications of Jesus Christ in world events, are integrated into, and instituted
by, the 'ministerium Verbi Divini. ... By the Verbum Divimim itself they [words]
are made worthy' (CD IV/3.1, 164).
The debate between Brunner and Barth displays at least two different
perspectives. One interesting observation is their different presuppositions in
understanding the sola-gratia which we have already mentioned.37 A more
important point is that Brunner understands the issue of natural theology from the
perspective of the 'old' creation, the creation of the world in the beginning. His
persistent argument is that if it is God the Creator who became not only the
Sustainer but also the Reconciler then nature, including humanity, cannot be
completely blind to God in spite of human sin. In other words, if the creation is
such that it has been sustained by God and is of such value that it has been saved
by Him, then the world, including the human race, cannot be completely empty of
divine glory or goodness. On the contrary, Barth understands the question of natural
theology from the perspective of the 'new' creation, the reconciliation. That is to
als Zeichen und Bezeugungen der Herrschaft der einen Prophetie Jesu Christi auch im profanen
Weltgeschehen wahre Worte zu vernemen, die wir als solche, auch wenn sie von dorther kommen,
zu horen haben' (CD IV/3.1, 123-124; KD 139).
36 ' Es kann dann, was sie sagen, mit dem, was Gott selbst sagt, so zusammenklingen, dafi, wer
ihn hort, auch sie hort, und wer sie hort, auch ihn hort ...' (CD IV/3.1, 159; KD 182).
37
Footnote 16 in pages 185-186.
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say, if humanity is totally corrupt that the grace of God alone (sola-gratia) enables
humanity to know God, then we cannot speak of the possibility of the human
knowledge of God in and through nature. Rather, this sola-gratia is fully revealed
in and through the 'new' creation alone, the reconciliation. Such different
perspectives resulted in the two different emphases and therefore the two different
orientations of the one issue. Nonetheless, what Barth says in his later theology is
that if God the Reconciler who made the world a 'new' creation, is also God the
Creator, then 'true words' must be capable of existing and speaking in and through
nature. In other words, if the power of the Word of reconciliation encircles all time
and space, then 'true words' must be spoken in and through 'wordly-occur-
rence.'38
What Barth wants to stress overall in his later theology is not that human
beings can have the knowledge of God purely through nature. On the contrary,
what he emphasises is that it is nature and world-events which are intelligent
enough to reflect true words, as the Word of the reconciliation is too powerful to
be confined within the event itself. When discussing this aspect of natural theology,
Barth may well have been careful to distinguish the goodness of nature from the
corruption of humankind. Ultimately such a subtle articulation might vindicate his
contention that the affirmation of true words must not be understood as an
affirmation of natural theology, but this possibility simply becomes groundless on
the basis of his rejection of Brunner's view that 'The creation of the world is at the
same time revelation, self-communication of God' (NaTheol 80). Nevertheless, in
his later theology, Barth affirms 'true words,' that is, 'free communication of Jesus
Christ' in and through the cosmos, and therefore the 'intelligent cosmos'' - a view
which he once simply dismissed. Although this affirmation does not amount to a
retraction of the early critique of Brunner, it does represent a qualified endorsement
of natural theology within the sphere of history and faith. Many theologians,
however, have either overlooked or treated too lightly this modification. Hans
38 '
Weltgeschehen' (CD 1V/3.1, 123, 131; KD 139, 148).
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Kiing, however, has pointed to the problem:
... theologians have paid too little attention to the fact that in this last, self-
contained volume of Church Dogmatics (1959) the old Karl Barth ... does return
to his harshly exclusive thesis: Jesus Christ 'is the one, the only light of life.' But
then, ... he goes on ... there are, in fact, 'other lights' alongside the one light of
Jesus Christ ... there are 'other true words' (KD IV/3, 40-188) alongside the one
Word. Obviously a new evaluation of the knowledge of God from the world of
creation and from 'natural theology' is emerging in Barth's late theology, a new
evaluation too of philosophy and human experience as a whole. Indeed we find,
in an indirect, concealed fashion, a new evaluation of the world religions, which
Barth had earlier lumped together ... and simply dismissed as forms of unbelief,
or worse yet, of idolatry and works righteousness.39
Our analysis thus far clearly confirms this view of Barth's modification of
his assessment of natural theology. This can be further clarified by proceeding to
a number of further points.
Firstly, Brunner holds to the possibility of human knowledge of God in
terms of'general revelation.' Humanity can have knowledge of God in and through
nature since God 'imprints' the image of Himself in nature. By contrast, Barth
emphasises the existence of 'true words' and their constant expression in world-
occurrences. The resurrection of Jesus Christ, the announcement of our reconcili¬
ation, is too great to be confined within the sphere of the biblical and the churchly
witnesses. However, we notice virtually no difference between Brunner's 'general
revelation' and Barth's 'true words,' as neither of them claims to be the same as
His self-revelation. Both Brunner and Barth admitted to limitations in terms of the
true words incapability for the salvation of humankind and in terms of their
ambiguity. Do not 'general revelation' and the 'true words' virtually correspond to
each other? Does Barth not eventually end by saying the same thing as Brunner had
said, and as such, open up the possibility of natural theology?
Secondly, one of the major reasons for Barth's harsh attack on Brunner's
j9
(Hans Kiing, 'Karl Barth after the Postmodern Paradigm' in: The Princeton Seminary
Bulletin (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1988, p. 26). According to Kiing, this new evaluation means an "explosion"
of his 'so cogently constructed dogmatic world' at least in principle. Kiing sees this explosion as
a coming back behind modernity from his, thus far, paradigm change from modernity to
postmodernity. In this view, Kting insists that it is wrong to label Barth as the 'neo-Orthodox'
theologian. See pp. 8-31 (ibid).
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understanding of natural theology was due to its insufficient power to bring
salvation for humankind, but had Brunner not already mentioned this fundamental
problem while he was advocating the general revelation in the creatura {NaTheol
26)? This being the case, could Barth then justify his rejection of natural theology
so aggressively against Brunner on its deficiency of salvific power?
Thirdly, Barth, in tackling Brunner, asked if he had an opinion that idolatry
is a somewhat 'imperfect preparatory stage' as the 'service' of the true God
(NaTheol 22). Yet does Barth not in fact admit this 'imperfect preparatory stage'
as the service for the true Word when he says that true words are a 'service' to the
one true Word (CD IV/3.1, 153)?
Fourthly, Barth pointed out that his affirmation of true words is by no
means an appeal to so-called 'natural theology' since what he has in view is
attestations of self-impartation of God Himself, who acts in the Son by the Holy
Spirit, or words like the Bible and the Church which can be claimed as 'parables
of the kingdom' (CD IV/3.1, 117). How and who can decide whether or not this
can be claimed as 'parables of the kingdom'? Does this question of certain criteria
and their veracity not simply suggest that there are practically no parables of the
kingdom in world-events apart from the divine self-impartation, and the Bible and
the Church? If it virtually does, does this not imply a petrification (ossification) of
the dynamism of the world by not allowing any virtual existence of true words
which can be claimed as 'parables of the kingdom'? It should also be asked
whether true words are then merely a theoretical possibility and not a practical
reality? If so, again, what does Barth mean by his statement that true words are
spoken even in world-events, since the Word, which is spoken in and through the
resurrection of Jesus Christ, is too great to be shut up within the sphere of the Bible
and the Church? If Barth truly meant the Word's unfailing power of self-speech,
does this not necessarily indicate the actual knowledge of God outside Scripture
and the Church, and therefore a homoligation of 'general revelation' which he once
so harshly rejected against Brunner? Moreover, what are these 'parables of the
kingdom'? If we are not mistaken, what Barth refers to by these 'parables of the
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kingdom' is nothing but these 'true words' spoken through 'world-events.' But
what are these 'world-events'? Could Barth think of something beyond nature,
including human reason, inasmuch as he insists upon God's use of the cosmos as
a medium of His words? As a corollary of his argument, did Barth not affirm one
of the issues in natural theology irrespective of whether or not he likes the phrase
'natural theology'? Incidentally, we have to remember that it is not only Barth who
did not wish us to understand his acknowledgement of 'true words' as an appeal
to natural theology, but Brunner also prefers 'the Christian doctrine of general
revelation' or 'the Christian doctrine of revelation in nature' rather than the phrase
of 'natural theology.' According to John Baillie, Brunner distinguishes between an
objective sense of the term which he accepts, and a subjective sense which he
rejects. By the former he means that a knowledge of God in creation can come only
to those who are already enlightened by the Christian revelation of him. By the
latter he means a knowledge of God which might be supposed to be accessible to
the heathen or to independent rational argumentation.40 If Baillie's understanding
is correct, then again it is difficult to concede whether there is any virtual
difference between Barth and Brunner in perceiving natural theology.
Fifthly, another reason why we cannot help but assume Barth's opening of
the closed door of one of the issues of natural theology lies in his determination to
insist upon the 'once-for-all-ness,' and therefore upon the 'universality,' of the
noetic event, the resurrection. The event of reconciliation took place finally and
completely. The resurrection proclaimed itself in finality. It will never be repeated.
This implies that the divine self-confirmation of our reconciliation through the
resurrection took place for all humankind. This universal announcement of 'all'
means that the power of reconciliation overarches, not only the questions of
humankind who have existed after this event of announcement, but all the
generations existing before, during, and after this announcement. If this were not
so, it is not only the case that the resurrection will have to occur again and again
40
John Baillie, 'Introduction' in: NaTheol 9.
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for a certain generation in order to maintain the same efficacy of reconciliation, but
it also becomes a problem for those who have not even heard the announcement
through the biblical witnesses. That is to say, there must be the knowledge of God
spoken and shone outside the Bible and the Church in virtue of this Word's finality.
This universal announcement of our reconciliation in and through the resurrection
admits the existence of true words, i.e., the 'general revelation,' outside the Bible
and the Church. By implying this, Barth simply opens the deadly-closed door of
natural theology, even though at the earlier stage, Barth simply dismissed Brunner's
affirmation of true words in the cosmos by saying that the world is gloom and dark
because of human sin. Barth's new perspective on this issue of the darkness of the
world, because of human sin, is revealed when he says 'its [true words'] self-
witness and lights are not extinguished by the corruption of the relationship
between God and man through the sin of man' (CD IV/3.1, 139).
Sixthly, what are the concrete clues for this overflowing reaching power that
'what was and is possible for Him in the narrower sphere is possible within His
powers in the wider' (CD IV/3.1, 118)? Are these, and can these, not be anything
other than either created nature or human reason or instinct? Further, if the Word
of God can make itself to be heard in and through the human secularism which is
by nature resistant to the Word, how much more can it be heard in and through the
divine nature which stands beyond human manipulation? Barth refers to Psalm 19:1,
4 in order to admit true words through the creation of God (CD IV/3.1, 164).
Interestingly enough, however, in his early theology Barth sternly discarded
Brunner's affirmation of the 'general revelation' despite the latter's reference to the
same passage Psalm 19:1, 4.
Seventhly, Barth ruthlessly disposed of Brunner's view that humankind still
retains the knowledge of God in and through nature, although its heart (reason) is
darkened by its sin. Yet Barth now tells quite a different story by stating that 'true
words' prevent the world from being merely dark by the sin of humankind: '... the
world neither is nor can be absolutely dumb or deaf. ... that even the worst
communication does not completely fail to be communication and may perhaps
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become better. ... We cannot live without them [true words in and through the
cosmos]' {CD IV/3.1, 141). Is this argument not a clear modification of his early
assertion that humanity cannot know God in and through nature, since the imago
Dei is darkened 'through and through' by its sin?
In addition, Barth in his early theology insisted that humankind needs the
absolute grace of God as its reason is totally corrupt. Yet he now gives a modified
view by stating that human beings can know true words by their 'common sense'
{CD IV/3.1, 143; KD 161) and therefore it does not need faith. Undoubtedly Barth
does not say that the one Word can be known by human 'common sense.' Yet does
this view not imply a considerable revision on the possibility of human knowledge
of God through the nature, in comparison to his uncompromising argument that
there are no true words outside Scripture and the Church since the human race, and
as such the world, is totally darkened by its sin? Does humanity's 'common sense'
not already presuppose divine sola-gratia if the once totally corrupt humanity can
obtain true words?41
41
Here, P. Tillich's early contention echoes when he said that there must be something to be
touched by God if God wishes to communicate Himself with earthly human beings. Insofar as the
issue of natural theology is concerned, the fundamental problem lies in the different assumptions
or emphases of the issue. If we are not mistaken the advocates of natural theology, and especially
many Roman Catholic theologians, seem to focus on the basis of (divine) communication so that
human beings can know God and can understand His will. The supporters of natural theology are
concerned primarily with the communication 'object' which needs to be touched.
Nevertheless, what we have to notice is that Barth does not negate this requirement of
communication ground. In fact, Barth was also well aware of the fact that a theology performed by
human beings cannot proceed without form of communication ground. Rather, his fundamental
emphasis centres on the issue that this natural theology, viz. this communication ground too, stands
under the realm of God's initiative', human beings can know God only when God creates this
ground of communication. Our appiecialion of the word 'too' proves to be correct as we have
already seen Barth's affirmation of the realities of 'many words' in the world, apart from divine
self-revelation, Scripture, and Church. Thus ifwe are to describe Barth's view of natural theology,
we may say that human beings can know God through nature or the world when they see and
understand the world in, and through, the eyes offaith in God the Creator. Conversely, when human
beings have faith in God as the Creator of the universe, then they can know God. Now the
fundamental issue is whether natural theology emphasises a perceptibility of natural humanity, or
a view of the faith of humanity. This question is whether we lay stress on the divine initiative, or
on the essentiality of the basis of communication itself.
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Summary
Accusing Barth of having a 'high' christology on the basis of his early
emphasis on the 'otherness' of God loses its veracity as Barth announces the
paradigm shift from the divinity to the humanity of God, from the 'otherness' to
the 'togetherness' of God with humankind.
Barth's understanding of the doctrine of predestination is another theological
foundation underpinning our thesis. His transformation of the doctrine of
Predestination into The Doctrine of the Election of Grace tells us not only of his
new understanding of the doctrine of election itself, but it also reveals his christol¬
ogy as a 'low' christology rather than a 'high' christology. The reason is this.
According to Barth, God elected the humanity of Christ before the creation
of the cosmos. By this election, all human beings are also elected for reconciliation.
The power of this election lies in its a priori, namely in its unconditional validity,
since the election took place prior to the creation of humankind. For this reason the
doctrine of election is not a 'dreadful decree' but 'the sum' of the Gospel.
Significantly, the election of grace interprets nothing but the very content of the
christology 'from below' en masse: the life-act, death, resurrection, and exaltation.
This christology 'from below' is nothing other than the concrete manifestation of
the interpretation of the election. This concrete manifestation implies, as we have
seen, that both the a priori election and the a posteriori manifestation correspond
to each other. But this correspondence does not mean an easy alternative view,
namely, that Barth's christology says the 'same thing' whether it is viewed from
the perspective of the a priori election or from the perspective of the a posteriori
life-act of Jesus. Rather, the correspondence is to say that the election of grace is
the theological roof2 to understanding Barth's christology as one 'from below'
for the following reasons.
Firstly, if the a priori election corresponds to the a posteriori life-act of the
Royal Man, the christology 'from below', to the extent that both give the same
42 The doctrine of election is one out of the three theological contexts of the christology 'from
below'. The two others are the election's historical fulfilment in the event of incarnation, and the
election's basis of revelation in the resurrection and ascension of the humanity of Christ.
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message, then the election is the genuine substance in Barth's christology because
it tells us nothing but this Gospel, this particular life-act of Jesus 'from below' en
masse.
Secondly, acknowledging that, for Barth, the election is the a priori event
to all other divine acts, and it is the election of the humanity of Christ, then, strictly
speaking, Barth begins his christology with the humanity of Christ, and to this
extent, with christology 'from below'. From all eternity God determined Himself
to be the God of this human being and as such of all humankind. This demonstrates
how crucial the humanity of Christ is in Barth's christology. To stress this, Barth
states: 'Ontologically, therefore, the covenant of grace is already included and
grounded in Jesus Christ, in the human form and human content which God willed
to give His Word from all eternity' {CD IV/1, 45 ea). Again, if the actual
christological starting-point is this humanity of Christ, it is highly doubtful to stamp
Barth's christology as a christology 'from above' in view of the Logos christology.
In short, both the antecedence of the election and the election of the humanity of
Christ implies the fact that the election is the genuine beginning of Barth's
christology, so that to classify Barth's christology as a christology 'from above'
because he starts his christology from the incarnation of the Logos, 'from above',
is a much too superficial judgment.
Thirdly, it is true that Barth deals with The Doctrine of Election in the
context of The Doctrine of God {CD II/2), and not in christology. Yet it would be
too naive if Barth's christology is to be understood as a 'high' christology in view
of the doctrine of God: Barth's christology is a christology 'from above' because
it is God who determines christology, as it is God who elected the humanity of
Christ 'from above'. The reason is that this elected humanity of Christ is nothing
other than the electing God Himself. Certainly, as we saw already, Barth launches
his dogmatics with The Doctrine of the Trinity {CD 1/1). However, what we must
also remember is that this doctrine of the Trinity is the exposition of the specific
revelation. To deal with the doctrine of the Trinity within Church Dogmatics is
adequate not because human capacity of rationale could imagine it, but because the
specific revelation, manifested in and through the particular Jesus, leads us to
Summary 207
express it. In this way, the overall orientation and content of Barth's christology is
found in the uncompromising dogmatic axiom that the fact or the history, the 'from
below' is presupposed before the meaning or the interpretation, the 'from
above'.
Some accused Barth of having a 'high' christology in view of his rejection
of natural theology. In other words, Barth's christology is a christology 'from
above' since, by discarding 'general revelation' in and through the cosmos, he does
not allow any channel from nature to God, to the Word of God Jesus Christ. It is
true that Barth stringently championed himself as 'the anti natural theologian' at an
early stage. Human beings cannot know God unless He reveals Himself, because
humanity is totally corrupted by its sin and the cosmos does not reveal God.
However, this understanding turns out to be a one-sided observation as Barth
developed a new orientation in facing the issue of natural theology. The world is
not completely blind despite human sin, for the Word of reconciliation impinges
upon all time and space. In such a way, the world reflects true words in and
through world-events. The cosmos is intelligent. Theologically speaking, the cosmos
must reflect true words since the Reconciler is nothing but the Creator.
As far as we can see, Barth rejects the power and the utility of natural
theology for the following theological reasons. First, if humanity could truly know
God through nature and world-events without His self-revelation, then what is the
use of His life, death, and resurrection? The second reason is that this knowledge
of God through general revelation cannot lead humankind to salvation. This second
reason seems to imply the fact that his later acknowledgement of the existence of
true words, and its constant speech in and through nature, does not necessarily
mean his coming back to the kind of natural theology that he opposed in his early
theology.
One thing that Barth overlooked was Brunner's clear cut presupposition that
human knowledge of the true God is possible only through divine self-revelation,
4j This presupposition forces us to understand Barth's doctrine of election from the perspective
of christology instead of the perspective of Theology. Indeed, understood from this perspective,
Barth's Theology is christology.
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and therefore that human knowledge of God through nature is not sufficient for
salvation. This was because even while Brunner was still arguing the importance
and necessity of natural theology. For this reason Brunner pointed out that his
debate with Barth is nothing but 'a dispute about words' (NaTheol 22).
Another interesting thing by which both Barth and Brunner justify their
acknowledgement of one of the issues of natural theology is their different
emphases on the same thing. On the one hand, Barth argues that there must be
other true words outside the witnesses of the Bible and the Church, i.e., true words
in and through the cosmos, because the Word of reconciliation is too great to be
confined within the sphere of a specific time and space. In other words, Barth
sanctioned the existence of true words from the view of the overreaching power of
the Reconciler, so he states that the Reconciler is the Creator. On the other hand,
for Brunner the natural theology must be maintained because the Creator is the
Reconciler and the Sustainer. God cannot leave the world and humankind without
any clues to know Him, indeed He must have left something for humankind to be
recognised however imperfect that may be. If our recognition that their different
arguments are nothing but a matter of different emphasis from a different
perspective on the same conclusion, we can hardly distinguish Barth's rejection of
natural theology from Brunner's affirmation of natural theology.
Prima facie, Barth seems to be rejecting not only the actuality of natural
theology, but even its possibility. This view appears to be confirmed when we put
his uncompromising theological axiom that 'humanity can know God only when
God reveals Himself in front of the issue of natural theology. It is true that Barth
bears out this theological axiom throughout his theology and as such, christology.
Nevertheless, as Barth revises one of the major issues of natural theology, it is not
only that we must not, but we cannot miss his virtual affirmation of natural
theology, which he once so vigorously negated. This affirmation becomes evident
as he simply admits the existence of true words outside the witnesses of the Bible
and the Church. This admission explicitly contrasts with his early contention that
Scripture alone is the responsible and basic norm for the knowledge of God and the
will of God.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis thus far shows that many theologians labelled Barth's
christology as a christology 'from above' or a 'high' christology for various
reasons. We saw, at the same time, that the concepts 'from above' and 'from
below' are too complex to be simply defined. In the context of our thesis,
however, we argued that Barth's christology is one 'from below' as much as it is
a christology 'from above'. What does this mean?
To begin our conclusion, it must be clear that our thesis is by no means to
underestimate or to suppress unnecessarily the centrality of the 'from above'
element in Barth's christology. Rather, our thesis is by all means intended to
provide a proper estimation of the significance of the 'from below' element in his
christology. This implies first of all that the 'from above' element is too conspicu¬
ous and critical to overlook in Barth 's christology. In fact, if we subtract or reduce
this 'from above' element in his thought, then it would be a sheer manipulation or
distortion of Barth's christology. Nevertheless, the converse is also true; the 'from
above' element must not be allowed to obscure the genuine emphasis on the 'from
below' element in Barth's christology, and thus to overshadow his christology
'from below'. Let us examine these questions again by way of conclusion.
1. The Prominence of the 'from above' Element in Barth's Christology
Barth's theological axiom that 'we know God only when God reveals
Himself had many theological consequences in reshaping the traditional as well as
his contemporary theological circles, and it still continues to challenge our
theological thinking in one way or another. We can account at least the following
three points:
(1) The theology of 'sola revelationis' was the replacement of God's
freedom and sovereignty. By divine revelation Barth means the divine self-
revelation. Human beings cannot postulate the revelation of God or impose any
necessities upon it. If the revelation of God takes place according to human
expectations and desires, the revelation would be nothing other than the humanly
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projected image of god. In His being and act God is totally free and as such
sovereign, otherwise He would become merely one of the objects of human
speculation, or human possession. Accordingly, if we ask the necessity of His
incarnation, the answer would have to be the 'divine necessity' (CD IV/1, 239).
Further, this sovereign and free revelation 'from above' re-appears in his
discussion about the resurrection as well. For Barth, the Easter event is the 'pre-
historical' event in the sense that although it is 'fact,' as it actually took place its
reality is beyond history. History cannot capture this 'new' act of God. This
concept of the 'pre-historical' therefore could implicate itself as a 'from above' in
terms of Christ's being and act. And this 'pre-historical' event, which could be
sensed as a christology 'from above' is, in other words, 'for the first time all God's
revealing and being revealed (in Him and generally)' (CD IV/1, 301). As such,
Barth's christological paradigm still lies on the divine initiative in the sense that his
christology stands or exists only at the moment when God (divinity of Christ)
reveals Himself as God or Christ 'from above'. For this reason, the idea of the
divine act is prevalent throughout Barth's christology. In such a way, the theology
of revelation is all about to let God be God.
(2) This divine self-revelation has a further implication in that it shatters all
human attempts at finding God. All human religions and cultures are rejected as
'unbelief' because God is not to be mixed with any forms of human religion or
culture. If this were not the case God would be eventually dissolved into them.
More pertinently, any forms or activities of religion and culture could justify, not
only their forms and activities, but could even identify themselves with God and
His will. God should have a means of expression in order to communicate Himself
with the cosmos if He is to be the truly relevant Being for, in and to the world. But
as it is God who creates this means of communication, human beings cannot
postulate this means. Indeed, as far as the existence and act of God is concerned,
human beings ('from below') cannot do anything but wait for His free and
sovereign act ('from above'). God stands over against any human forms and
activities of religion and culture. This is why Barth launches his christology
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primarily with the divine self-revelation 'from above' to 'below', which he phrases
as 'the Son of God goes into the far country' (CD IV/1, 157-210), because in this
way he constantly lays stress upon the divinity of Christ being the Subject of
christology and not the humanity of Christ. This incarnation is worked out within
the Godhead, the Trinity, before the creation. Naturally, while the divine dominates
and offers, the human follows and receives.
(3) As the revelation is a sovereign freedom of God Himself, the divine self-
revelation is an event. This divine revelation does not remain in a static or past
history, but freely acts and reveals Himself. Thus revelation is a new event which
takes place anew moment by moment, and therefore is a dynamic event. For Barth,
this dynamism and newness of revelation signifies the divine relativisation of all
human ideas and structures, since a fresh appearance (event) entails a different
situation and time, and therefore demands a new solution or answer. As such,
responsible Christian christology cannot give a permanent endorsement to any
status quo of mundane ideologies, structures, religion, culture, or privatisation of
God and faith, but it should always challenge them.
2. Two Fundamental Reasons for Dealing with Our Thesis
Why, then, insist on the 'from below' in Barth's christology? Is our attempt
purely a painstaking work of hair-splitting, a demonstration of thoughtful pedantry
or simply a kind of sophistication? Certainly, when we observe Barth's christology
purely in the context of divine self-revelation (incarnation), and if we mean the
'from above' in Barth's christology in terms of his apparent method of approach
alone, then it is more than fair to say that Barth's christology is one 'from above'.
Nevertheless, the power of this understanding 'from above' needs to be counter¬
balanced. The reason is that no one can postulate or even absolutise the method of
approach in characterising Barth's christology since there are other aspects to be
considered as well. It is vital to note that Barth demonstrates other significant
aspects alongside the significance and gravity of the approaching method. This
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means that it would be a fatal misconception not to see Barth's christology from
the standpoint of a totus Christus as he also consistently articulated this point of
view. This is what Barth means when he says that we should do theology
(christology) not in an analytical ('nicht analytiscW) way but in a synthetical
('sondern synthetisch') (CD IV/3,1. 323; KD 373) or comprehensive way. We
believe that one of the major problems of Barth interpreters is found in their
analytical mind-set rather than a synthetical mind-set. Recognising this problem,
Hunzinger's critique of the custom of Barth scholars is instructive when he says
that 'The task of responsible criticism presupposes a more reliable depiction of the
overall terrain, as well as of the proportional relationships among the various
segments, than has usually been the case.'1
We should also remember that Barth significantly changes (modifies) his
thoughts in the course of time. In parenthesis, we judge this change to be
acceptable as he predicted such a possibility of change when he once characterised
one of the natures of doing theology in terms of theologia viatorum. This change
is what Barth scholars mean by the 'early' (ca. until 1931) and Tate' (ca. since
1931 onwards). It is found particularly in his christological paradigm shift, viz. The
Humanity of God, and therefore, a genuine understanding of Barth's christology
will be at risk unless we consider these elements as well.2 Such a critical
observation motivates two major reasons for dealing with this 'high-low' issue in
particular. Firstly, we are concerned with a fair evaluation of Barth's christology.
Secondly, such a fair assessment is necessitated by its theological implication which
'
(George Hunzinger, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology [New York,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991], p. x. ea). On this conceptual basis, Hunzinger recommends
the reading of Barth's theology in an holistic view rather than to read him in any other way, despite
the fact that the motif of his theology could be classified in various ways {ibid., 4-23). McLean, too,
stresses the necessity of a holistic view which he calls 'the whole-part' principle or perspective, and
with which he actually writes to discuss Barth's view of humanity {CD III/2) (Stuart McLean,
Humanity in the Thought ofKarl Barth [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1981], pp. 1-194, esp. 11-14).
2 '... judgments made of his work based on the earlier theology alone are bound to be partial.'
'Whosoever has read him [Barth] firsthand will not be able to dismiss him lightly or accept one-
dimensional renditions of his ideas. ... reading his later writings is essential for the theologically
literate' (Mclean, Humanity in the Thought of Karl Barth 2, 5).
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is too critical to trivialise. It is necessary because we believe that this implication
is primarily Barth's lesson and thus we attempt to maximise this lesson by listening
to his thought rather than speaking to his thought.
Generally speaking, this means that many theologians simply overlook the
significance of the 'from below' element in Barth's christology, or even 'play
down' or reduced this 'low' element from a certain point of view which may be
legitimate in their own contexts. However, it must be underlined that arguing
Barth's christology simply as a christology 'from above' is highly questionable,
since Barth himself clearly states that a responsible Christian christology must speak
both 'from above' and 'from below'. The two movements of christology are
virtually one action in two forms: 'The atonement as it took place in Jesus Christ
is the one inclusive event of this going out of the Son of God and coming in of the
Son of Man' (CD IV/2, 21). We may give our opinions on Barth's christology. But
any interpretation cannot be the primary reference or authority over what the
author (Barth in our context) actually said, but any interpretation can only be a
secondary reference. The reason is that we cannot always postulate that our
understandings are an exact reflection upon the author's intention and meaning.
Moreover, readers' or listeners' different understanding, comprehensibility, and
interest could, easily produce manifold understandings of one object. Therefore,
marking Barth's christology as a 'high' christology cannot convince us that simply.
We suppose such simple or intentional mis-representations are either caused by a
misunderstanding or by a simple presumption which, in most cases, (we believe),
has to do with a lack of serious studies on Barth.
Precisely speaking, stamping Barth as having a 'high' christology is
extremely questionable for the reasons described in section 3 which in turn
constitute a proper estimation of Barth's christology. Further, we will discussion
about the theological importance of our proper appraisal, since our measure of
Sachkritik ('content critique' in terms of a 'holistic crtique') asks not only 'what
is' or 'what means,' but also 'why' this or that particular thing or issue.
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3. The Constituents of a Proper Estimation of Barth's Christology
1) The 'high' christology stands only in its making a breakthrough and an
integration of the 'low' christology
As we are concerned with a proper evaluation of Barth's christology, we
will have to look at its framework. The first volume of the doctrine of reconcili¬
ation is all about the divine incarnation from above downwards' in which the
possibility, necessity and relevance of the life-death-resurrection is mainly dealt
with. The second part of the doctrine of the reconciliation is all about the human
exaltation from below upwards', in which the life-act of the Royal Man stands as
the content of the historical Jesus. The third volume of the doctrine of reconcili¬
ation is about the unity of the two natures and the two movements of Jesus Christ
in which He is described as the true witness, and as such the guarantor, of our
reconciliation. Barth's placement of the 'from below' element within his christology
tells us that the 'high' christology cannot stand on its own without the Tow'
christology. Indeed, Barth does not bypass the Tow' christology and nor does he
make it a merely secondary matter, but he makes a breakthrough and integrates the
Tow' christology as it is the constitutional part of the entire christology. As such
Barth demonstrates the Tow' christology as being the centre of christology as long
as the 'high' christology is. Additionally, ifwe accept Barth's view that christology
is eventually all about the kingly rule of God, and as such the Gospel, then our
acceptance further advises us that the element of the christology 'from below'
stands truly in the centre of Barth's christology, because for him the life-act (the
'from below') is the very content of the kingly reign of God, and as such the
Gospel.
2) The Humanity of God, the christological paradigm shift, reflects and
sums up Barth's whole christology and as such advocates the 'low'
christology
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It is worth noting that while Barth was talking about the 'high' christology
in the (CD IV/1) in particular, his consistent emphasis was upon the fact that God
is for humankind (Immanuel) and therefore He made humankind His partner in and
through the incarnation of Jesus Christ. Notably this overriding emphasis reflects
exactly upon his later development of the 'togetherness' of God in The Humanity
ofGod. In probability this would indicate that Barth, consciously or unconsciously,
foresaw the direction and the goal of his christology as that which converges to the
humanity of God, which is demonstrated in the life-act of the Royal Man. What
does this debate mean for our thesis? Would it perhaps be an overstatement if we
say, that in probability, this indicates that Barth eventually prefigured his
christology with , and headed it towards, the significance of the humanity in
christology? Presumably this would be an overstatement. Yet we may say that,
whereas the former view is taken without knowing its consequences, the latter view
is spoken with a clear consciousness and intensity that indicates a knowledge about
the crucial nature of the christology 'from below'. Our observation is shown to be
viable when we remember that Barth characterises the lecture of the Humanity of
God as a 'revision' of his early view, indicating that this earlier theology was not
completely wrong or contrary to the revised argument/
3) The life-act of the Royal Man is both the ontic and the noetic ground for
Barth's christology
We have argued that, for Barth, the ontic ground of christology is nothing
other than the Jesus of Nazareth: '... in the one Jesus Christ divine and human
essence were and are united' (CD IV/2, 60; 60-69) Responsible Christian
christology is all about this particular being, Jesus of Nazareth. Moreover, our
knowledge that this particular Jesus of Nazareth is the self-revealed God Himself
is possible and actualised only in and through this particular Jesus of Nazareth.
J
Barth, Humanity ofGod 41-42.
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Barth acknowledges the impossibility of the union of the divine and human essence
in the one person. Yet, according to Barth, it is precisely the Royal Man and His
life-act that 'demands' and 'forces' (CD IV/2, 61) the statement of their unity. 'It
[this statement about the uniting] does not derive from a known a priori, a superior
possibility, but only from the given actuality, from Himself [Royal Man]' (CD
IV/2, 62).
The importance of this ground of actuality in connection with our thesis is
that Barth's christology is not a Logos concept or a claimed divinity 'from above',
but the particular man, Jesus of Nazareth. The divinity of Jesus Christ is discussed
in and through the humanity of Jesus Christ, the Royal Man. We must be clear
enough that what Barth meant by the divine self-revelation is no other than this
Royal Man. That is why Barth clarifies that the doctrine of the Trinity, which is for
him the ontology of christology, is nothing but an exposition of revelation. So
Moltmann aptly writes that Barth developed the doctrine of the Trinity 'from the
concrete form of (biblical) revelation,' the Godhead Jesus Christ, rather than from
the logic of the concept of revelation.4
No doubt Barth's constant argument was that we cannot think of the
humanity of Christ apart from His divinity. Nevertheless, if we take the Humanity
ofGod seriously as the theological and, as such, christological paradigm shift from
the divinity of Christ to the humanity of Christ, Barth's early argument must be
understood differently. He is not talking of an abstract God, but he speaks of the
God who cannot be thought of apart from the humanity in christology, the
christology 'from below'.
Admittedly, this paradigm shift is meant to be one of the bases for our
thesis. But specifically speaking, what Barth highlights with the paradigm of the
Humanity ofGod is the indispensability of the humanity with divinity. So he uses
such concepts as 'immanuel,' 'togetherness,' 'partner,' 'covenant mutually
contracted,' 'concreteness,' 'enclosure,' 'freedom for love,' and the 'oneness' of
4
Moltmann sees this change as necessary since Christian belief must begin with 'the concrete
and specific' revelation, Jesus Christ (Moltmann, Trinity and Kingdom 141-142).
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humiliation, exaltation, transcendence, and immanence.5 Incidentally, it is important
to note the fact that Barth persistently weaves these critical concepts, which
highlight much more about the 'from below' aspect of christology in comparison
with his early emphasis on the 'wholly otherness' of God ('God is in heaven and
you are on earth'), alongside the emphasis on the divine action 'from above'. Not
only does he do this in his christology and in The Humanity of God, but he also
does it in the doctrine of God, and especially in the election of grace even before
the christology and The Humanity ofGod. The gist of The Humanity ofGod is that
God does not exist without humanity. Christologically speaking, this means that the
christology 'from above' (the divinity of Christ) does not, and therefore cannot
exist, apart from the christology 'from below' (the humanity of Christ). Surprising¬
ly, such a significant point is reiterated throughout Barth's christology (CD IV/1-3),
and in the second volume of christology (CD IV/2) in particular. In this way,
Barth's christological contention and tenor reflect in many ways the Humanity of
God, and this reflection in turn means The Humanity ofGod illuminates the whole
christology of Barth, and as such it is the sum of his christology. Moreover, it is
very significant to remember that Barth wrote the christology 'from below' (CD
IV/2) immediately after the lecture of the Humanity of God. This would, in all
probability, imply that Barth's discussion about the life-act of the Royal Man is not
only the confirmation of the Humanity ofGod, but also a fuller (further) explication
of the content of the Humanity of God.
In parenthesis, interestingly enough, through an understanding of the
crucifixion, Barth constrains us to think that God the Reconciler is crucified rather
than the man that reconciled us is crucified, in spite of the fact that it was Jesus of
Nazareth that was crucified. And this constraint, paradoxically, espouses our thesis,
because it highlights the man Jesus of Nazareth, who is the only verifiable ground
'from below' for the true divine incarnation 'from above'.
5
Barth, Humanity of God 45-50.
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4) Barth's christological progression is circular and not lineal
So that Barth's christology is not distorted, we must always remember that
his christological progression is circular (spiral)6 and not lineal; that is, christology
explains the Trinity and the Trinity points to the christology, and as such undergirds
the whole of christology. This is the case at least when we see Barth's doctrine of
the Trinity which is not only about Godhead, but also is essentially the ontology of
christology, and the orientation of the Church Dogmatics. This circular progression
implies, first of all, that we cannot simply say that Barth's christology is a
christology 'from above', because the term 'from above' is more of a vertical
conception. At the same time, as the word 'from' also entails the counter word 'to'
(from - to), the label 'from above' is more of a lineal conception, from one
direction to the other direction.
In contrast, Barth's christology is framed on a circular movement; trinitarian
hermeneutic, and not on a lineal movement. To put this in Barth's orientation, the
Son of God goes into the far country (incarnation 'from above') (CD IV/1), the Son
of Man the Royal Man returns home (exaltation 'from below') (CD IV/2), and then
the Royal Man, who is the dual manifestation and Integrator of the two, binds them
together and witnesses to these as the 'two movement in one action' in and through
the work of the Holy Spirit (CD IV/3.1). In such a way, Barth's christology can
hardly be seen as a kind of one-sided movement, as if his christology is all about
'from above', but it can be seen as a circular correspondence in which neither the
'above' nor the 'below' are diminished or even dissolved into the other at the
expense of this or that element of christology. Again, with regard to cor-respond-
ence, we should not fail to appreciate the Christian Life (the fragmentary of the
Church Dogmatics IV/3.2) which realistically speaking 'ends' Barth's whole
dogmatics with an emphasis upon human responsibility ('from below') in cor¬
respondence to the divine act of salvation 'from above'.
6
To use a more general term for circular, viz. trinitarian hermeneutics, Barth's whole dogmatic
is composed of 'dialectical-dialogical' language or thought (McLean, Humanity in the Thought of
Karl Barth 12-13).
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5) Interpretation (meaning) presupposes fact, the methodic precedence is a
matter ofprocedural priority
We must not underestimate the criticality of the 'from above' element in
Barth's christology. However, at this juncture, we need to remember Barth's
constant emphasis that his christology never speaks in possibility but in actuality.
The importance of this emphasis lies in the subsequent implication that fact ('low')
precedes interpretation ('high'). For the emphasis on 'not in possibility but in
actuality' suggests to us that fact is presupposed before interpretation, reflection,
or meaning. Surely, if fact is to be understood as fact it, entails interpretation. Fact
(something) could be non-fact (nothing) and therefore it could be irrelevant or
meaningless without understanding through interpretation. This is the case
particularly in our existential epistemology, since we understand as much as we
know, and fact is fact as much as we know fact as fact. Interpretation involves a
dialectic process, a circular (chain) process of negation and affirmation: thesis-
antithesis-synthesis. Yet if understanding fact depends too heavily on interpreting
the meaning of fact, then meaning would totally differ from fact, since fact is left
behind meaning. Fact would become merely a victim of meaning in the chain of
negation and affirmation process. So if interpretation concentrate too heavily on
pursuing meaning without constant (consistent) reference to its fact, then meaning
would easily become either meaningless or irrelevant to fact. Analogically speaking,
again, whereas interpretation or meaning could be compared to the 'high'
christology, fact could be compared to the Tow' christology. This implies, at least
for Barth, that the 'high' christology has hardly any constitutional importance in
building a responsible christology outside this Tow' christology. For this reason,
Barth undergirds this 'high' christology in terms of this Tow' christology, the life-
act of the Royal Man. Strictly speaking, then, we will have to understand Barth
giving precedence to the meaning ('from above') over the description of the fact
('from below') as not promoting such as a 'high' christology, but as a procedural
priority in his dogmatic scheme. To wit, the 'from above' does not finish within
itself, but points beyond itself, that is, to the 'from below'.
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Differently put, christology 'from above' was necessary in order to establish
christology. The christological movement 'from above' to 'below' clarifies who the
Subject and the Initiator of christology is. However, the christology 'from above'
alone is not sufficient for the actuality and the reality of christology (reconciliation).
Christology 'from below' was crucial as it puts the christology 'from above' into
action. Logically, if the necessity of 'high' christology is going to be the true
necessity, then the necessity will necessarily entail a certain actuality. For necessity
will vindicate itself to be truly necessity only by actualising itself. Barth's
christology sees this necessity (incarnation 'from above') in the actuality (the
historical life-act of the Royal Man 'from below'). As such, while the 'from above'
envisions the 'from below', the 'from below' vindicates the 'from above'. That is
to say, for Barth, any responsible Christian christology must be anchored not only
in the 'from above', but also in the 'from below', because this alone will safeguard
christology from becoming either a mere idolised anthropology or a mere
speculative Christ-myth.
(6) Last but not the least, describing Barth's christology as a christology
'from above' in view of his early rejection of natural theology, will simply lose its
tenability as Barth clearly dis-closes a new vista for natural theology.
In conclusion, if we insist on Barth having a 'high' christology, then this
insistence would be a sheer distortion of Barth's christology, and therefore would
fail to have a proper appreciation of his thought. For this view is nothing but a
maximisation of one aspect (the 'from above' which is in the framework of the
priestly office and work!) at the expense of the rest: the kingly and prophetic office
and work which are developed overridingly in the framework of the 'from below'.
Ifwe acknowledge a proper appreciation of Barth's christology to the extent
that the 'trom below' is the constitutive part of his christology as well as the 'from
above', what then is the theological significance of our sensing or rediscovering this
'from below'? Additionally, is this 'from below' christology exempt from any
problems or dangers? In reality, there are problems and dangers in maintaining the
christology 'from below' no matter how vital that is.
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4. Problems7 in Maintaining the Christology 'from below'
(1) When we follow Barth's view of the movement 'from man to God,' the
exaltation of the Son of Man to the Son of God, as one of our categories for the
christology 'from below', then this view certainly entails the problem of 'divinising
humanity' as Barth also noted in explicating the christology 'from below' in
Church Dogmatics IV/2 (3-20). If the Son of Man revealed Himself as the Son of
God through the exaltation, and all humankind are also exalted through this
exaltation, then it would imply that we human beings could also become like the
7
For some other general problems in establishing the christology 'from below' see
(Macquarrie, The Humanity of Christ 244-250; 'A Dilemma in Christology' in: The Expository
Times Vol. 76. (1964-1965), pp. 207-210; Calvert, From Christ to God 8-17).
But Hodgson sees some problems in both 'from above' and 'from below'. So he proposes
a 'word-christology' to solve the christological impasse, arguing that the advocators of the 'Logos-
flesh' christology did not sufficiently explore the root of the concept 'word.' 'Logos' was regarded
as a personal agent, initiated in Hellenistic Judaism, and encouraged by Arianism. The problem of
such personification of the Logos is that when the personal Logos comes in the person of Jesus, the
humanity of Jesus would become a subordinate personal agent to the person of the Logos, if indeed
the transcendence of God (Logos) should be maintained at all. But the ancient terms for 'person'
(persona, prosopon, hypostasis) did not mean 'person' in the modern sense of a conscious
individual, but 'mask (persona)' or 'face' or 'countenance (prosopon)'. These terms came to denote
'functioning entity' or 'individuating principle.' Word is not a 'personal' agency but it is the
'power' or 'event' that 'constitutes' personhood. Therefore the logos (word) of God should not be
regarded as a divine hypostasis, humanum. Rather God exists in three 'modes of being" or "modes
of relationship.'
The 'word of God' transcends and confronts humanity, but it comes to speak and act, in fully
human words and actions, in Jesus of Nazareth. For although Jesus was fully human, God was
present in virtue ofHis faithful word ofwitness to God's word. When the word of the humanity of
Jesus was 'finished' in Him, God's word-presence in the world was 'definitively' established in
Him. So in Jesus of Nazareth, the word of God and the word of humanity are not two qualitatively
distinct substances or natures, but they become 'homologous' with each other. Where human
presence is accomplished as a presence to oneself and to the world 'by faith,' there God Himself
is present because His word is the source and power of human presence, just as humanity's enacted
word becomes the essential means in making God's future word present here and now in the world.
This is possible because word is the 'medium' ofpresence. This ending of the humanity and the
definitive presence of God in Jesus should be understood as the 'proleptic' of a final and perfect
co-presence of God and the world, which is anticipated in the consummation. As for Hodgson, this
view of 'word' as the 'medium' of the co-presence of God and humanity, overcomes 'the abstract
distinction between divine and human 'natures' entirely, avoiding both the supernaturalism of the
traditional Logod-flesh christologies and the subjectivism of modern anthropologically-oriented
christologies, and preserving the finitude and historicity of human experience' (Peter C. Hodgson,
Jesus-Word and Presence. An Essay in Christology [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971], pp. 65-71).
This understanding of word as 'medium of presence' leads him to recover the meaning of the
'Logos' in tradition in terms of Word as the Medium ofPresence (ibid., 60-135) and this is what
he develops throughout the book entitled as Jesus-Word and Presence {ibid., 1-291).
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Royal Man, both God and man. For if He is truly like us, this likeness can hardly
exclude the rest of the human beings from becoming like Him, both God and man,
even though Barth clearly notes that this exaltation is by no means a divinisation
of humanity, but humanity's 'perfect fellowship' with divinity. Likewise,
establishing a christology 'from below' upon the earthly life-act of the Royal Man
will have to cope with the problem of identifying the human life of Jesus with the
very life of God Himself.
(2) Epistemologically too, if we insist that we can see and acknowledge the
divinity by looking at the man Jesus and thus can build a christology 'from below',
then it also becomes extremely difficult to distinguish the divinity and the humanity
from each other. Do we know that the particular Jesus is God because the man
shows and tells us His divinity, or do we know it because the divinity reveals and
tells the humanity of Christ?8
(3) Paradoxically, the danger of divinising humanity also implies the fact
that the christology 'from below' could easily become an ebionite christology in
which the divinity of Christ is denied, regarding Jesus as merely an ordinary human
being. We see the example of this problem in Paul of Samosata when he employed
the phrase 'from below' in his exposition of a christology based on the ordinary
human nature of Jesus. Christology may become Jesuology, so to speak.9
(4) Holding a christology 'from below' will find its difficulty as we argue
that Barth's christology is a christology 'from below' in the sense that Barth builds
his christology on the basis of the historical Jesus. For it is unanimously agreed that
we know too little about Jesus10, even though 'the general character of his life is
rightly portrayed in them [New Testament], on the basis of historical recollec-
8
Calvert is not convinced by R.P.C. Hanson's claim that 'through his humanity his divinity
can be perceived' (The Attractiveness of God [SPCK 1973], p. 109; Calvert, From Christ to God
6, fn. 15).
9
A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition (Mowbrays, 1975), p. 165.
10 Nevertheless we must still ask how much of our knowledge about Jesus is necessary to
enable us to affirm the historical Jesus, in order for Him to carry the mass of theological
significance of the 'low' christology (Calvert, From Christ to God 8).
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tion,'" and the Gospel stories are re-presented differently from one another,
according to the aim of each book.
(5) Claiming Barth's christology as a christology 'from below' in terms of
the historical life-act of the Royal Man being the dual manifestation of both 'high'
and 'low' christology will face the problem of classifying what is divinity and what
is humanity, viz. in terms of the physical vs. the metaphysical, or in terms of a
miraculous act.
(6) If we contend that a responsible christology must build on a concrete
ground instead of an abstract concept, and therefore we should build a christology
'from below' on the basis of the concrete life-act of Christ, then we are in danger
of confining christology to the actuality (phenomenon) which could easily overlook
the fact that the being and power of Christ (potentiality) is more than the actual
witnesses of the Scripture about His actualised being and act, earthly ministry
(actuality).12
(7) Insisting upon a christology 'from below' on the basis of the true
humanity of Christ and thus on the normality, (His likeness to us), of the humanity
of Christ, then the question of its uniqueness (distinctiveness) arises.13 Without
His uniqueness there could hardly be any significance in dealing with christology.
If we maintain a christology 'from below' from the human side, then what is so
11
Rudolf Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. John Marsh (Oxford:
Blackwell, I9682 [=1963]), p. 50.
12
Here we see a tension between the possibility and actuality. According to the Aristotelian
view, nothing exists in essence unless it exists in actuality. But Jtingel argues that the Christian
epistemology is not based in the actuality but in the possibility, since Christian epistemology
commences with the divine act of Creatio ex nihilo. As God can (ex nihilo) do anything, actuality
(Creatio) is no more than a part of this possibility. It is necessary for Christians to hold the primacy
of possibility over actuality in our scientific world because, whereas our scientific world tends to
measure everything only on the basis of actuality, viz. provability, faith, by which Christians
primarily live, is that which goes beyond scientific positivism or actuality (Eberhard Jiingel, 'The
World as Possibility and Actuality,' [19722] in: Theological Essays [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
19892], pp. 95-123). See also (Simon Fisher, Revelatory Positivism? Barth's Earliest Theology and
the Marburg School, [Oxford University Press, 1988], pp. 48-56).
13
(E.L. Mascall, Theology and the Gospel ofChrist [London: SPCK 1977], p. 133). Whereas
Calvert does not see it as a problem because advocating the 'low' christology is often preoccupied
with the need to assert his manhood in lieu of considering the question of the unity of the human
and the divine as a critical issue (Calvert, From Christ to God 10).
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special about this human being is that His disciples became convinced that He was
God in the flesh? Describing Jesus Christ as a purely human being without
applying any God-language (divinity) would result in idolatry however laudable,
since the word 'christology' entails something which is more than merely a human
being which transcends to a new level like 'Godmanhood.'14 To signify the
christology 'from below' mainly by the humanity of Christ fails to appreciate that
in this step of using God-language, this christology 'from below' means mainly that
it would fall into adoptionism. For the christology 'from below' indicates that that
particular human being is chosen and adopted for a certain christological task
among humankind.13 Moreover, to ground Christian christology in the humanity
of Christ without His divinity would lead to a difficulties in discovering an
14
(Macquarrie, The Humanity ofChrist 244, 248-249). According to Macquarrie, we need to
use God-language in understanding Christ, because it is not enough to say that in Christ we saw a
new level of humanity as people recognised and confessed Christ as God. Using God-language
about Jesus also implies that this unique human life is not an accident or an anomaly of history, but
is the very meaning of history, its goal and rationale: 'The same creative love that we see in Christ
is the divine Source of all things. It is at this point that the human approach to Christology demands
to be supplemented by the incarnational approach. For to claim that the man Jesus shows froth
Godmanhood is to acknowledge with St Paul that all this from God or with St John that the Word
expressed in Jesus is the Word present in the beginning through whom all things were made'
(Macquarrie, The Humanity of Christ 249).
'The more christology insists on the humanity of Jesus, the greater is the need for that
humanity to be qualified in some way. For without some such qualification, or assertion of
specialness, the humanity of Jesus could not sustain the universal role that Christian theology has
assigned to it' (Calvert, From Christ to God 9; cf. E.L. Mascall, Theology and the Gospel ofChrist
[SPCK, 1977], p. 133).
Facing this question of the uniqueness of the humanity ofChrist some propose a 'transcendent
anthropology' as a possibility: humanity and God do not have fixed natures infinitely apart but
human beings transcend towards God, and Christ is the point at which the two come together; in
which the universal role of Christ stands (Calvert, From Christ to God 9; Macquarrie, The Humanity
of Christ 246).
15
Yet Macquarrie holds the possibility and legitimacy of the 'from below up' christology by
relying on Rahner's 'transcendental anthropology,' that is, that human beings can and actually do
transcend themselves and opens themselves towards God (Macquarrie, The Humanity ofChrist 243).
However, here we see an irony of Macquarrie's argument. For this transcendence of all
humankind implies that any human being could have been adopted to be the Christ. So
Macquarrie's dependence on Rahner's transcendental anthropology as the possible and legitimate
foundation for the 'bottom-up' christology revolves around the problem of becoming an adoptionist
christology, in spite o/his warning against such an adoptionism. Moreover, this transcendental view
would undermine the uniqueness of Christ, which would lead even to the trustworthiness of His
'Christ-ship'. See (Macquarrie, The Humanity of Christ 246, 248-249).
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objective uniqueness and special value of Christ, and therefore to believe in Christ
alone in comparison with other great religious or non-religious figures.
(8) Grounding the christology 'from below' exclusively in that particular
life-act of the Royal Man would confront the problem of transition from then and
there, to here and now. Rationally it is difficult to see how the particular human
life-act could effectively overarch this time and spatial distance.16 Pannenberg
insists this is feasible through the resurrection of Jesus since it is the historical
event.17 But there is a controversy about whether or not the resurrection is a
historical event, and therefore it becomes unclear whether such christology is still
'from below'.
(9) If we argue that a responsible Christian christology should base itself on
the concrete life-act of Jesus Christ, supposing this christology as one 'from
below', then this christology itself would be in great danger of becoming a kind of
exemplary, social, revolutionary or moral teaching. His life-act could be understood
as that of an ancient wonder-maker or magician. In short, christology may easily
16 Some sought an alternative metaphysics from the collapse of traditional metaphysics as a
result of the development of modern science, the evolutionary world-view, indeterminism, and
relativity.
We see some examples of the sought after alternative metaphysics: (Alfred North
Whitehead, Process and Reality; an essay in cosmology, [University of Edinburgh Press, c. 1929]);
Charles Hartshorne, The Reality ofGod [Yale University Press, 1948]; Philosophers Speak ofGod
[Chicago University Press, 1953], esp. chap I; Reality as Social Process [Boston: Beacon Press,
1953], esp. chaps VI-IX; For a brief note on process philosophy see (W. Norman Pittenger, The
Word Incarnate: A Study of the Doctrine of the Person ofChrist, [James Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1959],
pp. 146-175, esp. 169-175; Process Thought and Christian Faith, [New York: James Nisbet &
Macmillan Company, 1968]; Paul Tillich's Spirit christology in Systematic Theology Vol. 3 [Nisbet
1964] pp. 303, 153; Vol. 2 p. 156; Vol. 1, p. 151; Teilhard de Cahrdin, Science and Christ, [Collins,
1968], pp. 34ff.) in which the significance of Christ is seen not only in the humanity of Christ but
in the framework of the relationship between creation and incarnation in terms of the cosmic Christ;
Norman Hook, 'A Spirit Christology' in: Theology 75 (1972), pp. 226-232; Karl Rahner's the self-
transcendence of human nature; G.W.H. Lampe, 'The Holy Spirit and the Person of Christ' in:
Christ, Faith, and History, p. 115; God as Spirit [Clarendon Press, 1977]; See also J.B. Cobb &
D.R. Griffin, Process Theology, [Christian Journals, 1977], p. 105; David Arthur Pailin, 'Incarnation
as a Continuing Reality' in: Religious Studies 16 [1980], p. 303; God and the Process ofReality,
foundations ofa credible theism [London: Routlege, 1989]. Such an alternative attempt seems 'very
serious, even drastic, modifications in our theological pattern' (Pittenger, Christology Reconsidered
17). For a brief summary see also (Calvert, From Christ to God 20-31).
17
Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man (London: SCM Press, 1968), p. 189.
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become a christian morality or ethic which would accordingly ethicise or
moralise18 the Gospel and the kingly rule of God.
18
We see an example of altercation in this regard. Ebeling accuses Barth of ethicising Christian
truth by objectifying Christian faith in terms of Christian deeds (Gerhard Ebeling, 'Begriffsuntersuc-
hungen -Textinterpretationen - Wirkungsgeschichte' in: Lutherstudien Vol. Ill [1985], pp. 557-558).
According to Ebeling, Barth holds that the Christian act of faith has to be verified in its
corresponding deeds. And, because of the necessity of verification, dogmatics must be implemented
by ethics. Ebeling further asserts that Barth's theology derives from very definite or rigid
('schnurgeradef political conclusions of Christ (ibid., 567, Ebeling quotes Barth's term from the
KD 11/1, 434, 477). Hence, Ebeling disputes that, for Barth, ethics not only might impose or
overshadow the theme of the certainty of our salvation but also 'transform the Gospel into ethics'
6Die Transformation des Evangeliums in das Ethische' (ibid., 551). Willis also agrees along with
Ebeling (Robert E. Willis, The Ethics ofKarl Barth [1971], pp. 80-81, 428, 438-439).
However, this charge is highly questionable for the following reason. Barth suggests that
Jesus Christ is not really concerned with the cause of suffering, but only with suffering itself. That
is to say He did something for those who were in need of help (CD IV/2, 232; KD 257). Yet
Ebeling seems to misinterpret Barth's discussion by stating that his only emphasis was on Jesus'
action or deed itself. However the meaning of Barth's discussion is rather the opposite. What he
meant was to highlight the precedence ofdivine love over Law or ethics or morality in spite of His
radical challenge to the world. We must not overlook the fact that Barth spelled out that Jesus' prior
concern was with human misery in the light of the kingly rule of God, which is the content of the
Gospel, in which any moralistic understanding of the Gospel is entirely repudiated. Ahler agrees
with our view by rejecting Ebeling and Willis' accusation. See (Rolf Ahler, The Community of
Freedom [1989], pp. 219-240).
Even more significantly, it is important to note Barth's location of the revolutionary life-act
of the Royal Man. As we discussed, Barth places this dimension of deed and act (kingly office) (CD
IV/2) in between the dimension of religion; the completion of human salvation in and through the
incarnation and crucifixion (priestly office) (CD IV/1), and the constant witness to, and
proclamation of, these kingly and priestly events (prophetic offices) (CD 1V/3).
We argued that the life-act of the Royal Man (kingly office) is the pivotal centre in Barth's
christology. But if this particular and concrete life-act is emphasised so much as to become the
centre of it, then there would also be a danger that it would become his christology, an ethics, or
moralism. And this danger becomes even greater since Barth deals with Christian ethics within the
framework of dogmatics. Specifically speaking, Barth places Christian ethics under the doctrine of
God (CD II/2) which he calls a 'general' ethics, and under the doctrine of creation (CD I1I/4) and
reconciliation, viz. christology (CD IV/4) which he calls 'special' ethics. Whereas the former focuses
on the command of God, the latter is concerned with a human response to the command of God.
In parenthesis, of course, Barth's reason for this locus is clear. By definition, the theme of
theology is primarily human beings talking about the being and act of God, and not of humanity,
nature, etc. Yet since God acted for human redemption and thus it became totally renewed, it can
no longer insist on being its own master. Chiislian ethics therefore should be discussed in the light
of the Word of God, that is for Barth Jesus Christ, and not in any general principles or
anthropology. If Christian ethics claims to be an independent discipline outside dogmatics, Christian
ethics would cease to be so, but would instead be a general ethics or anthropology. 'Dogmatics has
no option: it has to be ethics as well. ... Dogmatics itself is ethics; and ethics is also dogmatics' (CD
1/2, 793, cf. 362-454, esp. 362-371; CD II/2, 513-515). So Christian ethics is only a 'predicate' to
the Subject, dogmatics. In short, Christian ethics is an integral element of dogmatics, i.e.,
christology. See (Barth, Christian Life 3-4, CD 1/2, 791-794; CD II/2, 522).
To return to our initial attention of the significance of Barth's location of this revolutionary
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However, answering our initial question as to whether our elaboration is an
unnecessary task (p. 3), we underline the fact that establishing the christology 'from
below' is so vital since only this content would be the hermeneutical filter for the
responsible Christian christology in spite of many problems and dangers in
establishing the christology 'from below'.
5. The Life-act of Jesus 'from below' as the Hermeneutical Filter for Respon¬
sible Christology and Theology
We have seen that for Barth the term Immanuel is the sum of his christolo¬
gy, and the ground of this summary is the concrete person Jesus Christ. Yet, if we
are really to understand what Barth means by the concrete name Jesus Christ, we
have no choice but to contemplate the two critical terms, life and act (CD IV/1,
18). For if we stipulate that the term 'person' is attributed only to a living being,
then our holistic understanding of the person's name must be identified only with
its life-act. So Barth delineates the concrete name Jesus Christ in the light of this
life-act, however, we acknowledge that he seems to reject either moralising the Gospel or
abstracting the power of the Gospel, by placing such a central content in the middle of the two
other offices (priestly and prophetic). The Gospel is concrete and powerful, and hence it is not an
'idle intellectual frivolity,' but entails concrete praxis (CD 1/2, 787). At the same time, however this
issue of Christian praxis should by no means overshadow the freeing power of the Gospel, because
the indicative that 'You are already the children of God' definitively and always precedes the
imperative that 'Therefore you should live like His children'. Christian ethics should not be
entangled within any kind of legalism, but rather it should tell us who we were, and are (CD II/2,
512). Thence Christian ethics is 'evangelical ethics' (Barth, 'The Gift of Freedom: The Foundation
of Evangelical Ethics,' [1953] in: The Humanity of God [1960 [=1956], p. 86). Further, it seems
most likely that Barth discusses the humanity (life-act) of Christ in a chiastic way, the humanity of
Christ in terms of His divine form (the kingly rule of God), and the divinty of Christ in terms of His
human form (incarnation, suffering, crucifixion, and resurrection), in an attempt to avoid any kind
of ethicising about the Gospel. The word 'ethics' presupposes a certain demarcation between good
and evil. And since Christians confess the goodness of God, christology could avoid any accusation
of becoming an ethics or morality only when this good God is integrated into this christology.
Nonetheless, Ramm criticises Barth: 'By keeping ethics and Christology so close, Barth goes along
way toward preventing the church, in its ethical witnesses, as appearing only moralistic, only
prudish, only interested in principles and not people' (Bernard Ramm, After Fundamentalism: The
Future of Evangelical Theology [Sanfrancisco: Harper and Row, 1983], p. 150).
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'historical' life-act. What does this tell us?
We mentioned that for Barth the life-act of the Royal Man ('from below')
is the sole Integrator of the 'from above'. This understanding is a result of a
Sachkritik of what Barth said. But we now ask what that means, because theology
is more than a mere descriptive science of what is. Instead theology also pursues
the meaning of what is.
It is known that for Barth the crucifixion is the most concrete manifestation
of the 'what?' of Deus pro nobis. But it is important to recognise that this 'what?'
is further and specifically elaborated in terms of the 'how?' which is represented
in terms of the Royal Man}9 By definition, christology is human reflection upon
19
By describing christology 'from above' rather in terms of the life-act of the konigliche
Mensch, which is developed in the light of the historical reality, Barth indicates the importance of
both 'what' Jesus said and did, and 'how' He spoke and acted. This implies that, for Barth, the
christology 'from below', that is, the 'how christology' is as equally important as the 'what
christology', that is, the christology 'from above'.
Since Karl Barth, the christology 'from below' is initiated by post-Bultmannians (Ernst
Kasemann, 'The Problem of the Historical Jesus' [1953] in: Essays on the New Testament Themes
[SCM Press, 1964], pp. 15-47), and then theologically articulated and developed by (Ernst Fuchs,
'Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus' in: ZTK L1II [1956], pp. 210-229; Giinther Bornkamm,
Jesus ofNazareth [1957 [=1960]] trans. Irene & Fraser Mcluskey with James M. Robinson [London
& Southhampton: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960=1963], pp. 13-232; J.M. Robinson's review of this
book in JBL LXXVI [1957], pp. 310-313; Gerhard Ebeling, 'Word of God and Hermeneutic' (1959)
in: The New Hermeneutic. New Frontiers in Theology Vol. II, ed. J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb
[New York and London: Harper and Row, 1964]).
For the overall development of the 'old', the 'new', and the 'third quest' of the historical
Jesus see (Martin Kahler, Der sogenante historische Jesus und der geschichtliche biblische Christus
[2te erweiterte und erlauterte Auflage. Photomechanischer Druck Leipzig: A Dreichertsche
Verlagsbuchhandung D Werner Scholl, 1928]; Albert Schweitzer, The Quest ofthe Historical Jesus:
a critical study of its progress from Reimarus to Wrede, trans. W. Montgomery [London & C.
Black, 1954], pp. 1-401, esp. 396-401; Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology [New York:
Charles and Scribner's Sons, 1958]; Ernst Kasemann, The Problem ofHistorical Jesus [1953]; Enrst
Fuchs, 'Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus' in: ZTK LIII [1956], pp. 210-229; "The New
Testament and Hermeneutical Problem' in: The New Hermeneutic [1964], pp. 111-145; Giinther
Bornkamm, Jesus ofNazareth [1957]; Gerhard Ebeling, 'Word of God and Hermeneutic' in: The
New Hermeneutic [1959], pp. /8-110; J. M. Robinson, A New Quest oj the Historical Jesus, studies
in biblical theology No. 25 [SCM Press, 1959], pp. 9-125; 'Hermeneutic Since Barth' in: The New
Hermeneutic [SCM Press, 1964], pp. 1-77; Van A. Harvey & Schubert M. Ogden, 'How New is
the "New Quest of the Historical Jesus"?' in: The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ.
Essays on the New Quest of the Historical Jesus [Nashiville: Abingdon Press, 1964], pp. 197-242;
William Hamilton, A Quest for the Post-Historical Jesus [SCM Press, 1993], pp. 1-288; Robert W.
Funk, Roy W. Hoover, and the Jesus Seminar, The Five Gospels. The Search for the Authentic
Words of Jesus [New York, Oxford, Singapore, & Sydney, 1993]; John Dominic Crossan, The
Historical Jesus: the life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant [Edinburgh: T. &. T. Clark, 1991])
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the particular Jesus Christ, and naturally therefore christology asks concerning
Jesus' identity and act. For Barth, this particular Jesus Christ is the revelation of
God's being. But how do we know this? The question of the ability to know is
substantially dealt with in the light of the doctrine of God (CD 1/1-2) rather than
in his christology. But now Barth resumes the question of this ability to know God
in the light of christology. According to Barth, we know God only if we are
witnesses to His act, Immanuel, which is the 'attestation' and 'report' of the 'life
and act of God' as the One who is (CD IV/1, 6-7). Here the term witness and life-
act is a significant point for our thesis. By the life-act of God Barth means the
Royal Man. Barth affirms that the life-act of the Royal Man, the historical life-act
of Jesus, is the concrete manifestation of His self-revelation, love, freedom, and
sovereignty. This life-act of the Royal Man, the Son of Man, is what Barth signifies
when he says that Christians speak of God and believe in Him in terms of the
concrete name Jesus Christ. We are well aware of Barth's Geological axiom that
we can know God only when He reveals Himself. But what Barth says at the
moment is that the ability to know God comes from our witness to (of) His life-act.
He means by this that the divine self-revelation is not sufficient for a proper
knowledge of God. This is because human beings are homo sapiens. In addition the
so-called 'divine self-revelation' is such an ambiguous concept that it could be
manipulated by the capacity of human reasoning according to either its personal
interest, perceptibility or image of it. To a certain extent, we accept Rahner's view
that human beings are dynamic and therefore they always attempt to transcend
themselves towards mysterious objects, including God. However, for this very
reason of human ability of transcendence, we cannot, and thus do not, build our
christology upon humanity's nature of transcendence, or experiences. For human
nature of transcendence also implies that it can manipulate christology, and its
experiences are such diversities to understand and are thus obscure grounds upon
which is called the 'third quest' of the historical Jesus, attempted by using a socio-economic method
of profiling Him. For a survey of the recent development of the historical Jesus see (Charles
Wanamaker, 'The Historical Jesus Today' in ■.Journal of Theology for Southern Africa [March 1996,
No. 94], pp. 3-17).
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which to base the responsible christology. Also, as we recognise human beings'
limitation, caprice, and sinfulness, they could and would easily misunderstand
christology in any form, in spite of their best effort. Therefore, it is crucial to
ground 'bottom-up' christology on the particular life-act of Christ and on nothing
else. If this were not the case, human beings could use God as an excuse for their
wrong doings whatever and whenever necessary, for their justification of the status
quo of their unjust status, for their exploitation, for their immorality etc. For this
reason, we suppose, Barth further develops, and as such concretises, the divine self-
revelation by this particular life-act of the Royal Man. Indeed, Barth draws a
correspondence between the self-revealing God and this particular life-act in order
to safeguard this self-revealing God from any misunderstanding and from misuse
of God's being. This matter of correspondence and safeguard provides us with the
vital insight that the question of christology is fundamentally the question of
Theology.20 This implies that human understanding of God will always have to be
shaped and challenged by this life-act of the Royal Man, the christology 'from
below', and not the other way around. Therefore, if we seek a responsible and
relevant christology, our christological reflection has necessarily to be filtered out
through our consistent reference21 to this concrete foundation. As such the
If a study of the identity of Jesus of Nazareth is to be christological, the question of His
humanity is not merely a historical or anthropological matter, but a theological one for the function
of christology is ultimately theological. The distinction between christology 'from above' and 'from
below' has important theological conclusions if christology is ultimately a matter of Theology. The
major reason is that contemporary christology does not conceive itself as a tool of theology, and
therefore does not investigate the theological implications of its approach. A criticism on the
christology 'from below' and the rejection of nature language is that they tend to reduce the divine
Son of God to a mere human being, his ontological divinity is reduced to an adjectival divinity.
Much modern christology has done little to restore its theological framework. Christology has no
theological value without theological framework. 'For only a christology which recognizes God in
Christ, whether it starts from below or above, is able to have theological influence, that is, able to
influence our understanding of God' (Calvert, From Christ to God 10, 17). This emphasis on
christology's theological function in parenthesis is the major crux in Calvert's book on the whole.
Much modern christology is in danger of neglecting its theological role, in contrast to the significant
fact that the Chalcedonian definition is operative in the theological scene.
21
This is why Jiingel articulates that dogmatic should be consisted in consistent exegesis: 'dass
Dogmatik konsequente Exegese ist' ('dogmatic is consistent exegesis') (Eberhard Jiingel, Gottes Sein
ist im Werden: Verantwortliche Rede vom Sein Gottes bei Karl Barth 3. Auflage. Um einen Anhang
erweitert [Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1976], p. 123). Originally, this notion of
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christology 'from below' (which is for Barth the life-act of the Royal Man) is
crucial as the hermeneutical filter, not only for Barth himself, but for all of us.
We must note that this Royal Man being the constant challenge and the
consistent reference to shaping our christology, is exactly what Barth highlighted
about four decades ago in his commentary on the Romerbrief In such a way, the
Royal Man s ever challenging life-act cor-responds to his early understanding of
God. We stress the word 'early' because Barth's early understanding of God was
grounded overwhelmingly in the divine self-revelation 'from above' par excellence.
But now, by recapitulating this God of the self-revelation 'from above' in such a
way of cor-respond-ence with the life-act of the Royal Man 'from below', Barth
significantly informs us that his christology cannot, and therefore does not, stand
on the christology 'from above' alone, but stands in response to the christology
'from below'. Barth's christology consists in such a reciprocal way that whereas
the 'from above' points to the 'from below', the 'from below' responds to the
'from above'.
In conforming to this decisiveness of the 'from below' constituency in any
responsible christology as being the hermeneutical filter, we need to deal with
Moltmann and Tracy's views of the 'from above-from below' issue.
1) Confronting Moltmann and Tracy's view of the 'high-low' issue
Moltmann supposes that the issue of the christology 'from above-from
below' is a matter of 'appearance' because the two elements are already coiled in
the Christian christology itself. However, the theological implications of the
paradigm either 'from above' or 'from below' is far more significant than its being
merely a matter of 'appearance.' Further, for Tracy, the paradigm 'from above' and
'konsequente Exegese' is part of Jiingel's programme of 'paraphrasing' Barth's doctrine of the
Trinity. By paraphrasing it in terms of Gottes Sein ist im Werden ('God's Being is in Becoming'),
Jiingel justifies this title, supposing a good summary of Barth's understanding of God which is
grounded in his constant explication of, and reference to, the one Word of God (ibid., p. viii).
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'from below' is complex to define for two reasons. First, although 'high'
christology proposes a 'modern psychologizing' of the ontological high christology
of Chalcedon and the Johannine Logos tradition, it still hinges on the central
assumption of 'low' christology, that is, that only fact or actualisation secures
christological meaning. Second, 'low' christology contends its case on the basis of
the synoptic accounts of Jesus' words, deeds, and destiny. Yet 'low' christology
combines this historical aspect with its meaning, i.e., it pursues the primary
relationship between language and existence. Provided this hermeneutic of
combination is accepted, the 'new' quest of the historical Jesus which represents
'low' christology results, still in a 'psychologizing' of the historical aspect. Thus
Tracy rather asks whether the factual status of the Christian affirmation of Jesus as
Christ really needs this 'historical-psychological reconstruction.'22 Surely, a 'new'
quest is entirely desirable as a 'strictly exegetical and historical task.'23 However,
if representations are those about fact and not fiction, it is not really necessary to
understand Jesus' own consciousness of His words and deeds ('low' christology)
in order to formulate a christology grounded in fact. Rather we need to know the
existential meaning of His life-act and destiny re-presented by our christological
affirmation of Jesus as Christ. This necessity of studying the existential meaning
of that christological affirmation in terms of its symbolic and re-presentative factual
character becomes unmistakable when we seek out some possibly transformative
meanings of our christological affirmation in the face of both the presence of evil,
and the need for symbolic expressions in our lives.24
So far, we basically share Tracy's conviction that the two christological
paradigms 'from above' and 'from below' are too complex to define in a clear cut
way. This is so because, as we also have seen in our first chapter, the two
paradigms are intertwined methodically and epistemologically, and at the same
time, their meanings could be also different depending on how we define them. In
22
Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order 217-218.
23
Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order 233.
24
Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order 217-218.
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addition, we basically agree with Moltmann's view of the relationship between the
being ('from above'') and knowledge ('from below'); that the two are essentially
interlocked. The reason is this. Theoretically speaking, from an epistemic point of
view, being cannot be or is not yet, being unless we know or recognise it as such.
Epistemology entails the two realities: perceiving subject and perceived object. This
entailment implies the fact that being is not yet real being without proper
understanding, since being is not perceived as being. At the same time however,
from an ontic standpoint, being is already being irrespective of our recognition of
that being, since ontic being does not relate itself to any question of epistemology
or cognoscendi. Practically speaking, however, it is difficult to separate the two.
We know being because it stands as being. Put in Moltmann's argument, in the
Christian theology, human knowledge as an a posteriori is based upon factum,
although Being also often turns out to be more than the capacity of our perception.
To this extent, Moltmann's view is understandable when he says that the difference
between the 'from above' and the 'from below' are only a matter 'appearance.'
Nevertheless, if we concede that the life-act of Christ ('from below') is, and
therefore should be, the hermeneutical filter for our responsible and relevant speech
of christology, and as such christian doctrine of God, then this paradigmatic issue
'from above' or 'from below' is far more significant than its appearance.
Moltmann's contention that the 'from above' and the 'from below' is a
matter of 'appearance' seems to presuppose the fact that we can and are professing
the 'same' christology irrespective of the method employed either 'from above' or
'from below', if the particular Jesus ofNazareth is presupposed. For Moltmann, this
'above-below' is either 'from divinity to humanity' or 'from humanity to divinity'
in portraying christology. However, this understanding of 'appearance' would
become presumptuous if we were to apply this view to the christology of Barth.
Why specific revelation then? What are the particularities of Jesus and His life-act
at a specific time for? Moltmann's assumption could possibly undermine the power
of revelation and therefore the power of revelation. Is the Christian's faith
(worship, prayer, life, and view of God) not decisively shaped by that of Jesus
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Christ? So Gunton adequately states that 'But whatever the outcome, one thing is
clear: in Christology, matters of method and content are closely related: the way a
Christology is approached cannot be separated from the kind of Christology that
emerges ... .'25
Tracy is right when he holds that such a 'historical and psychological
reconstruction' of christology is not really necessary if our christological confession
('high' christology) is nothing but a simple re-presentation of fact, the historical
Jesus ('low' christology). Nevertheless, such an accurate principle turns out to be
a different matter when it is applied in the reality of ecclesiastical history. If we are
not mistaken, there was hardly any theologian who doubted the actual existence of
Jesus in Palestine. This historicity is affirmed among the viewers of Docetism as
they maintained that particular historical Jesus, and among the theologians of the
nineteenth century onwards, in spite of their difficulty in reconstructing the history
of Jesus. Yet what happened when theologians and Christians did not give constant
reference and attention to the life-act of Jesus Christ while concentrating on the
meaning of His life-act? Has 'doing theology' not been customarily recognised
mainly, or even 'simply' in some case, as an 'intellectual discipline,' so that the
power of fact or event (cncavSaXov) itself has more or less succumbed to the
interest of meaning? Certainly it is necessary and right to seek interpretation and
as such meaning. But has the actual outcome of this necessity and legitimacy not
rather turned out to have been an ortho-doxy lacking the ortho-praxis, since the
Chalcedon and the Nicaea definition? Consequently, Christianity, which in many
25
(Gunton, Yesterday and Today 17-18). This criticality of the method of approach must not
be confused with our uncompromising contention that methodology should not postulate its being
the alpha and omega in judging any content which is in our context, christology. To speak in
general, we agree with Moltmann and Tracy that methodology (from divinity to humanity or vice
versa) would not really be a matter of significance especially when we develop christology with the
assumption that 'Jesus is Christ'. Yet, this general agreement is not applicable to the case of Earth's
christology in particular. For his christology is not consisted in the approach 'from above' alone,
but is consisted decisively in cor-respond-ence with the approach 'from below'. Moreover, Barth's
christological establishment on both methods of approach suggest that the gravity of the approaching
method itself is considerably commensurated, not only by its counter approach 'from below', but
also by the physical ground of the 'from above'.
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ways was influenced and thus shaped by its theology, tended to separate Church
from state. Naturally, Church has often been understood as having little interest in
the present world but focusing on life after death. Our purpose here is by no means
to develop a theology of Church and state, but simply to note how a certain
theological emphasis could bring such a crucial consequence. If Christian theology
could base itself upon both orthodoxy and orthopraxis, then it could stand as a
much more relevant science to the modern world instead of becoming an irrelevant
matter. Human beings are much more keen on speaking and thinking rather than
acting out what they say and think. On this level, the life-act of Jesus Christ, the
christology 'from below', would play such a vital role in awakening the importance
of praxis alongside understanding. Surely we cannot do everything that we
understand, and nor can we understand everything we do. Nevertheless, as we
realise that human nature is more keen on talking and thinking about something
rather than doing, we will have to stress, and perhaps give priority to, praxis,
especially against any forms of injustice.
At this point, we cannot resist the temptation to unveil one reason for
characterising Barth's christology as a 'high' christology in conjunction with the
vitality of Christian praxis in terms of its relevance to the world. Some theologians
like to emphasise Barth's 'high' christology in order to criticise it for being
irrelevant in connection with world reality, human rights, oppression, injustice,
atrocity, poverty etc. They say that Barth's christology is too optimistic by
emphasising that God had already reconciled the world to Himself, in Jesus Christ,
irrespective of its recognition or acceptance. God has already loved all humankind
and therefore has already completed its salvation irrespective of its response, or
moral and ethical behaviour! Further, as for Barth, the primary concern and task in
theology is 'God-talk,' in and through the Word of God, Jesus Christ, rather than
the social issues. Consequently, these hermeneutical postures led Barth to develop
his christology mainly in terms of the doctrine of reconciliation rather than a more
comprehensive christology which would have tackled more effectively the problems
of his time such as the massacre of Jews, communism, Russia's invasion of
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Hungary etc. Barth thus has merely an 'aristocratic' christology which does not
give a proper voice in, and to, world problems. It is true that a considerable part
of Barth's christology is occupied with an explication of the sovereign divine act,
and the primary concern of his theology was with the Word of God. However,
accusing Barth of being a 'high' christologian on this basis alone is not fair at all,
since we clearly find his counter articulation of the revolutionary character ofJesus
ofNazareth which primarily and therefore obviously stands in the setting of 'low'
christology. Barth describes this act from below' as nothing but the divine
partiality. In this regard, we cannot fail to see Barth's actual political and social
struggle?6 Surely we may raise questions as to whether or not his struggle was
strong and substantial enough in observing the balance between his theology of
partiality, and praxis in partiality.27 Nevertheless, the charge that Barth, as a 'high'
christologian should by no means overshadow the unfailing aspect of himself as a
'low' christologian, if his actual engagement in socio-economic and political issues
is true, and if we take his note earnestly that his doing theology as a theological
professor is by no means doing a different theology from what he did before, but
doing the same theology in a different form: 'I just did the same thing on another
level, the academic level, teaching, talking with students, and so on. This was not
26
Some of the examples are: Karl Barth, Theological Existence Today! [1933] (London:
Hodder & Stoughton); 'Barmen Declaration' [1934] in: Christians Against Hitler (ed.) E.H.
Robertson, (London: SCM Press, 1962), pp. 48-52; The German Church Struggle. Tribulation and
Promise (1938), (Highgate, West Hill, N.6), pp. 1-16; A Letter to Great Britain from Switzerland
(London: Gordon & George Hill, 1941); The Germans and Ourselves (James Nisbet, 1945); Against
the Stream [1946-1952] (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954); Barth with Johannes Hamel, How
to Serve in a Marxist Land (New York: Association Press, 1959).
27 The following scholars share similar criticisms that Barth did not give sufficient attention to
the socio-political arid economic problems of his time, in spite of some of his engagement in, and
writing of, the Barmen Declaration in 1939. O'Neill even doubts whether Barth really objected to
Hitler's regime (John Bowden, Karl Barth [SCM Press, 1971], pp. 68-85, cf. 9-24; James H. Cone,
God of the Oppressed [New York: The Seabury Press, 1975], p. 117, 127, 145; Minjung Theology
[London: Zed Press, 19832], p. ix; H. Gollwitzer, 'Kingdom of God and Socialism in the Theology
of Karl Barth' in: Karl Barth and Radical Politics, (ed.) Geroge Hunsinger [Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1976], pp. 104-106, 111; Takatso A. Mofokeng, The Crucified Among the
Crossbearers [Kampen: Uitgeversmaatschappij J. H. Kok, 1983], pp. 191-226, esp. 191-200, 222-
226; John C. O'Neill, The Bible's Authority [T. & T. Clark, 1991], pp. 266-273).
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a real break for me.'28 We do certainly admit that Barth did not develop his
christological insight in terms of socio-economic and political justice in full and
specific clarity. Yet, to mark Barth as a 'high' christologian without taking this
statement seriously, as his principle in doing theology, would be an excessive
postulate.29
The theological significance of the 'from below' in general could be seen
in the relationship between the crucifixion and life-act as well. We saw that, for
Barth, the crucifixion, which is definitely the divine act, is the centre of christology
alongside the resurrection. But we also found that the ground of this divine act
'from above' was decisively the humanity of Christ 'from below'. Further, it is also
helpful to recall Barth's view of simultaneity, that is, that the exaltation begins and
is completed already in and with the humiliation, and vice versa. It is helpful to
remember this because we cannot think of, or understand, the meaning of the death
of Jesus Christ by only looking at the crucifixion itself. Dogmatically speaking, we
may attempt to ponder any theological significance of the crucifixion by turning to
the fact that it is the death of God Himself; He who is the Creator of life. We may
90
(Karl Barth, Final Testimonies [Michigan: Eerdmans, 1977], p. 24). We need, for a fairer
evaluation of Barth's christology, to remember his customary visit to prison to preach the Gospels,
and his early engagement with Christian socialist movements. Moreover, out of his understanding
of the Gospel, he criticised the economic system which oppresses the poor. For relevancy, it is
worth noting Barth's striking comment that 'Jesus is the movement for social justice, and the
movement for social justice is in the present' ('Karl Barth, Jesus Christ and the Movement for
Social Justice' [1911] in: Karl Barth and Radical Politics [1976], ed. G. Hunsinger, p. 19). For the
details, see 19-45, esp. 19, 21, 25, 27-37, 45 (ibid)', Barth, The Christian Community and Civil
Community 173.
Concerning this emphasis on 'social justice,' which is related fundamentally to the question
of the relevance of Barth's christology, there is some conflict of opinions as to whether Barth's
whole theology is utterly based on socialism (F.W. Marquardt, Socialism in the Theology ofKarl
Barth [1972] 47-76); or it is not (H. Diem, Karl Barth as Socialist: Controversy Over a New
Attempt to Understand Him [1972], 121-138); or whether he shifted the priority from socialism to
the Gospel (H. Golwitzer, Kingdom of God and Socialism in the Theology of Karl Barth [1974],
159-179); or indeed whether his theology has stemmed ultimately from the political question of
theory and praxis (G. Hunsinger, 'Toward a Radical Barth' [1972], 181-233 in: Karl Barth and
Radical Politics, ed. & trans. G. Hunsinger [1976], pp. 19-236; cf. J. D. Smart, Revolutionary
Theology in the Making: Barth-Thurneysen Correspondence 1914-1925 [1964], p. 28).
29
So McLean states that if Barth lived today, 'he would have been present among and listening
to the outcasts from the Black and the Third World communities' (Stuart McLean, Humanity in the
Thought of Karl Barth 3, cf. 62-67).
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unanimously say that the crucifixion is one of the most horrible, brutal, and painful
executions. But so what? If we single out the crucifixion of Jesus from the context
of His whole life-act, then nothing of His crucifixion would be more special than
that of any other crucifixion no matter how lofty or significant an event that may
be. Why is that? We cannot discern His crucifixion from other crucifixions since
the form and nature of the pain would be the same for anyone crucified. Thus the
crucifixion of Jesus would not give us any unique and universal messages, even if
we might assume that it does from a dogmatic point of view. On the contrary, if
we see the crucifixion from the context of His whole life-act then we can see not
only what, but also why, and how, the crucifixion took place. The way of His life-
act offers the ground and content of the crucifixion. In this way, whereas the life-
act interprets and therefore explains the crucifixion, the crucifixion confirms this
interpretation and explanation. By establishing the very ground and content of the
crucifixion 'from above', the life-act 'from below' generates the power of the
crucifixion 'from above'. What authenticates the meaning and power of the
crucifixion is not the crucifixion itself, but the way of Jesus Christ's whole life-act.
To this clarified extent, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ had begun already, and was
completed in, and with, His birth and act. Indeed, observing christology from the
importance of this 'from below' perspective, our responsible understanding of
christology would certainly demand that we see the crucifixion in the light of His
life-act rather than the other way around. Therefore, the issue 'from above' or
'from below' could by no means simply be a matter of 'psychologizing' or
'metaphysicalizing' the orthodox christology as Tracy supposes, implying that the
issue is not really important, but a somewhat unnecessary pedantic speculation,
playing on words or concepts.
The importance of discussing the issue whether or not christology should be
done 'from above' or 'from below', lies at heart in our awareness that the primary
task of 'doing' or 'studying' theology is not theorisation or theologisation or
christologisation or for the theological ivory tower, but it should be for the people.
Why? Certainly theology is inevitable primarily because human beings are rational
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being who therefore raise questions and attempt to understand what they have
heard, seen, and experienced. Differently put, in many cases, a certain process of
'conceptualisation' is expected so that we become conscious of what we know,
what we are doing, and what needs to be done. However, this necessity for
conceptualisation may become rather irrelevant or even useless to the people when
it merely becomes something done for the sake of conceptualisation itself. In
general, Christians confess that this particular Jesus is God Himself, the Lord and
Saviour of the world. This confession, if accepted, suggests that theology is
ultimately a matter of christology because we have no other responsible ground or
reference for our understanding of'God' except the specific life-act of Jesus Christ.
Indeed our understanding of christology is crucial, for it determines our understand¬
ing of God the Creator of the universe. This implies that our perception of 'God'
cannot do away with focusing upon what that particular Jesus has said and has
done. And what we can conclude, if we agree with our view thus far, is that the
primary concern of christology (theology) does not merely stand for a christologic
(theologic) or christ-theory, but the christopraxA, viz. the christology of liberating
from all kinds shackles (Gospel) and of challenging for both physical conditions
and theoretical ideologies (mission) specifically and concretely for and towards the
people. But the importance of this christopraxis could be more tangibly and
relevantly maintained when we preserve this 'from below' aspect of christology and
when we constantly refer to this christology. For we cannot have more specific and
concrete christology for the people without this concrete and specific reality. Any
theological and christological conceptualisation cannot bypass this concrete
manifestation, 'from below'. Hence, responsible Christian theology consists in its
'consistent exegesis' of this Tow' aspect of christology (and we suppose that this
is what Barth has done throughout his dogmatics). Consequently, the issue of
christology 'from below' (or 'from above') is critical; it is not simply a matter of
speculation but the theological bulwark. This 'from below' aspect, therefore, has
tremendous theological implications for many issues: for social justice which is one
of the main messages of prophets throughout Scripture, for the relevance of the
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Christian doctrine of God to the world; for the question of the uniqueness of
Christianity in connection with other religions; and most obviously, for the proper
content of Christian faith.
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